THE WAR WITH SPAIN 



A COMPLETE HISTORY 
OF THE WAR OF 1898 



THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN 



BY 



CHARLES MORRIS 



AUTHOR OF "THE NATION'S NAVY," "HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 
" HISTORICAL TALES," ETC. 



WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS 



PHILADELPHIA 

J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY 
1899 



-MS J 






Copyright, 1898, 

BY 

J. B. Lippincott Company. 







PREFACE. 



The true mission of the United States may be held 
to be peace, not war ; production, not destruction ; in- 
dustry, not rapine. But even to the most peacefully 
inclined of nations occasions come which irresistibly 
demand that the sword shall be drawn and blows be 
struck, and through one of these periods of violence 
this country has just passed. It has had to deal with 
a nation not yet in the nineteenth century, a belated 
relic of the mediaeval age, and has found it necessary to 
employ forcible methods. War is an evil, but there are 
greater evils only to be met by war, national diseases which 
only the strongest remedies can cure. Spain's colonial 
system has been such a disease, one with which only 
heroic treatment would avail. It has been a system of 
despotism and enslavement, of the suppression of insur- 
rection by massacre and starvation, and of obstinate ad- 
here^^ to methods long since outlived by other civilized 
nations. The state of affairs had grown intolerable when 
the United States took up the sword for the relief of a 
starving and perishing people, and began a war based 
upon the highest of motives, that of humane sympathy 
and the succor of the oppressed. 

This country has been accused of a selfish greed for 
the territory of Spain ; but it may be safely said that no 
purpose of territorial aggrandizement was among the 
motives that inspired the war. All wars yield unpre- 

5 



6 PREFACE. 

meditated results, and the principal result of this has 
been to place under the control of the United States 
certain island possessions which obviously cannot be 
handed back to Spain, to be misgoverned as before, and 
whose people are incapable of self-government. The 
United States must retain them or hand them over to 
land-greedy nations which stand ready to seize every 
shred of unappropriated soil. Some of them she has 
decided to hold ; but it may be repeated that this result 
of the war was not included among its motives. 

The war has been regarded with interest by foreign 
nations from another point of view. For years past the 
powers of instruments of destruction have been steadily 
on the increase, until it began to appear as if war would 
become wholesale butchery, and must cease as some- 
thing too terrible to be contemplated. This war has, 
therefore, been looked upon as an object-lesson in the de- 
structive powers of magazine rifles, rapid-fire guns, tor- 
pedo-tubes, and other death-dealing implements. The 
result has been to prove that in the rush, the turmoil, the 
nerve-strain of combat, modern weapons are apt to waste 
their projectiles upon the empty air, and that infantry 
may still charge earthworks and rifle-pits with no greater 
loss of life than in former wars. In naval cornet the 
value of coolness and training, as compared with the 
opposite qualities, has received a wonderful demonstra- 
tion in the quick and complete destruction of the Spanish 
fleets and the remarkable immunity of American ships 
and men. The "man behind the gun" seems of more 
importance than the gun itself. 

But a preface should not be an argument or an ex- 
ample of special pleading, and we may conclude by 
saying that in these less than four months of war the 



PREFACE. 7 

United States has taken a new position before the world, 
a higher and nobler attitude. Europe has suddenly dis- 
covered that we are more than a nation of shopkeepers ; 
that we are a people who can strike shrewdly for the 
right, and one that is destined to be a leader in the van 
of human progress, an example to the world of the value 
of free institutions, peaceful industries, high aspirations, 
and moral energies. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 

SPAIN AND HER COLONIES. 

PAGE 

Cruelty of the early Spaniards— Annihilation of the natives 
— How Cuba was colonized— Later history of Cuba- 
Spain's methods of administration— Commerce forbidden 
—Character of office-holders— Insurrections begin— The 
cruelties of the Spanish army— The Captain-General of 
Cuba given despotic powers — Cuban hatred of Spain- 
Attempts at insurrection— The Lopez invasion— The 
Quitman project— Revolt in Spain— Condition of affairs 
in Cuba— Oppression of the islanders— Large salaries and 
perquisites of the Spanish officials— Frauds and fees— 
The share of Spain— Disregard of Cuban interests— The 
revolt of 1868— A guerilla war— The character of the 
country— The machete as a weapon— Bush fighting— The 
rainy season— Desultory warfare— Official bulletins— The 
trocha and reconcentration— Outrages in Havana— Mas- 
sacre of the students— The treaty of El Zanjon— Promises 
of reform not kept 2I 

CHAPTER II. 

RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA. 

Early difficulties with Spain— Threatened interference of 
the Holy Alliance between Spain and the revolting colo- 
nies—This leads to the Monroe doctrine— The United 
States gives warning to European powers— Mexico and 
Colombia warned to keep out of Cuba— The United 
States guarantees Spain's title to Cuba— Secretary Ever- 
ett's ultimatum— Offer to purchase Cuba— The Black 
Warrior affair— The Ostend conference— Buchanan's 

9 



io CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

views— The Virginius affair— Protest and indemnity- 
President Grant's attitude— Injuries to American com- 
merce 47 

CHAPTER III. 

CUBA IN INSURRECTION. 

Cubans in exile — The work of the clubs— Marti's efforts — 
The outbreak of revolt — Maceo and Gomez reach the 
island— Death of Marti— Campos appointed governor- 
general— His methods— How the insurgents fought — 
Their horsemanship— Life in a Cuban camp— Gomez in 
command — His troubles and despondency — Camaguey 
invaded— Gomez's plan of campaign — A war of skir- 
mishes—The battle of Bayamo — A Cuban constitution and 
government— Maceo' s activity — Progress of the war west- 
ward—Its destructive character — Pinar del Rio invaded 
— Campos replaced by General Weyler — Weyler's repu- 
tation for cruelty — His inefficient campaigning— Destruc- 
tion of plantations — Maceo' s operations — His death — 
The province of Pinar del Rio pacified— Operations of 
Weyler in Santa Clara — Gomez's waiting game — General 
Garcia's capture of Victoria de las Tunas— Indignation 
at Weyler's cruelty — He is recalled and replaced by Gen- 
eral Blanco — A reform administration — How the Cubans 
received it 58 

CHAPTER IV. 

THE FORTS AND THE TROCHAS. 

The Spanish ill-success due to their method of warfare — 
This method of advantage to the insurgents— Guerilla 
warfare a Spanish habit — The trocha trusted to — Suc- 
cessive trochas built — Gomez and Maceo treat them 
with disdain— Weyler's trocha from Mariel to Majana 
described — The trocha from Jucaro to Moron — The mul- 
titude of forts— The Spanish held the towns and forts, 
the Cubans the country — Spain on the defensive ; no 
energetic offensive operations — Their system of returning 
to dinner — War bulletins — Falsehoods with a purpose . . 82 



CONTENTS. ii 

CHAPTER V. 

THE RECONCENTRADOS AND THE MILITARY PRISONS. 

PAGE 

Weyler's barbarity — The reconcentrado order — Its disas- 
trous effect — Pacification by starvation — The reconcen- 
trados at Jaruco — McKinley's denunciation of the cruelty 
displayed — What Senator Proctor and others saw in Cuba 
— Incomunicado imprisonment — General Lee's protests 
— Murder of Dr. Ruiz — No more Americans imprisoned 
— The sufferings of Cuban exiles — The story of Evange- 
lina Cisneros — Spanish compared with Turkish barbarity 
— A butcher of men feasted in Sagua — The endless con- 
flagrations—An intolerable situation 92 



CHAPTER VI. 

EVENTS LEADING TO INTERVENTION. 

Efforts to prevent expeditions to Cuba — The Competitor 
prisoners — President Cleveland's message — Spain's reply 
— General Lee sent to Havana — His report — President 
McKinley's action — Spain's reply to Minister Woodford 
— Intervention for charity — Spain's financial condition — 
The hopeless state of the war — Lee's opinion of the in- 
surgents — Increase of irritation — The riot in Havana — 
The Key West squadron — The De Lome letter — The 
Maine in Havana harbor — The explosion and its result — 
Wide-spread indignation — The Court of Inquiry and its 
verdict — Active preparations for war — Emergency fund 
voted — New ships bought and ordered — Senator Proctor's 
speech — The feeling in Congress — McKinley's pacific 
action — Lee leaves Havana — The message to Congress 
— The consular reports— Warlike resolution of Congress — 
Its immediate results— Spanish methods — War inevitable 
— Concentration of the army — The attitude of the powers 
of Europe 103 



12 CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER VII. 

CUBA UNDER BLOCKADE. 

PAGE 

The waiting fleet at Key West— A night of signalling— The 
start for Cuba— The first prize— Establishment of the 
blockade— Peril of the Paris— Blanco and the Havanese 
—Prizes of the fleet— Lieutenant Rowan's daring journey 
— The question of privateers— Spain's declaration — Sec- 
retary Sherman retires— The Matanzas ports bombarded 
—The Cape Verde fleet— The flying squadron— Bombard- 
ment of forts at Cienfuegos and Cardenas— The jour- 
ney of the Oregon— Complaints from Tampa— Attitude 
of the powers of Europe— Friendliness of Great Britain . 134 



CHAPTER VIII. 

THE SEA-FIGHT AT MANILA. 

The Philippine Islands— The natives rebel against Spain — 
Admiral Dewey's squadron sent to Manila — First news of 
a victory— General Augustin's proclamation — The squad- 
ron in the bay — Passing Corregidor Island — Manila in 
view— The Spanish ships at Cavite— How they were 
stationed— The battle begins— Submarine mines — Fierce 
firing on both sides — Poor gunnery of the Spanish — 
Terrible results of the American fire — The Reina Cristina 
attacks the Olympia — Fatal result— Fate of the torpedo- 
boats — The Spanish ships in flames — Dewey withdraws 
for breakfast — Returns and completes the destruction of 
the Spanish ships — Wonderful result — No American killed 
— Heavy loss on the Spanish side— Great accuracy of 
American fire — Dewey asked not to bombard the city — 
Corregidor Island taken — Dewey's despatch — Work of 
the Petrel — The natives in Cavite — Dewey thanked and 
rewarded by the President and Congress— Ships and 
troops sent to his aid 150 



CONTENTS. 13 

CHAPTER IX. 

UNDER FIRE AT CARDENAS AND CIENFUEGOS. 

PAGE 

Sailing of the Cape Verde fleet— Preparations along the 
coas t— The mosquito fleet— An affair at Matanzas— In the 
Bay of Cardenas— The Winslow disabled— Death of En- 
sign Bagley and his companions — Escape of the Winslow 
—Burial of the victims— Grappling for the cables at Cien- 
fuegos— Sharp fire and return— The cables cut— The light- 
house demolished— Other efforts to cut cables 170 

CHAPTER X. 

THE SEARCH FOR THE SPANISH FLEET. 

Admiral Sampson's squadron seeks San Juan— Defences of 
the town— The rounds of the ships— The bombardment 
—The Terror at work— Results of the engagement— The 
lessons learned— The hospital ship Solace— News of the 
Spanish fleet— In search of coal— Schley's squadron leaves 
Key West— Reaches Cienfuegos— No trace of the Spanish 
ships— The Hawk brings news— Evidence of Cervera's 
movements — The collier Restormel captured — Schley 
sails for Santiago— Location of this city— Admiral Cer- 
vera's ships— Bombardment of the batteries— Presence 
of the ships proved— Admiral Sampson arrives— The 
voyage of the Oregon— Accident of the Columbia — 
Failure of the Gussie expedition— The newspaper censor- 
ship—The Florida lands supplies for the Cubans .... 180 

CHAPTER XI. 

THE HEROES OF THE MERRIMAC. 

The Merrimac— Hobson's scheme— Preparation— Hosts of 
volunteers— A premature start— The actual start— Powell 
and the launch— The collier goes in— The picket boat- 
Opening of the battery fire— The catamaran— Hobson's 
narrative— Saved by Cervera— News sent to the fleet- 
Prisoners in the Morro— Schley's opinion— Aid from 
British consul— The exchange— Enthusiastic reception of 
Hobson and his men I 99 



i 4 CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER XII. 

THE FIRST FIGHT ON CUBAN SOIL. 

PAGE 

Schley's scouts — Lieutenant Blue's exploit — A torpedo-boat 
attack — Torpedoes afloat — The forts bombarded — 
Marines landed in Guantanamo Bay — A Spanish attack — 
Fighting day and night — Death of Surgeon Gibbs — The 
Sunday attack — A picturesque scene — Cuban allies — The 
Spanish camp attacked — Tricks of the bush-fighters— 
Shelling of Caimanera— Work of the dynamite guns — 
The channel open — A conference on Cuban soil . . . . 215 



CHAPTER XIII. 

THE ARMY OF INVASION. 

Organizing an army — Commanding officers — Treatment of 
the soldiers criticised — General Alger's remarks — Char- 
acter of the army — The Rough Riders — The invading 
force — The transports sail and are called back — The final 
start — Santiago reached — A landing place chosen — The 
Spanish retreat — Landing under difficulties — The army 
on shore — Its unready condition — An advance movement 
— Skirmishing — Garcia's army moved 227 



CHAPTER XIV. 

THE RAID OF THE ROUGH RIDERS. 

Advance of the dismounted cavalry— Wheeler's reconnois- 
sance — The country and the roads — Spaniards in ambush 
— Plan of attack — The climb of the Rough Riders — Fight- 
ing by both columns — A dangerous situation — Wood and 
Roosevelt charge — The block-house taken — Fight of the 
regulars — Incidents of the battle — Its results — A Spanish 
comment 238 



CONTENTS. 15 

CHAPTER XV. 

THE BATTLE OF SANTIAGO. 

PAGE 

The Cuban roads— A reconnoissance —The American posi- 
tion and supplies — Condition of the troops — The lines of 
the enemy— Shafter orders battle— The lines on July 1— 
The balloon and its results— The Spanish positions at El 
Caney and San Juan— The wire-clipping advance-guard 
— Lack of artillery — Attack on the El Caney fort— The 
Spanish rifle-pits— Chaffee's charge— Fort and town taken 
—Exposure of the troops — Aguadores attacked— The 
fight at San Juan— Advance of the troops— Wading the 
San Juan — Grimes's battery at work— Exposure and loss 
of the Americans— An impetuous charge — The hill taken 
— Exhaustion of the men — The July 2 fight — The Span- 
ish repulse — Dastardly work of guerillas— Positions on 
the 3d— Shafter an invalid — Gallantry of the American 
soldiers 247 



CHAPTER XVI. 

THE FATE OF CERVERA'S FLEET. 

The doings of the Terror— A larger blockade— The fight 
at Manzanillo — The journey of Camara's squadron— An 
eastern squadron formed— The guard on Santiago harbor 
—Bombardment of July 1 and 2 — Cervera's plan of escape 
—Positions of American ships July 3— The flight of the 
Spanish ships— Clearing for action— Rapid work of the 
fleet— The hot fire on the Brooklyn— Terrific return— All 
the fleet in action— The Maria Teresa on fire and beached 
—Fate of the Almirante Oquendo— The Vizcaya in flames 
—Chase of the Colon by the Brooklyn and Oregon— The 
Colon beached— The Gloucester sinks the torpedo-boats 
—Lessons from the battle— The effort to save the crews 
—Work of the Iowa and the Gloucester— Admiral Cer- 
vera on the Iowa— The Reina Mercedes sunk— Brave 
deed of American sailors 267 



16 CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER XVII. 

THE SIEGE AND FALL OF SANTIAGO. 

PAGE 

The surrender of Santiago demanded and declined— Non- 
combatants leave the city— Food supplied them — The 
wounded seek Siboney — The refugees follow — Prepa- 
rations for bombardment— The American lines— General 
ToraPs offer to capitulate "with honor"— Declined and 
bombardment begins — Unconditional surrender refused 
— A tropical rain-fall— General Miles arrives— The burn- 
ing of Siboney — Shafter's offer to send the Spanish 
soldiers back to Spain— Appeal of General Linares — 
Toral accepts the terms — Basis of capitulation signed — 
Correspondence — The territory surrendered — Entering 
the harbor — Slight results of bombardment — Ceremonies 
of the surrender — Toral's demeanor — Stars and Stripes 
float over Santiago 286 



CHAPTER XVIII. 

EVENTS AFTER THE SURRENDER. 

Return of the refugees — Good feeling between the victors 
and the vanquished — Castilian cunning — Cleansing the 
city — Contempt for the Cubans — Garcia takes offence — 
Shafter's explanation — Naval events — Capitulation of gar- 
risons — A Spanish contract — The problem of the sunken 
ships — The Santiago prison record — Condition of the 
army — Treatment of the wounded — Their exposure to 
the weather — Rapid increase of sickness — Dr. Senn's 
statement — Testimony of Drs. McCook and Krauskopf — 
The War Department order — Roosevelt's letter — The 
Round Robin communication — The Porto Rico expe- 
dition — Comments of the press — Convalescent camp — 
Scandalous condition of the transports — State of affairs 
at Camp Alger — Who was responsible ? — Roosevelt and 
Secretary Alger 307 



CONTENTS. 17 

CHAPTER XIX. 

THE INVASION OF PORT RICO. 

PAGE 

Dominating influences in the war— The expedition to Porto 
Rico— The Gloucester in the harbor of Guanica— The 
town occupied— The port of Ponce surrenders— Welcome 
to the American flag— The city of Ponce occupied — 
Enthusiastic greeting— General Miles' s proclamation— A 
skirmish at Yauco— Business revives at Ponce — Mayor 
Magia's proclamation— The military road mined— Change 
of plan— Guayama taken— General Stone's advance- 
Capture of Coama and its garrison— A fight near Maya- 
guez— Cape San Juan— The advance on Aibonito— An 
artillery duel— News of peace stops hostilities — An affair 
at Manzanillo— The daring of the Mangrove— A shell in 
the San Francisco 334 

CHAPTER XX. 

THE SIEGE OF MANILA. 

The Philippine rebels— Investment of Manila— General 
Augustin in doubt — Aguinaldo's proclamations — A dec- 
laration of independence— Desperate situation of the 
Spaniards— Dewey's demeanor — A Ladrone island taken 
—Attitude of the Germans— The Irene incident— Ameri- 
can expeditions arrive— Want in the city— General Mer- 
ritt arrives— An attack by the Spaniards— Their repulse— 
The Monterey arrives— Notice sent General Jaudenes — 
Surrender demanded and refused— Clearing for action— 
The bombardment— Attack by the troops— A show of 
resistance— The American flag floats over Manila— Terms 
of surrender— Flight of Augustin— The final event of the 



CHAPTER XXI. 

FROM WAR TO PEACE. 

Singular character of the war— Its effect on the countries 
concerned— Events in Spain— A revolution threatened— 
The financial status of the United States -The loan and 



347 



i8 CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

tax — Great development of commerce — The Hawaiian 
annexation— Sailing of the Philadelphia — Admiral Miller 
raises the flag — Attitude of the powers — Thoughts of 
intervention — Great Britain's attitude— Spain's only hope 
— The request for peace — M. Cambon represents Spain — 
The terms accepted— A protocol prepared — Its text — The 
ceremony of signing — The news sent around the world . 361 

CHAPTER XXII. 

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS. 

Hostile relations of natives and Spaniards — The future of 
Cuba — The commission and its work — The demands of 
the Philippine natives — Naval demonstration — Rewards 
to the heroes — Proposed increase of the navy — A larger 
army demanded — The treatment of the sick soldiers — 
Effect of her colonial dominion on Spain — Possible benefit 
from the loss of her colonies — The war but an incident 
in United States history — The new position of this country 
before the world — Its future mission 375 



ILLUSTRATIONS 



PAGE 

The Wreck of the Maine Frontispiece. 

Map of the West Indies 25 

Map of the Island of Cuba 40 

Cuban Leaders 60 

Spanish Commanders 80 

United States Naval Commanders 120 

Map of Atlantic Ocean 131 

President McKinley and Secretaries Long and Alger . . . 142 

Map of the Philippine Islands 150 

Plan of the Battles at Manila 157 

The Annihilation of the Spanish Fleet in the Harbor of 

Manila 164 

Panoramic View of the Harbor of Santiago 192 

Map of Santiago and Vicinity 195 

Lieutenant Hobson on the Merrimac 202 

The Marine Bombardment of Santiago 210 

Soldiers Going on Transports at Tampa 232 

Massachusetts Volunteers Landing at Siboney 237 

Infantry Camp at Las Guasimas 242 

The Country near Santiago 252 

Plan of the Battle of Santiago 262 

How the American Soldiers Fought at Santiago 266 

Cervera's Fleet Endeavoring to Escape. American Ships 

Firing 274 

19 



20 ILLUSTRATIONS 

PAGE 

Wreck of the Spanish Cruiser Almirante Oquendo, showing 

Effect of American Fire 280 

The Oregon, just after her Chase of the Cristobal Colon . . 284 
Wounded at Siboney. After the Rough Riders' Charge . . 292 

United States Army Commanders 297 

Soldier Life : Washing Clothes in Stream 310 

Map of the Island of Porto Rico 334 

At the Front, near Arroyo, Porto Rico 342 

Ox-Train Disabled in the Rough Mud Road to Adjuntas, 

Porto Rico 344 

Map of Manila and Vicinity 354 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

¥¥ 

CHAPTER I. 

SPAIN AND HER COLONIES. 

On Sunday, October 28, 1492, Christopher Colum- 
bus, sailing southward through the placid Western seas, 
gazed with eyes of delight upon the shores of a rich and 
charming island, "the most beautiful land," he said, 
1 ' that the sun ever shone upon or that the eyes of man 
ever beheld." Cubanacan, the land "where gold is 
found," the natives called it. The Spanish were liberal 
with names, calling it successively Juana, Fernandina, 
Santiago, and Ave Maria. None of these titles, how- 
ever, took hold. Cuba, half the native name, prevailed, 
— about the only relic of the natives that survived a 
half-century of Spanish rule. It has been poetically 
designated the "Pearl of the Antilles," though it is a 
pearl whose lustre has been sadly dimmed. 

It is not without warrant that we begin our history four 
centuries back, for the causes of the nineteenth-century 
war of which we propose to treat began with the advent 
of the Spaniards to this continent, and have grown with 
the growth of their dominion in the New World. 
Cruelty and oppression marked their coming to Amer- 
ica, and to cruelty and oppression was due their final 
departure from its shores. The whole record of Spain 
on this continent, in fact, has been one of inhumanity 

21 



22 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

and tyranny, with the result that her colonies have, one 
after another, been driven into rebellion and won inde- 
pendence. At the opening of the nineteenth century 
much more than half the Western Hemisphere was held 
by the strong hand of Spain. At its close the final 
remnants of this splendid colonial dominion were falling 
from her enfeebled grasp, while hardly a throb of pity 
beat for her in the heart of the world, for her misfor- 
tunes were felt to be the inevitable consequences of her 
faults. We are constrained, therefore, to place Spain 
in witness against herself by a brief review of her policy 
in America, seeking to show that the war of 1898 was 
the culmination of a chain of related events due to her 
persistently oppressive colonial policy. 

It was a brief respite from suffering for the natives of 
Cuba that the Spaniards made their first settlement in 
the neighboring island named by them Hispaniola, but 
now known as Hayti. This island was peopled by a 
race of innocent and happy natives, who welcomed the 
white strangers as deities, though they were soon to 
regard them as demons. Under the cruel rule of the 
new-comers their happy lot suddenly ended. Their 
liberty was quickly exchanged for slavery, and so ruth- 
lessly were they driven to severe and unaccustomed toil 
that within a generation they had all disappeared. The 
entire population of the island was sacrificed to the 
cruelty and greed of its new lords. 

In the year 1502, ten years after the discovery of 
America, Nicolas de Ovanda became governor of His- 
paniola. He was a small, fair-haired man, mild of 
speech and courteous in demeanor ; yet the seven years 
of rule of this cultured Spaniard were so filled with 
horrors that one shudders at his very name. To invite 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 23 

independent chiefs to an entertainment, then seize, bind, 
and burn them to death, was a mild proceeding under 
the rule of the soft-voiced Ovanda. Such a crew of 
wretches surely never came together as those that deso- 
lated that fair island while under his control. The 
life of an Indian slave was of no value. The natives 
were plentiful and could easily be replaced. It was 
cheaper to work one to death and get another than to 
treat the first with humanity ; and the whip of the task- 
master rapidly did its work. At times the natives rose 
in rebellion, but their revolts were subdued with fright- 
ful savagery. Some were burned alive at the stake, 
others were torn to pieces by fierce bloodhounds. The 
murder of a Spaniard was revenged by chopping off the 
hands of fifty or sixty Indians. The masters of the isle 
made a sport of cruelty. On one occasion thirteen 
natives were hanged so that their toes just touched the 
ground, and then were slowly pricked to death by the 
sword-points of the Spaniards. Other tales of almost 
unmentionable cruelty might be given, but it must suf- 
fice to say that, fortunately for the natives, they soon 
disappeared under this rigorous discipline, and the 
Spaniards were obliged to replace them with negro 
slaves, who, as they had to be paid for, were treated 
with more humanity. 

This, and much more of the kind, we may read in the 
pages of Las Casas, the gentlest and most humane of 
his race, whose pen fairly trembles with indignation as 
he writes. This apostle of humanity spent his life in 
vain attempts to alleviate the condition of the natives of 
New Spain, and died after a life of earnest but largely 
useless appeal. It was not the cruelties shown in His- 
paniola alone of which he had to speak, for the progress 



24 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

of Spain in the New World was everywhere marked by 
a trail of blood. The courage of Cortes and Pizarro was 
sadly vitiated with treachery and cruelty, and two flour- 
ishing empires were overthrown, hosts of their people 
slain, and the remainder reduced to slavery, that a 
handful of adventurers might rise to power upon their 
misery. De Soto, in our own southern territory, with 
his bloodhounds and chains, was as faithless and cruel ; 
and the whole story of the conquest of New Spain is one 
that it is best not to dwell upon too minutely. In the 
history of Mexico we are told that the rapacious laws 
depopulated towns, and that it mattered little whether 
a tribe was an ally or an enemy, since the work of the 
scourge and the sword led to the same end. Revolt 
only intensified cruelty. Death in the mines or inhu- 
manity worse than death in the fields, we are told, was 
the lot of the natives under the rule of Spain. 

In 151 1, Don Diego Columbus, son of the discov- 
erer, determined to take possession of Cuba, Hispaniola 
having become nearly exhausted of laborers within less 
than twenty years. No opposition was made to the 
invasion except by a chief named Hatuey, a fugitive 
who had lived under the amenities of Spanish rule in 
Hispaniola. His opposition was useless, and he was 
soon in the hands of the invaders, who, instead of 
treating him as an honorable captive, condemned him 
to be burned alive as a fugitive slave. While the fagots 
were being heaped around him, a Franciscan friar stood 
by the pile and, cross in hand, besought him to accept 
Christianity, in order that the flames which consumed 
his body might waft his soul to realms of endless bliss. 

"Are there any Spaniards in those happy realms?" 
asked the chief. 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 25 

' ' Yes, ' ' was the reply. 

' ' Then I will have nothing to do with your religion. 
I will not go to a place where I may meet one of that 
accursed race." 

No long period passed before all the native Cubans 
followed their intrepid chief. At the time of settlement 
they are said to have numbered more than three hundred 
thousand. Forty years afterwards it is doubtful if one 
of them survived. The wars they waged with the 
Spaniards ended in blood and torture. Their lot in 
peace was worse than in war. The sword and the lash 
soon did the work, and the natives vanished from the 
land. The methods by which a whole population can 
be exterminated in a generation need not be commented 
upon ; they may be left to the imagination of the reader. 

The subsequent history of Cuba, up to the early years 
of the nineteenth century, may be epitomized in a few 
words. Negro slaves succeeded the natives as laborers, 
and grew numerous after 1580, at which time the culti- 
vation of tobacco and sugar-cane began. For a century 
and a half after 1600 almost perpetual fear brooded over 
the island. The French, English, and Dutch, and the 
pirates who infested the waters of the West Indies, in- 
vaded it at will. Even before that date Havana had 
been twice taken and burned by the French. In 1762 
it was besieged by the English, and taken after an 
obstinate resistance of more than two months. Cuba 
was restored to Spain .in the following year, and then 
first began to be prosperous. At its first census, in 
1773, its population, black and white, numbered only 
171,620. At its latest census it had a population of 
over 1,600,000. 

The history of Cuba as a colony is at one with that of 



26 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

the Spanish colonies as a whole. Much as the inhabi- 
tants of the British colonies in America objected to the 
methods of the home country, they enjoyed a high state 
of freedom as compared with the people of New Spain. 
The latter were destitute of even the shadow of liberty, 
being deprived of all privileges, civil, political, and 
religious. While the British colonists made their own 
laws, and in several colonies chose their own governors, 
the Spanish colonists were under the absolute dominion 
of governors appointed by the crown, and were as 
destitute of actual liberty as the slaves in their fields. 
Spanish officials filled every place of power or profit, 
monopoly and restriction were the principles of adminis- 
tration, and the people were kept in submission by a 
powerful army and navy, which they were heavily taxed 
to maintain. The "taxation without representation" 
which led to the revolt of the British colonists was but a 
mild measure of oppression as compared with that under 
which the people of Spanish America groaned. 

A more detailed account of the character of this 
tyranny may be given, in view of the fact that it con- 
tinued in Cuba and the Philippine Islands until the year 
1898. It was of the most crushing character. The 
viceroys and captain-generals who were appointed by 
the king of Spain to rule over his dominions in America 
were invested with despotic power, their word having 
the force of absolute law. How they governed may be 
deduced from the fact that each of them went back to 
Spain immensely rich. 

Spain looked upon her colonies as sources of revenue 
only, and rivalled the rapacious policy of her captain- 
generals and other colonial officials. Heavy duties were 
laid alike on imports and exports, and trade with any 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 27 

other nation than Spain was forbidden under the severest 
penalties. Any merchant captain not hailing from a 
Spanish port, and even Spanish merchants who sought 
to trade without official permission, were punished with 
death if they dared to enter a colonial harbor of Spain. 
The sole right of trading with his colonies was sold, near 
the end of the eighteenth century, by the king to the 
Philippine Company, an association of merchants trading 
with the West and the East alike, and privileged to fix 
the rates at which all goods might be sold. To trade 
without license from these merchants was a crime whose 
penalty was death. The colonists were forced to sell and 
buy their goods at prices fixed for them by this company, 
whose net profits were usually three hundred per cent. 

The tyranny exercised was not restricted to trade, 
but covered every detail of life. Literature was under 
a strict censorship, and no book could be imported 
without the permission of the priests. In 18 10, when 
the revolution in Chili and Peru began, these two 
colonies owned between them a single printing-press. 
Every effort was made to prevent intercourse with other 
countries, and even a native of Spain could not visit the 
colonies unless the king chose to grant him a passport. 
The colonists were under a similar restriction. They 
could not visit Europe, they could not even enter a 
neighboring colony, without special permission from the 
captain-general of their province. At home they were 
discriminated against in favor of Spanish-born immi- 
grants, who occupied all the official positions and held 
them with the sole purpose of filling their pockets. 
Robbery, under the disguise of fees and charges, was 
the prevalent practice, from the captain-general down to 
the pettiest official. ' ' Robamos todos 1 ' ("we are all 



28 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

thieves"), a functionary of high rank is said to have 
openly remarked ; and it may well be questioned if any 
other colonies in the history of the world have been so 
shamefully misgoverned as those of Spain. This state 
of affairs yielded its natural result. In the year 1800 
Spain was the unquestioned owner of all South America 
except Brazil and Guiana, and of all North America ex- 
cept the United States east of the Mississippi and the 
British possessions of the north. In 1825 her sole pos- 
sessions consisted of Cuba and Porto Rico, two islands 
whose combined area is about equal to that of the State 
of Pennsylvania. Tyranny had driven the colonists into 
general revolt, and they had won their liberties by the 
sword, — such of them as remained alive after Spain had 
worked her will. 

The effort of Spain to subdue her insurgent colonists 
was marked by a savage cruelty unknown in any other 
wars of the century. The Spanish official records admit 
that eighty thousand persons were executed, many of 
them being put to death with the refinements of cruelty. 
The records of the insurgents claim that fully a quarter 
of a million were thus dealt with, in addition to the mul- 
titude slaughtered in cold blood by the Spanish soldiers, 
who destroyed every city and town the people of which 
were suspected of sympathy with the rebels. We have 
a striking example of the Spanish method of suppressing 
insurrection in an official despatch of General Morillo, in 
which he refers to his dealings with the inhabitants of 
the city of Santa Fe de Bogota. 

" Every person of either sex," he writes, "who was 
capable of reading or writing was put to death. By 
thus cutting off all who are in any way educated I hope 
effectually to check the spirit of the revolution." 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 29 

Fortunately for the people of this city, the Spanish 
restrictions on education and literature had prevented 
the arts of reading and writing from being widely dissem- 
inated. We are further told that all who had held official 
positions in the local administration, who were related to 
insurgents, or were distinguished for their talents and 
attainments, were thrown into prison, from which they 
were taken only to be hanged or shot, — husbands being 
thus put to death in the presence of their wives, and chil- 
dren in the presence of their parents. All this might be 
difficult to believe but for the fact that we have had 
similar examples in our own day in General Weyler's 
methods of suppressing insurrection. The spirit that 
finds enjoyment in the bull-fight seems to have infected 
the whole nature of the Spanish race. 

The loss of all her colonies upon the mainland might 
have taught Spain that her colonial policy was a false 
one. Great Britain learned this lesson well, but" Spain 
seemed past profiting by experience, and maintained in 
her few remaining possessions the mediaeval methods 
that had cost her a continent. In 1808 Cuba gained the 
title of "The Ever-faithful Isle," in consequence of the 
members of its provincial council taking an oath to pre- 
serve the island for their sovereign, who had been de- 
posed by Napoleon. This sovereign rewarded them in 
the true Spanish manner, by making the powers of the 
captain-general more autocratic, if possible, than before, 
giving him an authority equal to that of the Sultan of 
Turkey or the Russian Czar. 

In 1825, the Spanish king issued a decree which put 
Cuba practically under martial law. Incensed by the 
loss of all his dominions upon the mainland, and even of 
Hispaniola, the earliest possession of Spain in the New 



3 o THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

World, he took a step for the prevention of rebellion in 
the ' ' Ever-faithful Isle' ' that seemed studiously designed 
to drive the colonists into revolt. We may quote from 
this astonishing decree : 

" His Majesty, the King, our Lord, desiring to obviate 
the inconveniences that might, in extraordinary cases, 
result from a division of command, and from the inter- 
ferences and prerogatives of the respective officers, for 
the important end of preserving in that precious island 
his legitimate sovereign authority and the public tran- 
quillity through proper means, has resolved, in accord- 
ance with the opinion of his council of ministers, to give 
to your Excellency the fullest authority, bestowing on you 
all the powers which by the royal ordinances are granted 
to the governors of besieged cities. 

"Inconsequence of this, His Majesty gives to your 
Excellency the most ample and unbounded power, not 
only to send away from the island any persons in office, 
whatever their occupation, rank, class, or condition, 
whose continuance therein your Excellency may deem 
injurious, or whose conduct, public or private, may alarm 
you, replacing them with persons faithful to His Majesty 
and deserving of all the confidence of your Excellency ; 
but also to suspend the execution of any order whatso- 
ever, or any general provision made concerning any 
branch of the administration, as your Excellency may 
think most suitable to the royal service." 

This is, with few alleviations, the supreme law in Cuba 
to-day, whose governor has the absolute power of the 
commander of a besieged city. We need hardly ask 
what effect such a decree would have had upon the people 
of any Anglo-Saxon colony. In Cuba its result has 
been to produce a bitter spirit of revolt and an incurable 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 31 

hatred of Spanish rule. One writer tells us that ' ' there 
is no hatred in the world to be compared to that of the 
Cuban for Spain and everything Spanish." The Creole 
detests the Spaniard, whom he looks upon as an alien 
thief, coming to rob him of the revenues of his island 
and to oppress and annoy him by petty and illegal exac- 
tions for which he has no redress. The Spaniard, on the 
other hand, treats the Creole with disdain, taunts him with 
cowardice and thriftlessness, and looks upon him as a 
degenerate being, born but to fill the coffers of Spain 
and swell with gold the purses of her officials. Feelings 
and acts like these are the seeds of rebellion, and we 
cannot be surprised that Cuba has made successive efforts 
to gain her liberty. 

As early as 1823 an insurrection was attempted by a 
secret political society known as the ' ' Soles de Bolivar. ' ' 
But the plot was discovered, and its leaders — such of 
them as did not escape by flight — were taught how Spain 
deals with rebels. In 1826, a plan to invade Cuba was 
laid by Cuban refugees in Mexico and Colombia, Simon 
Bolivar, the South American liberator, being asked to 
lead it ; but, for reasons to be given in the next chapter, 
nothing came of it. In 1827-29, a secret society known 
as the " Black Eagle" was organized by the refugees in 
Mexico, who sought to gain recruits in the United States. 
This also failed, and its supporters in Cuba fell into the 
tender hands of Spain. 

The next attempt at insurrection took place in 1844. 
This was a movement of the slaves on the sugar planta- 
tions around Matanzas, or rather the suspicion of a 
movement, for nothing was known about it except such 
evidence as could be obtained from witnesses under tor- 
ture. It is well known what evidence of this kind is 



32 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

worth, yet it led to the conviction of more than thirteen 
hundred people, of whom seventy-eight were shot and 
the rest otherwise punished. Only a few of these were 
slaves. 

A few years afterwards the celebrated Lopez invasion 
took place. Narciso Lopez was a Venezuelan by birth 
who had risen to a high rank in the Spanish army and 
had lived long in Cuba, for whose freedom he gained an 
ardent desire. He organized an insurrection in the 
island, but was obliged to flee for his life. Seeking New 
York, he made that city a centre for sympathetic appeals, 
and in 1849 sought to return with a small party to Cuba. 
He was prevented by the United States authorities, but 
in the following year he succeeded in reaching the island 
with a force of six hundred volunteers. He landed at 
Cardenas, but no aid and support came to him from the 
Cubans, and he was driven back to his ship, which a 
Spanish man-of-war chased to Key West. 

In 1 85 1, Lopez started again, now with four hundred 
and fifty men, sailing in the steamer Pampero from New 
Orleans. He landed at Playitas, thirty miles from Havana. 
It was his hope to find support from Cuban rebels, some 
of whom had taken to the field, but he quickly found 
himself confronted by a superior force of Spanish troops. 
With the main body of invaders Lopez sought the inte- 
rior, leaving his second in command, a Kentuckian named 
Crittenden, to bring up the supplies with the rear-guard. 
Both parties were in a short time vigorously attacked. 
Crittenden's party, reduced by the fire of the foe to fifty 
men, were captured and shot. Lopez and his followers 
succeeded in reaching the interior, where, no longer 
able to fight, they wandered miserably in the thick woods 
without food or shelter, suffering severely from the pur- 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 33 

suit of the foe and finding no Cuban aid. One by one 
the fugitives fell into Spanish hands, Lopez among the 
last. He was executed, but his American followers, after 
a term of imprisonment, were set free. 

A second invasion was planned in 1854, General 
Quitman, of Mississippi, being its leader. This was 
organized in connection with a revolutionary movement 
in Cuba, but, like all previous movements of the kind, 
it came to grief. The leaders in the island were betrayed 
into the hands of their enemies, seized, and incontinently 
put to death, and the would-be invaders deemed it wise 
to stay at home. And thus affairs went on until 1868, 
when the long-repressed rebellious sentiment in the island 
finally broke out in open insurrection. 

For the inciting cause of this revolt we must go to 
Spain. For years that country had presented a dismal 
picture of faction and intrigue, while its queen, Isabella 
II., had won the abhorrence of the people by the un- 
blushing dissoluteness of her life. A strong party of 
reform grew under these conditions, and at length, not 
able to put an end to the disorders by quiet means, over- 
turned the government by a successful revolt. The 
queen, on September 30, 1868, fled to France, from 
which she was never to return to the throne, and several 
years passed before a settled government was established 
in the Spanish realm. This state of affairs offered an 
opportunity to the revolutionists in Cuba of which they 
were quick to take advantage. On October 10, ten 
days after the flight of the queen, they issued a declara- 
tion of independence, and took to the field prepared to 
fight for their freedom. 

Before speaking of the incidents of the war that fol- 
lowed, a fuller review of the influences leading to it seems 

3 



34 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

in place. These were of two kinds, — financial and polit- 
ical. Cuba had been, under the despotic decree of 1825, 
for nearly half a century in a state of siege. Spain in 
Cuba was like an army encamped in the midst of a con- 
quered people. All the soldiers were Spanish except 
the members of the body known as Cuban Volunteers, 
the National Guard of the island, and these were care- 
fully recruited from Spanish sympathizers. The people 
of Cuba became divided into two parties, — the Insulares 
and the Peninsulares, — the Islanders and the Spaniards, 
or those in sympathy with them. Out of the latter grew 
the Volunteers, nearly all of them active politicians and 
of great power and influence in the affairs of the island. 
Even the captain-general stood in some awe of this 
powerful body ; and in 1870 the Volunteers went so far 
as to arrest and send back to Spain Captain-General 
Dulce, of whose actions they did not approve. 

As for the people of Cuba, they were completely dis- 
franchised. After 1825 no legislative assembly, either 
provincial or municipal, existed in the island. At an 
earlier date the officials of the cities held some control 
over taxes and expenditures, but these powers were now 
all lost. No vestige remained of a popular assembly, 
trial by jury, independent tribunals, the right to vote, or 
the right to bear arms ; in fact, no right of any kind 
was left ; the will or the whim of the captain-general 
was the absolute law. And the Cubans were not alone 
disfranchised ; they were rarely permitted to hold any 
office of honor, trust, or emolument in the island. Some 
Cubans did hold office, but they gained their positions 
through utter servility to the ruling powers. 

This preference given to Spaniards over Cubans was a 
bitter pill for the natives of the island to swallow. All 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 35 

the power was wielded by the people of one country 
over those of another, the sole interest of the ruling class 
being that of the highwayman in his victim. The offi- 
cials went to Cuba with the one purpose of filling their 
purses and returning to Spain to enjoy their gains. 
Some small offices in remote districts might be filled 
by natives of the island, but those of higher emolument 
were wanted for the sons of Spain. It was in this way 
that the statesman or politician at the head of affairs in 
the home government paid his political debts. Spain 
did not provide offices enough for these worthies, and 
Cuba was filled with them. Doubtless it was deemed 
presumptuous on the part of the natives to expect posi- 
tions which cabinet officers at home needed for their 
useful friends. 

The financial causes of the insurrection were imme- 
diately connected with the political. The office-holders 
sought only to retrieve their broken fortunes, and in this 
they usually succeeded — by fair means or foul. They 
had given important services to the leaders in Spain, 
and could demand large salaries. The captain-general 
was paid $50,000 a year, double the salary, at that time, 
of the President of the United States. The governor of 
each province had $12,000, twice the sum paid to the 
prime minister of Spain. The archbishops of Havana 
and Santiago each received an annual stipend of $18,000. 
And so downward in the same extravagant ratio ranged 
the salaries. 

But the officials were not so easily satisfied. The 
' ' perquisites' ' often more than doubled the salaries. 
Wholesale robbery, in the form of illegal fees and 
charges, everywhere prevailed. All this was no secret, 
but no captain-general ever sought to prevent it. He 



36 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

was either the leader of the robbers himself or was 
powerless to overcome the deeply intrenched system. 
These official brigands went to Cuba for booty, and were 
not to be balked in their design. 

It was openly known that at least forty per cent, were 
added to the custom-house charges at Havana by illegal 
fees. The officials at Santiago were less scrupulous ; 
they exacted fully seventy per cent. These officials 
were changed with discouraging frequency. At every 
ministerial crisis in Spain — which came at times semi- 
annually — a new batch of hungry political servitors was 
sent to make their fortunes in Cuba by rapacity and 
corruption of every kind. The custom-house was but 
one of their fields of industry. Fees were everywhere 
to be picked up. We may instance one of the methods 
employed. A planter might make his return for the 
income-tax at ten thousand dollars. The tax-collector 
would blandly give him to understand that this was too 
low a rating, and that he proposed to assess him at fif- 
teen thousand dollars. The planter, afraid to protest 
too strongly against this arbitrary assessment, might 
suggest a compromise at twelve thousand five hundred 
dollars. The result of the operation would be a rating 
on the books at ten thousand dollars and a fee for the 
astute collector of the tax on the extra two thousand 
five hundred dollars. Possibly the assessment of fifteen 
thousand dollars might not have been too much. Under 
such a system the government is sure to be one of the 
chief sufferers, for its interest is the last thing considered. 

Spain was as rapacious as her officials. Cuba had 
long served her as a money-bag. In the effort to sup- 
press the revolutions on the mainland, the ' ' ever-faithful 
isle" has been obliged to supply a lion's share of the 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 37 

funds. The tariff, alike on imports and exports, was 
kept high enough to yield the largest revenue of which 
the island was capable, if not increased to an extent 
that threatened to put an end to commerce altogether. 
Spain could no longer keep the trade of Cuba for her 
own merchants and manufacturers by the old method of 
putting to death any foreign navigator who dared to 
enter a port of her colonies, but she sought to achieve 
the same result by a system of differential duties which 
discriminated severely against foreign goods. 

As for the revenue produced, we have seen where 
much of it went. The sovereign of Spain would have 
preferred to keep a large share of it for himself, but he 
was powerless in the hands of the officials, with their 
strong political " pull," and had to content himself with 
what they left unappropriated. Yet, whatever these 
harpies might absorb, it was felt necessary that the 
crown should have a fairly liberal share, and this could 
best be secured by more sharply tightening the screws on 
the island. In 1857 the revenue yielded by Cuba was 
$17,960,000. By 1867 it had been largely forced up, 
and it was proposed to increase it to over $40,000,000. 
This was more than the islanders could possibly pay, 
and only a portion of it was collected. Yet every effort 
was made to squeeze the last drop of life-blood from the 
suffering colony. 

Some further statistics may be of service. The people 
of Cuba were forced to pay the interest on the public 
debt of Spain at the rate of $6.39 per capita, while the 
rate paid by the home people was only $3. 23. The cost 
of living was so increased by the high duties that, while 
four hundred pounds of bread per capita were annually 
consumed in Spain, fifty-four pounds were all that a 



3 8 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

Cuban could afford to buy. A letter from Europe, even 
if prepaid, had to pay twenty-five cents at the Cuban 
post-office, and if delivered, twelve and a half cents 
more were exacted. 

One necessary result of the methods of administration 
pursued was that the home interests of the island had 
to be sadly neglected. The cities were overloaded with 
debt and unable to meet the most essential expenses. 
The streets remained uncleaned, garbage was not col- 
lected, a dozen important functions were left undone. 
No money could be diverted to pay teachers, and the 
schools were closed. Havana had the only asylum for 
the insane on the island, and elsewhere this class of un- 
fortunates had to be kept in the cells of the common 
jails. In every way the revenues of Cuba were em- 
ployed for the benefit of Spain and her needy sons, 
and the interests of the islanders were left out of the 
account. 

It was this state of affairs in Cuba which gave rise to 
the revolution of 1868. A revolt had been secretly 
planned months before the revolution in Spain, but the 
outbreak in that country and the flight of the queen pre- 
cipitated it. On October 10, 1868, Carlos M. de Ces- 
pedes, a lawyer of Bayamo, issued a declaration of in- 
dependence from Spain, and took to the field at the 
head of an army amounting to one hundred and twenty- 
eight half-armed men. But he had the country at his 
back. His appeal to the people that ' ' we are in danger 
of losing our property, our lives, and our honor under 
further Spanish dominion" struck home to the Cuban 
heart, and at the end of a few weeks Cespedes headed 
a force of fifteen thousand men, ill supplied with arms 
and equipments, it is true, but stout of heart and earnest 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 39 

in purpose. A constitution was drawn up and promul- 
gated on April 10, 1869. This provided for a repub- 
lican government and the immediate abolition of slavery. 
A legislature was chosen, which met and elected Ces- 
pedes president. 

The war that followed was one that cannot be dealt 
with in the ordinary manner. We can give no pictu- 
resque description of marches, battles, and campaigns. 
It was a war of irregulars, not of regulars ; of bush 
fighting, not of contests in the open field ; of guerrilla 
skirmishes, not of set battles. ' ' The pomp and circum- 
stance of glorious war' ' were sadly wanting, and forest 
ambushes, sudden attacks and retreats, and sharp affrays 
that led to nothing formed the staple of the affair. The 
Cubans were bold and daring, and for the first two years 
proved successful in nearly every engagement. But 
they had no expectation, with their lack of arms and 
dearth of supplies, of triumphing over Spain, whose 
power of furnishing fresh troops, armed with the best 
modern weapons, gave her the ascendency in the open 
country and kept the patriots confined to the bush. 
Their one hope was to wear out their enemy, and make 
the war so costly for Spain that sheer lack of means 
would in the end force her to retire from the contest in 
despair. 

That we may better understand the character of this 
war, something must be said of the country in which it 
was fought. Despite the fact that Cuba has been settled 
for nearly four centuries, two-thirds of it remain unculti- 
vated, and half its area is covered with forest and thicket. 
The lowlands of the coast in the wet season are turned 
into swamps of tenacious black mud, impassable to the 
traveller. Underbrush everywhere fills the forest, so 



4 o THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

thick and dense that it can be traversed only with the 
aid of the machete. High bushes and thick grasses 
cover much of the dry plains, forming a close jungle that 
also calls for the sharp edge of the machete, that tool of 
the Cuban farmer and weapon of the Cuban warrior. 

The machete is a formidable instrument in the hands 
of the countrymen of Cuba. Its handle, usually of horn, 
fits upon a perfectly straight blade from twenty-four to 
thirty inches long, as heavy as a cleaver, and with an 
edge kept almost at razor sharpness. The corn-scythe 
of the American farmer is not unlike it, but the machete 
is heavier, and its outer instead of its inner edge is the 
cutting one. To the Cubans skilled in its use as an im- 
plement to hew a way through the jungle and under- 
growth it is a weapon that takes the place of the sword 
in war, and with which they can decapitate an enemy as 
easily as they can shear through a sapling. 

Through the centre of the island passes a mountain 
range, broken at intervals, but extending from end to 
end, and in the east turning and following the southern 
coast past Santiago de Cuba to Cape Cruz. The range 
is highest in the eastern section, where it presents rugged 
summits over six thousand five hundred feet in height, 
though its average elevation is not over two thousand 
two hundred feet. The wooded heights of the moun- 
tains, the recesses of the densely-grown forests, and the 
depths of the grassy jungle have furnished secure lurk- 
ing-places for the Cuban insurrectionists in all their out- 
breaks, to which they could retire at will and from 
which they could break at unexpected points upon the 
foe. To retire to the "long grass," to use a common 
Cuban phrase, was to gain safety from pursuit, and an 
ambushed host might lie unseen and unheard in these 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 41 

secure retreats while an army passed by not many feet 
away. In short, Cuba is a paradise for the bush-fighter, 
and all the contests in that island have taken the form of 
guerrilla warfare, with its unpremeditated affrays and lack 
of definite results. 

The war with which we are concerned took, in part, 
the form of a hunt for the insurgents, in which the 
Spanish soldiers were, perhaps, none too eager to find 
them, since they usually learned that they had " caught 
a Tartar." In this exercise the Cuban Volunteers took 
little part. They employed themselves in police and 
garrison duties, leaving the work in the field to the 
Spanish soldiers, of whom during the ten years of war 
not less than one hundred and fifty thousand were sent 
to the island. Of these more than one-half met their 
death, largely through disease. 

While Cuba is very ill adapted by nature to regular 
warfare, it was rendered more so by the inefficiency of 
the military authorities. The roads are abominable ; even 
those near Havana itself being mere tracks with deep 
ruts and holes. For half' the year, during the hot and 
rainy season, campaigning was pursued under frightful 
difficulties, and from May to November warlike opera- 
tions in great part ceased. At the opening of a campaign 
the custom was to convey a force by land or sea to a 
point near which the insurgents were supposed to lurk ; 
then, drawing up the force in narrow columns, to cut a 
pathway into the forest. If the insurgents were met, a 
few shots were apt to end the affray, — the troops finding it 
judicious to retire or the rebels seeking some new retreat. 

Often the enemy could not be found at all, and the 
troops wandered for days or weeks in vain search for a 
rebel in arms. Their spies served them poorly, while 



42 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

the sympathy of the people kept the insurgents well 
advised of every movement of the troops. As for starv- 
ing out the rebels, that was out of the question. The 
wild fruits of the earth, the yams, sweet potatoes, ba- 
nanas, and other productions which they could readily 
cultivate in forest clearings, kept them well supplied. 
The soil of Cuba is so prolific that a crop planted to-day 
may yield food in plenty within two months, while the 
country-people were ever ready to supply their friends 
in the field. 

The only way to overcome the insurgents would have 
been to intersect their haunts with a net-work of roads, 
laying bare their lurking-places, and to pursue them 
with remorseless energy from lair to lair. But this was 
not the Spanish idea of campaigning ; it was certainly 
not that of the officers, to whom the allurements of the 
towns were too enticing to be long deserted ; while the 
leaders doubtless found an inducement to prolong the 
war in their share of the Cuban spoils. 

The Spanish official bulletins during this war were 
curious affairs. One officer with his battalions had 
' ' come up with an insurgent band far away in some spot 
above Guantanamo, in the district of Santiago de Cuba. 
To attack the rebels and to completely rout them was 
for the heroic Spanish troops one and the same thing. 
They killed many of them, wounded many more, and 
took fourteen horses and one rifle." Again, an affray 
yielded the Spaniards " six prisoners and a mule." In 
another affair the valiant troops captured two prisoners 
and three fire-arms, while forty women and children 
were taken. This is neither magnificent nor is it war. 
Nor were the outrages which were perpetrated on the 
non-combatants war in any modern sense of the word. 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 43 

It cannot be said that the insurgents were any more 
daring than the troops. Only once in four years of 
war did they make an open attack. Then they swooped 
down suddenly upon Holguin, an inland town of San- 
tiago de Cuba. But here they contented themselves with 
plundering the inhabitants, and withdrew without waiting 
for the troops. 

The government adopted methods similar to those 
with which we have recently become very familiar. The 
troc/ia, of which so much has been said of late years, 
was tried, — a military cordon being drawn across the 
island from side to side with the hope of hemming in the 
insurrection. It proved as useless then as it has done 
since. Reconcentration, General Weyler's later system 
of warfare, was also attempted, — the whole population of 
one large district being huddled together under guard 
in the little town of St. Espiritu. The result was, as it 
has been since : a dozen diseases assailed the poor cap- 
tives, and they as well as their guards died in multitudes. 
Thus the population was murdered, the country was de- 
vastated, the cattle were slaughtered, the crops and 
dwellings were burned, everything was done but to put 
down the rebellion, which held its own despite these 
measures of repression. 

Outrages were common. The rule on both sides was 
to kill their prisoners without discrimination. Powder 
and shot could not be wasted for such purposes ; the 
machete did the work,— unless torture was preferred. 
Women fared as badly as men ; even children were not 
spared : a carnival of cruelty and bloodshed ravaged the 
island. In March, 1869, a party of young men, who 
had foolishly displayed the Cuban flag and sung patriotic 
songs at a theatre and a cafe in Havana, were set upon 



44 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

by the Volunteers, who poured volleys into both places, 
heedless of whom they might kill. In 1871 an affair 
took place which attracted wide attention. The graves of 
some soldiers at the cemetery had been defaced, and a 
number of students were seized as the criminals, dragged 
before a lynch-law tribunal of Volunteers, and ordered to 
be shot. Fifteen thousand Volunteers turned out and 
executed the eight boys in defiance of the captain- 
general. Indignation at this outrage spread through 
the world ; even the Spanish Cortes censured it ; but no 
one was punished. The Volunteers were too powerful 
to be called to account. There were eighty thousand 
of them in Cuba. 

The insurrection continued active until 1871, in which 
year a large number of the insurgents in Central Cuba 
surrendered on condition that their lives should be spared. 
General Agramonte, their leader, refused to yield, and 
kept up the war for two years more, when he was killed. 
President Cespedes was deposed in 1873, and was soon 
after killed by the Spaniards. He was succeeded by 
Salvador Cisneros (formerly the Marquis de Santa Lucia), 
who was elected president again in the revolt of 1895. 
The war dragged on until 1878. By that time both 
parties were thoroughly worn out, and neither saw any 
hope of success. General Martinez de Campos, com- 
mander of the Spanish forces, finding hostilities un- 
availing, now resorted to negotiation. Terms of peace 
were offered and accepted, and the war came to an end 
in February, 1878. The treaty is known as that of El 
Zanjon, from the place near which it was concluded. 

The terms of this treaty were the following : Full par- 
don was granted to all who had been engaged in the 
war, and freedom to the slaves who had taken part in it. 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 45 

Every one who wished was at liberty to leave the island, 
the Spanish government agreeing to furnish him with the 
means. Under this clause, Maximo Gomez, one of the 
Cuban leaders, sought a new home in San Domingo, 
there to bide his time until 1895. Many others left their 
native land, not caring to remain within Spanish reach. 
The island of Cuba was to be granted the same privi- 
leges as were enjoyed by the island of Porto Rico, 
— namely, the right of representation in the Spanish 
Cortes. 

Radical reforms in the administration of Cuba were 
promised and expected ; the island was divided into its 
present provinces ; provisional assemblies were instituted, 
and, as has been said, representation in the Cortes was 
granted. But the captain-general remained an irrespon- 
sible despot, and all these so-called reforms were manip- 
ulated in the interest of the Spanish party. Everything 
soon fell back into its old state. The debt continued to 
grow, taxation was as heavy as ever, the officials were as 
corrupt, the salaries and perquisites as high. The debt 
of Cuba began in 1864 with an issue of $3,000,000. In 
1 89 1 it had increased to $175,000,000. Of this great 
sum hardly a dollar had been spent on the island. The 
peculations continued. In 1895 it was asserted by a 
Spanish newspaper that the custom-house frauds in Cuba 
since 1878 had amounted to $100,000,000. 

There has been only one substantial measure of reform 
in Cuba within the century. A bill was passed in 1870 
providing for the gradual abolition of slavery. The work 
of abolition was completed in 1886 by an act which finally 
put an end to this long-established institution. This 
reform was hardly a free-will offering, but a necessary 
result of the conditions arising from the war ; and though 



46 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

the blacks were set free, the whites were as stringently 
controlled as ever. The decree of 1825, which likened 
Cuba to a besieged city, was revoked about 1870 ; but 
the captain-general (or the governor-general, as he was 
now entitled) retained all his old power, and could play 
the autocrat as much as ever. In 1895 another measure 
of reform was passed, a council of administration being 
established, half chosen by the crown, half elected by 
the provinces. But as the governor was given the power 
to suspend any member likely to make trouble, or to 
suspend the whole council if he chose, this was not likely 
to serve a very useful purpose, except as a handy tool of 
tyranny. 

If it had possessed any element of value, it came too 
late. The Cubans, incensed at the broken promises of 
Spain and seeing no hope of redress under Spanish rule, 
again declared for liberty and once more raised the 
standard of revolt. 



CHAPTER II. 

RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA. 

Cuba, as was long ago said by an American states- 
man, is by nature an outpost of the United States, and 
it has long been held that ' ' manifest destiny' ' demands 
its annexation to this country. Seventy-five years ago 
Jefferson said that "the addition of Cuba to our confed- 
eracy is exactly what is wanted to bound our power as a 
nation to the point of its utmost interest, ' ' and this sen- 
timent has been widely entertained. The relations of 
amity between the United States and Spain have fre- 
quently been strained through the aggressive acts of 
Spanish colonial agents. As long ago as the beginning 
of the nineteenth century the efforts of the authorities at 
New Orleans to close the Mississippi to American com- 
merce almost precipitated war. At a later date border 
troubles with Florida caused a suspension of diplomatic 
relations with Spain, lasting from 1808 to 18 15. In the 
end, West Florida was taken by force, the uncivilized 
methods of Spanish colonial administration having ren- 
dered the situation intolerable. In 18 19, Florida was 
obtained by purchase, and the long-existing border diffi- 
culties were brought to an end. Meanwhile, in 18 10, 
I the revolution in Spanish America had begun. Injury 
j was done by Spain to the commerce of the United States 
, during the war, but redress was stoutly resisted, and only 
' granted after seven years' negotiations. Payment of the 

47 



48 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

indemnity was made in the usual dilatory fashion of 
Spain. 

In July, 1818, Richard Rush, United States minister 
to England, was told by Lord Castlereagh that Spain 
had requested that country to mediate between her and 
her rebellious colonies, with the co-operation of the Holy 
Alliance, — a compact of the despotic powers of Europe 
formed after the fall of Napoleon, though it was never 
made manifest in what the holiness of this alliance con- 
sisted. Rush said in reply that the United States would 
take no part in any intervention for peace ' ' if its basis 
were not the independence of the colonies." 

This plain declaration ended the matter until 1823, in 
which year Rush found reason to believe that the Holy 
Alliance was laying plans to aid Spain in her struggle 
with her colonies. England had now shifted in the oppo- 
site direction, refused to join the alliance in these plans, 
and suggested opposition on the part of the United 
States. This was the state of affairs which led to the 
celebrated Monroe Doctrine, in which this country first 
clearly formulated the policy in relation to European 
interference in America which it has since vigorously 
maintained. 

Monroe began by asking Jefferson for his opinion as to 
what was proper in the crisis. The venerable author of 
the Declaration of Independence replied briefly but for- 
cibly, saying that it should be a leading principle of the 
United States " never to suffer Europe to interfere with 
cisatlantic affairs." Monroe placed this opinion before 
his cabinet, by which body it was fully indorsed. This 
it was that led to the doctrine which later events have 
made famous. It will suffice here to quote one of its 
most significant passages : 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 49 

"We declare that we should consider any attempt 
[of the allied powers] to extend their system to any 
portion of our hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and 
safety. ' ' 

This general declaration of principles was followed by 
statements of American policy directly relating to Cuba. 
The close of the struggle for independence in Spanish 
America left Spain devoid of any colonies in this part of 
the world except Cuba and Porto Rico. Avaricious eyes 
were being turned upon these. There was reason to dis- 
trust France and England, while Mexico and Colombia 
made open preparations for invasion, as mentioned in 
the preceding chapter. It was time for the United States 
to act. 

There was no hesitation or loss of time in doing so. 
The opinion was everywhere held in this country that 
the interests of the United States demanded the main- 
tenance of the status quo in Cuba. This was officially 
indicated in 1825 in the decided declaration that the 
United States could not see with equanimity the island 
pass into the possession of any European power what- 
ever. Henry Clay, secretary of state, put this declara- 
tion into plainer language still, sending a despatch to 
our minister to Russia in which it was distinctly stated 
that the United States would not " allow and permit" 
Cuba to pass into the hands of any foreign power. This 
threatening ultimatum put an end to all projects of in- 
terference on the part of England, France, or the Holy 
Alliance. 

American powers remained to be warned off. In 1821, 
a congress had been suggested for the purpose of form- 
ing a close union between the Spanish states of Central 
and South America. This, known as the Panama Con- 

4 



5 o THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

gress, met in 1825. The freeing of the islands of Cuba 
and Porto Rico from Spain was openly placed upon the 
platform of the congress, in consequence of which 
Mexico and Colombia began, as has been stated, to 
organize an expedition for the invasion of Cuba. This 
the United^States was not willing to permit. The hor- 
rors of the San Domingo massacre were fresh in memory, 
and those countries were informed, in polite phrase, that 
if an invasion should lead to a race war between blacks 
and whites, the United States would feel obliged to in- 
terfere. They were, therefore, requested to delay the 
expedition that they were fitting out. 

In Congress it was declared by Senator Hayne that 
the United States would not permit the Spanish Amer- 
ican states to ' ' take or to revolutionize' ' Cuba. Other 
members suggested that threats should be tried if advice 
or remonstrance failed. No overt action was needed, 
however. Diplomacy ended the difficulty. Mexico and 
Colombia deemed it wise to withdraw from their pro- 
jected enterprise. 

The United States had thus virtually guaranteed to 
defend the title of Spain to Cuba against any other 
power in Europe or America. The guarantee as re- 
garded American states was made openly in 1830, when 
Martin Van Buren, secretary of state under Jackson, 
declared that Mexico 'would not be allowed to acquire 
Cuba. As for European powers, a similar declaration 
was made by every secretary of state from Clay to 
Webster. The latter, under date of October 22, 1851, 
wrote to the Spanish Minister Sartiges as follows : " The 
government of France and those of other European 
countries were long since officially apprised by this gov- 
ernment that the United States could not see without 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 51 

concern that island transferred by Spain to any other 
European state." 

In 1852, a proposition was made to the United States, 
on the part of France and Great Britain, to the effect 
that each of those three parties should bind itself not to 
acquire Cuba, nor suffer any other power to do so. The 
United States declined to enter into any such conven- 
tion, and Secretary Everett, in a despatch to Minister 
Crampton, decisively laid down the position of this 
country as regarded Cuba. His statement contained 
three clauses : First, that the United States would per- 
mit no foreign interference, European or American, in 
the island of Cuba ; second, that it would join in no 
agreement with European powers respecting the island ; 
third, that it would not bind itself not to take the island 
if this should become necessary through its condition 
under Spanish rule. 

"But," he continued, "the President would con- 
sider its acquisition by force, except in a just war with 
Spain (should an event so gravely to be deprecated ever 
take place), as a disgrace to the civilization of the age." 

This was certainly plain enough. Nearly half a cen- 
tury ago the United States had definitely formulated its 
position, and Spain had accepted it as a guarantee to 
her title in Cuba, — viz., that the destiny of the island 
must be determined by the United States, and could be 
left to no foreign power whatever. This country had 
also virtually pledged itself not to interfere, unless the 
character of Spanish rule in the island or other suffi- 
cient cause should lead to a just war with Spain. 

Previous to this declaration, however, a strong feeling 
in favor of the acquisition of Cuba had arisen in the 
Southern States, whose leaders were moved by a desire 



52 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

to gain more slave territory. For the same reason this 
movement met with opposition in the North. In 1848, 
James Buchanan, secretary of state under President 
Polk, authorized in the name of the President an offer 
to Spain of $100,000,000 for the purchase of Cuba. 
This offer was indignantly refused by Spain, and the 
negotiation ended almost as quickly as it had begun. 
Soon afterwards the Lopez invasion took place. It 
found sympathizers and adherents in the South, many 
Americans joining the expedition. The execution of 
Crittenden's fifty men led to such a show of indignation 
that when the remainder of the party was captured the 
military authorities in Cuba found it convenient to con- 
fine their executions to Lopez and his Cubans, the Ameri- 
cans being released after a term of severe imprisonment. 

Another event that aroused much excitement in this 
country took place in 1850. The Black Warrior, a 
steamer plying between New York and Mobile, which 
was in the habit of stopping at Havana to land and 
receive passengers and mail, but not to take on or 
discharge freight, was seized on a charge of violating 
the customs regulations She had on board nine hun- 
dred and sixty bales of cotton, and in strict accordance 
with the stringent revenue laws at that port should 
have shown a manifest of her cargo. But this would 
have been a mere form, as none of it was moved ; and 
therefore, to save time and trouble, she was entered and 
cleared as "in ballast. ' ' This had taken place no less 
than thirty-six times before, the revenue officers knowing 
the facts and consenting, and it was in accordance with 
a written general order of the Cuban authorities. 

Yet on the occasion in question the vessel was seized 
for alleged violation of law, its cargo confiscated and 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 53 

taken on shore, and a fine of twice its value laid against 
the vessel. Captain Bullock refused to pay any fine, 
protested against the whole proceeding, and when the 
customs authorities forcibly opened the hatches, he 
hauled down his colors, took them with him, and left 
the vessel in the hands of the authorities as a Spanish 
prize. He and his crew and passengers made their 
way home by other vessels to the United States. 

This violent and uncalled-for action raised a storm in 
the United States. The feeling was strongly warlike ; 
but the difficulty was settled by negotiation, Spain 
agreeing to pay an indemnity of $300,000, and doing 
so after five years' delay. The feeling of resentment 
was added to by the action of England and France after 
the failure of the Lopez invasion. They sent orders to 
their admirals in the West Indies to prevent by force 
any new attempt of filibusters to land on the island. 
Mr. Crittenden, then acting secretary of state, emphat- 
ically intimated that any attempt by these countries 
to exercise police powers in American waters might lead 
to serious complications. The orders to the admirals 
were withdrawn. 

The Black Warrior affair and the attitude of the 
European powers named had their natural effect in 
creating a strong annexation sentiment in this country, 
which was greatly strengthened by the desire then enter- 
tained in the South to extend the area of slavery. It 
gave rise to a second attempt to take the island by force, 
—the General Quitman enterprise of 1854, already re- 
ferred to. A secret society devoted to the same purpose, 
the ' ' Order of the Lone Star, ' ' was organized in New 
Orleans, its membership early in 1853 being twenty- 
eight thousand. 



54 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

But the chief method depended upon to gain the 
island was that of purchase, and in this two Presidents 
from the North, Pierce and Buchanan, took a leading 
part. President Pierce proposed the annexation of Cuba 
by purchase early in his term. The most decided move 
in this direction, however, was the celebrated Ostend 
Conference. Under the inspiration of the President's 
desire, three leading American statesmen, Mr. Buchanan, 
Mr. Mason, and Mr. Soule, United States ministers 
respectively to England, France, and Spain, met at 
Ostend, the result of their deliberations being the 
Ostend Manifesto, in which the purchase of Cuba for 
$120,000,000 was strongly recommended, with the 
further declaration that in no event should the island be 
permitted to become subject to any other European 
power than Spain. 

Buchanan, on reaching the Presidency, continued to 
advocate the acquisition of Cuba, asking for an appro- 
priation for its purchase in his first message, and con- 
tinuing to do so in later messages. "It is required," 
he said in i860, " by manifest destiny that the United I 
States should possess Cuba, not by violence, but by 
purchase at a fair price." If the offer was not accepted, 
he did not see how a collision could be avoided. But 
neither Pierce, Buchanan, nor the Ostend confreres 
could induce Congress to act, and no offer was made to 
Spain. After i860, more vital interests at home put an 
end to the scheme until 1868, when the subject of Cuban 
annexation was discussed in the American Senate, but 
no action was taken. 

The insurrection of 1868-78 again brought the subject 
of Cuban annexation into prominence. The shooting of 
the students at Havana in 187 1 sent a thrill of indigna- 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 55 

tion throughout the United States, which was succeeded 
by a decidedly warlike feeling in 1873 in consequence of 
the celebrated Virginius affair. The Virginius had been 
a blockade-runner during the Civil War. She was cap- 
tured and sold at New York to John F. Patterson, an 
American citizen. From 1870 to 1873 this vessel was 
engaged in West Indian waters, under control of a 
Cuban junta, in whose interest she occasionally visited 
the coast of Cuba. On October 31, 1873, while hovering 
off the Cuban coast with a cargo of arms for the insur- 
gents, she was chased and captured by the Spanish 
cruiser Tornado, and brought the next day into the 
harbor of Santiago de Cuba. There were one hundred 
and fifty-five persons on board, mainly with Spanish 
names, though a considerable number of them had 
American names. 

The Virginius carried the flag of the United States, 
and was chartered and cleared as an American vessel. 
She had, therefore, the right to protection as such until 
her claim to show these colors had been disproved. 
Mr. Schmitt, the American vice-consul at Santiago, 
made a prompt assertion of this right, and also de- 
manded proper treatment for any American citizens on 
board ; but the provincial governor treated him with 
great lack of courtesy, and declared that the prisoners 
were pirates, and should be dealt with as such. He even 
refused to the consul the use of the cable to Kingston, 
Jamaica. 

A court-martial to try the prisoners was hastily sum- 
moned. They were as hastily condemned, and a series of 
shootings began, fifty-three of them having been tried 
and executed by the morning of the 8th of November. 
On that morning the British war-ship Niobe, which had 



56 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

been summoned in haste from Kingston by the British 
consul, entered the harbor of Santiago, and, so it is said, 
Captain Lorraine threatened to bombard the town unless 
the executions were stopped at once. There was no 
more shooting. 

The tone assumed by the governor of Santiago was 
copied by the Spanish minister of state when General 
Sickles, United States minister to Spain, entered his 
protest against these sanguinary proceedings. The 
minister was so defiant that General Sickles demanded 
his passports, whereupon Senor Carvajal changed his 
tone, and agreed to give up the vessel and the surviving 
prisoners, salute the American flag, and punish the per- 
petrators of the massacre. This ended the affair. The 
Virginius had no right to fly the American flag, but 
could not well be called to account for her fraud, since 
she and all on board went to the bottom in a storm off 
Cape Fear on their way to the United States. Indem- 
nity was paid to the families of American and British 
citizens who had been executed, but the sanguinary 
governor was never punished. 

Citizens of the United States suffered in other ways 
from the arbitrary methods of the Spaniards, and much 
irritation was occasioned, but the government showed 
no disposition to interfere. Hamilton Fish, secretary of 
state, in a letter to Caleb Cushing, minister to Spain, in 
1875, spoke strongly of the barbarous and useless char- 
acter of the warfare, saying further, ' ' No effective steps 
have been taken to establish reforms or remedy abuses, 
and the effort to suppress the insurrection by force alone 
has been a complete failure." He hinted that the time 
was at hand when it might be necessary to intervene. 

President Grant, in his message of 1875, reviewed the 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 57 

situation, but without recommending any definite action, 
and the government seemed disposed to move with 
great caution. The mild suggestions made were wasted 
on Spain. No attention was paid to them, and the 
insurrection dragged on until both parties, worn out 
with the useless struggle, consented to peace. 

Some further injuries were done to American com- 
merce. Three whaling vessels were fired upon and held 
for a time, their crews being treated with the usual 
brutality by Spanish officials. But these troubles, like 
former ones, were settled by the payment of an indem- 
nity, and the two countries continued in a state of irrita- 
tion, but without a show of open hostility, until the El 
Zanjon treaty of peace put an end to the cause of dissat- 
isfaction. From that time until 1895 things went on 
smoothly. The blank disregard of its engagements on 
the part of Spain was not satisfactory to the American 
sense of honor, but however the Cubans themselves 
might chafe under the injustice done them, the people of 
this country settled down and watched calmly the course 
of events, with its slow but unseen drift towards war. 



CHAPTER III. 

CUBA IN INSURRECTION. 

The end of the war of 1868-78 was followed by the 
exile, voluntary or involuntary, of a large number of 
Cubans, many of whom found new homes in the United 
States, others in the Spanish-American republics and 
non-Spanish West India Islands. Among these were 
Maximo Gomez, the brothers Antonio and Jose Maceo, 
and others of the prominent leaders in the rebellion. 
Despite the pacific terms of the capitulation, these men 
deemed it safest not to remain within reach of Spain, 
particularly after seeing how that country juggled with 
its promised reforms. The number of Cubans in the 
United States is said to have been forty thousand, while 
there were large numbers elsewhere, all inspired by 
active hostility to Spain. 

The spirit of revolution was never permitted to die 
out in the hearts of these exiles. Revolutionary clubs 
or juntas were formed, until about one hundred and forty 
of these existed in North and South America and the 
West Indies. For several years before 1895 these clubs 
were busily engaged in collecting money, buying war- 
supplies, and laying plans. Cuban workmen in the 
United States offered to give one- tenth of their earnings 
towards the fund. There were fire-arms on the island, 
concealed since 1878. Others were smuggled in. Every 
available step of preparation was made, and the revolu- 
53 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 59 

tionists impatiently awaited a suitable opportunity to 
institute a new rebellion. 

The chief organizer of these movements was a Cuban 
named Jose Marti, then in New York. Born in Cuba, 
he had studied at Seville, graduated at Madrid, and 
become a political convict at Havana, finally finding a 
refuge in the United States. Taking advantage of the 
business depression of 1894 in Cuba and the lack of 
employment on the sugar estates, hundreds of men 
being idle through the closing of the mills, Marti fixed 
the date of February 24, 1895, for the outbreak of the 
proposed rebellion, and notified the clubs in Cuba of his 
plan. He promised to bring them aid from outside, and 
for this purpose chartered three vessels, the Lagonda, 
the Amadis, and the Baracoa, which were loaded with 
war-material. This expedition failed, being stopped by 
the United States authorities at Fernandina, Florida. 
About the end of January, 1895, Marti made his way to 
San Domingo, where he entered into communication 
with the old soldier Maximo Gomez, who had taken a 
leading part in the previous war, and was now over 
seventy years of age. Consultations were also held with 
the Maceos, then in Costa Rica, and with other leaders 
of the late rebellion. 

On the appointed day, February 24, 1895, the citi- 
zens of Havana were startled by the report that the 
public order had been disturbed, — a band of rebels, 
twenty-four in number, having appeared in arms at 
Ybarra, in the province of Matanzas. Other small 
bands defied the authorities in other sections of the 
island. Yet the affair at first seemed no more serious 
than a negro riot, and very unlikely to make way against 
the twenty thousand Spanish troops in the island and 



60 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

the sixty thousand Volunteers enrolled. Governor- 
General Calleja hastened to declare martial law in the 
provinces affected, and the outbreaks in Matanzas and 
Santa Clara were soon put down. This was not the case 
in the province of Santiago de Cuba, a thinly-settled, 
mountainous, and densely-wooded district, admirably 
adapted for the guerrilla warfare which the insurgents 
proposed to wage. 

The plans of the conspirators in this province included 
wide-spread conflagrations and the extermination of the 
Spanish officials and soldiery, including the resident 
governor. Though these sanguinary plans were not 
carried out, the activity of the rebels in arms soon con- 
vinced the authorities that the affair was more serious 
than they had supposed, and early in March seven 
thousand troops were sent over from Spain to reinforce 
those in the island, of whom less than half were effective. 
Of the thirteen gunboats on patrol duty along the coast, 
no more than seven were in condition for use. The 
commissary arrangements were so bad as seriously to 
hamper the movements of the troops, and for a time the 
insurgents had it largely their own way, raiding and 
plundering the plantations of loyalists, and vanishing 
into the woods and mountains on the appearance of the 
troops. Many of the plantation hands joined them, and 
their numbers rapidly increased until there were several 
thousand men in arms. 

They were as yet, however, without experienced 
leaders ; but early in April, Antonio Maceo, with his 
brother and twenty-two others of the exiles who had 
taken part in the former war, arrived from Costa Rica, 
landing near Baracoa, not far from the eastern extremity 
of the island. Their progress inward proved a danger- 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 6r 

ous one. Intercepted by a party of Spanish cavalry, 
they had a brisk fight, Maceo finally getting away with 
a bullet-hole through his hat. For ten days the party 
made its way through the country, now seeking places 
of concealment, now forced to fight, and trusting to the 
wild fruits of the woodland for food. So alert were the 
Spanish patrols that in the end Maceo was left with only 
two or three of his original companions. With these he 
fell in with a band of rebels, by whom he was enthusias- 
tically received. 

Maceo, an educated mulatto, had gained a high repu- 
tation for daring and ability during the former conflict, 
his influence being great with the negro contingent of 
the rebellion. He was the only one of the leaders who 
had refused to concur in the capitulation of Zanjon, con- 
tinuing in arms for two months, and finally leaving the 
country without signing the treaty of peace. He now 
put himself at the head of the insurgents in the district 
he had reached, and in several sharp brushes with the 
Spanish, in which he more than held his own, he proved 
that the rebellion had at length gained an able leader. 

Shortly afterwards Jose Marti, the acknowledged head 
of the insurrection, reached Cuba from San Domingo, 
Maximo Gomez and several others coming with him. 
They landed on the southern coast, in a district filled 
with the pickets and patrols of the enemy, and for two 
days they were in great danger, hiding in caves on the 
coast. On the evening of the third day, with five fol- 
lowers, they reached a camp of the rebel army, where 
they were received with an enthusiasm equal to that 
which had greeted Maceo. 

The arrival of these experienced leaders inspirited the 
Cuban patriots, many of whom now joined the ranks, 



62 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

until the patriot army numbered more than six thousand 
men, and bolder operations became possible. It was 
arranged that Marti should return to the United States 
and seek further aid for the revolutionists, leaving the 
command in the able hands of Gomez, who was to ad- 
vance to his old battle-ground of Camaguey, the Cuban 
name for the province of Puerto Principe, while Maceo 
and the others remained in Santiago de Cuba to recruit 
their forces. 

Marti accompanied Gomez some distance on his way, 
and on seeking to return was met by a body of troops, 
before whose fire he fell dead. Gomez, who came to his 
aid, was slightly wounded, and was borne by his men 
from the field. The corpse of Marti was embalmed by 
the Spaniards and taken to the city of Santiago de Cuba, 
where it was given honorable burial. Thus early in the 
war perished the fomenter and organizer of the insur- 
rection, for which he, with his associates, is said to have 
collected a fund of more than a million dollars. 

The rapid growth of the insurrection soon satisfied the 
Spanish authorities in the home government that Calleja 
was not the man for the situation, and Premier Canovas 
had him removed, appointing in his place Martinez Cam- 
pos, who had the prestige of having put an end to the 
previous war, and was looked upon as the ablest general 
of Spain. He reached the island about the middle of 
April, landing at the port of Guantanamo with reinforce- 
ments numbering twenty-five thousand men. 

Great hopes were entertained by the Spanish party 
that the new governor-general would quickly end the 
war. He took hold of affairs with energy, while at the 
same time he sought to conciliate the people, giving em- 
ployment to the laboring population on the roads, and 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 63 

otherwise trying to alleviate the prevailing distress. His 
standard of action, however, was above that of his agents, 
and things soon went wrong. As for the revolutionists, 
they quickly made it apparent that they were not to be 
disarmed by a show of leniency, and their numbers in- 
creased until over ten thousand were in the field, perhaps 
three-fourths of them armed with rifles, though cartridges 
were not abundant. The war went on in the fashion of 
1868. There was no such thing as a battle, though 
skirmishes were of almost daily occurrence. In most of 
these affairs the Spaniards largely outnumbered their 
opponents, and were far superior to them in equipments. 
The insurgents, therefore, fought principally from am- 
bush, being little affected in their consciences by the 
constant reproach of the Spaniards that they would not 
stay still long enough to be killed. They were past- 
masters in the act of vanishing, and were so thoroughly 
familiar with all the by-paths and mountain fastnesses of 
the island that pursuit was usually idle. It was their 
purpose to wear out and worry out their foes, and in this 
they showed excellent skill. 

It may be said here that the strength of the insurgents 
lay largely in their horses. They were admirable horse- 
men, riding like Cossacks or cowboys, and far superior 
in this respect to the Spanish cavalry, few of whom were 
trained to the saddle. Many stories are told of women 
who rode in their ranks and wielded the machete even 
more fiercely than the men, and there is little doubt that 
these stories have some foundation in truth. The favorite 
mode of fighting by the insurgents was to harass the 
Spanish troops with a skirmish fire, in which they sought 
to pick off the officers by sharpshooting ; then, if the 
opportunity presented, they would dash forward in a 



64 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

wild cavalry charge, machete in hand, and seek to make 
havoc in the ranks of the foe. The Maceos excelled in 
this mode of fighting. 

As regards the character of their horses, we are told 
by a newspaper correspondent who visited one of their 
camps: "Horses are tethered about everywhere, and 
stand unsheltered, rain or shine. They are fed on rushes, 
or colla, for no other grain is to be had, and a sore-backed, 
sorry lot they are, though tough and tireless as our own 
bronchos." 

A further extract may fitly be made from the picturesque 
account given by this writer, Mr. Grover Flint, corre- 
spondent of the New York Journal. He says : 

"Camp Sabanas, near Sagua, April i, 1896. — This 
is a real insurgent camp. About me, as I write, are 
standing its swarthy guards, with the silver star on their 
hat-rims and rifles in their hands. It is a permanent 
camp, with a little hospital. Dr. Francisco Domingues, 
of Havana, is stationed here as a special agent of Gen- 
eral Maximo Gomez, not only to attend to the wounded, 
but to forward despatches to the chiefs of insurgent divi- 
sions throughout the Matanzas province. 

"The camp lies in a forest among the foot-hills that 
rise from either side of the valley, reaching from the coast 
to the interior of the island. High mountains and 
swamps, green with rushes and cane, protect it on all 
sides but one. On this side a narrow trail zigzags for a 
league in the woods, barely missing morasses and pitfalls. 
Twenty well-armed men could hold that trail against a 
regiment. The camp itself is tropical and picturesque. 
It is a plateau, thickly overgrown with stunted trees and 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 65 

towering palms, reached by little paths cut with the 
machete. 

"The insurgents live in small huts or wikyups, — ' jack- 
als' they call them here, — built of boughs and saplings 
and thatched with palm-leaves. Rebels against Spain 
must sleep in hammocks, for the ground sweats in the 
Cuban jungle, and white men cannot sleep on it and live. 
At night strange birds sing, queer animals, like over- 
grown rats, look at you from the trees, and great land- 
crabs scurry into their holes at your approach. . . . 

' ' The camp-guard consists of fifty men, exclusive of 
negro camp-servants, armed only with machetes. . . . 
Guards and patrols watch the trail leading from the val- 
ley, and no one is allowed to leave without a pass from 
the commander. Squads of men ride through the coun- 
try at night in search of the 'plateados,' those blood- 
thirsty robbers who were the terror of the country early 
in the war, but who have been almost suppressed by the 
insurgents. When the plateado is caught, he is brought 
into camp and hanged to the nearest tree. 

" It is odd to find soldiers with camp-servants to fetch 
water, cut wood, and perform the acts of personal ser- 
vice ; but the men are active and quick to take the saddle 
on sudden alarm, as I have seen on several occasions 
since my arrival. For simplicity, the life is like that of 
Marion's men in our American Revolution. No coffee, 
no bread ; heated sugar and water at daybreak, sweet 
potatoes and stewed beef at noon, and stewed beef and 
sweet potatoes at night. Beans and rice are luxuries. 
Sugar-cane, sweet and nutritious, does for bread. We eat 
with our fingers and knives down here, with bits of palm- 
bark for plates. Food is plentiful or scarce according to 
the country and to circumstances. That there is no 

5 



66 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

scarcity now is proof that the sympathy of the native 
population is with the insurrection. No man is so poor 
that he cannot cheerfully give food for the army. This 
proves, also, the truth of the saying here that the 
Spaniard owns only the ground he stands on. The 
news of every movement of the Spaniards is quickly 
reported. ' ' 

The death of Marti left Gomez at the head of the in- 
surrectionary movement. But the old rebel leader did 
not find himself in comfortable surroundings. After the 
death of Marti, he wrote despondently : ' ' From that 
moment my position became considerably worse. I 
was without health, without troops, without arms." 
Though determined on the invasion of Camaguey, he 
made the movement " sick not only in body, but in soul 
as well." He had abundant reason for depression. 
" The people of Camaguey," he was informed, "wanted 
no war." To rid themselves of their unwelcome visitor, 
they offered to find him the means to leave the country, 
and proposed to make him re-embark by force if he 
would not do so of good will. 

A still more dangerous phase of the situation was the 
attitude assumed by his men, who did not relish being 
led out of their province into new and strange districts. 
One morning his escort drew up their horses to a halt, 
declaring that they would go no farther, and demanding 
to be led back to their native province. 

" It cost me trouble to reduce them to obedience,'' 
writes Gomez. "Three days later," he continues, "a 
traitor presented himself to the enemy and informed him 
of my situation, and again my escort insisted upon their 
proposition not to follow me. In vain their own officer 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 67 

in command interposed his authority ; the soldiers re- 
fused to obey. Then, indignant, I rebuked them 
severely, calling them disloyal and bad companions. 
1 Return to the East,' said I to them. ' I alone will go 
to Camaguey. ' " 

General Borrero addressed them still more indignantly. 
4 ' General Gomez is a foreigner," he said, "who has 
come to help us in this holy war, and you wish to aban- 
don him while sick and pursued by the enemy. If that 
is the way you act, then the whole world can say with 
reason that you are cowards." 

This and more of the same kind of argument finally 
induced the soldiers to go on; but Gomez was " troubled 
with the most terrible doubts. ' ' His hopes revived on 
learning that Campos had ' ' urged that his march should 
be stopped at all hazards, ' ' for, if he entered Camaguey, 
Spain might consider her cause lost. 

The period spoken of was that of the greatest depres- 
sion in the old soldier's career. His invasion of Ca- 
maguey proved highly successful, the Spaniards being 
beaten at every point, while abundant spoil fell into 
the hands of the patriots, and they had every reason for 
encouragement. 

Gomez now developed his plan of campaign. The 
patriot bands were given the following general orders : 
They were, first, to attack the small posts held by the 
Spaniards, making every effort to obtain arms, and setting 
free every prisoner who would deliver his weapons ; 
second, they were to cut all railway and telegraph lines ; 
third, they were to keep on the defensive, and to retreat 
in small groups unless they had the advantage ; fourth, 
all forts or buildings from which any resistance was made 
were to be destroyed ; fifth, all crops of sugar-cane 



68 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

and all sugar-mills were to be destroyed unless their 
owners contributed to the Cuban war-fund ; sixth, the 
farmers were forbidden to send any food to the cities 
without paying taxes on the same to the insurgents. 

Campos took steps to counteract the insurgent plan by 
ordering the division of certain regiments into detach- 
ments to protect the sugar-estates, while other detach- 
ments were stationed along the railroads and placed on 
every moving train. He further ordered an attack to be 
made on every band of rebels encountered that did not 
more than three times outnumber the troops, directing 
his officers to set free all who surrendered, and to pro- 
vide convoys for food sent to the towns. 

The war in 1895 was one of skirmishes innumerable, 
only a single affair reaching the dignity of a battle. 
This was of interest from the fact that Maceo and Cam- 
pos were the opposing leaders. Maceo had greatly 
annoyed his foes by attacks on train-loads of supplies for 
the fortified town of Bayamo, in the district of Santiago 
de Cuba, and it was deemed necessary to drive him 
from the field. Several Spanish columns were put in 
movement against him from different quarters. Campos 
led one of these, a force of fifteen hundred men, from 
Manzanillo, and on July 13 came upon the foe, about 
two thousand seven hundred strong, well posted on a 
stock-farm several miles from Bayamo. The plan of 
Maceo was to attack the centre division, under Campos, 
but by an error the assault was made on the advance 
guard, led by General Santocildes, upon which fell a 
sharp fire from the wooded hill-sides. Santocildes fell 
dead, and a rebel bullet tore the heel from the boot of the 
governor-general. 

The confusion in the Spanish ranks, due to the fall of 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 69 

Santocildes, convinced Maceo that they had lost some 
important officer, and he at once made a vigorous 
machete charge, hoping to win a decisive victory. He 
was repulsed. But Campos, finding the situation critical, 
felt obliged to draw up his whole force into a hollow 
square, using as breastworks the wagons and the dead 
horses and mules. For several hours the Cubans raged 
around this strong formation, the Spaniards being saved 
from a disastrous rout only by the presence and the 
generalship of Campos. An assault had been made on 
the rear-guard early in the affray, Maceo hoping to 
capture the ammunition-train. But these troops de- 
fended themselves vigorously and fought their way to 
the main body, where they aided in the formation of the 
square. The Spaniards finally succeeded in reaching 
Bayamo, having suffered heavily in the fight and been 
pursued to the environs of the town. Maceo' s lack of 
artillery saved them from total destruction, and Campos 
did not venture to leave his place of refuge until he had 
gathered around him a powerful force. 

The advance of Gomez into Camaguey brought him 
into communication with the venerable Salvador Cis- 
neros, who had discarded his title of Marquis de Santa 
Lucia to accept the presidency of the Cuban republic 
during the former insurrection, and was as ardent a 
revolutionist as ever. Marti had, upon landing in Cuba, 
issued a call for a constitutional convention, in conse- 
quence of which Cisneros and other Cuban leaders had 
come together, twenty representatives being sent from 
the provinces and twenty from the army. The conven- 
tion met on September 13, 1895, adopted a constitution 
on the 1 6th, and on the iSth elected the following execu- 
tive officers : 



70 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

President, Salvador Cisneros Betancourt. 
Vice-President, Bartolome Maso. 
Secretary of State, Rafael Portuondo. 
Secretary of War, Carlos Roloff. 
Secretary of the Treasury, Severo Pina. 
General-in-Chief, Maximo Gomez. 
Lieutenant-General, Antonio Maceo. 

Cuba was divided by this constitution into five states. 
Laws were passed regulating various government affairs, 
establishing post-offices, providing for the collection of 
taxes, etc., the whole forming a fairly complete govern- 
ment on paper, though one few of whose functions could 
be exercised. The tradition is that the seat of govern- 
ment was fixed at Cubitas, a mythical station on a 
mountain-top, approachable only by a spiral track, 
which a corporal's guard could defend against an army. 
But this stronghold probably existed only in imagina- 
tion, and the government seems to have been a per- 
ambulatory one, though having its head-quarters in the 
Cubitas mountain district. 

At the end of the constitutional two years' term of 
office, in October, 1897, a new government was elected, 
Bartolome Maso being now chosen President, Dr. Do- 
mingo M. Capote Vice-President, and Jose B. Aleman 
Secretary of War. Various other departmental officers 
were chosen, General Gomez was reappointed Com- 
mander-in-Chief, and Calixto Garcia was appointed 
Lieutenant-General. 

In November, 1895, Maceo left Santiago de Cuba to 
join Gomez, who had made his way westward into 
the province of Santa Clara, where, on November 19 
and 20, he fought a severe battle at Taguasco, in which 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 71 

he gained a decided advantage over General Valdez and 
his men. The much-vaunted trocha lay in Maceo's 
way, but he made short work of it. He simulated an 
attack on this line of defence, and, as soon as the 
Spaniards were concentrated upon the threatened point, 
he crossed an unprotected part of the line without firing 
a shot or losing a man. 

Campos had concentrated twenty-five thousand troops 
in Santa Clara, but these failed to keep back the insur- 
gents, who shrewdly availed themselves of their old 
guerrilla tactics, advancing in small columns, which held 
the enemy in check by pretended attacks, while the 
main body slipped onward with its pack-trains. In this 
way the provinces of Santa Clara and Matanzas were 
successfully crossed and that of Havana entered, the 
war being by this daring movement brought nearly to 
the gates of the capital. Gomez had succeeded in ob- 
taining a few pieces of artillery, and the insurgent army 
no longer felt obliged to lurk in the woods and the long 
grass. 

During the year 1895 the Spanish government had 
sent more than one hundred thousand troops across the 
ocean, to which the Volunteers added a strong contin- 
gent available for garrison duty. But there had been 
heavy losses through disease and combat, and the hos- 
pitals were full of the sick. It is impossible to say how 
many rebels were in the field. They have been variously 
estimated at from thirty thousand to fifty thousand, but 
may have been considerably less in number. This is 
certain, the present war was a far more serious affair 
than the former one, while the methods adopted by the 
Cuban leaders were more destructive of the Spanish 
strength and less easy to overcome. As the year pro- 



72 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

gressed towards its end, the orders of Gomez were more 
fully carried out. Trains were wrecked and bridges 
blown up with dynamite, tracks were torn up and tele- 
graph lines cut, contributions were forced from the 
planters to secure their crops from the torch, and taxes 
were collected upon food-supplies sent to the cities. 

Fighting went on almost daily, but it was of the old 
kind. The insurgents would not fight unless they had 
the advantage in number or position. Every foot of 
ground was known to them, while nearly the whole 
population served them as spies. All the negroes and 
most of the whites were their friends, and they had 
timely warning of every movement of their foes. The 
Spanish outposts and columns were perpetually exposed 
to sudden and sharp assaults, the Cuban soldiers making 
off before an effective blow could be dealt them in return. 

By the end of the year the Cuban forces were firmly 
established in Havana province, where they gained rein- 
forcements from the negro field-hands and Cuban youths. 
The bandits, of whom a considerable number had arisen, 
taking toll from both parties alike, were hanged by the 
insurgents wherever captured. The fighting was princi- 
pally done by Maceo, Gomez occupying himself in the 
more effective work of depriving Spain of the sinews of 
war by burning cane-fields and destroying railroads. 

In January, 1896, a still further advance was made, 
Maceo leading his men into Pinar del Rio, the most 
westerly province of Cuba, into which insurrection had 
never before made its way. Thus within a year the 
Cuban revolution had spread from end to end of the 
island, the Spanish being left in possession only of the 
cities, while all the country was in insurgent hands or in 
a state of turmoil and insecurity. Gomez marched 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 73 

where he would and burned the crops of planters who 
sought to grind their cane, until the sky around the 
capital was filled with smoke by day and lurid at night 
with the flames of blazing fields. 

The campaign of Campos had proved an utter failure. 
But, despite the severe criticism to which he was ex- 
posed, he refused to depart from his humane policy and 
make war upon non-combatants. In consequence, the 
demand for his recall and replacement by a man who 
would conduct the war with less regard to the feelings 
of the people grew urgent, and at length was responded 
to. He was ordered home, and sailed for Spain January 
17, 1S96, leaving General Sabis Marin in temporary 
authority until his successor should arrive. 

We may somewhat briefly conclude our record of 
the events of the war before describing more particularly 
the system upon which it was conducted and the peculi- 
arly Spanish method of dealing with a colonial revolu- 
tion. The new governor-general, General Valeriano 
Weyler y Nicolau, Marquis of Tenerife, to give him his 
full title, reached Havana February 10, 1896, greatly to 
the satisfaction of the ultra- Spanish party, who now 
looked to see vigorous methods introduced and the 
island quickly swept clear of the scum of rebellion which 
had swept over it from end to end. They were destined 
to disappointment. The Weyler trumpet was blown 
very loudly, but its noise proved only empty air. 

General Weyler had won the deep hatred of the 
Cubans by the atrocious deeds which he was said to 
have committed in Camaguey during the former war. 
In his military career during the disturbances in Spain 
and in the African war against the Moors he was a 
favorite lieutenant of the brutal chief Valmaseda, under 



74 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

whom he gained a reputation for barbarous cruelty. 
His fame in this direction preceded him to Cuba, and 
his career there fully sustained his reputation, the cruelty 
exercised towards the helpless non-combatants having 
rarely been surpassed in the history of war. 

At present, however, we propose to deal only with 
warlike events, leaving methods to be considered later. 
Governor- General Weyler began by promising to clear 
the provinces near Havana of rebels in arms and let 
peaceful industry take its course. He was not long in 
discovering that he had a bold and active enemy to deal 
with. Hardly had he entered upon his office when 
Maceo returned from Pinar del Rio and swooped down 
on the city of Jaruco, which he looted and burned. 
Gomez joined him, and the two resumed their former 
course, burning cane, exacting tribute, and otherwise 
disturbing the enemy. The Cuban leaders had an- 
nounced in December, 1895, their purpose to stop pro- 
duction and commerce, and thus deprive the Spanish 
government of the revenues of the island. In carrying 
out this policy Gomez had made his march through the 
rich sugar districts, destroying as he went and leaving 
ashes and desolation behind him. Maceo had wreaked 
similar ruin in the wealthy tobacco districts of Pinar del 
Rio, burning and destroying and forcing the helpless 
laborers either to join his ranks or seek subsistence in 
the cities. The work of ' ' concentration' ' was thus 
began by the insurgents themselves. 

Weyler' s warlike energy proved to be more show than 
substance. He sent his infantry to pursue the cane- 
burning insurgents, but beyond the murder of non- 
combatants little was accomplished. He sent troops 
into Pinar del Rio, where they met no great opposition, 






THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 75 

and the world was informed that this province was paci- 
fied. Yet his proclamation had hardly been made before 
Maceo was back there again. On March 13, 1896, the 
dashing mulatto leader had entered and burnt the port 
of Batabano, on the southern coast, and before Weyler's 
troops could reach him he was in the ' ' pacified' ' prov- 
ince. Here he made his head-quarters in the mountains 
and bade defiance to all the power of Spain. 

Now was the time for Weyler to show his military 
skill, but in this he signally failed. Instead of pursuing 
his defiant foe persistently with cavalry and using bodies 
of infantry to occupy the country and cut off his retreat, 
he wasted his strength in the old exercise of trocha- 
building, extending a defensive line across the island 
from Mariel to Majana, a work which it took two months 
to construct and fifteen thousand soldiers to guard, a 
force sufficient, one would think, to have cleared the 
province of insurgents. 

Meanwhile, Maceo held the province almost unop- 
posed. By May 1 only four fortified cities were left to 
Spain in its southern part, and these were crowded with 
refugees. Weyler refused to do anything to aid these 
unfortunates, and the operating columns which he sent 
into the province were defeated in almost every engage- 
ment. Gomez meanwhile withdrew his forces to Cama- 
guey, where, with five hundred followers, he met and 
defeated General Castillanos with two thousand troops. 
Two hundred men were killed and wounded on the side 
of the Spaniards, while the insurgents had but ten killed 
in this affair. 

Though Maceo showed a humane disposition, Bermu- 
dez, one of his lieutenants, an ex-bandit, established a 
reign of terror in the district controlled by him, murder- 



76 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

ing men on the slightest pretext, and forcing the inhabi- 
tants to seek refuge in the fortified places until the 
country was practically depopulated. The autumn cam- 
paign was opened by Weyler in person, he marching 
into Pinar del Rio at the head of thirty thousand men, 
with the determination of starving or driving out the foe. 
While he did not succeed in this purpose, the province, 
through the double destruction achieved by the Cubans 
and the Spanish, was rendered incapable of supporting 
a large force, and Maceo's negro followers dwindled 
away. In consequence, leaving his slender following 
under Rius Rivera, the daring leader passed in a boat 
around Weyler s trocha into Havana province, having 
sent orders in advance for a concentration of the Cuban 
forces in this and Matanzas province. While waiting 
for these forces, on December 4, 1896, he, with his few 
followers, was fired on by soldiers in ambush, and fell, 
mortally wounded. Dr. Zertucha, of his staff, is charged 
with having treacherously led him into this ambuscade, 
though this is far from certain. Thus perished the 
most daring warrior of the Cuban conflict. His eight 
brothers had all died before him in the struggle for 
Cuban freedom. His body was recovered from the 
enemy after a desperate fight ; his valiant soul was lost 
to the cause. 

The death of Maceo and the capture of Rivera, which 
soon after took place, practically put an end to military 
operations in Pinar del Rio, and on January n, 1897, 
Weyler proclaimed that the three western provinces 
were pacified and the rebellion confined to the eastern 
section of the island. Gomez had withdrawn into Cama- 
guey, where he held his own, the members of the Cuban 
government being with him. After announcing that the 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 77 

provinces were "pacified," Weyler set out to pacify 
them. Pinar del Rio was actively patrolled by his 
troops, and he entered upon a campaign through Ma- 
tanzas. Here he met with no insurgents in arms, but 
treated the country- people as rebels, ruthless devastation 
marking his line of march. The decree of concentra- 
tion which he had issued was vigorously enforced, the 
country-people being driven into the towns, their dwel- 
lings burned, and everything destroyed that could in 
any way aid or shelter the insurgents. All those against 
whom the shadow of suspicion rested were killed on the 
spot and set down as rebels slain in battle in the absurd 
bulletins which Weyler constantly issued. Eventually, 
disturbed by the protests in the United States against 
his barbarity, he issued an order that no sentence of 
death should be carried out without his signature. But 
this did not put an end to the bulletins of battles in 
which a Spaniard or two were wounded and ten or more 
rebels killed, and which at once excited the derision of 
the world and the indignation of those who believed that 
these so-called engagements were really massacres of 
unarmed "pacificos." Weyler was rapidly earning 
contempt by his rodomontade and hatred by his cruelty. 
The Spanish army reached the city of Santa Clara in 
February, 1897. Here, finding no large body of insur- 
gents to oppose his progress, Weyler sent out columns 
of infantry to burn and destroy, afterwards crossing the 
province back and forth to see if his orders had been 
well obeyed. By the end of the month his troops had 
reached the fertile valleys of the mountains between 
Santa Clara and Trinidad, a region in which the Cubans 
had large supplies. Their system of government em- 
braced a prefecture it being the duty of the prefect in 



78 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

each district to claim control of all supplies, using them 
for the troops as needed and paying the owners in re- 
ceipts for the goods taken. This system had been well 
organized in the district mentioned, and the troops 
found here herds of cattle, which they drove away ; 
coffee- and potato-plants, which they destroyed ; and 
hospitals, which they burned. Non-combatants were 
forced to take to the woods. If captured, they were 
killed or taken with the women and children to fortified 
towns, there to suffer the slower death of starvation. 

Gomez, meanwhile, was playing a waiting game, 
knowing that the fury of Weyler's assault would soon 
subside. He had no commissary department, and his 
men were divided up into small bands, coming and 
going much as they pleased, planting and gathering 
their rapidly growing crops, and simply keeping within 
call that they might concentrate in the main camps if 
any movement in force should be undertaken. During 
their longer marches, they had to trust to their chance 
of living off the country. The two eastern provinces of 
Santiago de Cuba and Puerto Principe continued in 
their hands throughout the war. The only district held 
by the Spaniards in Santiago province was that of 
Bayamo, and this was retained only at severe cost in 
lives and strenuous effort. The cutting of the railroad 
to the north more than once reduced the garrison of 
Bayamo to the verge of starvation, while the supplies 
which it obtained by boat up the Rio Cauto were inter- 
fered with by the insurgents, who in January, 1897, blew 
up a Spanish gunboat in that river with a torpedo 
operated by means of an electric wire from the bordering 
woods. It was the effort to hold this town that led to the 
battle between Maceo and Campos, already described. 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 79 

The principal demonstrations of the insurgents during 
1897 were made by the forces under General Calixto 
Garcia, like Gomez a veteran of the ten-years' war, and 
now second in command. He had reached Cuba from 
the United States in the spring of 1897. The only 
military operation of the year on the part of the insur- 
gents that calls for particular attention was the capture 
by Garcia of the strongly fortified post of Victoria de 
las Tunas, northwest of Bayamo, September 30. The 
siege of this place continued for three days, during which 
the Spanish commander was slain and forty per cent, of 
the garrison were killed or wounded, the remainder sur- 
rendering. Garcia' s success must be attributed to his 
possession of artillery, he having two heavy and six 
rapid-fire guns, which were handled by American artil- 
lerymen. One of the latter estimated the spoils of the 
victory to be " twenty-one forts, over a thousand rifles, 
a million rounds of ammunition, and two Krupp can- 
non." The post had been declared impregnable by 
Weyler, and its fall exposed him to severe criticism in 
Madrid. 

In truth, Weyler had been losing ground with the 
home government throughout the year. The indigna- 
tion roused in the United States by his cruelty had pro- 
duced a feeling of uneasiness in Spain, whose people 
seemed far more affected by this protest than by the 
cruelty itself. And it was growing evident that Wey- 
ler' s severity was little more effective than Campos' s 
clemency. The rebels continued unsubdued, the high- 
sounding war-bulletins were being derided in foreign 
newspapers as transparent fictions, and there was im- 
minent danger that the era of Weylerism might provoke 
armed intervention from the United States. 



8o THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

Canovas, the prime minister who had appointed Wey- 
ler, continued to sustain him, but the Liberal party in 
Spain was gaining power at the expense of the Conser- 
vatives, and on August 6, 1897, the assassination of 
Canovas by an Anarchist left Weyler without support in 
the administration. After a brief interval the Liberals 
came into power on October 4, under their leader Sagasta, 
one of whose first acts was to order Weyler home. The 
chief reason offered for this step was ' ' the deplorable 
condition of the sick and wounded soldiers arriving from 
Cuba." In fact, the principal losses to Spain during the 
war in Cuba had been from disease, the field operations 
being largely a series of inconsequential skirmishes with 
little loss to either side. 

Weyler' s successor was General Ramon Blanco, late 
governor-general of the Philippine Islands, and a man 
of very different character from his predecessor. He 
reached Havana October 31, 1897, and at once attempted 
to put into effect the milder policy which had been de- 
cided upon at Madrid. He had announced, " My policy 
will never include concentration. I fight the enemy, not 
women and children. One of the first things I shall do 
will be to greatly extend the zones of cultivation, and 
allow the reconcentrados to go out of the towns and till 
the soil. ' ' 

But it was easier to promise than to perform. The 
starving reconcentrados were in no condition to wait 
until nature should return food in exchange for their 
labor. The amnesty proclamation issued by Blanco was 
unheeded by the insurgents. They had lost all faith in 
Spanish clemency, and did not propose to lay down their 
arms. The autonomous administration which he sought 
to establish was a similar failure. The insurgents would 





Aclm. Patricio Montojo 



Adm. Pascual Cervera 





Gen. Linares 



Gen. Ramon Blanco 





■ '- w 


^^ 


it •* s - H 

lit if- Ja 




Hyk/mm/fli 1 








Gen. Valeriano Weyler Gen. Martinez de Campos 

SPANISH COMMANDERS 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 81 

have no autonomy. " Independence or death" was their 
sole demand. Gomez issued a warning that any person 
coming to his camps with offers of autonomy should be 
shot as a spy ; and this severe order was carried out in 
the case of Lieutenant-Colonel Ruiz, who sought the 
camp of General Aranguren and persisted in offering 
autonomy to the men after being warned of the conse- 
quences. Aranguren, although his personal friend, 
ordered him to execution. That decisive event put an 
end to the scheme of home rule under a Spanish gov- 
ernor-general. 

With the offers of amnesty and home government was 
mingled an attempt to bribe the Cuban leaders to desert 
their men. This met with a still less favorable recep- 
tion, and several of those who sought to tempt the 
leaders to dishonor were dealt with as Ruiz had been. 

Meanwhile the war had fallen back into its old condi- 
tion of outpost skirmishes and indecisive conflicts, and 
to all appearance the task of putting down the insurrec- 
tion was no more advanced than in the spring of 1895, 
though Spain had sent two hundred thousand soldiers to 
Cuba and had almost fallen into bankruptcy through 
her futile efforts. Thus events drifted on into the year 
1898. 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE FORTS AND THE TROCHAS. 

The account of the leading events of the insurrection 
given in the preceding chapter is but half the story. The 
methods of conducting the war by the Spaniards were 
there little more than hinted at, it being deemed advisable 
to reserve them for a more detailed separate description. 
This it is proposed to give in the present chapter. Why 
it is that an army of more than two hundred thousand 
regulars, with a contingent force of some sixty thousand 
volunteers, could be held at bay for three years by a 
body of insurgents certainly never numbering over fifty 
thousand, and most of the time, in all probability, far 
below that number, and this in an island of comparatively 
small dimensions, is a mystery which has sorely puzzled 
the lookers-on. It seems evident that there has been 
something radically wrong in the conduct of the war by 
its three successive generals, for such strenuous efforts 
on the part of Spain to yield such meagre results. A 
consideration of the mode in which the war was conducted 
may serve to make more apparent the cause of Spain's 
signal failure. 

Certainly, no very decisive result can ever be looked 
for from guerrilla warfare. As a defensive expedient, 
adopted to protract a combat, it has its uses, and the 
Cubans, with their inferior forces, were wise in employ- 
ing it. They had no hope of mastering Spain in the 
field, but entertained a reasonable expectation of wearing 
82 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 83 

her out in the bush, and of forcing her at length to retire 
from the contest through sheer lack of money and men. 
These hardy bush-rangers preferred to let disease do its 
work on the unacclimated lives of Spain and save their 
small supply of cartridges for sheer necessity. The yel- 
low fever could be trusted as a more effective ally of their 
cause than the Mauser rifle. 

But why the Spanish commanders adopted the same 
mode of warfare is difficult of comprehension, unless it 
be that this is the intuitive Spanish idea of war. In the 
early years of the nineteenth century, during the Napo- 
leonic contests, the Spanish forces conducted war in the 
guerrilla method. In its closing years they adopted 
the same method in their contest with the Cuban insur- 
rectionists. In all their wars of the century, in fact, the 
guerrilla system seems to have held predominance ; and 
it may be that Spain's loss of all her American colonies 
was due to a lack of breadth, boldness, and energy of 
movement in dealing with the rebel forces. The Spanish 
soldier does not want in courage, but the Spanish com- 
mander seems sadly lacking in military genius. 

With a quarter of a million of men at their command, 
Campos or Weyler should, one would think, have been 
able to construct a net-work of military roads from end 
to end of the island with no more effort than was ex- 
pended in building forts and trochas. And with such 
facilities provided for rapid movements in force they 
should certainly have succeeded in keeping the small 
bodies of insurgents in check and in penetrating all 
their lurking-places. It is easy, of course, for civilian 
generals to win battles on paper, and the easier the less 
they are familiar with the facts of the situation ; yet it 
may be taken as beyond question that if the Spanish 



84 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

troops had been replaced by an American, British, 
German, or French army, with almost any one of the 
skilled commanders now in those armies, the mode of 
campaigning and the result would have been far different 
from those which Spain has to show. 

The trocha and the fort, trusted to by Spain as her 
principal means of success, seem to have been her prin- 
cipal causes of failure. An account of these expedients, 
upon which so much dependence was placed, comes next 
in course. The trocha is simply a passage-way made 
across a country without regard to its topography or its 
other roads. The word trocha means trench, and sus- 
tains this meaning in some of the military lines con- 
structed in Cuba, though not in all. The idea of the 
trocha was first conceived in the insurrection of 1868-78 
as a military cordon across the island, with detached 
forts at short intervals, its purpose being to hem in the 
insurrectionists and confine them to a limited region of 
the island, — a purpose in which it signally failed. 

This original trocha crossed the island between the 
provinces of Puerto Principe and Santa Clara, the dis- 
tance across at this point being less than fifty miles and 
the country elevated but little above sea-level, the moun- 
tains here sinking into the plain. The flanks of this 
military line rested in the tangled mangrove swamps of 
the coast. The forts were garrisoned, and small detach- 
ments of troops occupied the spaces between ; but the 
device proved of little value, Gomez, as if in derision, 
crossing it with his wife and servants. 

Campos no sooner took command in 1895 than he 
revived the idea of confining his foes by a trocha, con- 
structing it across the same region as before, fifty thou- 
sand men being employed in the task. It was barely 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 85 

finished when Gomez crossed it at Sancti Spiritus and 
carried the war into Santa Clara. Maceo followed him, 
as already stated, by means of a feigned attack, and 
Campos, thinking his trocha too far from the capital, 
built a second, this extending between Las Cruces and 
Las Lajas and skirting the great salt marsh of Zapata. 
It proved as ineffectual as the former, and Campos found 
it expedient to continue his retreat, defending his rear 
by a third trocha, which crossed the island between 
Matanzas and La Broa Bay, a distance of only twenty- 
eight miles. This line had a new means of defence, it 
being traversed by the railroad from Havana to Bata- 
bano, on whose tracks were placed a series of perambu- 
latory forts in the form of freight-cars plated with boiler 
iron and pierced with loop-holes for rifles. All the rail- 
roads were provided with similar cars, which were sent 
with all passenger trains and kept in motion night and 
day. But Gomez and Maceo showed their appreciation 
of the Spanish general' s device by crossing the ' ' iron 
dead-line" with all their forces without firing a shot. 
Then they rode back and tore up some three miles of 
the railroad track, "Just to let the Spaniards know," 
said Gomez, " that we have noticed their toy." 

Weyler, on coming into power, accepted the idea of 
the trocha as a valuable inheritance from his predecessor, 
and soon after reaching the island set his men to con- 
structing one to the westward of Havana, with the 
expectation of shutting up Maceo in Pinar del Rio. 
This extended from Mariel, about twenty-five miles from 
the capital, to Majana, on the southern coast, a distance 
of about twenty miles. He also made one on the old 
line between Jucaro and Moron, in the western part of 
the province of Puerto Principe. 



86 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

The trocha upon which Weyler depended to cut the 
rebel army in two and shut up Maceo effectually in Pinar 
del Rio can be described in a few words. In construct- 
ing this military line the forest and dense underbrush 
were cut down through a width of from one hundred to 
eight hundred yards. Along this passage-way a barbed- 
wire fence nearly four feet high was erected, behind 
which the sentinels were posted. Forty yards back of 
it was a trench three feet wide and four feet deep, with a 
breastwork of palmetto logs. Fifty yards farther back 
were the log houses which served as quarters for the 
troops. These were built at intervals of from five hun- 
dred to eight hundred yards, being constructed of logs 
with dressed lumber on the outside. A narrow opening 
ran round the fort to permit firing, and near the top was 
an opening three feet wide to admit the air. Each fort 
had a garrison of about one hundred men, the whole 
line being guarded by about fifteen thousand soldiers. 
A platform of palm-boards, eight feet wide, was built 
where the line penetrated the swamp, the huts being 
there erected on piles. The soldiers never left the forts 
or platform to explore the swamp, but fired upon every 
person they saw near the line, taking it for granted that 
all intruders were enemies. It was through the swamp 
that the insurgents usually passed the line. Maceo 
made the passage that led to his death by aid of a 
boat. 

The trocha from Jucaro to Moron presented some differ- 
ences, the ditch being absent. The cleared space through 
the tropical forest was here some fifty miles long and 
about two hundred yards wide, the felled trees being 
piled up along the two sides of the roadway in parallel 
rows to a height of six feet or more. No man could 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 87 

cross this breastwork of jagged roots and branches with- 
out difficulty, and no horse could make its way across. 
A military railroad extended the whole length of the 
cleared space, on one side of which was the line of forts, 
and beyond this the barbed-wire fence. On the two 
sides were the barriers of fallen trees, with the jungle 
beyond. 

There were three kinds and sizes of forts along the 
trocha, — large ones half a mile apart, smaller block- 
houses midway between these, and in each of the quarter- 
mile intervals three little forts of mud and planks, each 
surrounded by a ditch and holding five men. The 
barbed wire was closely interlaced, there being over 
four hundred yards of wire to every twelve yards of 
posts. Entrance to the larger forts was obtainable only 
by the aid of ladders, which could be raised from the 
inside ; and there was provided an overhanging story 
with loop-holes through which the defenders could fire 
down upon a foe below. The Spaniards also distributed 
bombs along the trocha, each with an explosive cap to 
which five or six wires were attached, so that they might 
be exploded by any one striking a wire. This was a 
device that seemed likely to prove as dangerous to the 
defenders as to their enemies. 

As to the utility of the trochas, Consul- General Lee 
tells us that they cost a large amount of money and were 
in the end practically abandoned as useless. They had 
the serious defect of absorbing a large force of men for 
their defence, to this extent diminishing the effective 
Spanish army. 

A second Spanish military measure, the fort (aside 
from those along the trochas), added seriously to the 
depletion of the force effective for field duty. In the 



88 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

words of Richard Harding Davis,* the Spaniards, as 
soon as the revolution broke out, ' ' began to build tiny- 
forts, and continued to add to these and improve those 
already built, until now the whole island, which is eight 
hundred miles long and averages eighty miles in width, 
is studded as thickly with these little forts as is the sole 
of a brogan with iron nails. . . . These forts now stretch 
all over the island, some in straight lines, some in circles, 
and some zigzagging from hill-top to hill-top ; some 
within a quarter of a mile of the next, and others so near 
that the sentries can toss a cartridge from one to the 
other." 

Within these forts and the fortified towns and cities 
the Spaniards held absolute possession. Outside them — 
that is, in all the rest of the country — the Cubans were 
masters of the situation, not in fixed possession, but 
able to make it uncomfortable for any intruders on their 
domain. The towns were surrounded by successive 
circles of forts, with detached ones farther out, no person 
being allowed to leave a town without a pass, or to enter 
one without giving a satisfactory account of himself. 
Any one venturing outside the circle without authority 
rendered himself a rebel, and was likely soon to be made 
"food for powder." 

In all, Cuba possessed two thousand or more such 
forts, structures impervious to rifle-shots and loop-holed 
for service. They stood upon every commanding place 
and formed a feature in the landscape hardly second to 
the royal palm, that dominating characteristic of Cuban 
scenery. With the long range of their rifles the Spanish 
soldiery could command a wide reach of territory from 

* " Cuba in War Time." 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 89 

these strongholds, but they were such wretched marks- 
men that the insurgents had little fear in venturing close 
up. The marksmanship on either side, indeed, had 
little to boast of. 

It will be seen that the Spaniards were specially active 
in defensive measures. These were well enough in 
themselves, but of little value in suppressing an insur- 
rection unless supplemented by active offensive opera- 
tions. From their forts one would think it should have 
been their policy to follow the enemy and give him 
battle wherever found, but this is an idea that does not 
seem to have deeply penetrated the Spanish cerebrum. 
Bodies of guerrillas and columns of troops left the forts 
often enough, but they seemed to regard it as their duty 
to fall back upon their strongholds every night. If they 
encountered a body of the enemy, a fusillade would 
follow ; but to pursue a flying enemy did not form a 
part of their policy, and instead of encamping on the 
ground and following the retreating foe the next day, 
they invariably retreated after the battle to the shelter of 
a neighboring town or circle of forts. Their excuse for 
this was that they were afraid of being decoyed into an 
ambush, or that they could not forsake their wounded 
to pursue the enemy. A force of as many as a thousand 
soldiers might carry back a few wounded men, making 
this their sole pretense for a return. 

In truth, there is good reason to believe that the 
Spanish officers were not eager to end the rebellion, and 
that much of the failure of Campos and Weyler was due 
to the character of the tools they had to handle. The 
officers preferred to have the war go on, as they received 
double pay while on foreign service, while promotion 
was much more rapid than in times of peace. Orders 



9 o THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

and crosses are also freely distributed, often for small 
service. They seem to have emulated the civil officials 
in forcing loans or fees from planters and others, and are 
believed to have kept for themselves a large part of the 
pay of their men. The government suffered from their 
peculations, it being a common practice to report a con- 
siderable consumption of rations and expenditure of 
cartridges ' ' in service, ' ' when perhaps only a few huts 
had been burned and the command had come back in 
time for dinner. The officers played constantly into one 
another's hands in thus hoodwinking the government. 
Such is the strange Spanish sense of honor. A soldier 
may be quite ready to die for his country, but is quite 
as ready to rob it. 

In illustration of the character of the officers' reports, 
some extracts from war-bulletins may be of interest. 
Here is a typical Spanish story : 

"The Guadalajara battalion, while marching to San 
Miguel, met a party of six hundred rebels, commanded 
by Aguirre and Morejon. A fierce fight ensued, result- 
ing, it is said, in the rebels being so thoroughly beaten 
that they fled demoralized from the field. The rebel 
loss was stated to have been sixty, including fourteen 
killed. The Spanish troops were reported to have lost 
one officer and three soldiers wounded." 

The Cubans tell this story with a difference : 

1 ' The affair was similar to others in which ' Pacifi- 
cos,' or peaceful citizens, have been killed by Spanish 
troops. Fourteen of the dead are said to have been 
employes on estates, and not insurgents. On the 
Spanish side none were killed and only three wounded, 
while the Cuban dead exceeded thirty." 

Numerous examples of this kind might be quoted in 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 91 

which the discrepancy of losses was so great as to be- 
come ridiculous. It was easier to lie than to fight. We 
quote again : 

"Colonel Hernandez reports having a fight with the 
rebel bands of Masso and Acea near San Felipe. The 
enemy occupied strong positions, but were attacked 
with great vigor by the troops, and finally fled, leaving 
seven dead upon the field. The troops had five men 
wounded. ' ' 

"Colonel Moncado reports having had several en- 
gagements with rebel bands near Cienfuegos, in which 
the enemy had four men killed and seventy wounded, 
and the Spanish troops had five wounded." 

' ' The official report of the fight on the Fermina 
ranch, near Jovellanos, states that the rebels lost eight 
killed ; the troops lost seven wounded. The Spaniards 
pursued the rebels and in skirmishes killed eighteen, 
without loss to themselves." 

These preposterous stories were probably not told 
through sheer love of lying and trust in human gulli- 
bility. The officers probably had another object in 
view in reporting so few of their troops killed, that of 
keeping the names of the dead on the pay-rolls and 
pocketing their pay. Such is said to have been one of 
the methods in which those who were chiefly responsible 
for protracting the war managed to make it profitable to 
themselves. 



CHAPTER V. 

THE RECONCENTRADOS AND THE MILITARY PRISONS. 

In the present chapter we propose to consider the 
principal causes of American interposition in the war, 
this being the savage Weylerian policy of concentration 
and the barbarous treatment of American citizens in 
Spanish prisons. General Weyler paved the way for 
intervention in his famous " Reconcentrado" order. 
Finding the rebels when he came to the government 
stationed in every part of the island, and failing to dis- 
possess them as he had engaged to do, he sought to 
starve them out by cutting off what he supposed to be 
their main source of food-supply. By laying waste the 
country, and depriving them of the food they had been 
obtaining from the country-people, he fancied that he 
could through sheer starvation force them into sub- 
mission. 

The result was one without a parallel in the military 
history of the nations, — the deliberate enforcement of a 
plan of action which brought starvation to the bulk of 
the inhabitants of a country, and which had no just 
claim of efficacy to warrant it. All the pacificos, as 
the non-combatants were called, were ordered into the 
cities and towns, — namely, the old men, women, and 
children, as the brutal order forced most of the young 
men into the rebel ranks. All their food-plants were 
then uprooted, their dwellings burned, and their animals 
driven away. The helpless people were gathered within 
92 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 93 

a line drawn one hundred and fifty yards around a town, 
or were collected around the forts. They were thus in 
a great measure prevented from tilling the ground ; they 
had no means of obtaining food beyond the little the 
town-people could spare in charity ; death by bullet was 
their lot if they ventured to cross the dead-line, and 
death by disease or starvation was inevitable if they 
remained. 

' ' War is war, ' ' was Weyler' s excuse for this barbar- 
ous order ; but the order was in no proper sense a war 
necessity, since its effect was to drive the able-bodied 
into the fields to fight and leave the helpless behind to 
die. It was "worse than a crime, it was a blunder," 
for it failed in its original purpose, the insurgents prov- 
ing able to find what food they required, and having 
little need of the shelter of the burned huts. The order 
failed to distress those against whom it was aimed, while 
it brought the deepest misery to thousands of inno- 
cent and helpless people who were crowded into the 
towns, without food or shelter, and under most unsani- 
tary conditions. As a result, disease and starvation vied 
with each other in sweeping them away, until, in the 
words of Consul-General Lee, of the four hundred thou- 
sand innocents herded where they could obtain no food 
no less than two hundred thousand died of starvation. 
Small-pox, yellow fever, and other dread diseases aided 
hunger in this fearful work, the people being forced to 
live amid a filth which in that hot climate, especially in 
the rainy season, could not but cause pestilence to run 
rampant over the land. 

General Weyler had issued a reconcentration decree 
upon his arrival in Havana. This it was not convenient 
to put into effect at that time, and it was deferred until 



94 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

he took the field in person against Maceo, when a new 
decree was promulgated, under date of October 21, 
1896. He gave the pacificos eight days to come in to 
the fortified places, stating that all who remained in the 
country after that interval should be treated as enemies, 
— that is, should be killed wherever found. Zones of 
cultivation were marked off, adjoining the towns and 
villages, which the pacificos were to have permission to 
cultivate ; but this part of the decree seems never to 
have been carried out, or so imperfectly as to be useless. 
Such is the statement of travellers, who also state that 
low-lying and swampy ground was selected for the 
reconcentrados, — the most insalubrious situations that 
could well be chosen. 

In Jaruco, as described by Richard Harding Davis, 
the filth lay ankle-deep in streets and plaza, and made 
its way into a church which was occupied as a barrack. 
The pacificos occupied closely-built rows of huts, holding 
from four to six persons each, while ten feet away were 
cavalry- barracks, occupied by sixty men with their 
horses, and left in a state of dangerous uncleanliness. No 
one was vaccinated, and small-pox swept like a con- 
suming fire through huts and barracks alike. Decency 
of any kind was out of the question. Utter, hopeless 
dejection was the aspect of the pacificos, most of whom 
were incapable from weakness of cultivating the ground 
and waiting for the slow return in food. Gaunt, hollow- 
eyed, half-clad in rags, they sat listless and hopeless, 
too dejected even to lift their eyes when money or food J 
was handed them. At Cardenas he saw ' ' babies with J 
the skin drawn so tightly over their little bodies that thel 
bones showed through as plainly as the rings under a 
glove. They were covered with sores, and they pro- 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 95 

tested as loudly as they could against the treatment that 
the world was giving them, clinching their fists and sob- 
bing with pain when the sore places came in contact 
with their mothers' arms. ' ' 

As time went on the horrors of the situation increased. 
President McKinley, in his message of April 11, 1898, 
states that a year earlier reconcentration had been ex- 
tended over all but the two eastern provinces, more than 
three hundred thousand of the country-people being 
herded in the vicinity of the towns, without shelter or 
means of support, poorly clad, and under most unsani- 
tary conditions. 

' ' As the scarcity of food increased with the devasta- 
tion of the depopulated areas of production," he con- 
tinues, "destitution and want became misery and star- 
vation. Month by month the death-rate increased in 
I alarming ratio. By March, 1897, according to conserva- 
j tive estimates from official Spanish sources, the mortality 
i among the reconcentrados from starvation and the dis- 
eases thereto incident exceeded fifty per cent, of their 
I total number. No practical relief was accorded to the 
I destitute. The overburdened towns, already suffering 
from the general dearth, could give no aid. So-called 
zones of cultivation that were established within the im- 
mediate area of effective military control about the cities 
and fortified camps proved illusory as a remedy for the 
uffering. The unfortunates, being for the most part 
women and children, or aged and helpless men enfeebled 
by disease and hunger, could not have tilled the soil 
{without tools, seed, or shelter, to provide for their own 
support or for the supply of the cities. Reconcentration 
worked its predestined result. As I said in my message 
pi last December, it was not a civilized warfare, it was 



96 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

extermination. The only peace it could beget was that 
of the wilderness and the grave. ' ' 

In March, 1898, a party of Congressmen visited Cuba 
with a partly official purpose, that of seeing for them- 
selves and reporting to the government the actual con- 
dition of affairs in the island. Among them were 
Senators Proctor of Vermont, Gallinger of New Hamp- 
shire, and Thurston of Nebraska. What they saw and 
described in eloquent language to Congress was of a 
soul-harrowing character. Their description of the hope- 
less, unspeakable misery of the famishing reconcentrados 
and the frightfully-desolated condition of one of the most 
fertile islands under the sun roused the American people 
as they had rarely been aroused before, awakening a 
pity and indignation which rendered speedy intervention 
inevitable. So great, to one of sympathetic nature, was 
the shock of the suffering observed, that the wife of 
Senator Thurston, who was in delicate health, received 
her death-stroke from the dreadful scenes witnessed by 
her on this journey. 

The result of it all was, that while General Weylerwas 
living in the utmost luxury at Havana, and boasting of 
being surrounded by conditions of wealth and ease un- 
equalled in the land (we quote from an interview reported 
by Mrs. Masterson), nearly or quite a quarter of a million 
of human beings were perishing of starvation and disease, 
the result of his brutal order, and under conditions of j 
misery too horrible to contemplate. 

This was not the only barbarity practised. That metedl 
out to the ' ' suspects' ' was quite as brutal. The massi 
of these were disposed of summarily by the aid of thej 
rifle-shot or the machete. But many were thrown into 
prison, and kept there under maddening conditions, 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 97 

being held incomunicado ("without communication") 
in dark little cells, where for days and months they were 
not permitted to hear a human voice, have book or paper 
to read, or any alleviation of their suffering. Among 
them were a considerable number of American citizens, 
men of Cuban birth who had become naturalized in 
this country, and some of them of American ancestry. 
Among these were the Competitor prisoners, a number 
of men captured on the filibustering vessel of that name, 
who had been taken May 8, 1896, tried by a Spanish 
court organized to convict, and sentenced to death on the 
testimony of the captain of the Spanish gunboat that had 
made the capture. The execution of this unjust sentence 
was prevented by the intervention of the United States, 
but the prisoners were kept in a state of painful imprison- 
ment until the end of Weyler's term of office. 

Consul-General Lee earnestly and vigorously protested 
against the detention of American citizens under such 
circumstances as a violation of the treaty between the 
United States and Spain, which, he stated, limited im- 
prisonment incomunicado to seventy-two hours. Weyler 
replied that his declaration of martial law superseded the 
treaty ; a claim which Lee strenuously denied. Ameri- 
cans, he stated, had been arrested without any declared 
charges and without the knowledge of their friends and 
relatives, and put in little eight-by-ten cells, dark and with 
floors of stone, where they were kept for days, seeing 
none but their jailers and speaking to no one. Lee pro- 
tested that every man was by law considered innocent 
until he had been proved guilty, but he found it diffi- 
cult to penetrate Weyler's thick moral cuticle with the 
arguments usually effective among civilized people. 

A final case came when Dr. Ruiz, an American dentist 
7 



98 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

of Guanabacoa, a town about four miles from Havana, 
was arrested, with others of the place, in consequence of 
an insurgent attack on a railroad train. It was charged 
that the rebels had received information from these pris- 
oners. Dr. Ruiz could easily have disproved this, but 
he was given no opportunity to do so, being thrown into 
prison and kept there for three hundred and sixty hours. 
He was an athletic man, in perfect health, but the hor- 
rors of the incomunicado prison-cell crazed him. While 
calling pitifully for his wife and children, he was struck 
on the head with the baton of a brutal jailer, and died in 
consequence. 

This cruel act, which could not be concealed, caused 
widespread indignation, and General Lee determined 
that such treatment of United States citizens should 
cease. Finding that another American, named Scott, 
was in prison under similar conditions, he demanded his 
release in words whose import there was no mistaking. 
Weyler complied ; and from that time forward every 
American arrested was turned over to General Lee, who 
sent all such to the United States. 

This respite applied only to Americans. Cuban sus- 
pects had no alleviation of their sufferings except the 
final one that came from the fusillade of the firing-party. 
Of those who escaped execution, many suffered exile 
under aggravating circumstances. A letter from Senor 
Carpio says of the Cuban exiles who, disembarking at 
Cadiz, were sent on foot to the distant castle of Figueras : 
" The unfortunate exiles pass here barefooted and bleed- 
ing, almost naked and freezing. At every town, far 
from finding rest from their fatigue, they are received 
with all sorts of insults ; they are scoffed and provoked. 
I have two sons who are fighting against the Cuban 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 99 

insurgents, but this does not prevent me from de- 
nouncing those who ill-treat their prisoners. I have 
witnessed such outrages upon the unfortunate exiles that 
I do not hesitate to say that nothing like it has ever 
occurred in Africa." 

The act of barbarity of the Spanish authorities that 
excited most interest in the United States was the im- 
prisonment of Evangelina Cisneros, a beautiful and cul- 
tured girl related to the venerable president of the Cuban 
republic. The interest in her fate was largely increased 
by the romance attending her escape. She was arrested 
upon some slight suspicion, incarcerated for months 
among prisoners of the criminal and degraded class, and 
subjected to such indignities as to arouse a world-wide 
demand for her release or a mitigation of her sufferings. 
The queen-regent of Spain was applied to, but declined 
to interfere. Finally, the publisher of the New York 
Journal, who had been one of the most active advocates 
for her release, decided upon more radical measures. 
He sent Mr. Carl Decker, a reporter of his staff, to 
Havana to aid her in escaping. Mr. Decker was suc- 
cessful in this perilous enterprise. On the night of 
October 6, 1897, Miss Cisneros escaped with his aid 
through the broken bars of her cell window, and soon 
after, disguised as a boy, passed the Spanish officials 
unsuspected to the deck of an American vessel. In this 
she was conveyed to the United States, where she was 
received with a decided ovation. 

We have not completed the story of Spanish barbarity. 
General Lee says that it is " difficult to comprehend the 
cruelties and enormities of Spanish rule, especially during 
the last few years," and this remark is well borne out by 
the facts. The Turkish barbarities in Bulgaria, which 



ioo THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

called for Russian intervention and brought on a war 
that almost swept the Turkish empire from the map of 
Europe, and the later barbarities in Crete, which resulted 
in European intervention between the combatants, were 
in no sense worse than those which forced the govern- 
ment of the United States to intervene between the 
combatants in Cuba. Despite the accusation made in 
Europe that selfish interest was at the basis of the 
American intervention, it could easily be shown that the 
provocation here was quite as great as in similar cases in 
Europe, and the cruelties as marked as those in Armenia, 
which the selfish fears of European statesmen permitted 
to go on unchecked. 

We have already, perhaps, said sufficient concerning 
the massacres of Cubans by the Spanish soldiery under 
the guise of war. In evidence of this, Leslie 1 s Illustrated 
Weekly published in December, 1896, a picture showing 
the corpses of six Cuban pacificos, firmly bound, their 
bodies mutilated by machetes, and their faces hacked 
out of all human aspect. The portrait was also given of 
their murderer, Benito Cerreros, who had found them 
working in a field near Sagua, had murdered them, and 
then brought their bodies to town and had them photo- 
graphed. His claim was that he had killed them in 
battle ; but he had been stupid enough to forget to 
remove from their arms and legs the ropes that told the 
truth of the story. 

The people of Sagua celebrated by a public dinner 
another victory of this worthy. A colonel in the insur- 
gent army who was dying of consumption had captured 
a Spanish spy, whom he had set free on condition of 
bringing him some medicine from Sagua. An American 
was with him in the hut in which he lay concealed. The 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 101 

spy proved a traitor, and revealed the hiding-place of 
the Cuban to Cerreros, who sought the hut with abundant 
care for his own safety, as he took with him no less than 
forty-four men. These shot the two inmates through 
the windows, and then hacked their bodies with machetes. 
It was in recognition of this gallant exploit that the 
Spanish sympathizers of Sagua tendered the victor a 
dinner. 

These will serve as examples of barbarities of which 
there seem, unfortunately, to have been far too many 
instances in Cuba. While these cruelties to the people 
were in progress, those to the land continued night and 
day, the smoke of its torment being forever in the air. 
Both parties were active in this work of desolation ; the 
result being that the smoke of burning buildings and 
cane-fields hung heavily everywhere. In railroading 
through the country the heat of burning districts would 
at times render the journey intolerable, sparks and cin- 
ders coming through every open car-window, while in 
the distance the flames of burning buildings could be 
seen ascending redly towards the sky. 

The Spaniards burned the dwellings of the pacificos 
and the Cubans the cane and tobacco crops and the 
sugar-mills, and between them they turned a fertile 
country into a desert of ashes. The grinding of cane 
was not prevented by the Cubans alone, since Weyler 
seems to have secretly aided them in this. Suspecting 
that the planters were playing a double game, and 
assisting the insurgents in secret while professing to be 
strongly in favor of Spain in public, he took covert 
steps to prevent grinding. Consistency would not let 
him forbid it openly, but it was easy to stop it by arrest- 
ing the laborers as suspects, seizing the draught oxen for 



102 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

army use, and by other methods, — the result being that 
the planters who were seemingly under Spanish protec- 
tion were placed in as serious straits as those exposed to 
the operations of the insurgents. 

Nothing more seems necessary to say in depicting 
what President McKinley truthfully designated as an 
"intolerable situation," and in showing the need of 
intervention of some strong party to prevent the com- 
batants from destroying one another by the crudest of 
means, and utterly ruining the fair island on which they 
were conducting a strife that they sadly miscalled ' ' war. ' ' 
And as the United States stood guarantee for Spain that 
no other nation should set hostile foot on her island 
colony, the task of suppression remained for this country 
to take in hand, in the sacred name of humanity. 



CHAPTER VI. 

EVENTS LEADING TO INTERVENTION. 

The cruelty with which the war between Spain and 
the Cuban insurgents was conducted was viewed with 
intense indignation in the United States, while Spain's 
seeming inability to suppress the insurrection led to 
many demands for intervention by the press and people 
of this country. The inhumanity of the combatants, 
and particularly of the Spaniards, increased as the war 
went on, and the government of the United States was 
strongly urged to interfere. It was variously suggested 
that the insurgents should be treated as belligerents, 
that their republic should be recognized, and that Spain 
should be asked to sell Cuba. But nothing beyond 
suggestion came of all this ; the time was not ripe for 
action. 

Meanwhile the government of this country was kept 
busy in efforts to enforce its neutrality laws. The revo- 
lutionary Cuban Junta in New York was actively at work 
collecting funds and equipping relief-expeditions, and a 
considerable number of vessels became engaged in efforts 
to land men and munitions of war on the shores of Cuba. 
Both the United States and Spain endeavored to pre- 
vent this, but met with indifferent success. Many of 
the expeditions from American ports succeeded in elud- 
ing the vigilance of the authorities and getting away 
with their contraband cargoes. Many others were 
stopped, but in very few instances could satisfactory 

103 



104 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

evidence of an intention to break the law be obtained. 
Only two of the captains of filibustering vessels were 
convicted, Captain J. H. Wiborg, of the Horsa, and 
Captain John H. Hart, of the Laurada. The latter, 
sentenced for a term of imprisonment, was pardoned by- 
President McKinley after the war with Spain began. 

In January, 1896, General Calixto Garcia sought to 
take a large quantity of military supplies and three hun- 
dred men to Cuba. His vessel, the Hawkins, foundered 
off Long Island, fortunately losing only five of its men. 
He made a second attempt on March 15 with the Ber- 
muda, and this time succeeded in reaching Cuba and 
landing part of his supplies. He was at once given a 
prominent command in the Cuban army of independence. 

Spain, which had the highest interest in checking 
these expeditions, was singularly unsuccessful in doing 
so. Of the many vessels which reached the Cuban 
coast the Spanish patrol-fleet succeeded in capturing 
only one, the Competitor, which left Key West April 
23, 1896, and was taken near Esperanza, on the northern 
coast. The supplies had been landed before the Spanish 
patrol-boat appeared ; but the bulk of them were aban- 
doned, the men escaping into the interior with the ex- 
ception of seven, who were taken prisoners. These 
were Alfred Laborde, captain of the vessel ; William 
Gildea, its sailing-master ; Ona Melton, a newspaper 
correspondent ; Dr. Vezia, the physician of the expedi- 
tion ; a Cuban named Moza, and two sailors. None of 
them except the sailors sought to escape, they not 
fancying that they had committed any serious crime. 
The Spanish authorities thought otherwise. All of 
them except Moza, who volunteered evidence for the 
crown, were sentenced to death, and would have been 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 105 

summarily executed but for the intervention of Consul- 
General Lee. They were rigorously imprisoned under 
incomanicado conditions for eighteen months, being 
finally released by General Blanco. 

In December, 1896, the war being then nearly two 
years old, and having seemingly fallen into a state of 
hopeless decrepitude, while the Weylerian cruelty and 
incapability had become strikingly evidenced, the first 
open declaration of the United States government was 
made in President Cleveland's annual message to Con- 
gress. In this he reviewed the situation at considerable 
length, stating the various propositions which had been 
made for recognition of Cuban belligerency or inde- 
pendence, or, all other methods failing, of interven- 
tion, even at the cost of a war with Spain. The Presi- 
dent did not think that any of these measures was yet 
demanded by the situation, and stated that this govern- 
ment had intimated to Spain that if a satisfactory system 
of home rule were offered the islanders the United 
States would guarantee its execution, since nothing less 
would overcome the distrust of the insurgents. This 
offer Spain had failed to accept. 

" It should be added," he continued, "that it cannot 
be reasonably assumed that the hitherto expectant atti- 
tude of the United States will be indefinitely maintained. 
. . . By the course of events we may be driven into 
such an unusual and unprecedented condition as will fix 
a limit to our patient waiting for Spain to win the con- 
test, either alone and in her own way or by our friendly 
co-operation." He remarked further that if nothing 
remained but useless sacrifice of human life and utter 
desolation of the subject-matter of the conflict, "a situa- 
tion will be presented in which our obligations to the 



106 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obli- 
gations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and 
discharge. ' ' 

The scarcely veiled threat under these diplomatic 
utterances proved anything but palatable to Spain, and 
Prime-Minister Canovas quickly put himself on record 
by declaring that Spain would under no circumstances 
grant Cuba a system of autonomy similar to that of 
Canada. " No concession of any kind," he said, "will 
be made until the insurrection in Cuba is put under con- 
trol. Spain is strong enough to carry on the campaign 
in Cuba and the Philippine Islands until peace is re- 
stored, no matter how long the struggle may last." 

This declaration put an end to all hope of an accom- 
modation. Spain, or at least her representatives in 
Cuba, had shown a marked incapability of doing any- 
thing of the kind promised, and the gates of a peaceful 
settlement were deliberately closed by the hands of the 
over-confident Spanish premier. The insurrectionary 
war was left to drift on in its old inconsequential way, 
with but a single end in view, that of final forced inter- 
vention on the part of the United States, since there 
seemed no hope that Spain would retire of herself from 
the futile contest. 

Previous to the date of Cleveland's message he had 
sent General Fitzhugh Lee to Havana as United States 
consul-general, largely with the purpose of observing 
and reporting upon the state of affairs. A resolution 
recognizing the Cubans as belligerents had passed Con- 
gress, and at that time lay before the President. It was 
his doubt what action to take in this contingency that 
induced him to despatch Lee upon his errand. A week's 
observation enabled the quick-sighted Virginian to de- 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 107 

cide that there was no immediate prospect of either 
party's winning, and that meanwhile the island was 
being reduced to an ash-heap, property widely destroyed, 
commerce extinguished, and life taken on both sides 
under circumstances of great aggravation. The injury 
to commerce was causing great loss to American mer- 
cantile interests and to the people of the United States. 

He found in the state of the country and the people 
much to provoke the Cubans and little evidence that 
judicious measures were being taken for their subjuga- 
tion. While less than half a century before Cubans had 
owned most of the property and wealth of the country, 
now the Spaniards were the wealthy class, — doubtless in 
consequence of the supremacy given them by the govern- 
ment. Public enterprise was sadly lacking. There 
were no highways, scarcely any country roads, no 
canals, and no telegraphs except along some of the rail- 
roads. Of the latter none had been built by Spanish 
enterprise. The soldiers were as ill fitted for effective 
operations as the country was ill adapted to military 
movements. They were poorly drilled, disciplined, and 
organized ; their pay was small and often failed to reach 
them ; their clothing was poor ; their officers exposed 
them heedlessly to all conditions of temperature and 
weather. As a result they had become feeble, listless, 
liable to disease, and unfit for active campaigning. Such 
was the state of affairs which gave its tone to President 
Cleveland's message. 

Early in his administration President McKinley took 
similar steps to ascertain the state of affairs on the island, 
special reports being ordered from the consuls at the 
several cities. These confirmed the unofficial advices of 
the terrible lack of sanitary conditions under which the 



108 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

reconcentrados dwelt and the misery and starvation to 
which they were exposed, and the absence of effort on 
the part of Governor- General Weyler for their relief. 
Among the sufferers were many naturalized citizens of 
the United States, for whose relief the President sent a 
special message to Congress, asking for an appropriation 
of $50,000 to provide them with food and medicine or 
to transport them to this country. Fewer American citi- 
zens were found than had been reported, and the food 
provided did not reach them without difficulty, as Spanish 
jealousy threw obstacles in the way of its distribution. 

On June 16, 1897, General Stewart L. Woodford was 
appointed United States minister to Spain, with instruc- 
tions from the executive to inform that country that, in 
the opinion of the United States, the war ought to have 
ended, and asking it to name a date before the month of 
December, 1897, when it would end. The reply of the 
Spanish cabinet was that no such date could be named, 
but that they would spare no efforts to bring the war to a 
speedy termination. They said further, that it would 
have ended long before but for aid given by filibusters 
from the United States. This statement, with its impli- 
cation of disregard of neutral obligations, created con- 
siderable irritation in American official circles, in view of 
the fact that this country had spent some $2,000,000 in 
the effort to check Cuban expeditions, and had in no 
sense failed in its duty. 

The coming of General Blanco with his scheme of 
reform created a temporary hope that peace might 
result, a hope which vanished when the insurgents utterly 
refused to accept autonomy or amnesty from Spain and 
shot the tempters who came to them bribe in hand. 
The scheme of autonomy did not propose to abolish the 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 109 

autocratic office of governor -general, under which no 
true liberty could exist, and it would have left Cuba 
saddled with a war-debt far beyond her power to sustain. 
The rebels in arms refused to have anything to do with 
so feeble and colorless a system of home government, 
and the autonomous administration attempted by Blanco 
proved a weak and futile expedient, its officials being 
mere puppets, with no influence outside of Spanish garri- 
sons. The effort, indeed, to establish a democracy 
under the shadow of an autocracy must have proved 
useless under any circumstances, and the Cubans had no 
intention of trusting a second time to the good faith of 
Spain. 

In his message to Congress of December, 1897, Presi- 
dent McKinley stated in impressive words the record of 
our relations with Cuba, spoke of the horrors of the war 
then raging in the island, and indicated that the time 
might come when we would be obliged to interfere. 
That time was much nearer at hand than he dreamed of. 
In truth, matters on the island were not improving, and 
the weakness of the ruling powers was becoming daily 
more declared. General Blanco had withdrawn Weyler's 
concentration order, but his action came too late. The 
evil was past remedy. In the words of General Lee, 
" In the first place, these people have no place to go to ; 
their houses have been burned down ; there is nothing 
but the bare land left, and it would take them two 
months before they could raise the first crop. In the 
next place, they are afraid to go out from the lines of the 
towns, because the roving bands of Spanish guerrillas, as 
they are called, would kill them. So they stick right in 
the edges of the town, just like they did, with nothing 
to eat except what they can get from charity. ' ' 



no THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

This condition of affairs gave rise to President Mc- 
Kinley's next action, which was an intervention in the 
form of charity. He proposed now to extend aid to all 
the sufferers, not to limit it to American citizens, as be- 
fore. On December 24, 1897, he issued an appeal to 
the American people, inviting contributions for the succor 
of the starving sufferers, and on the 8th of January, 1898, 
announced the formation of a Central Cuban Relief Com- 
mittee under the auspices of the American National Red 
Cross Society. Clara Barton, president of this society, 
just returned from her relief-work in Armenia, made her 
way to Cuba to control this new duty of benevolence, 
and a vast quantity of supplies was sent to relieve the 
needs of the sufferers. Goods and money to the value 
of more than $200,000 were donated, and the relief, at 
first confined to Havana and the other large cities, grad- 
ually extended to all the towns where suffering existed. 
Thousands of lives were saved by this late but welcome 
charitable aid. 

Spain, however, in her usual manner, threw difficul- 
ties in the way, objecting to the fact that some of the 
smaller war-vessels of the United States were employed 
in carrying relief-supplies, and rendering it necessary 
to employ other vessels for that purpose. She also 
showed her animus by requesting that Consul-General 
Lee, whose plain truth-telling had given offence, should 
be recalled. To this the United States government 
declined to accede, and Spain withdrew the request. 

The activity of the Americans in their work of mercy 
had its effect upon the dulled moral consciousness of 
Spain. All American citizens in prison were released, 
and mercy was granted to certain Cuban prisoners who 
lay under sentence of death. Blanco had been author- 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. in 

ized to sign a credit of $100,000 for the relief of the 
suffering. An equal sum was granted at a later date, 
and pacificos were sent to rebuild the small towns that 
had been destroyed. But the suffering people seem to 
have derived little benefit from the tardy benevolence of 
Spain. 

Meanwhile the Spanish home government was as 
energetic as ever in its efforts to end the war, — and as 
unsuccessful. Money was borrowed freely from any one 
who would lend, until the country reached the verge of 
bankruptcy and the money-lords of Europe closed their 
purses against appeals from Spain. In addition to her 
funded debt of $1,200,000,000, one-third of which was 
due to foreign capitalists, she had a floating debt of 
$200,000,000, and a Cuban guarantee debt of $350,- 
000,000, bearing interest at five and six per cent., yet 
very greatly depreciated in value. These $550,000,- 
000 had been spent in the Cuban war, and the weight 
of this debt would have been laid upon Cuba in the 
event of subjugation. It would have constituted an 
overwhelming burden. 

Spain was not only bankrupt in money, but was be- 
coming so in men. The youth of the land had been 
sent, sorely against their will, across the ocean to feed 
the army in Cuba until exhaustion in this direction was 
at hand. And the discouraging feature of it all was 
that this proved to be largely waste effort. The degree 
of activity under Campos and Weyler, falsely directed 
as it had been, vanished under Blanco, who suffered 
the war to lag in his efforts to induce the insurgents to 
accept his measures of autonomy and amnesty. 

The positive rejection of these by the insurgents left 
Spain in a hopeless state. Of the great army which 



ii2 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

she had sent to Cuba, many thousands had been swept 
away by the dread scourge of yellow fever, and thou- 
sands more were in a condition of unfitness for service. 
Of those who had escaped the hospital and the grave 
fully one-half were distributed among the multitudes of 
little forts that covered the island, and were useless for 
any effective operation. Of the remainder, many were 
needed for duties that rendered them unavailable for 
field operations, — such as guarding the railroads and 
the sugar-plantations. On the other hand, the insur- 
gents seemed capable of continuing the war indefinitely. 
They needed no money, and the swift-growing roots 
supplied them with food. Arms and ammunition were 
their most pressing needs. 

" Whatever may be said about old General Gomez," 
remarked General Lee, ' ' he is, in my humble opinion, 
fighting the war in the only way it can be fought, — 
scattering his troops out ; because to concentrate would 
be to starve, having no commissary-train and no way 
to get supplies. They come in sometimes for the 
purpose of making some little raid where he thinks it 
will do something ; but he has given orders, so I have 
always been informed, not to fight in masses, not to 
lose their cartridges ; and sometimes, when he gets into 
a fight, each man is ordered not to fire more than two 
cartridges. The way the insurgents do is this : they 
have little patches of sweet potatoes — everything grows 
there abundantly in a short time — and Irish potatoes and 
fruits. They drive their pigs and cattle into the valleys 
and hill-sides, and they use those and scatter out. The 
insurgents plant crops in many parts of the island." 

Their system of warfare was to keep out of the reach 
of Spanish bullets and to save their own, so far as was 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 113 

consistent with their policy of incessantly annoying the 
enemy. This method, in common with the destruction 
of the resources of the island, must in the end have 
forced Spain to give up the fight through utter exhaus- 
tion. The trocha and the fort had failed. Reconcen- 
tration had done far more harm than good. The horrors 
o'f the firing-party and the military fusillade had no effect 
on the enemy in arms. The power of Spain had been 
frittered away in piecemeal operations, and, as there was 
no indication of the adoption of more effective methods, 
the strife in Cuba in the beginning of the year 1898 
seemed in a stage of absolute hopelessness so far as 
Spain was concerned. 

Meanwhile the irritation between Spain and the 
United States was daily increasing. The two govern- 
ments seemed on the surface in accord, but the very 
evident sympathy for the insurgents among the people 
of the United States aroused hot indignation in Spain, 
and threats of war with this country were freely uttered 
by the populace and the papers. This feeling extended 
to Cuba. There were three parties in that island, — the 
revolutionary separatists, who desired complete inde- 
pendence ; the autonomists, who wished for home rule ; 
and the Spanish party, who opposed changes in the 
existing condition of affairs, bitterly objected to Blanco 
and his reforms, and looked upon the recall of Weyler 
as a fatal confession of weakness by Spain. 

With the incoming of 1898 affairs rapidly approached 
a crisis. Early in the year the Spanish government, 
through its minister, De Lome, intimated that it would 
be agreeable to Spain if the charitable people of the 
United States should contribute for Cuban relief, and if 
money and supplies were sent to the American consuls 



ii 4 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

to be forwarded and distributed under their charge. But 
this relief proposition was not kindly received by the 
people of Spain, and was furiously objected to by the 
conservative party in Cuba, who looked upon it as the 
entering-wedge for American intervention. The dissatis- 
faction grew so great that it gave rise on January 1 2 to 
a riotous outbreak in the streets of Havana. Though 
this seemed chiefly directed against two newspapers that 
favored autonomy, Blanco deemed it necessary to send 
a strong body of troops to protect the American con- 
sulate. And the fidelity of these could not be greatly 
trusted, in view of the fact that many of the rioters wore 
Spanish uniforms, showing that the hostile feeling was 
deeply intrenched in the army. 

The United States government had been previously 
informed by Consul- General Lee of the critical state of 
affairs in Havana. It was well aware, also, that Spain 
was covertly preparing for war, having taken steps in the 
latter part of 1897 to increase her naval strength by pur- 
chasing ships in other European countries. Measures 
of this kind, whose threatening character was apparent, 
were not calculated to allay the irritation existing in the 
United States, and the riots at Havana were quickly fol- 
lowed by a significant act on the part of the government, 
— the North Atlantic Squadron of the navy being ordered 
to rendezvous at Key West and the Dry Tortugas. The 
squadron reached Florida on the 20th, and was joined 
there by the battle-ship Maine, which on the 25th was 
ordered to Havana harbor, ostensibly on a friendly visit, 
but probably with a view to protection of the American 
residents in case of a renewal of the riots. Other steps 
were taken which indicated preparation for possible hos- 
tilities, orders being sent to United States vessels in for- 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. n S 

eign waters to be ready to sail for home at short notice. 
Commodore Dewey, in command of the squadron at 
Hong Kong, was advised to hold himself in readiness to 
sail to the Atlantic. All these measures were significant 
of coming war. In return for the visit of the Maine, the 
Spanish cruiser Vizcaya was ordered to the United 
States, and reached New York harbor shortly after the 
wrecking of the Maine. She was received there with 
every courtesy. 

The strained relations were greatly added to by an 
event that took place in early February. Senor Don 
Enrique de Lome, Spain's representative at Washing- 
ton, had written a confidential letter to Senor Canalejas, 
whom Sagasta had sent to Havana to make a quiet in- 
vestigation of the situation. This letter failed to reach 
the hands for which it was intended, being stolen from 
the mail by a Cuban sympathizer in the Havana post- 
office, probably on account of its bearing the stamp of the 
Spanish legation on the envelope. By him it was sent 
to the Cuban Junta in New York, whose members, per- 
ceiving its value to their cause, had photographed copies 
made, which they gave to the public press. The origi- 
nal was sent to the State Department at Washington. 

The publication of this letter raised a storm. It was 
bitterly insulting to President McKinley, of whom it 
spoke as a " low politician," who catered to the rabble. 
It proposed that the question of commercial relations 
should be agitated, " even though only for effect," and 
indicated that the Spanish government was insincere and 
playing a double part in its negotiations. The letter 
further acknowledged that the military operations of 
Spain had been failures, and seemed likely to continue 
so. The war dragged on tediously, it admitted, and in- 



n6 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

timated that if Spain could conquer Cuba at all she 
would be ruined in the effort. 

This letter rendered De Lome's position in Washing- 
ton untenable. He was not slow in perceiving this, and 
hastened to cable his resignation before Minister Wood- 
ford could have an opportunity to demand his with- 
drawal. De Lome lost no time in leaving the country 
in which he had so suddenly brought his usefulness to 
an end. He was succeeded in March by Senor Polo, 
whose father had represented Spain in Washington 
many years before. 

The turning-point in the tide of events came on the 
night of the 15th of February, 1898. The battle-ship 
Maine then lay in all seeming security in Havana harbor, 
where she swung at anchor about five hundred yards 
from the arsenal and two hundred yards from the 
floating dock. About two hundred yards away lay the 
American Ward Line steamer City of Washington, and 
a little farther off the Spanish cruiser Alfonso XII. 
This vessel had saluted the Maine with great display of 
amity upon her entrance to the harbor, and had been 
greeted with equal courtesy, each displaying the national 
ensign of the other and saluting with thirteen guns. 

The night of the 15th was one of intense darkness. 
The crew of the Maine were asleep in their quarters. 
Captain Sigsbee was in bed in his cabin, and the ex- 
ecutive officer, Lieutenant-Commander Richard Wain- 
wright, was smoking in his quarters, when, at the hour of 
nine-forty, the silence was broken by a terrific explosion. 
The great vessel was lifted as if she had been a leaf 
floating on the waves, and in an instant was rent and 
torn almost out of all semblance to a ship-of-war. As 
the reverberation of the explosion died away, the dark- 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. n; 

ness was broken by a great flame that burst from the 
ruined ship and illuminated the harbor far and near. 
On shore the shock of the explosion had extinguished 
the electric-lights, thrown down many of the telegraph- 
poles, and shaken the whole city front. 

This dreadful event was met with great coolness and 
courage by the officers of the Maine. Wainwright, the 
executive officer, was in an instant on his feet, struck 
a match, for darkness prevailed in his quarters, and 
hurried to the captain's cabin. He found him unin- 
jured, though the explosion had hurled him from his 
berth to the floor. Hurrying to the deck, the captain 
at once gave orders to a seaman to flood the magazine, 
which contained some five tons of powder. The man 
did so, but failed to return. He had fallen a victim to 
the catastrophe which had slain so many of his com- 
rades. The explosion had wrecked the forward part of 
the ship, immediately under the quarters of the men, 
most of whom were instantly killed, while that portion 
of the ship was frightfully shattered. 

Meanwhile the whole city had been aroused, and 
people were running to the water-front to learn the 
cause of the terrible shock. It was now easy to per- 
ceive, for the darkness was effectually broken. In 
addition to the glare from the burning Maine, a number 
of search-lights were turned on the dark surface of the 
waters, and electric-lights glowed on shore and ships. 
With the utmost haste boats were lowered from the two 
neighboring steamers and rowed to the wreck of the 
Maine, where every effort to render service was made. 
Thirty-seven of the wounded men were rescued by the 
boats of the Spanish ship and twenty-four by those of 
the City of Washington. 



n8 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

Captain Sigsbee did not for a moment lose his self- 
possession and worked diligently to rescue the remnants 
of his crew. In this his officers actively aided him. 
Such of the boats of the Maine as had escaped destruc- 
tion were filled with the wounded, who were taken to 
the hospitals in Havana, where every care was given 
them, General Blanco lending all his influence to the 
work of mercy. Of the ship's company of three hun- 
dred and fifty-three only forty-eight escaped without 
injury. Captain Sigsbee was the last man to leave the 
ship, going in the launch to the Alphonso XII., where 
he thanked the captain and officers for their active aid. 
He then went to the City of Washington, arriving about 
midnight, and meeting there Consul-General Lee and 
others of prominence. 

At three o'clock on the morning of February 16, 
President McKinley was awakened to hear a message of 
startling import which had just been received from 
Captain Sigsbee. It described the frightful disaster in 
the most temperate language : 

"Secretary of the Navy, 

" Washington, D.C. 
' ' Maine blown up in Havana harbor at nine-forty 
to-night and destroyed. Many wounded and doubtless 
more killed or drowned. Wounded and others on board 
Spanish man-of-war and Ward Line steamer. Send 
light-house tenders from Key West for crew and the 
few pieces of equipment above water. None had 
clothing other than that upon him. Public opinion 
should be suspended until further report. All officers 
believed to be saved. Jenkins and Merritt not yet ac- 
counted for. [These two proved to have been lost.] 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 119 

Many Spanish officers, including representative of 
General Blanco, now with me to express sympathy. ' ' 

"Sigsbee." 

The suspension of opinion asked for by Captain Sigs- 
bee was not accorded by the people, whose indignation 
was extreme on learning of the terrible event. The 
general opinion, aided by statements concerning the 
appearance of the vessel as she lay in the mud of Havana 
harbor, was that the loss of the Maine was not due to 
the explosion of her own magazines, as the Spaniards 
maintained, but that she had been blown up by a mine 
beneath her hull, and that the disaster was not the result 
of accident, but of Spanish malignity, The fact that 
among the numerous expressions of sympathy from 
foreign powers were cabled messages from General 
Blanco, the Spanish cabinet, and the Queen of Spain 
did not suffice to change the public opinion or to allay 
the excitement. No one thought that any of these had 
anything to do with the explosion, but many believed 
that Spanish officials were in some way concerned in it ; 
and this feeling grew, instead of subsiding, as time 
went on. 

A plot of ground in the cemetery at Havana was 
given for the interment of the victims, nineteen of whom 
were buried there with the greatest show of honor and 
sympathy, fifty thousand people crowding the streets 
and paying respect to the dead. Shortly after the de- 
struction of the Maine, the Spanish cruiser Vizcaya, as 
already stated, reached the harbor of New York, where 
she was placed under close guard by federal and city 
authorities to prevent any injury to her through revenge. 
She remained there for a brief period and then set sail 



120 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

for Cuba, full courtesy and consideration being shown 
her officers while in New York. 

The Maine was the oldest battle-ship of the American 
navy. While second-rate in size, being of less than 7000 
tons displacement, she was a fine and powerful ship, and 
had been built at a cost of $2,500,000, which expendi- 
ture had been greatly added to by the cost of her arms 
and equipments. In addition to the total destruction of 
the ship itself was the loss of two hundred and sixty-six 
lives, including those who died from their wounds and 
the two officers named in Captain Sigbee's message, 
who had hastened to their posts of duty on being aroused 
by the explosion and had perished in consequence. 
This state of affairs gave rise to a natural feeling of re- 
sentment in the minds of the American people, which 
quickly deepened to a thirst for revenge and a feverish 
impatience which could scarce await the deliberate move- 
ments of a committee of investigation. Had the general 
feeling been accepted, the country would have been 
plunged into war at once, but the government was less 
hasty in its decision, feeling that investigation should 
precede action, and that it remained to be shown whether 
the disaster was due to the explosion of an external 
mine or of the ship's own magazines. A naval Court of 
Inquiry was therefore appointed by the Navy Depart- 
ment, consisting of Captain W. T. Sampson of the 
Iowa, Captain F. C. Chadwick of the New York, Lieu- 
tenant-Commander W. P. Potter of the New York, 
and Lieutenant-Commander Adolph Marix of the Ver- 
mont. 

Divers were sent with all convenient despatch to 
Havana harbor to examine the condition of the sunken 
hull and furnish evidence for the committee to act upon. 





Rear- Ad m. George Dewey Rear-Adm. William T. Sampson 




Rear-Adm. Winfield Scott Sehle\ 





Capt. Charles E. Clark Capt. John W. Philip 

UNITED STATES NAVAL COMMANDERS 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 121 

The investigation proceeded with a deliberation that was 
exasperating to the mass of the people, who had formed 
their opinion without waiting for the evidence. A 
thorough examination was made of the condition of the 
wreck. Here, though no trace of a submarine mine 
could be found, there were abundant indications that 
some powerful explosive had been set off below the hull 
of the ship which had force sufficient to cause a frightful 
distortion of her hull and practically to break her in 
two. 

The evidence presented before the court was very 
voluminous, the testimony covering twelve thousand 
type-written pages. Every item of evidence was thor- 
oughly considered and sifted. A unanimous decision 
of the court was reached March 21, 1898, after more 
than four weeks of deliberation. The verdict, as sum- 
marized, was as follows : "That the loss of the Maine 
was not in any respect due to fault or negligence on the 
part of any of the officers or members of her crew ; that 
the ship was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine 
mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more 
of her forward magazines ; and that no evidence has 
been obtainable fixing the responsibility for the destruc- 
tion of the Maine upon any person or persons." 

This decision, given to the public on March 25, was 
in full accord with the opinion almost universally enter- 
tained by the American people. The long-continued 
investigation by our divers was followed by a hasty one 
ordered by Spain, which took only a day or two for its 
completion, and resulted in, judging from its rapidity, 
what may have been a predetermined decision, that the 
cause of the explosion was wholly internal. A settle- 
ment of the question by arbitration was demanded. 



122 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

This, under the aggravating circumstances of the case, 
the United States government was in no mood to accord. 
Efforts were made to recover the heavy guns and other 
valuable material from the wreck, but these proved in 
great part futile, and the shattered hulk, as a coffin for 
the gallant crew, was permitted to sink into the soft and 
deep mud of the bottom of Havana harbor. 

The Maine was not to perish unavenged. The hostile 
feeling of the people was reflected in the government, 
and active preparations were made by the War and 
Navy Departments for possible war. Movements in this 
direction had been made early in the year. They were 
intensified by the Maine horror. The fortifications of 
the coast were strengthened, war-material was collected 
and distributed with energy, recruiting went on for all 
branches of the service, and the greatest activity was 
manifested in adding to the strength of the navy. The 
ship-yards engaged on government work were kept busy 
day and night. All vessels needing repair were hurried 
into the dry-docks. The old monitors at League Island 
were overhauled with all haste. A fleet of auxiliary 
cruisers was added to the regular naval force, including a 
number of the largest and fastest passenger-steamers. A 
naval officer was hurried to Europe to purchase suitable 
war-ships found for sale in foreign ship-yards, and large 
numbers of the smaller cannon and a great quantity of 
ammunition were bought abroad. Of the several vessels 
purchased only one came into important use during the 
war, the New Orleans (formerly the Amazonas), a fine 
cruiser obtained from Brazil. The Buffalo (formerly the 
Nictheroy), a dynamite gunboat obtained from the same 
source, proved of little utility. Two small cruisers were 
purchased in England, the Topeka and the Albany, the 



! 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 123 

latter being detained, as the war had begun before she 
could be removed from her English port. 

Anticipating the decision of the Court of Inquiry, Con- 
gress did not wait for its verdict, but on the 9th of 
March, at the request of the President, voted $50,000,000 
as an emergency fund for the national defence. This 
money was at once employed in purchasing ships and 
war-material at home and abroad, and in adding to the 
strength of the army, a bill being passed for the recruit- 
ing of two regiments of artillery, to be employed in 
manning the heavy guns in the forts along the coast. 

Captain William T. Sampson was put in command of 
the fleet at Key West, with the rank of acting rear- 
admiral, while a ' ' Flying Squadron' ' was organized at 
Hampton Roads, under the command of Commodore 
Winfield Scott Schley, with the armored cruiser Brooklyn 
as flag-ship, the battle-ships Massachusetts and Texas, 
and the cruisers Columbia and Minneapolis, the fastest 
afloat in the navies of the world. 

In addition to the ships purchased and subsidized, 
work on the battle-ships under contract, five in number, 
was hastened, and a naval bill was passed by Congress 
carrying an unusually large addition to the navy, 
embracing three battle-ships, four monitors, twelve tor- 
pedo-boats, and sixteen torpedo-boat destroyers. This 
provision was made without any reference to the hostile 
relations with Spain, but simply in response to the war 
sentiment abroad and the general feeling that our navy 
was too weak for the possible needs of the nation. 

On March 17, Senator Proctor made a speech before 
Congress, in which he described, with the simple elo- 
quence of facts, the terrible scenes of destitution he had 
witnessed in his visit to Cuba, of which we have already 



124 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

spoken. The horrors of the reconcentration policy were 
depicted by him with a clearness never before realized 
by the people, and his words sent a shudder of horrified 
feeling from end to end of the land. Senators Gallinger 
and Thurston added their testimony to his, arousing the 
deep indignation not only of the people, but of Congress, 
whose members had not before fully appreciated the 
condition of affairs in Cuba. From all sides came fer- 
vent appeals from people and press for the relief of the 
starving inhabitants of the desolated island. The $50,- 
000,000 appropriation for defence had been passed by a 
unanimous vote. But preparation for war, not for de- 
fence, was now demanded, since, aside from the disaster to 
the Maine, it was felt that the barbarous policy of Spain 
had rendered war inevitable. The decision of the Maine 
Court of Inquiry, which quickly followed, and was trans- 
mitted by the President to Congress, with an accompany- 
ing message, on March 28, added fuel to the flame and 
roused the House to a grim determination which no 
advocate of the policy of peace could restrain. Speaker 
Reed in vain attempted to hold it back The Senate was 
equally bent on war. The disaster to the Maine was 
but a match touched to the powder of public sentiment. 
War must have come without it if Spain did not 
change her policy, and this she showed no intention of 
doing. The terrible spectacle of nearly a quarter of a 
million of unoffending people dying of sheer starvation 
was more than the moral sentiment of the American 
people could endure. Spain would not succor the 
people and could not conquer the insurgents. Nothing 
remained but for the United States to intervene. 

Meanwhile President McKinley endeavored to avert 
hostilities. On March 27 he submitted a proposition 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 125 

to Spain, asking that country to grant an amnesty to 
the insurgents, to continue till October 1, during which 
time the United States would conduct negotiations for 
peace. He also asked that steps should be taken for 
the return of the reconcentrados to their farms, promis- 
ing that the United States would relieve their wants until 
they were able to support themselves. This communica- 
tion met the usual fate of negotiations with Spain. An 
evasive and unsatisfactory reply was returned, deferring 
the immediate cessation of hostilities and proposing a 
scheme for ' ' preparing peace. ' ' The offer of aid to the 
reconcentrados was accepted, and a proposition to arbi- 
trate the Maine affair was added. 

The President had made his final effort. Spain's pol- 
icy of procrastination could no longer be endured. He 
now turned the matter over to Congress, preparing a 
special message, in which the whole question at issue was 
considered and the situation delineated from its various 
points of view. Congress was asked for legislation. This 
message was ready April 4, but was kept back for a week 
to give time for the American consuls and other citizens 
to leave Cuba. It was sure to cause violent excitement 
in the Cuban cities, and might give rise to riotous as- 
saults on the consulates, and the safety of American res- 
idents counselled delay. On April 9 Consul-General Lee 
left Havana. There were no hostile demonstrations by 
the people, but General Blanco treated him with marked 
discourtesy, and the soldiers on guard at the palace were 
permitted to act in an insulting manner. Many other 
! Americans left the Cuban ports, few or none remaining, 
; and on April 1 1 the message of the President was sent 
j to Congress, a final decision on the question of peace 
' or war being left to that body. There was added to 



126 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

the document, in the form of a postscript, the statement 
that Spain had just granted the amnesty asked for, — as 
usual, too late. 

We have already quoted from this message. A fur- 
ther quotation will be in place. " The efforts of Spain," 
it said, "added to the horrors of the strife a new and 
inhuman phase happily unprecedented in the modern 
history of civilized Christian people. The policy of de- 
vastation and concentration inaugurated on October 21, 
1896, in the province of Pinar del Rio, was thence ex- 
tended to embrace all of the island to which the power 
of the Spanish arms was able to reach by military occupa- 
tion or by military operations. The peasantry, including 
all dwellers in the open agricultural interior, were driven 
into the garrisoned towns or isolated places held by 
troops. The raising and movement of provisions of 
all kinds were interdicted. The fields were laid waste, 
dwellings unroofed or fired, mills destroyed, and, in short, 
everything that could desolate the land and render it 
unfit for human habitation or support was commanded 
by one or other of the contending parties and executed 
by all the powers at their disposal." 

The President described in thrilling language the re- 
sults of this terrible policy, with the frightful destitution, 
misery, and starvation to which it had given rise, say- 
ing that ' ' The only peace it could beget was that of 
the wilderness and the grave." There had arisen in 
consequence what he designated as an " intolerable sit- 
uation. " " The only hope of relief and repose, ' ' he 
said, " from a condition which can no longer be endured 
is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of 
humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of en- 
dangered American interests, which give us the right 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 127 

and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must 
stop." In view of the facts presented, Congress was 
asked to authorize the President to take measures for 
the termination of hostilities and to secure a stable gov- 
ernment in Cuba, ' ' and to use the military and naval 
forces of the United States as may be necessary for these 
purposes." Evidently the President had given up all 
hope of peace, for these words meant war. 

In addition to his message, President McKinley trans- 
mitted to Congress an extensive series of reports received 
from the American consuls in Cuba during the preceding 
year in reference to the treatment of the reconcentrados. 
These had been asked for by Congress on February 14, 
but the sinking of the Maine on the following day had 
put them out of sight, and they were only now trans- 
mitted to the legislative bodies. They fully confirmed 
all that had been stated by General Lee, Senator Proc- 
tor, and others in regard to the inhuman treatment of the 
unarmed people by Spain, and furnished ample confirma- 
tion of all that the President had said, and an argument 
for war on the highest grounds on which a resort to arms 
can be based, those of humanity and the preservation of 
the moral standard of mankind. 

An impassioned debate followed the reception of the 
message and continued for several days. In this scarcely 
a voice was raised for peace. The vast majority of the 
members were bent upon war, the question at issue 
being that of the recognition or non-recognition of the 
republic of Cuba, on which a prolonged disagreement 
was developed between the Senate and the House. This 
question was finally shelved, and on April 19 the two 
bodies of Congress united upon the following joint reso- 
lution, which was approved by the President on the 20th : 






128 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

"Joint Resolution for the recognition of the inde- 
pendence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the 
government of Spain relinquish its authority and gov- 
ernment in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land 
and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and 
directing the President of the United States to use the 
land and naval forces of the United States to carry these 
resolutions into effect. 

" Whereas, The abhorrent conditions which have 
existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, 
so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense 
of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace 
to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in 
the destruction of a United States battle-ship, with two 
hundred and sixty-six of its officers and crew, while on 
a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot 
longer be endured, as has been set forth by the Presi- 
dent of the United States in his message to Congress of 
April n, 1898, upon which the action of Congress was 
united ; therefore, 

' ' Resolved, By the Senate and House of Representa- 
tives of the United States of America in Congress as- 
sembled, 

" 1. That the people of the island of Cuba are, and 
of right ought to be, free and independent. 

' ' 2. That it is the duty of the United States to de- 
mand, and the government of the United States does 
hereby demand, that the government of Spain at once 
relinquish its authority and government in the island of 
Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba 
and Cuban waters. 

" 3. That the President of the United States be, and 
he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the land 



'l 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 129 

and naval forces of the United States and to call into 
the actual service of the United States the militia of the 
several States to such an extent as may be necessary to 
carry these resolutions into effect. 

"4. That the United States hereby disclaims any 
disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, juris- 
diction, or control over said island except for the pacifi- 
cation thereof, and asserts its determination, when that 
is accomplished, to leave the government and control of 
the island to its people." 

There could be but one outcome from these resolutions. 
No one dreamed for a moment that Spain would accede 
to the conditions offered her. In truth, she was quick 
to act. She was to be given until noon of the 23d for 
an answer, but on the 20th Sefior Polo, the Spanish 
minister, asked for his passports and left Washington. 
General Woodford, the American minister at Madrid, 
was not given an opportunity to present the ultimatum 
of the United States to the government of Spain, his 
passports being sent him before he had time to act. 
Spain thus took the initiative in inaugurating the war. 
Woodford left Madrid on the night of the 21st, not 
without some efforts at violence on the part of the ex- 
cited people. On April 24 Spain issued a declaration of 
war. On the 25th Congress passed a resolution that war 
between the United States and Spain "is declared to 
exist, and to have existed, since April 21." After a 
period of thirty- three years of peace and prosperity war 
had again come to the great republic of the West. 

War was in the air long before it was declared. The 
verdict of the Maine Court of Inquiry, taken in con- 
nection with Spain's denial and repellant attitude, had 
rendered hostilities inevitable unless some radical change 

9 



130 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

should take place in the demeanor of the Spanish gov- 
ernment and in the situation in Cuba. Of such changes 
there was no indication. Spain was actively engaged in 
efforts to purchase ships and munitions of war, and in 
other preparations for hostilities. Nothing was being 
done in Cuba, other than to permit American charity to 
aid the suffering. In early April, 1898, the Spanish 
cabinet, either shamed into action by the activity of 
American benevolence or for effect, voted three million 
pesetas — more than $600,000 — for the aid of the starving 
reconcentrados. That this succor would reach them was 
very questionable. The soldiers were in almost as pitia- 
ble a state as the pacificos. General Lee, questioned 
concerning this subject on April 12 by the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations, replied : " I do not believe 
$600,000 in supplies will be given to these people and 
the soldiers left to starve. They will divide it up here 
and there — a piece taken off here and a piece taken off 
there. The condition of the reconcentrados out in the 
country is just as bad as in General Weyler's day, 
except as it has been relieved by supplies from the United 
States." 

Whatever effect such a belated act of charity was likely 
to produce, it came too late to check the tide of hostile 
feeling. Like all Spanish yieldings to the pressure of 
circumstances, it was delayed until its force was spent. 
In every reform proclaimed by Spain in Cuban affairs 
the fatal fault of procrastination appeared. Manana (to- 
morrow) should be taken as the national motto of Spain. 
In no instance that can be named has a reform measure 
been offered except under the absolute pressure of events, 
and all such have been vitiated by conditions which 
would quickly have negatived their effect. Such was 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 131 

the case with the various Blanco reforms. The natives 
remembered too well the result of the Zanjon capitula- 
tion to accept any pacification on the same terms. The 
appropriation for relief was like all the other steps of 
reform,— it came too late. In the state of affairs then 
existing, it was like Dame Partington's effort to keep 
back the ocean with a broom. 

In fact, for a month before the declaration of war such 
a result of the controversy had become inevitable. There 
was talk of friendly intervention of the nations of Europe, 
and the representatives of six of the great powers made 
an official call upon the President in the interests of 
peace. The courteous but decisive reply of the Execu- 
tive put a final end to all efforts in this direction. At- 
tempts to influence Spain to withdraw from her hostile 
attitude were also made, but without effect. The affair 
had gone too far to be checked without a resort to arms. 

Meanwhile, preparations for hostilities went on with 
all activity. In addition to the movements of the fleet 
mentioned, the battle-ship Oregon was ordered to the 
Atlantic, and left San Francisco on March 19 for a long 
journey around the South American continent. She 
was accompanied in part of her course by the gunboat 
Marietta. The activity displayed in the navy was now 
paralleled in the army. Orders were issued on April 15 
for the concentration of the troops at different points in 
the South, six regiments of cavalry and the light bat- 
teries of five regiments of artillery being ordered to 
rendezvous at Chickamauga, where a military camp was 
established. Eight regiments of infantry were set in 
motion for New Orleans, seven for Tampa, Florida, and 
seven for Mobile ; making a total force of twenty thou- 
sand men. During the week ending April 18 the troops 



132 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

of the regular army began moving rapidly by rail towards 
these camps. 

This movement had been under contemplation for 
some time, its purpose being to acclimate the troops to 
a climate approaching the tropical ; but it had been de- 
layed in view of the expense entailed and with the hope 
that an accommodation might be reached. But with the 
near approach of war, immediate action became neces- 
sary, and the army was set in rapid motion, converging 
from all points upon the new camps in the South. The 
whole army was under the command of Major-General 
Nelson A. Miles, its several divisions being under Major- 
General J. R. Brooke and Brigadier-Generals W. B. 
Shafter, J. J. Coppinger, and J. F. Wade. 

While the United States was thus actively preparing 
for the threatened war, Spain was no less active. Her 
agents were abroad purchasing war-material in the 
other countries of Europe and seeking to obtain war- 
ships that had been built for other nations. In the latter 
effort she was unsuccessful, and no additions were made 
to her fleet. A squadron embracing some of the finest 
vessels in her navy was sent to the Cape Verde Islands, 
in preparation for a rapid run across the Atlantic should 
necessity demand. Thus the two nations stood at bay, 
while actively preparing for what seemed an inevitable 
strife. 

The powers of Europe looked on meanwhile with 
much apprehension, not knowing to what complications 
a war might lead. Yet they had no warrant for inter- 
vention. It could not be denied that the highest in- 
terests of morality sustained the United States in its 
course. On the other hand, Spain was preparing to 
fight for its colonies, as any of these nations would have 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 133 

done. The loss of the Maine was an added provocation 
sufficient to have plunged any of these powers into war. 
In consequence, the European governments confined 
themselves to amicable efforts, which proved of no avail 
in preventing the appeal to arms. 



CHAPTER VII. 

CUBA UNDER BLOCKADE. 

For three weary months the North Atlantic Squadron 
of the United States navy had lain in the waters south 
of Florida, lazily falling and lifting as the tide ebbed 
and flowed, while impatience for action on the part of 
the crews deepened until almost into a passion. Cap- 
tain William T. Sampson, appointed acting rear-admiral, 
was in command, his flag-ship being the armored cruiser 
New York. The fleet included in addition the battle- 
ships Iowa and Indiana, the double-turreted monitors 
Puritan, Terror, Miantonomah, and Amphitrite, the 
cruisers Montgomery, Marblehead, Cincinnati, and De- 
troit, and a considerable number of gunboats, torpedo- 
boats, and accessory craft. On the evening of April 21, 
1898, the flag-ship swung at anchor about seven miles 
out from Key West, flanked by the two great battle- 
ships, while the inner harbor presented an animated 
picture with its throng of monitors, cruisers, and smaller 
craft, — the larger vessels at anchor, the smaller ones 
gliding about on various errands. 

Dulness and calm rested upon the ships, as it had 
rested for weeks past. Men and officers lounged about 
the decks or sought relaxation in the neighboring town. 
But as the night wore on a change appeared. A special 
boat from the flag-ship called back to their ships all 
those on shore, and by midnight the show of gold braid 
and blue jackets, which had long been familiar sights in 
134 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. i 35 

the streets of the Gulf port, had disappeared. At the 
mast-heads of the New York and her consorts signal- 
lights flashed and flickered, their vari-colored gleams con- 
veying significant orders to the ships in shore. From 
the latter flashed back replies, and during the night a 
conversation in points of fire was kept up through the 
air, telling but one thing to the interested observers, 
that the long wait was at an end and great events were 
in train. 

Over the wires had come from Washington the start- 
ling words : "War is declared." With them came to 
the admiral of the fleet orders for an immediate blockade 
of the Cuban coast, and at break of day on the 
22d smoke was seen to pour densely from the black- 
mouthed stacks, anchors were cheerily drawn from 
their holding-ground, the lazy swinging of the ships was 
exchanged for active motion, and lively hope chased 
despondency from the faces of the crews. At the earliest 
hour of dawn the final signals burned in letters of light 
above the ships, and some of the vessels of the fleet were 
already gliding out of the harbor. Shortly before six 
o'clock the flag-ship was seen moving slowly outward, 
the Iowa and Indiana following on either side. In the 
harbor the remaining ships were all astir, with the ex- 
ception of the Puritan, the Terror, and some smaller 
boats, which remained behind to take on water and coal. 
Gradually the fleet grew smaller and less distinct, and 
one by one the vessels vanished in the blue distance. 
The time of expectation was over ; that of action had 
begun. The ships were on their way to carry the mes- 
sage of war to Cuba's verdant shores. The first fruits 
of the new dispensation were seen when a flash broke 
from the side of the gunboat Nashville, and a cannon- 



136 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

ball ruffled the water in front of a passing - steamer at 
whose mast-head flew the Spanish flag. A second shot 
was necessary before the Spanish captain took the hint 
and hove to his vessel. In a brief time she had veered 
and was making her way to Key West in charge of a 
prize crew. The vessel proved to be the merchantman 
Buena Ventura, laden with lumber from Texas. The 
captain had hoisted his flag as a salute, not knowing that 
war was declared. 

Before nightfall the blockade of the Cuban coast had 
begun, and Havana, at the bottom of whose harbor lay 
the sunken Maine, was feeling the stress of war. On 
the same day President McKinley announced to the 
powers of the world that Havana and the neighboring 
ports were under blockade, and that commercial inter- 
course with them must be suspended. The blockade, 
as proclaimed, extended from Cardenas to Bahia Honda 
on the north coast, a distance of about one hundred and 
sixty miles. On the south coast it was limited to the 
single port of Cienfuegos. 

While these events were in progress, a note of alarm 
came from across the seas. The great steamer of the 
American Line, the Paris, which had been chosen as 
part of our auxiliary fleet, lay at Southampton, Eng- 
land, with orders to sail for the United States on the 
2 2d. Fears were entertained that this noble ship might 
be made a Spanish prize, and rumors were rife that 
cruisers from Spain were prowling about in her expected 
route. The anxiety did not subside until the Paris 
loomed up in American waters, safe from capture and 
without having seen a hostile sail. 

In Havana, on the same day, defiance was being cast 
in the face of the Americans. On the night before, the 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 137 

public buildings and many private residences had been 
decorated with the national colors, and an illumination of 
the city followed, as though the occasion was one of fes- 
tivity. The next morning the people, wearing ribbons 
of the Spanish colors, gathered densely in the square 
opposite the palace, sending a committee to the gov- 
ernor-general to tender their estates and their lives in 
aid of the national cause, for which they pledged 
themselves to fight to the bitter end. General Blanco 
thanked them in the name of the king and the governing 
powers, and made a speech to the people in which he 
assured them that he would lead them to victory. 

1 ' Otherwise I shall not live, ' ' he said. ' ' Do you 
swear to follow me to the fight ?' ' 

" Yes, yes, we do !" shouted the throng. 

' ' Do you swear to give the last drop of blood in your 
veins before letting a foreigner stamp his foot on the 
land we discovered and place his yoke on the people we 
civilized?" 

" Yes, yes, we do !" 

"The enemy's fleet is almost at Morro Castle, almost 
at the shores of Havana. We will throw them into the 
sea." 

Just where the people whom Spain had civilized were 
to be found General Blanco, in his enthusiasm, neglected 
to state. But he sought to make his words good on the 
following day by opening fire from Morro Castle on the 
flag-ship of the American fleet. On the 24th Morro 
fired again on the American ships. It was a futile waste 
of powder and shot, which was not accorded the honor 
of a reply. The projectiles had sunk uselessly into the 
waves. During this fusillade the fleet was engaged in 
making prizes. On the 23d the New York brought to 



138 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

bay, after an exciting chase, the Spanish freight-steamer 
Pedro, the Porter captured the steamer Mathilde, and 
the Helena made prize of the fine steamer Miguel Jover. 
Four more prizes were taken on the following day, and 
by the end of a week the number of prizes had more 
than doubled, their value aggregating upwards of $3,000,- 
000. The mail-steamer Montserrat, laden with eighteen 
large guns and $800,000 in silver, and having on board 
one thousand Spanish troops, was fortunate in discov- 
ering the lion in her path, and doubled back when near 
Havana, landing her cargo and troops at the distant port 
of Santiago de Cuba. 

The Cuban insurgents were not long in receiving the 
glad tidings that a powerful ally was coming to their aid. 
For three years they had kept the field with desperate 
determination, but almost hopeless of help from without. 
Now the long-prayed-for message of hope and success 
was brought to their camps, a gallant American soldier 
risking danger and death in the perilous enterprise. 
Before war was declared, before the President's message 
had reached Congress, Lieutenant Andrew S. Rowan, 
of the United States army, had left Washington on a 
mission to the Cubans in arms. Starting from the cap- 
ital on April 9, he reached Kingston, Jamaica, on the 
23d, and crossed from that island to Cuba in a little 
sailing-boat, handled by a man whom the daring lieuten- 
ant familiarly designated his ' ' pirate' ' and who was 
thoroughly familiar with the waters of those seas. The 
movements of the Spanish patrol-boats were well known 
to him, and he succeeded in landing Lieutenant Rowan 
while the coast was clear. 

The danger of the enterprise was great, the coast being 
patrolled bv land and sea, while if taken he would prob- 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 139 

ably have been executed as a spy. But he was met by 
Cubans and escorted to the mountains in the vicinity of 
Santiago, making his way in a few days to General Gar- 
cia' s camp, then at Bayamo, where he was greeted with 
the highest enthusiasm. This interior stronghold, which 
the Spanish troops had held against Cuban assault 
since the beginning of the war, had been evacuated by 
them on April 28. It was immediately occupied by the 
insurgents, who doubtless looked upon this withdrawal 
of their foe as the first signal of the good time coming. 
Lieutenant Rowan had been charged by the Presi- 
dent with a secret mission to General Garcia, with 
whom he had a long interview, laying plans for a future 
co-operation of the allied forces. On his return to the 
coast he was accompanied by General Collazo and Col- 
onel Hernandez, of the Cuban army, as envoys to the 
United States. Three guides completed the party, which 
risked the perils of the sea in a small boat. The first 
morning out they came in sight of Admiral Sampson's 
squadron, but made no attempt to board the ships. The 
next day they were picked up by a sponging-sloop and 
carried to Nassau, New Providence, whence the adven- 
turous party made its way to the United States. Thus 
ended in success the first of those daring enterprises 
through which Americans won reputation for boldness 
and courage during the war. Through it the President 
received valuable information concerning the numbers 
and condition of the Cuban army and the state of affairs 
in the interior. Major-General Miles gave the following 
tribute to Rowan's courage : " This was a most perilous 
undertaking, and in my judgment Lieutenant Rowan 
1 performed an act of heroism and cool daring that has 
rarely been excelled in the annals of warfare. ' ' 



i 4 o THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

The events described at the seat of war were paralleled 
by as active ones at the seat of the government. An 
army bill was passed by Congress on April 22 providing 
for a temporary increase of the army, in response to 
which, on the following day, the President issued a proc- 
lamation calling for one hundred and twenty-five thousand 
volunteers to serve for two years, and to be apportioned 
among the States and Territories in accordance with 
their populations. The proclamation was enthusiastically 
responded to from all parts of the country, the National 
Guards of the several States hastening to offer their 
services, while there were thousands ready to fill up 
vacancies and to swell out the depleted columns of the 
regular army, so as to bring every regiment up to its full 
official strength. Far more offered, indeed, than the 
government was ready to accept, and a most rigid sys- 
tem of health inspection was inaugurated, in order that 
none but those in a state of full health and capable of 
enduring the hardships of campaigning in a tropical 
island should be enrolled. The result was to give the 
government one of the most physically perfect armies 
that had ever been put in the field. 

A question of world-wide importance had meanwhile 
arisen, that concerning privateering. Spain had not 
signed the Declaration of Paris abolishing privateering, 
and stood free to cover the ocean with swift vessels to 
prey on American commerce. In such an obsolete 
mode of warfare, even if the United States government 
had met Spain by issuing letters of marque, this country 
would have been at a serious disadvantage, on account 
of the vast preponderance of American commerce over 
that of Spain. But it had no such purpose in view, and 
Spain, while formally reserving the right to send out 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 141 

privateers, deemed it unwise to put it in exercise, in view 
of the irritation such a course would have caused in the 
nations whose friendship she desired to preserve. Her 
declaration of the existence of war therefore took the 
following form : 

" Clause i. The state of war existing between Spain 
and the United States annuls the treaty of peace and 
amity of October 17, 1795, and the protocol of January 
12, 1877, and all other agreements, treaties, or conven- 
tions in force between the two countries. 

1 ' Clause 2. From the publication of these presents, 
thirty days are granted to all vessels of the United States 
anchored in our harbors to take their departure free of 
hindrance. 

" Clause 3. Notwithstanding that Spain has not ad- 
hered to the Declaration of Paris, the government, re- 
specting the principles of the law of nations, proposes to 
observe, and hereby orders to be observed, the following 
regulations of maritime law : 

' ' First. Neutral flags cover the enemy's merchandise, 
except contraband of war. 

" Second. Neutral merchandise, except contraband of 
war, is not seizable under the enemy's flag. 

" Third. A blockade to be obligatory must be effec- 
tive, — viz., it must be maintained with sufficient force to 
prevent access to the enemy's littoral. 

' ' Fourth. The Spanish government, upholding its right 
to grant letters of marque, will at present confine itself 
to organizing, with the vessels of the mercantile marine, 
a force of auxiliary cruisers which will co-operate with 
the navy, according to the needs of the campaign, and 
will be under naval control. 

"Fifth. In order to capture the enemy's ships and 



142 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

confiscate the enemy's merchandise and contraband of 
war under whatever form, the auxiliary cruisers will 
exercise the right of search on the high seas and in the 
waters under the enemy's jurisdiction, in accordance 
with international law and the regulations which will be 
published. 

' ' Sixth. [Defines what is included in contraband of 
war, naming weapons, ammunition, equipments, engines, 
and, in general, all the appliances used in war.] 

"Seventh. To be regarded and judged as pirates, with 
all the rigor of the law, are captains, masters, officers, 
and two-thirds of the crew of vessels which, not being 
American, shall commit acts of war against Spain, even 
if provided with letters of marque issued by the United 
States." 

Spain thus took the initiative in declaring war, this 
proclamation being issued on April 24, while the declara- 
tion of the United States, as already stated, was issued 
on the 25th. Both were merely formal declarations of 
the war which had existed since the 21st. On the day 
of the declaration, Secretary of State John Sherman 
retired from his post in the Cabinet, being incapacitated 
by age and feebleness to perform the onerous duties of 
the office in times of war. William R. Day, the assistant 
secretary, was appointed to the vacant post. The other 
Cabinet officers whose duties were specially affected by 
the declaration of war were Russell A. Alger, Secretary 
of War ; John D. Long, Secretary of the Navy ; and 
Lyman T. Gage, Secretary of the Treasury. 

For five days the blockading fleet lay off Havana, the 
great ships seven or eight miles from shore, the smaller 
ones occasionally venturing nearer, confining themselves 
strictly to blockading duties, and seizing all Spanish 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 143 

vessels that incautiously ventured within their reach. 
On shore the soldiers of Spain were kept busy in build- 
ing and strengthening batteries, a form of activity of 
which Admiral Sampson did not approve, and with 
which he concluded to interfere. On the morning of 
the 27th the flag-ship steamed along the coast to Matan- 
zas, a sea-port city some fifty miles to the east of Havana. 
Near the entrance to the harbor she was met by the 
Puritan and the Cincinnati, on blockade duty at that 
point. The wind blew freshly and the waves poured in 
sheets of green water over the low bow and stern of the 
monitor as she followed in the wake of the New York. 
Admiral Sampson stood on the bridge of the flag-ship 
carefully surveying the shore, where evidence appeared 
that the Spanish troops were actively engaged in build- 
ing what seemed to be a sand battery, on which several 
guns had been mounted. The admiral thought that a 
lesson was needed. The signal call of ' ' general quar- 
ters" was given, and with alacrity the men rushed to 
their guns. For more than thirty years the United 
States navy had not fired a hostile shot. Now a new 
record was to be made. 

Reaching a situation about four thousand yards distant 
from Punta Gorda, where the new earthwork appeared, 
the helm of the flag-ship was put to starboard and the 
bugler sounded the signal, ' ' Commence firing. ' ' Re- 
sponse was instant. From " Waist," the gunner's name 
for the eight-inch gun amidships on the port-side, came 
a loud roar and a shock that shook the great ship from 
stem to stern. The shell struck a little to the right of 
the earthwork, where a small cloud of dust testified to 
the fall of the first shot fired at an enemy from a ship of 
the new American navy. Two others followed, the third 



144 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

landing in the very centre of the earthwork, the dense 
cloud that rose being evidence of the perfect accuracy of 
the aim. These three shots were followed by a broad- 
side from all the guns that could be brought to bear, — 
eight-inch and four-inch guns hurling their projectiles 
together upon the obtrusive work. 

So far the New York had been engaged alone. But 
the Puritan and the Cincinnati were vigorously sig- 
nalling for permission to fire. ' ' All right ; tell them to 
go ahead," said the admiral on learning their request. 
They lost no time in taking part in the work. 

The bombardment had not been without a return. At 
Quintas de Recreo, on the east of the harbor, seven 
thousand yards from the New York, was a fort armed 
with four 8-inch guns, whose shots were coming towards 
the flag-ship, though falling very short. Sampson now 
directed his fire on this fort. The Puritan did the same, 
while the Cincinnati continued to attend to the earth- 
work. Five minutes sufficed to silence the fort, and the 
New York again turned her guns on the sand battery. 
At 1. 15 p.m., nineteen minutes after the affair began, 
the admiral signalled to ' ' cease firing, ' ' and the brief 
engagement came to an end. 

About three hundred shots had been fired during this 
initial engagement, with few returns from the shore, no 
shot hitting any of the ships. The effect on shore was 
not apparent, other than that the forts were silenced and 
seemingly deserted. From Madrid came the report that 
the Spanish loss consisted of "one mule," a sarcastic 
tribute to American gunnery that elicited much mirth 
from our ill-wishers on the other side of the ocean. Leav- 
ing the Puritan and the Cincinnati to look after Matanzas, 
the New York headed for Havana. The affair had 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 145 

amounted to little more than useful target-practice, its 
chief utility being its evidence of the accuracy of American 
gunnery. All that need further be said about it is to note 
the eagerness displayed by the sailors at the opportunity 
to fight, four sick men springing from their cots at the 
first shot and rushing to their stations at the guns. It 
was with bitter disappointment that they returned when 
ordered back to the sick-bay. 

While the United States navy had thus actively en- 
gaged in hostilities, that of Spain was not quite idle. 
In number of ships that country fairly equalled the 
United States. It was inferior in strength, though it 
had a number of vessels of good fighting capacity. 
Several of the best of the Spanish ships, comprising 
four swift armored cruisers and a number of torpedo- 
boat destroyers, had assembled in the days preceding 
the declaration of war at St. Vincent harbor, Cape 
Verde Islands. A second fleet, of inferior strength, lay 
at Manila, in the Philippines ; and a third, of consider- 
able numerical strength, yet embracing few ships in 
good condition for duty, was at the port of Cadiz, Spain. 
It was to the Cape Verde fleet that the principal attention 
was paid on the American side. There was much appre- 
hension that the powerful ships of this fleet might make 
a sudden dash across the Atlantic and attack some of 
our seaport cities, few of which were well defended, 
while some were in serious need of forts and guns. 

To guard against this possible danger, the ' ' Flying 
Squadron," under Commodore Winfield Scott Schley, 
was held ready at Newport News. It included the 
battle - ships Massachusetts and Texas, the armored 
cruiser Brooklyn, Commodore Schley's flag-ship, and 
the protected cruisers Minneapolis and Columbia. The 



146 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

latter were kept patrolling the coast, in which duty was 
also engaged a "Northern Patrol Squadron," under 
Admiral Howell, consisting of the subsidized passenger- 
steamers renamed the Yankee, Dixie, Prairie, and Yo- 
semite. The harbor-defence ram Katahdin was included 
in this squadron, while the thirteen old monitors, relics 
of the Civil War, were being hastily refitted for harbor 
duty. As fast as they could be made serviceable they 
were sent to various harbors to aid in their defence. 

The Cape Verde Islands are a Portuguese colony, 
and the continuance of the Spanish fleet in the harbor 
of St. Vincent became inadmissible after Portugal had, 
following most of the nations of Europe, proclaimed 
neutrality between the combatants. Admiral Cervera, 
in command of the fleet, was warned to leave, and on 
April 29 the squadron set sail. It consisted of the 
first-class armored cruisers Cristobal Colon, Almirante 
Oquendo, Infanta Maria Teresa, and Vizcaya, and the 
three torpedo-boat destroyers Furor, Terror, and Pluton. 
The whole comprised a formidable fleet, which, if directed 
against some of the less protected American sea-board 
cities, might cause immense damage. The activity of 
the patrolling ships was in consequence redoubled ; 
mines were laid in the various harbor approaches, and 
guns were mounted as rapidly as possible on sea-coast 
defences ; and apprehension of possible danger threat- 
ened to interfere seriously with the business of sea-side 
resorts during the coming summer. 

Apprehensions of this kind, however, had no effect on 
the activity of the blockading fleet. On the 29th of 
April the batteries at Cienfuegos, on the southern Cuban 
coast, were bombarded by the cruiser Marblehead, and 
on the same day the gunboat Nashville, which had made 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 147 

the first prize of the war, added to her record by the 
capture of the Spanish steamer Argonauta, laden with 
troops, arms, and ammunition and seeking an open port. 
The prizes made up to this time consisted of vessels that 
had left harbor before war was declared and whose cap- 
tains were unaware of the state of affairs. 

On the 30th the forts at Cabanas, near Havana, were 
attacked and demolished by the cruiser New York, and 
on the same day came the welcome tidings that the 
Oregon and Marietta, which for weeks had been making 
their way along the many thousands of miles of South 
American coast, were in the harbor of Rio Janeiro, 
having progressed safely that far on their long route. 
Much the most dangerous stage of their journey lay 
before them still. Before the Oregon could reach the 
North Atlantic Squadron, to which she was accredited, 
the Cape Verde squadron might be in her track, way- 
laying her on the open seas or in the West India chan- 
nels. The Oregon was more powerful than any one of 
these ships, but four against one are frightful odds, and, 
though she might have given a good account of herself 
against the whole fleet, a lively degree of uneasiness con- 
cerning her prevailed. It could not then be conjectured 
that the Oregon was thereafter to meet and fight this 
fleet under circumstances far different from those sur- 
mised. 

The activity in the navy was paralleled by that in the 
army. A powerful force of United States regular troops 
began to assemble at Tampa, Florida, a point chosen for 
its nearness to Cuba. The purpose of this movement 
was believed to be an early descent upon Cuba, and ex- 
pectation of stirring events in the near future was enter- 
tained. These troops, however, were illy provided with 



148 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

military supplies, and the hoped-for invasion was neces- 
sarily deferred ; the conditions being such as are apt to 
arise in the hasty mobilization of an army, particularly 
where large deficiencies in number have to be made up 
by raw recruits. The difficulties were in the main the 
results of a sudden change from a state of peace to one 
of war, and the necessity of making rapid provision for 
the requirements of a large army. Much fault was found 
with the government for alleged slowness of action and 
neglect of the troops, and bitter comments were made 
on the appointment of staff-officers through seeming 
political influence. These complaints were not without 
warrant, though they were exaggerated, no allowance 
being made for the difficulty under which the War De- 
partment labored in the sudden necessity of obtaining 
and forwarding a vast quantity of supplies. In reality, 
no nation under similar circumstances could have made 
more rapid progress in preparing for war. 

We have already spoken of the efforts of the powers of 
Europe to effect an accommodation between the United 
States and Spain. When war had actually begun, they 
quickly took sides with one or the other of the com- 
batants. France and Germany became strong adherents 
of Spain, their newspapers vigorously denouncing the 
United States, though the governments remained passive. 
This attitude was supposed to be due, on the part of 
France, to the Spanish debt being largely owing to citi- 
zens of that country. With Germany it was ascribed to 
a commercial rather than a pecuniary cause, the United 
States tariff having aroused deep-seated hostility in the 
agrarian party of that country. Austria also favored 
Spain, though her press was less aggressive. In Italy 
the tide of public opinion seems to have run most 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. i 49 

strongly in favor of the United States ; while Russia was 
non-committal, an occasional press utterance indicating- 
some degree of animosity to the United States. 

The remaining leading power, Great Britain, from the 
start took strong sides with the United States, evincing 
an unexpected warmth of friendliness and a strong desire 
to ally herself with this country. It was shrewdly held 
by many that self-interest was at the bottom of this 
seemingly exaggerated show of amity ; but such was 
hardly the case with the people, who were strongly pro- 
American. The press, with very few exceptions, sus- 
tained this country, and the opposing papers in a few 
months veered around, probably through the influence 
of public opinion. 

Whatever the underlying motive in the British heart, 
this earnest display of friendliness was of much service 
to the United States. It tied the hands of our enemies 
on the Continent, who feared that any hostile act would 
result in an alliance between the two great Anglo-Saxon 
nations. Some active efforts at interference might have 
been made but for this haunting fear. Great Britain 
stood as a buffer between us and our opponents, she re- 
fusing to co-operate in any steps of interference. The 
union of the English-speaking peoples was a result 
which none of them wished to brinaf about. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

THE SEA-FIGHT AT MANILA. 

The story of the war now leads us to a far remote 
locality, one, in fact, on the opposite side of the earth, 
that extensive archipelago lying east of Indo-China 
known as the Philippine Islands. These islands, proba- 
bly more than fourteen hundred in number, though only 
a few of them are large enough to be of importance, have 
been in the possession of Spain almost as long as Cuba. 
They were discovered by Magellan in 152 1, but were 
not made a Spanish colony until 1569. Manila, the 
capital, was founded two years afterwards. The natives, 
eight millions or more in number, were not so summarily 
disposed of as those of Cuba, but of late years their 
lot has been still more severe than that of the modern 
Cubans, they being oppressed in exasperating and cruel 
ways, and treated so badly that their hatred of the 
Spaniards has become quite equal to that felt by the 
Cubans, — it could not well be greater. 

In 1896, under the incitement of news of the Cuban 
insurrection, the natives of the Philippines rebelled 
against their masters, fighting fiercely for their liberty 
until near the end of' 1897. With this rebellion we have 
no direct concern. It will suffice to say that the insur- 
gents proved very difficult to subdue, and that they 
were treated with revolting cruelty by the Spaniards 
when taken prisoners. Finally, in December, 1897, the 
Spanish authorities adopted the method they had em- 
no 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 151 

ployed in Cuba in 1878, entering into communication 
with General Emilio Aguinaldo, the leader in the insur- 
rectionary movement, and promising to inaugurate an 
extensive system of reforms if he would bring the insur- 
rection to an end. A large sum of money was also 
promised to the principal insurgents. The offer was ac- 
cepted, and Aguinaldo and others retired to Hong Kong 
with their share of the subsidy. Spain, as usual, failed 
to keep her word. The remainder of the money was 
not paid. The leaders who, trusting in Spanish faith, 
had remained in the islands, were seized and executed. 
The promised reforms were ignored, the governor-gen- 
eral denying that he had pledged himself. As a result, 
before two months had passed the rebels were once 
more in arms. The country was soon again in turmoil, 
the anger of the insurgents being particularly directed 
against the priests, to whose influence they ascribed the 
dishonesty of the Spanish authorities. ' ' No quarter to 
the priests' ' was the sentiment with which they went to 
war. They had long and bitter scores with these ecclesi- 
astics to wipe out. 

At the opening of the war little thought was given by 
the people of the United States to this far-off possession 
of Spain. But the government had it in mind. A 
small fleet, under the command of Commodore George 
Dewey, lay at Hong Kong, China, consisting of the 
cruisers Olympia, Baltimore, Raleigh, and Boston, the 
gunboats Concord and Petrel, and the despatch-boat 
McCullough. The declaration of war rendered the con- 
tinuance of this fleet in a neutral port inadmissible under 
the rules of international law, and orders for its departure 
were given by the British authorities. It sailed on 
April 26, bound, not for an American port, in accord- 



152 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

ance with the instructions earlier sent it, but for the 
Philippine Islands, under orders from Washington to 
attack the Spanish fleet at Manila and "capture or 
destroy it." On the same day Spain made its first 
and only prize during the war, the American bark 
Saranac, taken by the gunboat El Cano at Iloilo, a 
Philippine port. On May 2 came, by way of Madrid, an 
exciting report to the effect that the United States fleet 
had attacked and partly destroyed the Manila fleet of 
Spain. The cutting of the cable put an end to further 
news, and for a week the American nation remained in 
suspense. It then was gladdened by a despatch from 
Commodore Dewey, saying that he had destroyed the 
entire Spanish fleet without the loss of a single life on 
his side. 

Dewey's despatch, which was laconic in form but 
crowded with meaning, is a historical document well 
worthy of giving in full : 

"Manila, May 1. — Squadron arrived at Manila at 
daybreak this morning. Immediately engaged the 
enemy and destroyed the following Spanish vessels : 
Reina Cristina, Castilla, Don Antonio de Ulloa, Isla de 
Luzon, Isla de Cuba, General Lezo, Marquis de Duero, 
Cano, Velasco, Isla de Mindanao, a transport, and 
water-battery at Cavite. The squadron is uninjured and 
only a few men are slightly wounded. Only means of 
telegraphing is to American consul at Hong Kong. I 
shall communicate with him. Dewey. ' ' 

The story of the victory is one of the most glorious in 
the annals of the American navy. On April 27 the 
squadron left Mirs Bay, some thirty miles from Hong 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 153 

Kong, to which it had sailed the day before. It was 
accompanied by two colliers, the Nanshan and the 
Zafiro, which Dewey had purchased and which were 
loaded with ten thousand tons of coal. The Monocacy, 
a corvette of the old navy, was left behind, as of no use 
in modern naval war, her officers and crew being dis- 
tributed among the other vessels. The flag-ship was the 
Olympia, Captain C. V. Gridley commanding, one of 
the finest cruisers in the American navy, her armament 
consisting of four 8-inch slow-fire, ten 5-inch rapid-fire, 
and fourteen 6-pounder guns. The other cruisers were 
little behind her in power of armament and weight of 
projectiles. 

Straight across the China Sea sailed the fleet, heavy 
weather forcing the war-vessels to slow up to about eight 
knots speed, on account of the deeply laden colliers, 
which plunged heavily through the waves. On the 
evening of the first day out the news of the declaration 
of war was read to the crews, followed by a proclama- 
tion of the most inflammatory character which had been 
issued to the people by the governor-general of Manila. 
This described the Americans as heretic vandals, who 
were coming to rob their churches and insult their 
women, and was full of uncomplimentary sayings about 
the invaders and warm appeals to the people of Manila 
to defend their city to the death. Its bombast elicited 
the derisive laughter of the men, while enthusiastic 
cheers for the American flag indicated their patriotic 
temper. 

We append, as of some interest, an extract from this 
proclamation : 

"The North American people, constituted of all the 
social excrescences, have exhausted our patience and 



154 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

provoked war with their perfidious machinations, with 
their acts of treachery, with their outrages against the 
law of nations and international conventions. 

' ' The struggle will be short and decisive. The God 
of Victories will give us one as brilliant as the justice of 
our cause demands. Spain, which counts upon the 
sympathies of all the nations, will emerge triumphantly 
from the new test, humiliating and blasting the adven- 
turers from those States that, without cohesion and 
without a history, offer to humanity only infamous tra- 
ditions and the ungrateful spectacle of Chambers in 
which appear united insolence and defamation, coward- 
ice and cynicism. 

"You will not allow the faith you profess to be made 
a mock of, impious hands to be placed on the temple of 
the true God, the images you adore to be thrown down 
by unbelief. The aggressors shall not profane the tombs 
of your fathers, they shall not gratify their lustful pas- 
sions at the cost of your wives' and daughters' honor, 
or appropriate the property that your industry has ac- 
cumulated as a provision for your old age. No ; they 
shall not perpetrate any of the crimes inspired by their 
wickedness and covetousness, because your valor and 
patriotism will suffice to punish and abase the people 
that, claiming to be civilized and cultivated, have ex- 
terminated the natives of North America instead of 
bringing to them the life of civilization and of prog- 
ress. 

"Philippines, prepare for the struggle, and, united 
under the glorious Spanish flag, which is ever covered 
with laurels, let us fight with the conviction that victory 
will crown our efforts, and to the calls of our enemies 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 155 

let us oppose with the decision of the Christian and the 
patriot the cry of ' Viva Espaiia !' 

' ' Your General, 
" Bacilio Augustin Davila. 
"Manila, 23d April, 1898." 

The island of Luzon, the largest of the Philippines, 
and the one on which Manila is situated, was sighted by 
the fleet on the morning of Saturday, April 30, at 
Bolinao Cape, about one hundred and ten miles from 
the entrance to Manila Bay. Here the land rose green 
and beautiful under the morning sunlight, faint blue lines 
in the distance indicating the mountains of the interior. 
In the afternoon, when about thirty miles north of Ma- 
nila Bay, the squadron approached another deep inden- 
tation in the coast, known as Subig Bay, in which it was 
possible that some part of the Spanish fleet might lie. 
The Boston and Concord led the way as this harbor was 
neared. They were soon followed by the Baltimore, the 
remainder of the fleet proceeding slowly as these pioneers 
dashed ahead at full speed. In the late afternoon they 
returned, reporting that they had explored Subig Bay, 
finding there only some insignificant coasting craft. 

At about 5.15 p.m. the squadron came to a halt, and 
a council of war was held on the flag-ship, in which it 
was decided to enter Manila Bay during the darkness of 
that night. Getting under way again, the ships jogged 
on at a four-knot speed, in order that the harbor en- 
trance might not be reached until the night was well 
advanced. Active preparations were meanwhile made 
for battle, all impedimenta that could be spared from the 
decks being thrown overboard, while mess-chests and 
tables, chairs, and other woodwork from between decks 



156 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

were also set afloat. Other steps of precaution were 
hastily taken, the life-boats being wrapped in canvas to 
prevent splinters flying, and buoyant objects placed 
where they would float and serve as life-rafts in case the 
ship went down. There were unpleasantly suggestive 
preparations for the care of the wounded, which brought 
grim looks to the faces of the men. This was no holi- 
day excursion upon which they were bound. 

As the ships moved on the battle-ports were put up, 
and every light was hidden except those that shone 
astern, a small electric-light glowing from each as a 
guide to the next in line. The chart-rooms were sealed 
and every effort was made to darken the ships. Invol- 
untarily every one moved stealthily about the decks. 
Word was passed to the men that the bay of Manila 
would be entered during the night, and many a face 
grew stern with grim determination as the import of this 
message was understood. A half moon lit the sky, but 
it was hidden under masses of gray cloud. Everything 
favored the hope entertained of stealing in unseen past 
the forts that guarded Corregidor Island, in the entrance 
to the bay. 

About 11.30 p.m. two dark headlands could be seen 
looming up, showing black against the shifting clouds 
that veiled the moon. In the intervening space lay a 
smaller mass, the fortified isle whose guns commanded 
the ship channels. The speed was increased to eight 
knots, and one by one the ships glided round the 
northern headland, and the Olympia, followed by her 
consorts, steered for the centre of the southern and 
wider channel. Soon Corregidor Island lay abeam of 
the leading ship. The Spanish sentinels seemed still 
wrapped in slumber. 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 157 

A faint light now flashed and died out on the island 
shore, and a rocket shot into the air. The invading 
fleet had been discovered. But no shot came, and the 
foremost ships were well past the island before a flash of 
flame gleamed through the darkness, followed by the 
boom of a heavy gun, and a shell went whistling over- 
head clear of the ships. The Raleigh replied with a 
5-inch gun, the Boston and Concord followed, and the 
McCullough sent in a six-pound projectile. After a shot 
or two more from shore the batteries relapsed into 
silence, possibly from the effects of some of the shells 
dropped in their midst, and the fleet moved on, the 
colliers hugging the land close and escaping unharmed. 
The forts had been safely passed and the harbor-entrance 
won. Speed was now slowed down, and the men flung 
themselves on the decks beside their guns to snatch an 
interval of sleep. It was known that Manila would not 
be reached until early dawn. One casualty had oc- 
curred. Chief-Engineer Randall, of the McCullough, 
was overcome by a nervous shock, of probably apoplectic 
character, and at two o'clock he died. It was the only 
death on the American side during that eventful day. 

As the fleet glided onward the distant lights of Manila 
came into view. The bay is a deep one ; Cavite, the 
naval station of the capital, being seventeen miles from 
its mouth and Manila still further in. Lieutenant Cal- 
kins, the navigator of the Olympia, carried the fleet up 
through the dark harbor with commendable boldness and 
success. At four o'clock the men were roused, and a 
frugal meal of coffee and hardtack was served out to 
them, the officers joining in the repast. The first signs 
of dawn were visible in the sky about 4.30, when Manila 
was some six miles away. There lay a group of shipping, 



158 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

but these were made out, as the sun rose behind the city, 
to be merchant-ships, not the war-vessels of which the 
cruisers were in search. On went the fleet in close 
battle array, the Olympia leading, the Baltimore, Raleigh, 
Petrel, Concord, and Boston following in succession. 

Passing to the northward of the capital and turning 
south, the keen eyes of Commodore Dewey caught sight 
of his predestined prey, the Spanish fleet, grouped in 
the little bay of Cavite. Here the Spaniards had a well- 
equipped navy-yard, known as Cavite Arsenal, protected 
by forts and under the command of Rear-Admiral Patri- 
cio Montojo, who was also commander-in-chief of the 
squadron. His flag-ship was the Reina Cristina, a 3500- 
ton cruiser, carrying twenty guns which ranged from 
6. 2-inch to 3-pounders. The others included the 3300- 
ton cruiser Castilla, four smaller cruisers, the Don An- 
tonio de Ulloa, Velasco, Isla de Cuba, and Isla de Luzon, 
and the gunboats General Lezo, Marquis del Duero, and 
El Correo, with a transport, the Isla de Mindanao. Of 
these, the Velasco was under repair and her guns were 
mounted in earthworks in the harbor. There were also 
four torpedo-boats. 

The Spanish squadron was in every respect inferior to 
its enemy, the ships being of less tonnage and lighter 
armament. In open sea they would not have had a 
moment's chance. But flanked by shore batteries, as 
they were, the conditions were far more equalized. And 
the Spaniards had the advantage of an exact knowledge 
of distances in the harbor, while the Americans were in 
ignorance of distance and soundings and, unable to use 
range-finders with effect, at a marked disadvantage in 
opportunities for sure marksmanship. Their principal 
advantage lay in the fact that the men knew how to use 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 159 

the guns, being trained to shoot straight and to make 
every shot tell. This was a training which the Spanish 
gunners sadly lacked, and which had a remarkable effect 
upon the issue of the combat. 

With the flag of the American Union flying at the 
masthead of every ship, the squadron moved steadily on, 
passing the Manila forts at the distance of several miles. 
The great guns of the forts boomed out as they advanced, 
but there was no reply except a brace of shots from the 
Concord. The commodore had another object in view, 
and did not wish to hurl destruction into the crowded 
city behind the forts. As they advanced, the fleet of 
the enemy came plainly into view. Its position may be 
briefly described. 

At Cavite a spit of land projects out into the bay, its 
curved shores enclosing a body of water known as Bakor 
Bay. Batteries occupied the extremity of the peninsula, 
between which and Cavite Arsenal, on the inner shore, 
lay extended the Spanish ships, crossing the mouth of 
Bakor Bay from east to west, the line ending in shoal 
water near the shore. Farther in, behind the arsenal 
boom, lay the gunboats of the fleet. Each end of the 
line was protected by shore batteries mounted with 6- 
and 8-inch guns. 

Fronting this squadron, at a distance of three or four 
miles, the American ships swept down in the order above 
named. The little McCullough kept farther away, as a 
guard to the transports which were placed under her 
care. On the bridge of the Olympia Dewey stood ex- 
posed, with Flag-Captain Lamberton by his side, and 
maintained this position as the ship swept on through the 
storm of shot and shell which soon hurtled from the 
Spanish guns. Captain Gridley, commander of the flag- 



160 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

ship, took his position within the conning-tower, lest 
some unlucky shot should sweep away all the executive 
officers of the ship. This daring of Commodore Dewey 
is said to have been equalled by that of Admiral Montojo 
of the Spanish squadron. He also is credited with occu- 
pying the bridge of his ship during the fight, and, when 
one end of it was wrecked by a shell, taking his station 
on the other end. 

The shore batteries began the engagement, opening 
on the American ships while still out of range. As the 
Olympia moved steadily onward, a new peril threatened 
her, — two submarine mines were exploded in her front. 
Fortunately, Spanish nervousness had set them off too 
soon and their force was uselessly expended on the water. 
How many more of these dreaded instruments of destruc- 
tion might lie in their path no man could guess, but 
Dewey had been with Farragut in the Mississippi and 
was not the man to halt for the unseen. 

The ships swept on until about forty-five hundred yards 
away, the Spanish fire growing continuous. But not a 
ship was struck, and they steamed onward grim and 
silent, with the men at the guns waiting in strained im- 
patience for the battle-signal to be given, and disdainful 
of the shots that were uselessly tearing up the waters of 
the bay. " Remember the Maine !" came in an unpre- 
meditated cry from the lips of one stern sea-dog, and in 
an instant it was taken up and ran throughout the ship. 
It was the war-cry of the first battle of the new American 
navy. 

"You may fire when ready, Gridley," said the com- 
modore at length ; and in echo to his words an 8-inch 
shell from the forward turret of the Olympia went scream- 
ing through the air. The hour was 5.33. The guns 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 161 

of the Baltimore and Boston followed, and by 5.40 a 
continuous stream of projectiles was pouring in towards 
the Spanish ships. The difference in effect of the fire of 
the two fleets was remarkable. The Spanish shells flew 
high or struck the water before reaching the ships ; 
hardly one of them touched its mark, while few from 
the American guns went astray. The effect was soon 
evident. The ships of Spain were being rent and torn 
and their men hurled prostrate in death, while scarcely a 
trace of damage was visible on an American hull. 

There were narrow escapes. One fragment of a shell 
struck the bridge- gratings of the Olympia ; another 
passed just underwhere Commodore Dewey stood, tearing 
a hole in the deck. Chaplain Frazier was looking out 
of a gun-port when a shell struck the ship's side within 
a yard. His head was withdrawn just in time to save it 
from being blown off. As the fight went on, other shots 
found a mark. One entered the port quarters of the 
Boston and burst in the state-room of Ensign Dodridge, 
setting it in flames. A second had similar effect on the 
port hammock-netting. The Baltimore was shot through 
and through by a shell, which fortunately struck no one 
in its career. Another ripped up the main deck, disabled 
a 6-inch gun, and exploded a box of ammunition, which 
wounded eight men. Strange to relate, these were the 
only men injured during the whole battle, and none of 
them was seriously hurt. 

Sweeping down parallel to the Spanish line, the 
American fleet, on reaching the end of its course, 
swung round in a long ellipse and moved back over the 
same route, now opening fire from its starboard batteries. 
Six times in succession, as the hours moved on, the 
long line of ships moved over this course, pouring in 

11 



162 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

shot and shell as they went, the boom of the great 
guns breaking at intervals through the continuous rattle 
of the rapid-fire guns, which poured out their projectiles 
in what seemed a continuous sheet of flame. 

The Spanish ships, which had been in a measure un- 
prepared for this assault, hastened to get up steam, and 
soon clouds of black smoke were pouring from their 
funnels. As the American squadron started upon its 
third course, the Spanish admiral, with a daring equal to 
that of his foes, headed his flag-ship, the Reina Cris- 
tina, straight for his principal opponent, steaming gal- 
lantly out, as if with the intention of running the Olympia 
down. It was a desperate attempt. At once the whole 
array of ships turned their guns on this single antagonist, 
tearing and rending her frightfully with shot and shell. 
As she came nearer, the storm of projectiles became so 
terrific that Admiral Montojo saw that his ship would be 
annihilated if he continued his perilous movement. He 
therefore swung her sharply round and started shoreward. 
Just as he did so, an 8-inch shell from the Olympia 
struck the Reina Cristina squarely in the stern, and 
drove inward through the length of the ship, rending 
through every obstruction, and wrecking the aft boiler 
and blowing open the deck in its explosion. This one 
shell proved the flag-ship's fate. Men lay dead through- 
out its course, and clouds of white smoke soon snowed 
that the ship was in flames. For half an hour longer she 
kept up the fight, but the fire started in her continued 
to burn until she sank. It was now seven o'clock. 

Early in the engagement another effort was made to 
destroy the Olympia. Two torpedo-boats came swiftly 
out and halted under the fire of the war-ships until their 
hoped-for prey should come within torpedo-reach. On 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 163 

came the flag-ship until but eight hundred yards distant. 
Then, as the daring little foes held their ground, she 
stopped and signalled for a concentrated fire on those 
dreaded terrors of the seas. In a moment they were the 
centre of a rain of shell, whipping the water around them 
until they were forced to turn and flee. As they did so 
a shell struck one of them fairly, and the daring craft 
was seen to plunge headlong under the sea. The other 
managed to reach cover, but was beached and deserted 
by her crew. Still another bold advance was made from 
the Spanish fleet, this time by a gunboat, which slipped 
out and made for the McCullough, probably hoping to 
destroy the transports. This effort also failed. The shot 
became so hot around her that she quickly drew back 
to her lurking-place. Meanwhile the batteries at Manila, 
distant as they were, were keeping up a steady fire upon 
the ships. No return was made by the fleet, but in the 
end Dewey sent a message to the governor-general that 
this fire must be stopped or the city would be shelled. 
The threat proved effectual. No more shells came from 
the Manila forts. 

After four runs had been made at a distance of four 
thousand or five thousand yards, Lieutenant Calkins, the 
navigator of the Olympia, told the commodore that he 
believed it would be safe to take the ships nearer the 
enemy, with the lead going to test the depth of the 
water. Two more runs were therefore made within two 
thousand yards of the Spanish fleet. At this distance 
all the guns told, even the 6-pounders reaching their 
mark, and the effect on the enemy became terribly 
severe ; three of their ships were in full flames, their fire 
had slackened, and it was evident that the victory was 
practically won. 



164 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

But the men were becoming exhausted by the strain. 
For two hours they had been engaged, with little more 
than a cup of coffee to sustain them. At 7.35, there- 
fore, Dewey ceased firing and withdrew the squadron 
for breakfast. What harm had been done to his ships 
was not known, but when the word passed through the 
fleet that not a ship had been damaged or a man killed, 
involuntary cheers broke out. The gun-captains knew 
that there was a very different story to tell for the enemy, 
who had fought with a courage worthy of a better 
fate. 

At 11. 16, the men having had their breakfast and a 
few hours' rest, the ships returned to the attack, the 
Baltimore leading the way and the Olympia following, 
with Dewey occupying the perilous position on the 
bridge which he had maintained throughout. As they 
came within range, nearly the whole Spanish fleet was 
seen to be in flames, the flag-ship burning fiercely. 
Again shells were poured upon the devoted ships, the 
Spaniards still firing, but with less energy than before. 
By noon their fire had nearly ceased. At 12.30 the 
squadron ceased firing, the batteries being silenced and 
the Spanish ships sunk, burnt, and deserted. Every 
flag had gone down except one that floated above a 
small fortification in the distance. The transport Isla de 
Mindanao was still afloat, but a few shots through its 
helpless hulk soon set it in flames. 

At 12.40 the squadron withdrew towards Manila, 
having finished its work, the little Petrel being left to 
complete the destruction of the gunboats which lay 
within the interior harbor. Lieutenant Hughes, with 
an armed boat's crew, set fire to these, and soon they 
were vying in flame with the larger vessels outside. 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 165 

Warning was sent to Governor-General Augustin, the 
author of the grandiloquent proclamation of a week 
before, that the port of Manila was under blockade, and 
that at a single shot from his batteries at any American 
ship the city would be laid in ashes. 

The victory had been one without parallel in the whole 
history of naval warfare. For three or four hours the 
American ships had been exposed, within easy range, 
to a hot fire from the Spanish fleet and forts, and yet all 
that fiery storm had failed to kill a single man or to do 
serious injury to a single ship. On the other hand, the 
Spanish fleet had ceased to exist. Its burnt remnants 
lay on the bottom of the bay. In men the loss had been 
as severe as in ships. General Augustin gave their num- 
ber at six hundred and eighteen. It was probably near 
a thousand, the Reina Cristina alone having one hundred 
and fifty killed, the captain among them. During the 
battle, Admiral Montojo had been obliged to shift his 
flag from the burning flag-ship to the little Isla de Cuba. 
This, too, was soon destroyed, the admiral being wounded, 
though not seriously. The forts had suffered as severely 
as the ships, being knocked into shapeless heaps of earth 
and their garrisons killed or put to flight. The remark- 
able difference in result was due to the skilful manoeu- 
vring of the American fleet and the accurate handling 
of its guns, as compared with the wretched gunnery of 
the Spaniards, who seemed incapable of hitting a ship 
in motion. A French official account spoke of the 
American fire as "for accuracy and for rapidity some- 
thing awful. ' ' 

For a week previously Manila had been on the verge 
of a panic. Now terror and confusion prevailed. Flight 
was impossible, since it would have been into the hands 



166 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

of the insurgents, who had been greatly emboldened by 
the news of the war, and swarmed in the surrounding 
country. It was not known but that Dewey would turn 
his guns on the city and batter it to the earth. General 
Augustin's proclamation had prepared the citizens for 
the wildest excesses on the part of the victorious foe, 
and they were in a state of pitiable dismay. 

In the afternoon of May i Dewey's ship was boarded 
by the British consul, who requested the victor, in view 
of the many foreigners in the city, represented by the 
consuls of twenty-one different governments, not to 
bombard the place. Dewey promised on condition that 
the military supplies of Manila should be delivered to 
him, with coal for his ships and the control of the cable 
to Hong Kong. General Augustin, threatened by 
enemies on all sides, the insurgents by land, the Amer- 
icans by water, telegraphed to Madrid for instructions, 
sending the partial report of the battle which quickly 
spread over the world. On May 2 the answer came. 
It offered defiance to the enemy. At once Dewey sent the 
Baltimore and the Raleigh to Corregidor Island, and sum- 
moned the colonel in command to surrender. He did so 
without hesitation, and the works commanding the en- 
trance to the harbor fell into American hands. At four 
o'clock that afternoon communication by telegraph with 
Hong Kong ceased. Dewey had lifted and cut the 
cable, the use of which had been refused to him. The 
only means of communication left was by boat to Hong 
Kong, and thither the McCullough was despatched with 
news of the victory. On May 7 came by telegraph from 
China the message from Dewey we have quoted, and 
which electrified the expectant people of the United 
States and elicited the admiration of all Europe. 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 167 

In addition to the despatch given, the McCullough 
brought another, dated May 4, saying : 

' ' I have taken possession of naval station at Cavite, 
Philippine Islands, and destroyed the fortifications. Have 
destroyed fortifications at bay entrance, Corregidor Is- 
land, paroling the garrison. I control the bay com- 
pletely and can take the city at any time. The squadron 
is in excellent health and spirits. The Spanish loss not 
fully known, but is very heavy. One hundred and fifty 
killed, including captain, on Reina Cristina alone. I 
am assisting in protecting Spanish sick and wounded. 
Two hundred and fifty sick and wounded in hospital 
within our lines. Much excitement at Manila. Will 

protect foreign residents. 

"Dewey." 

The Petrel, which had been sent into the inner harbor 
to destroy the gunboats, found there one vessel unhurt, the 
transport Manila, which lay in three feet of mud near 
the navy-yard. She was towed off and anchored near 
the squadron, and proved to be a handsome steamer of 
about two thousand tons. She was laden with supplies 
and five hundred tons of coal, from which the Raleigh 
supplied her bunkers. The remaining prizes consisted of 
a number of tugs and launches, which were seized for 
the service of the American fleet. When the men 
landed from the Petrel to search the navy-yard, they 
were met by the doctor and a deputation of Sisters of 
Mercy from the hospital, who begged them not to kill 
the wounded or fire on the hospital. They learned with 
surprise and delight that American soldiers did not per- 
form such deeds. They had been made to believe that 
they had ruthless savages to deal with. 



168 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

The departure of the Spanish soldiers, who fled in 
haste to Manila after the battle, left Cavite at the mercy 
of the insurgents, who swarmed into the place and looted 
it to their hearts' content, carrying off many boat-loads 
of plunder over the bay. At the request of the officers 
and surgeons of the naval hospital, which was filled 
with wounded from the fleet and threatened with attack 
by the natives, a force of marines was sent to guard it. 
The work of plundering, however, went on with activity 
in the town of St. Roque, near Cavite, the houses of 
Spaniards being mercilessly looted, while hundreds of 
people fled from the town, carrying their household 
effects in all available vehicles. Even the arsenal was 
robbed of many boat-loads of furniture and stores before 
the guard of marines was posted at its gates. 

The reception of the despatch from Dewey by the 
President was acknowledged without delay through Sec- 
retary Long, who sent the following message to the 

victorious commodore : 

"Washington, May 7, 1898. 
" Dewey, Manila. 

" The President, in the name of the American people, 
thanks you and your officers and men for your splendid 
achievement and overwhelming victory. In recognition 
he has appointed you acting admiral, and will recom- 
mend a vote of thanks to you by Congress. 

"Long." 

On May 9, Congress, by a rising vote in both Houses, 
passed a resolution of thanks to Dewey and his officers 
and men, and appropriated $10,000 to present him with 
a sword and medals to all under his command. On the 
nth he was nominated and confirmed rear-admiral. He 
hastened to return his grateful thanks to the President 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 169 

and Congress for the compliment paid him and the honors 
conferred on him and his men. 

The unexpectedly complete success of the Manila ex- 
pedition was followed by steps for the reinforcement of 
Admiral Dewey and for taking possession of the Philip- 
pine Islands, an outcome of the war which at once be- 
came urgent. Supplies and men were made ready to 
send across the Pacific, under command of Major-Gen- 
eral Wesley Merritt, who on May 12 was announced as 
military governor of the Philippines. 

On the 1 8th the cruiser Charleston sailed from Mare 
Island for Manila, loaded with supplies and ammunition. 
There was considerable delay in despatching men, the 
first detachment of troops, numbering two thousand five 
hundred men, not leaving San Francisco for the Philip- 
pines until May 25. The second expedition, three thou- 
sand five hundred strong, set out on June 15. To 
strengthen Dewey's fleet the monitor Monterey was 
ordered, June 1, to join him, and on June 23 the monitor 
Monadnock set out from San Francisco for the same 
purpose. Meanwhile the victorious admiral awaited in 
the bay of Manila the arrival of Merritt and his men, he 
having decided that it would be unwise to proceed against 
the city until amply able to hold it and restrain the 
insurgent forces. The two monitors sent were deemed 
sufficient to enable him to meet any fleet which Spain 
could despatch against him. A third expedition, five 
thousand in number, left San Francisco for the Philip- 
pines June 27 to 29, and on July 15 and subsequently a 
fourth expedition set sail. Admiral Dewey meanwhile 
awaited the arrival of these reinforcements, keeping up 
a strict blockade, but making no effort to take posses- 
sion of a city which he was too weak to hold. 



CHAPTER IX. 

UNDER FIRE AT CARDENAS AND CIENFUEGOS. 

On May i, the date of Commodore Dewey's signal 
victory at Manila, preparations for active work were 
making in the Atlantic waters. The Spanish fleet at the 
Cape Verde Islands had been obliged to leave harbor 
there on April 29, in consequence of the proclamation of 
neutrality by Portugal. It was believed to have steamed 
westward, bound, so many thought, for Porto Rico, 
though others feared that its destination might be some 
point on the coast of the United States. The uncer- 
tainty as to its goal gave rise to much apprehension 
among the seaboard population of this country, and 
active measures were taken to meet it on land and water. 
The defence of our seaports became of prime importance, 
and the whole coast was put under surveillance, a system 
of land patrol being organized which extended along the 
exposed seaboard of the country, and was alert to make 
instant report of the approach of suspicious vessels to 
any part of the coast. Harbor defence was similarly 
provided for, submarine mines being planted in all chan- 
nels leading to commercial cities, and guns mounted 
on coast-defence fortifications as rapidly as they could 
be procured. The movements of merchant-vessels en- 
tering port were put under careful supervision, that 
there might be no interference by anchor or keel with 
the mines. 

At sea the same alertness was shown as on land. The 
170 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 171 

Flying Squadron at Hampton Roads was kept ready, 
like so many war-hounds in leash, to fly to the defence 
of any imperilled point. It was strengthened by the 
addition of other vessels, among them the fine purchased 
cruiser New Orleans. The swift Columbia and Minne- 
apolis, the greyhounds of the seas, were kept on scout- 
ing duty along the northern coast, in sharp lookout for 
the approach of hostile craft. The Northern Patrol 
Squadron was similarly on the qui vwe, and it would 
have been next to impossible for an enemy to enter our 
waters without quick discovery and as quick preparation 
for his approach. 

The probability that Porto Rico or some Cuban port 
might be the destination of the Spanish fleet gave rise to 
equal activity in the West India waters. The larger 
vessels of Admiral Sampson's squadron were withdrawn 
to Key West to coal and otherwise prepare for a long 
journey in the tropical seas, leaving the duty of the 
blockade to the minor vessels, the gunboats, torpedo- 
boats, and smaller cruisers. This squadron, under the 
familiar designation of the "mosquito fleet," from that 
time forward kept up the blockade, while the larger 
vessels were more actively employed. 

Life was not altogether monotonous on board the 
mosquito fleet. It had its adventures, some of them 
interesting and important. The Spaniards on shore 
were watchful and combative, and a brisk exchange of 
shots was no uncommon occurrence. Certain thrilling 
experiences were gone through by members of the fleet 
in the effort to perform perilous duties assigned them. 
The present chapter will be devoted to an account of the 
more striking of these events. 

On May 6 the bombardment of the Matanzas forts by 



172 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

Admiral Sampson on the New York was repeated by 
two of the smallest vessels in the navy, — the torpedo- 
boat Dupont and the auxiliary cruiser Hornet. On the 
previous day the Dupont, while cruising close to the 
shore, had observed a number of men raising a Spanish 
flag on a point near Matanzas light-house. It was sus- 
pected that a new battery was being constructed there, 
and on the following afternoon the Dupont, now accom- 
panied by the Hornet, scouted close in shore. This 
temerity soon called forth a response. When they were 
not more than six hundred yards distant a storm of 
rifle-bullets came whizzing towards them, lashing the 
water sharply about the boats, but not touching a man 
on board. The attack came from a body of Spanish 
cavalry ranged in groups along the shore. The little 
boats lost no time in replying, pouring a stream of pro- 
jectiles from their quick-firing guns into the cavalry, 
which sought cover with all convenient speed. Their 
fire was next directed against three block-houses, which 
were quickly destroyed. The activity of the craft now 
drew an 8-inch shell from one of the Matanzas batteries. 
It fell short and was not repeated. On the following 
day the boats returned and fired on the forts, but no 
reply was drawn from them. Though no harm was 
done to the men on board, there were indications that 
the Spanish had suffered considerable loss. 

The first engagements of the war in which the Ameri- 
cans suffered any loss of life occurred on May 1 1 , at 
Cardenas and Cienfuegos. Cardenas, a seaport town on 
the north coast of Cuba, lies seventy-five miles to the 
eastward of Havana, and about twenty miles from Ma- 
tanzas. Cardenas Bay, in which one of the engage- 
ments in question took place, is a picturesque harbor, 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 173 

broad and shallow, the channel, scarcely two fathoms 
deep, winding its way tortuously inward through clusters 
of verdant coral keys to the city, which spreads out on 
the sloping hills fully seven miles from the entrance. 

The blockading squadron off this port consisted of the 
gunboats Wilmington and Machias, the torpedo-boat 
Winslow, and the auxiliary tug Hudson. The Spaniards 
had withdrawn from the entrance to the bay, destroying 
the buoys and other aids to navigation as they went. 
On Sunday, the 8th, the Winslow, venturing into the 
harbor, was chased to its entrance by three small gun- 
boats, one of which she disabled. It was to destroy 
these and the signal-station, and to make observations 
on the harbor, that Captain Todd, of the Wilmington, 
and Commander Merry, of the Machias, decided on 
Wednesday to run into the bay. In this movement the 
Winslow led the way, closely followed by the Hudson. 
The Wilmington, which draws a little over nine feet of 
water, was obliged to stop at eighteen hundred yards 
from the city, while the Machias, which draws thirteen 
feet, was unable to enter the shallow harbor. 

The Winslow followed the eastern and the Hudson 
the western shore of the bay. They had drawn close 
together at about one thousand yards from the water- 
front of the city, when, just before two p.m., a puff of 
smoke was observed on shore at Cardenas and a shell 
whistled over the daring boats. This shot was quickly 
followed by others, and soon shells were bursting hotly 
about the little Winslow, which was firing rapidly in 
return. The Hudson was also actively engaged, pour- 
ing projectiles from her two rapid-fire 6-pounder guns. 
What effect was produced could not easily be seen for 
the cloud of smoke ; but it was perceived that the 



174 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

Spanish aim improved as the battle went on, two empty 
barks anchored off shore being used as ranges. The 
garrison had evidently prepared for an attack. At 
about half-past two a 4-inch shell struck the Winslow on 
the starboard beam, wrecking her forward boiler and 
starboard engine, and crippling her steam steering-gear. 
A minute later, while the quartermaster was hooking up 
the hand-gear, it also was shot away, he receiving a 
severe wound in the breast. 

Lieutenant Bernadou, finding his vessel crippled be- 
yond control, and that it had become the target for a 
stream of well-directed shot, hailed the Hudson, and 
asked her to take him in tow. A group of sailors on 
the Hudson at once made ready to heave a line, Ensign 
Bagley, of the Winslow, hastening them with the ex- 
clamation, " Heave her ! Let her come ! It's getting 
pretty warm. ' ' 

The line was flung and was grasped by the Winslow' s 
men, who vigorously drew it in, bringing their craft foot 
by foot towards the Hudson. The next instant a tragic 
event took place. A 4-inch shell from the shore battery 
burst among the crew, Ensign Bagley and Fireman 
Daniels being almost torn asunder by its explosion. 
Three others were struck by fragments of the shell, and 
died in a few minutes. A flying piece of shrapnel struck 
Lieutenant Bernadou in the thigh, cutting an ugly gash. 
The hawser parted and the torpedo-boat was left floun- 
dering helplessly in the water at the mercy of the 
enemy's fire, which never relaxed. 

Meanwhile, the Wilmington was hurling her 4-inch 
shells rapidly on shore, with an accuracy of aim that 
must have done deadly execution. The enemy seemed 
to have the exact range of the Winslow, not a shell 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 175 

reaching the Hudson. With all haste the men on the 
latter boat threw another line, which was made fast, and 
the torpedo-boat pulled out of the range of the Spanish 
guns. The Hudson then towed her consort to Piedras 
Cay, a little island twelve miles off, where the Machias 
lay. The Wilmington followed them out. 

Little trace of the enemy's shot was visible on the 
Hudson or the Wilmington, the Winslow alone having 
suffered. What damage had been done to the gunboats 
and batteries of the enemy could not be told, though 
there was reason to believe that it had been considera- 
ble. After the battle, the signal-station on Diana Cay, 
whose destruction had been one of the purposes of the 
expedition, was laid in ruins by a force of marines from 
the Machias. 

Lieutenant Bernadou had shown intrepid courage 
through the action, stopping the flow of blood in his 
wounded thigh with a tourniquet tightened by a 1 -pound 
shell, and remaining pluckily at his post, manoeuvring 
his .little craft as well as he could by means of her screw- 
propeller, and replying briskly to the enemy's fire from 
his 1 -pounder rapid-fire gun. 

The dead were brought to Key West, where four of 
them were interred with all the honors of war, side by 
side with the graves of the victims of the Maine. The 
body of Ensign Bagley was sent to his home for inter- 
ment. As the first victims of the war, the death of these 
five men, and particularly of Ensign Bagley, a young 
man of much promise, sent a thrill of sympathy through- 
out the land. Many now first began to appreciate what 
war really is, and a shudder of dread filled thousands of 
hearts as they looked forward into the uncertain future, 
with its possible harvest of sanguinary events. 



i 7 6 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

On the same day with this engagement an event of 
equal interest, and one that also had its victims, took 
place on the opposite coast of Cuba, in the bay of Cien- 
fuegos, the only post then under blockade in the south. 
The town of Cienfuegos, like that of Cardenas, lies some 
distance back from the sea, in a harbor whose channel 
winds and twists. It is bounded by high hills, which 
completely hide the town from ships at sea. Near the 
harbor's mouth the land is low for some distance back, 
then it rises into a sharp bluff covered with trees. The 
cable connecting Havana with Santiago de Cuba enters 
the water at this point, the cable-house standing on the 
shore close to the water's edge. Not far away, on one 
side of this, a light-house then stood, and opposite it an 
old block-house, one of the many established along the 
coast to intercept filibustering expeditions. There was 
another cable running to Batabano, and a small one ex- 
tending to some local point eastward. These cables it 
was determined to cut. 

The blockading squadron, consisting of the cruiser 
Marblehead, the gunboat Nashville, and the auxiliary 
cruiser Windom, was detailed to do the perilous work of 
cutting these cables ; and in the early morning of Wed- 
nesday, May ii, those vessels steamed in close to the 
shore. It was evident that the Spanish had made prep- 
arations for such an attempt. Rifle-pits could be seen 
at the water's edge, rapid-fire guns were visible, and 
groups of cavalry and infantry were in motion upon the 
hill-side and the shore. Yet, in defiance of this evident 
preparation, the boats assigned to the task were manned 
and set out on their perilous duty. They consisted of 
two steam launches, two launches of smaller size, and 
half a dozen row-boats. The launches were armed with 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. i 77 

machine-guns, their purpose being to protect the small 
boats as they worked, and tow them back to the ships if 
the men should be disabled. 

The boats moved steadily inward until a point about 
one hundred feet from the cable-house and two hundred 
from the rifle-pits was reached. Lieutenant Winslow, of 
the Marblehead, was in command. Standing fearlessly 
upright in his launch as the boats drew near to the shore, 
he at length gave the word to anchor and grapple for 
the cable. Without delay the oars were shipped and 
the grappling-hooks thrown over the side, while the 
launches, and, farther out, the ships, stood ready to 
repel an assault. The work went on with all haste, but 
the cable was difficult to find, and some time passed 
before it was drawn from the sands in which it lay em- 
bedded and lifted to the gunwales of the boats. 

Until this moment the Spaniards had made no attack. 
Now there came a flash on shore, and a singing shot 
went over the heads of the men in the boats. It was 
the signal for a sharp fire from the shore, which was 
echoed in a moment by a volley from the machine-guns 
of the launches and by broadsides from the ships. The 
shells of the Marblehead, bursting in the rifle-pits, 
quickly put their defenders to flight. The Nashville 
followed, and the little Windom opened briskly with her 
4-pounders. Protected by this vigorous fire, the men 
continued their work, hacking away at the tough steel 
wires of the cable with axes, chisels, and saws. Severed 
at length, the cable was underrun and cut at another 
point, one hundred and fifty feet being taken out of its 
length. This was done to prevent its being lifted and 
spliced. The cable thus cut was supposed to be the one 
to Batabano. 



178 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

A more important one, that to Santiago de Cuba, re- 
mained, and grappling for this at once began. It was 
soon found and dealt with in the same manner, eighty 
feet being cut out of its length. The other cable men- 
tioned, of smaller calibre, was also cut. In the opinion 
of the daring workers, General Blanco's last channel of 
communication with the outside world was severed. 
This, as subsequent events proved, was an error, but 
the valor and energy of the workers was not the less 
commendable. 

The work of cable-lifting and cutting took consider- 
able time, during much of which the sailors were exposed 
to a sharp rifle-fire from the shore, though the activity 
of the attack was greatly diminished by the fierce return 
from the launches and the ships. A shell from the 
Nashville tore the cable-house into fragments. One 
from the Marblehead tumbled the block- house into a 
heap of ruins. The ships were rolling in a heavy sea, 
yet the marksmanship was superb, — the shots searching 
the rifle-pits, furrowing the sand of the beach, and 
sweeping the hill-side. But, despite this active bom- 
bardment, the rifle-bullets found their victims, eight men 
falling wounded, one of whom, Patrick Regan, died on 
the way back to the ships. Lieutenant Winslow was 
struck in the hand. All the ships bore marks of the 
fray, being struck many times by bullets from machine- 
guns. But the only casualty on the ships was on the 
Nashville, where a bullet passed through the shoulder 
of an ensign and struck Captain Maynard on the chest 
near the heart. Fortunately, the wound was a slight one. 

It had not been proposed to injure the light-house, 
but it was found that the Spaniards were using it as a 
fort, firing from its cover on the men in the boats. The 



I 

! 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 179 

guns of the Marblehead were at once trained on it, and 
the commander, from the bridge, gave the order to 
' ' Cut it down !' ' At once fire was opened on it with 
remarkable accuracy, considering the rolling motion of 
the ships, which lay at a distance of one thousand yards. 
In a short time the tower was a ruin and the assailants 
were in hasty flight for new places of shelter. 

The bold enterprise had occupied more than three 
hours, the boats leaving the ships at seven o'clock in 
the morning and returning at 10.15 A -M. During all 
that time they had been under fire within short rifle- 
range, and only the incessant work of the machine- and 
rapid-fire guns had saved their crews from annihilation. 
What loss the Spanish sustained was unknown. It was 
probably considerable, in view of their numbers and the 
torrent of fire that searched out their every lurking-place. 
This affair and that at Cardenas were of great moral 
value in showing the intrepidity of American sailors and 
their coolness and daring under fire. Like the battle at 
Manila, these smaller engagements served as valuable 
object lessons to America and the world. 

It is not necessary to mention in detail the several 
later attempts that were made to cut the cables connect- 
ing Cuba with the outer world. Despite the success at 
Cienfuegos, Blanco at Havana kept in communication 
with Santiago and Spain, and, though other wires were 
cut at later dates, in front of Santiago, at Guantanamo 
Bay, and at the eastern end of Cuba, the governor-gen- 
eral kept in touch with the government at Madrid. Not 
until after the capture of Santiago was he finally cut off 
from communication with the world without. There 
was still a cable from Havana to Key West, but that, 
for obvious reasons, he did not care to use. 



CHAPTER X. 

THE SEARCH FOR THE SPANISH FLEET. 

The events narrated in the last chapter were followed 
on the succeeding day by a more important one, the 
bombardment of San Juan de Porto Rico by Admiral 
Sampson's squadron, which, on May 3, had sailed from 
Key West for a destination unknown, though shrewdly 
suspected. It was believed that the Cape Verde Span- 
ish squadron was bound for the West Indies and would 
seek to make port at San Juan. Admiral Sampson's 
purpose was to cut the Spanish fleet off from this port, 
or, if too late for that, to attack it in the harbor of San 
Juan, or wherever it could be found outside. His squad- 
ron consisted of the battle-ships Iowa and Indiana, the 
monitors Amphitrite and Terror, the cruisers New York, 
Montgomery, and Detroit, and the torpedo-boat Porter. 
It was accompanied by the coaler Niagara, the tug 
Wampatuck, and the Dauntless, one of the press-boats 
which accompanied every expedition of the fleets. 

Moving along the northern coast of Cuba, which was 
kept steadily in sight, the squadron on May 7 reached 
Cape Haytien, a northern seaport of the island of Hayti. 
Progress had been delayed by the slow speed of the 
monitors, which needed to be towed during most of the 
course, and won from the sailors the ungallant name of 
' ' crabs. ' ' Stopping at Cape Haytien to send despatches 
to Washington and receive replies, the ships moved on 
eastward during the 10th and nth, and during the night 
180 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 



i«i 



of the 1 2th appeared off the port of San Juan, the me- 
tropolis and principal seaport of the island of Porto Rico. 

The city of San Juan lies on the interior of a long, 
narrow bay, a high headland separating it from the 
ocean, while in the mouth of the channel rises the lofty 
Cabras Island, whose summit, like that of the headland, 
is fortified. The city is built on the slopes of high 
hills which rise on the ocean side of the bay. To reach 
it, it is necessary to pass the Canuelo battery on Cabras 
Island, the Morro Castle fortifications within, and the 
San Carlos battery on a promontory at the east entrance 
to the harbor. Inland, sharply outlined against the sky, 
rises a range of mountains, which send down their spurs 
in broken hills almost to the sea. It was about three 
o'clock in the morning of May 12 that the fleet came 
near the entrance of this bay and began its preparations 
for battle, stripping the decks of impedimenta and get- 
ting ready the guns, ammunition, and appliances for 
handling the wounded. On reaching the entrance to 
the bay, it became evident that the Spanish fleet was 
not within. It had either not reached there or had de- 
parted for some new destination. But before seeking it 
elsewhere, Admiral Sampson determined to attack the 
batteries defending the port, in order to develop their 
positions and strength, though with no intention of bom- 
barding or besieging the city. 

Preliminary to the assault, the admiral transferred his 
flag to the Iowa, and issued orders that the flag-ship, 
followed by the Indiana, New York, Amphitrite, and 
Terror, should sail inward past Cabras Island, then turn 
and pass outward by the westward channel, repeating 
this evolution until signalled to stop. The smaller ves- 
sels were directed to occupy certain positions and to 



182 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

keep a sharp lookout for torpedo-boat destroyers. Two 
principal objects of attack had been in view, the bat- 
teries upon Morro and the Spanish men-of-war, if any 
were found in the harbor, — care being taken to avoid 
firing on neutral war-vessels if present, and also to avoid 
striking the hospitals on Cabras Island. As soon, how- 
ever, as it became evident that the ships were not within 
the harbor, attention was confined to the forts, which 
were vigorously assailed. 

The attack began at 5.15 a.m. and lasted for three 
hours. The plans of the admiral were thoroughly car- 
ried out, the ships steaming majestically into the harbor 
and three times making the circuit outlined in the general 
order. A ten-knot easterly breeze was blowing, lifting 
the waters into a long, heavy swell as the great ships 
moved gracefully on. As they entered the harbor's 
mouth, no evidence of a lookout by the enemy was ob- 
served. Alike in town and forts the Spaniards seemed 
asleep, and only the roar of the mighty guns appeared 
to waken them from their slumbers. Four broadsides 
were fired from the ships before the Spanish gunners 
were thoroughly aroused to the exigencies of the situa- 
tion and began to reply from their elevated positions to 
the projectiles of the great 12- and 13-inch guns. Inward 
swept the Iowa, delivering the fire from her turrets as 
she went. Behind her came the Indiana and then the 
graceful New York, while the low-lying monitors glided 
inward in the rear. When the Iowa turned to go back 
in the circuit laid down, the whole line had become en- 
gaged, the Detroit and Montgomery firing rapidly from 
their smaller guns on the Cabras and Morro batteries. 

The squadron had completed one round and was re- 
turning on the second before the Spanish gunners be- 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 183 

came fully warmed up to their work. Then from their 
elevated positions they poured a plunging fire upon 
the fleet, one which, had the guns been well served, 
might have done serious execution. Their fire was 
furious but aimless, the shells causing the water to spurt 
up all around, but only one or two during the whole 
conflict touching a ship. The Detroit, which preceded 
the Iowa into the harbor, and the Wampatuck, which 
kept on her beam, sounding constantly as they moved 
inward, occupied posts of danger, but escaped injury. 
The Detroit drew in close under Morro, and shells 
seemed to rain around her as she lay within five hun- 
dred yards of the batteries, hurling projectiles from her 
4-inch rapid-fire guns ; yet she made a marvellous escape 
from damage by shot or shell. 

By the end of the third round the heat of the sun had 
become intense, the men working under great strain ; 
and, as his purpose had been achieved, the admiral 
deemed it useless to continue the attack on the forts, 
and signalled to withdraw. This signal failed to be seen 
or, at least, to be understood by the Terror, which re- 
mained in the channel and for half an hour engaged 
Morro Castle alone. The scene was one of intense 
interest as the low-lying craft hurled the shells from her 
turrets up-hill at the elevated forts, while the Spanish 
gunners poured down their projectiles with utter useless- 
ness, the shells splashing in the water often hundreds 
of feet from the Terror, and, when exploding, hurling 
columns of water sixty feet into the air. Finally, as if 
weary of the work, the monitor glided slowly outward, 
firing as she went, while the gunners on the hill-side 
blazed away until she was far out of range, not a shot 
touching her during the whole exciting duel. The 



;84 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

Montgomery, meanwhile, had engaged and silenced 
Fort Canuelo, on Cabras Island, while the Porter, lying 
close under the cliff east of the Detroit, was prepared to 
torpedo any Spanish cruiser that sought to escape from 
the harbor. 

It was eight o'clock when the engagement closed. 
The escape of the fleet from the heavy and continuous 
fire of the enemy's batteries, all occupying elevated 
positions, was something almost incredible, and could 
only have been due to absolute incapacity in the 
gunners. Of the hundreds of projectiles only two 
reached their mark, and only one man was killed on the 
fleet. A shell struck the Iowa and did some small 
damage on deck, where three men were slightly hurt. 
One that exploded on the New York was more effective, 
one seaman, Frank Widemark, being killed, and four 
wounded, while two search-lights were shattered and 
other slight injuries done. In addition to the man 
killed on the New York, a gunner's mate on the Am- 
phitrite died from the effect of the stifling heat. Of the 
wounded men only two were seriously enough hurt to 
be transferred to the hospital-ship Solace, which subse- 
quently joined the fleet. During the engagement the 
admiral occupied a position on the lee of the conning- 
tower, not deeming it necessary to enter that place of 
refuge. His experience and that of Dewey indicate that 
the conning-tower is little likely to be made use of un- 
less the shots come from both sides. The commander 
seems as safe behind it as in it. 

The results of the bombardment were the silencing of 
the Cabras Island battery, the damaging of the San 
Carlos battery, and the demolition of the north end of 
Morro Castle. Some damage was done to the section 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 185 

of the city adjoining the batteries and a panic seems to 
have prevailed, most of the inhabitants taking to the 
woods, with a natural fear that the hostile fleet might 
turn its death-dealing guns on the helpless city. They 
returned with a warm sense of relief when it was certain 
that the terrible ships had withdrawn. 

One lesson of importance was learned from these three 
hours of sharp work. It was the first time that modern 
ships had attacked in force land fortifications, and the 
result was observed by the military nations of the world 
with deep interest. It had been an unsettled problem 
whether coast defence could be best provided for by war- 
vessels or land intrenchments. The engagement at San 
Juan and the subsequent naval siege of Santiago went 
far to settle this question. In both instances ancient 
forts, quite unfit to bear the fire of modern guns, sus- 
tained a hot fire for hours without being silenced or 
materially injured. They had, it may be said, a special 
advantage from their elevated situation, which rendered 
it difficult to plant shells effectively in their midst. On 
the other hand, they bore the bombardment practically 
without replying, for the wretched gunnery of the Span- 
iards was a subject of derision to the sailors, their pro- 
jectiles being wasted by hundreds on the waters of the 
bay. Only two of the whole number reached their 
mark, and this perhaps more by accident than accurate 
aiming. Had the guns of the Morro all been of modern 
make and handled by well-trained gunners, the result 
must have been decidedly different. From their coign 
of vantage on the harbor hills they could have poured 
their shells in a devastating stream on the ships and 
have driven them in haste from their waters or sunk 
them in the channel. Such forts, well built and handled, 



186 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

would be impregnable to the fire of ships, and would 
be able to meet an attack with a deadly and destructive 
return. 

The hospital-ship Solace, which visited the fleet after 
the battle on an errand of mercy, was a new departure 
in naval warfare, — a vessel fitted up with all requirements 
for aid of the sick and wounded. She was in effect an 
ambulance-ship, her mission being to make the suffering 
comfortable until they could be landed in a hospital on 
shore. Her white sides and the flag of the Red Cross 
that floated at her peak told the story of her benevo- 
lent purpose to friend and foe, while she was provided 
with delicacies for the sick and all the requirements for 
temporary hospital treatment of the wounded, having 
an operating-room well equipped with surgical instru- 
ments, a complete paraphernalia for treating wounds, a 
convalescents' room, and a full corps of surgeons and 
nurses. Her accommodations were sufficient for two 
hundred or more wounded soldiers, and her speed great 
enough to enable her to reach a northern port with her 
suffering inmates without loss of time. The wounded 
of the New York were the first that called for the services 
of this useful ship. At a later date a second vessel 
adapted to the same important service, the Relief, spe- 
cially known as an "army hospital-ship," was added to 
the auxiliary vessels of the navy. Later in the war 
these two winged messengers of mercy proved of the 
highest utility. 

Immediately after the end of the bombardment the 
squadron put to sea again, standing to the northeast 
until out of sight of San Juan, when the course was laid 
to the westward, with the view of communicating with 
Washington and ascertaining if anything had been 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 187 

learned about the movements of the Spanish fleet. At 
Cape Haytien the admiral received word by wire that the 
squadron of the enemy, under Admiral Cervera, had 
been heard from at the French island of Martinique. 
Being unable to obtain supplies there, it had made its 
way to the Dutch island of Curacao, near the north 
coast of South America. Here entrance was forbidden 
to more than two vessels of the fleet at a time, the 
Maria Teresa and the Vizcaya being admitted to the 
port, where they obtained a small quantity of inferior 
coal and some other supplies. 

As Holland and France had declared neutrality, they 
could not, under the rules of international law governing 
belligerents, permit the ships of either combatant to 
remain in any of their ports longer than necessity de- 
manded, or to obtain more coal than was requisite to 
enable them to reach the nearest port of their respective 
nations. Great Britain had declared coal contraband of 
war. This rendered it useless for Admiral Cervera to 
call at any British West India port. Nothing remained 
for him but to make a dash for some Cuban or Porto 
Rican harbor, and the American fleet was on the alert to 
check any effort of this kind, and to meet and engage 
the Spanish squadron if possible. 

The news of the presence of a powerful Spanish fleet 
in the West Indies was followed by active naval move- 
ments. On the 1 2th, the Flying Squadron, so long held 
at Hampton Roads, was released from its weary wait 
for a possible enemy, and sailed southward under the 
command of Commodore Schley. The main section of 
the squadron, consisting of the flag-ship Brooklyn, the 
battle-ships Massachusetts and Texas, and the gunboat 
Scorpion, put in at Key West, where coal and other 



i88 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

supplies were taken on with all haste. The Minneapolis, 
leaving Hampton Roads a day later, sailed eastward and 
passed through the Windward Passage to the south of 
Cuba, where the Harvard and the St. Paul were then 
cruising. The Columbia was left on patrol duty off the 
North Atlantic States. 

At Key West Schley's squadron was joined on the 
1 8th by that of Admiral Sampson, which came dashing 
in at top speed, the New York far ahead of the other 
vessels of the squadron, which made their appearance 
one by one during that and the following day. They 
had steamed in all haste from San Juan to Key West for 
coal. No time was to be lost with a Spanish squadron 
at large in the West India seas. Orders were given to 
Commodore Schley to proceed south at once by the 
Yucatan Channel and scour the southern waters for the 
foe, and by the time the last of Sampson's ships had 
reached harbor the first of Schley's had set her fore- 
foot towards the Cuban coast. ' ' I congratulate you in 
advance. I believe you are going to meet and defeat 
the Spaniards," signalled Sampson from the New York 
as the Flying Squadron passed out to sea. The Iowa, 
then coaling, was ordered to follow and join it, while the 
North Atlantic Squadron began coaling with all rapidity, 
preparatory to a return voyage eastward to the Wind- 
ward Channel. By the night of Saturday, the 21st, 
nearly all the ships had coaled and were off again. 
Cuba was being circumnavigated in search of the enemy. 

Commodore Schley's orders were to proceed to Cien- 
fuegos, where he would be joined by the Iowa, and could 
take up the Marblehead and Nashville and the two tor- 
pedo-boats then off that point. It was soon learned, 
however, that the blockade at Cienfuegos had been 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 189 

temporarily abandoned in consequence of the probable 
arrival of the Spanish fleet, and the Marblehead and the 
Nashville were soon sighted running to Key West for 
coal and repairs. Off Cape San Antonio, at the western 
extremity of Cuba, two steamers were sighted, which 
proved to be the cruiser Cincinnati and the dynamite 
boat Vesuvius. They were also running in for coal, and 
reported that they had seen nothing of the Spanish fleet. 
On Saturday, the 21st, at five p.m., the harbor of Cien- 
fuegos came in sight. It was possible that Cervera's 
squadron might have taken refuge in this land-locked 
bay, and the commodore prepared to satisfy his mind on 
this important point before proceeding farther. The 
first evidence of activity within the bay came at an early 
hour on Sunday morning, when a torpedo-boat thrust 
its forefoot out of the harbor entrance. It quickly dis- 
appeared on seeing the group of war-vessels that lay 
outside. On the shore batteries the Spanish standard 
waved defiance, and some cavalry were visible on the 
hill-side, but from the position of the ships no trace 
could be seen of the Spanish fleet. Noon that day 
brought the Iowa, whose coming was greeted with 
cheers for its gallant commander, ' ' Fighting Bob' ' 
Evans, whose arm had recently been crushed by the 
falling of a battle-hatch, but who did not let the intense 
pain of this accident allay his thirst for battle. 

At five o'clock, Sunday afternoon, Commodore Schley 
made an inspection of the harbor, running close in. No 
ships-of-war were visible from his point of view, the only 
craft to be seen being a few schooners and a small gun- 
boat. No shot was fired. " It is the Spanish squadron 
I am after, ' ' said the gallant commodore, ' ' not a few of 
Spain's almost ruined subjects in Cuba." 



i 9 o THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

If not at Cienfuegos, where was this fleet ? It was all- 
essential to discover, and at eight o'clock that evening 
the Scorpion was despatched to Santiago de Cuba, three 
hundred miles to the east, off which port it was hoped 
she would find the Minneapolis or the Harvard, and 
perhaps gain some important information. Despatches 
were sent on the Scorpion to be taken by either of these 
swift vessels to Hayti and forwarded to the Navy De- 
partment of the United States. 

On Monday, May 23, the converted yacht Hawk came 
in from Key West, in company with the gunboat Cas- 
tine and the collier Merrimac, and bringing important 
news. This was that the Minneapolis, while scouting 
to the eastward on the 19th, had tracked the Spanish 
fleet to Santiago harbor, and at once hastened to Hayti 
and cabled the news. The Hawk had been sent with 
all speed to apprise Schley, who on learning the news 
felt much alarm for the safety of the Scorpion. 

Yet the location of the Spanish fleet remained much 
of a mystery. It might have merely touched at San- 
tiago and proceeded westward. The hills that bounded 
the winding channel of Cienfuegos harbor hid its depths 
from view, the city being reached through two sharp 
turns followed by a winding passage only wide enough 
for a single ship to pass. The fleet might still lie there 
out of sight, or might have touched at some other point 
along the coast. Commodore Schley deemed it wise to 
wait and investigate more thoroughly before leaving the 
way open for the enemy to make a dash to Havana. 
On Tuesday the Marblehead joined, with the two con- 
verted yachts Eagle and Vixen. The squadron had be- 
come large and formidable. 

Meanwhile, evidence was gathering as to the actual 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 191 

location and the condition of the Spanish fleet. Reports 
came from two captains, British and Dutch, who had 
seen Admiral Cervera's ships at Curacao, and who re- 
ported them as in bad condition, the ships' bottoms be- 
ing seriously fouled with barnacles and long grass. They 
reached there on May 14, bought all the provisions they 
could and a small quantity of very inferior coal, and 
sailed again on the evening of the 15th, seemingly in 
haste in consequence of a despatch received by the ad- 
miral, for much of the coal and a considerable number 
of cattle were left behind. 

Other skippers of merchant-vessels reported having 
observed the Spanish fleet near Santiago, and still others 
claimed to have seen it enter the harbor. One of these, 
the captain of the British ship Adula, from Kingston, 
Jamaica, reported to Schley at Cienfuegos that at mid- 
night on the 19th he had seen the lights of seven ships 
some seventy miles south of Santiago, and that on the 
following day the arrival of the Spanish fleet in that har- 
bor had been telegraphed to Kingston. Further evi- 
dence was obtained on May 26, when the St. Paul, 
cruising off Santiago harbor, picked up the British 
steamer Restormel, which was trying to steal into the 
harbor with a cargo of coal, presumably for the Spanish 
ships. The Restormel had sailed first for San Juan. 
This port being deemed unsafe, she was ordered to 
Curacao, and, reaching there too late, was despatched 
to Santiago, only to be sent on a final journey to Key 
West under the care of a prize crew from the St. Paul. 

These various shreds of testimony, or such of them 
as came to Commodore Schley's ears, induced him to 
leave Cienfuegos for Santiago, in front of whose harbor 
he arrived on the night of the 27th. The result of his 



192 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

visit was indicated in a despatch which reached Wash- 
ington May 30, and which stated that the Spanish fleet 
was certainly in the bay of Santiago de Cuba, since he 
had himself seen and recognized the vessels. 

The fleet being there, the next thing was to keep it 
there, and the great ships of the squadron were ranged 
in line in front of the harbor's mouth, effectually closing 
it. Cervera and his fleet were safely bottled up, never 
again to sail the open seas under the Spanish flag. 

Santiago de Cuba, which was about to become the 
principal seat of the war, is the second city in size on 
the island, and has the credit of being probably the 
oldest city of any importance in the western hemisphere, 
having been founded in 15 14, twenty-two years after the 
discovery of America. In 1895 it had a population of 
59,614. It is the metropolis of eastern Cuba, had before 
the war a large commerce, and is the head-quarters of 
three large mining plants owned by citizens of the United 
States. It lies near the bottom of a beautiful bay, six 
miles long and two miles wide, which is entered by a 
narrow channel, flanked by highlands, on which, to the 
east, stands Morro Castle,* a venerable fortification which 
derives its sole importance from its elevated position. 
Opposite the Morro were some newly-built batteries, and 
two others, Estrella and Catalina, on the east shore, 
farther in. About half a mile inward, where the channel 
widens out into the bay, is an islet, Cayo Smith, on 



* The title Morro seems somewhat abundant in Spanish forti- 
fications. There is a famous Morro Castle at Havana, and others 
at San Juan and Santiago. The word Morro has various signi- 
fications, but as thus employed means a fort on a rounded head- 
land, such as appears at the entrance of each of these ports. 



3 n 

O o 
» 3 





THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 193 

which were batteries with modern guns, while Blanco 
battery, near the city, was similarly armed. There was 
excellent reason, also, to believe that the channel was 
mined, and that an attempt to make a forcible entrance 
into the harbor would prove a very dangerous pro- 
ceeding. 

As regards Admiral Cervera's fleet, it was not easy 
to recognize it from the harbor entrance. The Reina 
Mercedes, a partly dismantled cruiser, not connected 
with the fleet, lay within easy view, and farther in were 
two ships, supposed to be the Almirante Oquendo and 
the Cristobal Colon. The remainder of the fleet could 
not be seen. This fleet, it is proper here to state, con- 
sisted of four armored cruisers and three torpedo-boat 
destroyers. Of the former, the Vizcaya, Almirante 
Oquendo, and Infanta Maria Teresa were similar in 
design and armament, being of 6890 tons displacement 
and of about 20 knots speed. The side armor was of 
ten or twelve inches thickness, while the two turrets 
were protected by 9-inch steel armor, and carried two 
n-inch Hontorio guns, one in each turret. The main 
battery contained also ten 5.5-inch guns, and the secon- 
dary battery eight 6-pounders, ten 1 -pounders, ten 
machine-guns, and eight torpedo-tubes. The Cristobal 
Colon was a 6840-ton cruiser, armored with a complete 
belt of 6-inch nickel steel. She carried two 10-inch 
guns in barbettes, ten 6-inch and six 4.7-inch guns, and 
a considerable number of small guns. The Terror, 
Furor, and Pluton were torpedo-boat destroyers of recent 
British build, and formidable examples of this type of 
modern war-vessels. 

Of the latter craft, the Terror was not now with the 
fleet, having been left at Fort-de- France, Martinique. 

13 



i 9 4 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

Here was the auxiliary cruiser Harvard under repair, 
and apprehension was felt that the formidable little 
torpedo gunboat might make a prize of the large but 
lightly armed cruiser. The danger, however, existed 
more in imagination than in fact, and the Harvard sailed 
safely north when ready to do so. 

Such was the known strength of the fleet. As regarded 
that of the fortifications Commodore Schley determined 
to satisfy himself, and on the 31st, the fourth day after 
his arrival, he stood close in with the Massachusetts and 
Iowa and the cruiser New Orleans, which had joined his 
squadron. At 1.15 p.m. the ships reached a point about 
seven thousand yards from the shore, and then headed 
due west, the Massachusetts in the lead, the Iowa bring- 
ing up the rear. The two battle-ships opened with their 
heavy guns on the Cristobal Colon, which lay about a 
mile inside the Morro, while the New Orleans sought to 
draw the fire of the forts. The narrowness of the har- 
bor entrance permitted only a few shots to be fired at 
the Colon before the speed of the ships shut her out 
from view. All the forts, some six in number, opened 
fire, some of the guns being fairly well aimed, but none 
of them doing any damage to the ships. The round 
completed, a second one was made, somewhat farther 
in, Schley standing unconcernedly near the forward 
turret of the Massachusetts and watching the effect of 
the enemy's fire. Having accomplished his mission, he 
withdrew. It was evident that a heavy bombardment 
would be necessary to disable the Spanish batteries. A 
second purpose of the movement was indicated in Schley's 
despatch to the Navy Department : ' ' Reconnoissance 
developed satisfactorily the presence of the Spanish 
squadron lying behind the island near the upper fort, 






THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 



i95 



as they fired over the hill at random. Quite satisfied 
the Spanish fleet is here." 

About midnight the two torpedo-boats slipped out of 
the harbor, gliding under the shadow of the hills towards 



i\JK^ V 




SANTIAGO and Vicinity 

SCALE OF MILES 
10 20 30 40 






Cananoba 
Sagu: 



the American fleet. They were first seen by the lookout 
on the Texas, whose search-light was at once turned upon 
them, revealing their dangerous presence. They dashed 
towards the Texas, which was lying farthest inshore, but 
were met with such a rain of shot from her rapid-fire guns 
that discretion appeared the better part of valor, and they 
turned and ran hastily back into the harbor. 

On June 1, Admiral Sampson, with the New York, 



1 96 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

Oregon, and Mayflower, arrived off Santiago and took 
command of the combined squadrons. He had at his 
disposal a total fleet of fifteen war- vessels to pit against 
Cervera's squadron, the escape of which was now ren- 
dered hopeless. 

The presence of the Oregon calls for some further 
mention. For more than two months that stanch battle- 
ship had been sailing along the American coast, having 
left San Francisco on March 19 with a journey of thir- 
teen thousand miles before her, equal to more than half 
the circumference of the globe. Rio Janeiro was reached 
on April 30, and here came the most exciting part of 
the journey, since there was reason to believe that the 
Spanish torpedo-boat Temerario, stationed on that coast, 
was giving chase. But this proved to be a false alarm, 
and the great ship sped on, reaching Bahia on May 8. 
Warning was received here of a possible attempt at 
interception by the Spanish squadron, but Captain Clark 
kept steadily onward without meeting an enemy, touch- 
ing at Barbadoes on the 18th, and reaching Jupiter 
Inlet, Florida, on the 25th. The ship had coaled four 
times on her trip. The remarkable feature of the great 
achievement was that the Oregon came into port after 
her stupendous run at a fifteen-knot speed, and in such 
excellent condition that she was ready for service with- 
out any overhauling. Hastily coaling, she at once set 
out for Santiago, where she joined the blockading fleet. 

Another of the American war-vessels, the Columbia, 
was less fortunate. On May 28, while cruising off the 
coast in a dense fog, about eight miles southwest of 
Fire Island Light, she collided with the British steamship 
Foscolio, which had left New York with a cargo the day 
before. The result of the collision was fatal to the Fos- 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 197 

colio, which gradually filled and sank, all of her crew 
being taken off. The Columbia had a jagged hole stove 
in her starboard side, abreast of the mainmast, about six 
feet wide and extending some five feet below the water- 
line. The four-inch steel of the protective deck was 
bent backward nearly double by the blow. Only for 
her heavy frame and this deck of steel the great cruiser 
might have been cut in two. As it was, her water-tight 
compartments kept her easily afloat, and a brief period 
in dry-dock put her in serviceable condition again. 

During the month of May several attempts to land 
supplies for the Cubans in arms had been made. On 
May 11 the transport steamer Gussie left Key West 
laden with seven thousand rifles and a large quantity of 
ammunition brought from Tampa, the expedition being 
under the charge of Captain J. H. Dorst, of the cavalry 
arm, who took with him over one hundred men of the 
First Infantry and ten Cuban scouts. The approach of 
the expedition was amply heralded to the Spaniards by 
the newspaper correspondents, who gave minute descrip- 
tions of the purpose and cargo and the probable landing- 
point of the Gussie. This information was duly trans- 
mitted to Havana, and preparations were made to give 
the transport a warm reception. 

After a rough voyage the Gussie was met off the 
Cuban coast by the gunboats Wasp and Manning, which 
escorted her in. The selected place of landing was at 
Cabanas, province of Pinar del Rio ; but as the shore 
was approached, a large body of Spanish soldiers ap- 
peared and opened fire on the vessels. The gunboats 
replied, the men being landed under cover of their guns. 
The Spaniards drew back, but opened fire again from 
their works and from the woods, maintaining their posi- 



iq8 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

tion with such energy that the Americans found it ne- 
cessary to withdraw. 

The failure of this expedition had an important result. 
It was evidently due to the publicity which had been 
given to the movements of the vessel, and in consequence 
a rigid censorship of newspaper messages was estab- 
lished, no despatch being allowed to go over the wires 
until it had passed under the blue pencil of the censor. 
Anticipated movements were no longer heralded to the 
world, and much greater secrecy afterwards surrounded 
military and naval movements. Conjectures were printed 
freely enough : no objection was made to them if they 
did not touch too closely on the truth, as their effect 
could be but to set the enemy astray. 

On May 21 another expedition set sail, this time on 
the steamer Florida, it being under Captain Dorst, as 
before. It comprised nearly four hundred men, three 
hundred of them being Cubans, the latter under the 
command of Colonel Jose Lacret, a dashing Cuban 
leader. It brought with it a pack-train of seventy-five 
mules and twenty-five horses ; its stores consisting of 
seven thousand rifles and two million rounds of ammuni- 
tion for General Garcia' s army. The landing was made 
at Point Banes without interruption, though a body of 
Spanish soldiers and two gunboats were known to be 
within a few miles. The Florida spent three days in the 
harbor, landing all her stores, aided by insurgents, who 
eagerly helped in the work. And with them came some 
three hundred half-starved pacificos, who earnestly lent 
their assistance in exchange for a little food. The rifle- 
cases were opened and their contents distributed among 
the men and loaded on pack-animals, the procession then 
joyfully setting out with its treasures for the mountains. 



CHAPTER XL 

THE HEROES OF THE MERRIMAC. 

About the hour of three in the morning of June 3, a 
craft that loomed large through the darkness left the 
side of the flag-ship of the American squadron before 
Santiago and sailed straight for the throat of the narrow 
channel leading to the beleaguered city. On board 
were eight men, apparently devoted to death, yet all of 
them eager volunteers. Below decks a series of torpe- 
does were ranged along the sides of the ship, prepared 
to blow it into an utter wreck when the proper moment 
came. As for the safety of the crew, that had been a 
secondary consideration. Death was likely to be their 
lot, but they offered their lives in their country's service 
when they went on that perilous enterprise, and were 
ready to do and dare all that might be demanded of 
them. The vessel was the collier Merrimac ; her crew 
consisted of Richmond P. Hobson, Assistant Naval Con- 
structor, and seven volunteer seamen ; their purpose 
was to seal up the Spanish fleet effectually in Santiago 
harbor. 

How best to deal with Cervera and his ships had been 
a matter of much concern. Commodore Schley had 
drawn the fire of the Spanish forts and discovered that 
an attempt to take his fleet into the harbor over the 
mines and in face of the batteries was likely to prove 
ruinous. There was some thought of attempting to ex- 
plode the mines by the use of the dynamite projectiles 

199 



200 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

of the Vesuvius, but the result of this was doubtful. 
The ships would have to enter single file, and the sinking 
of one of them would block the channel to the others. 
At this juncture Lieutenant Hobson suggested that it 
would be better to sink a useless hulk than a battle-ship. 
If the Spanish ships could not be reached, they might be 
kept where they were. With the fleet was the large 
collier Merrimac, bought by the government at a high 
price, yet practically worthless. She could be put to 
no better service than to block up the channel. The 
Spanish fleet was "bottled up" in Santiago harbor. 
The Merrimac could be placed as a " cork in the neck 
of the bottle," and Hobson volunteered to be the man 
for the work. 

Admiral Sampson hesitated to send men to what 
seemed likely to be certain death, but the brave lieu- 
tenant's enthusiasm finally won his consent, and the 
daring enterprise was determined upon. The Merrimac 
was brought from the side of the Massachusetts, to which 
she had been delivering coal, and on the day and night 
of June i crews from the New York and Brooklyn were 
kept busy in preparing her for her final service. A 
heavy weight in coal was still on board, but that was 
left to aid in her speedy sinking, after her sides had 
been torn open by the torpedoes arranged for that pur- 
pose. The night was well advanced towards morning 
before the work was completed and the Merrimac ready 
for her task. 

When the news of the intended expedition passed 
through the fleet, with word that volunteers were wanted 
for the desperate enterprise, it seemed as if half the men 
in service were eager to take part. The six men asked 
for could easily have been extended into a ship's crew. 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 201 

More than two hundred men on the New York offered 
their services. The Iowa signalled that she had one 
hundred and forty volunteers. Similar responses came 
from the other ships. The junior officers were wildly- 
eager to take part. There was bitter disappointment in 
many faces when Hobson announced his choice, consist- 
ing of Daniel Montague, chief master-at-arms of the 
New York ; George Charette, gunner's mate of the same 
vessel ; J. C. Murphy, a coxswain of the Iowa, and three 
of the crew of the Merrimac, Oscar Deignan, John P. 
Phillips, and John Kelly. When the expedition finally 
started, there was another man on board, H. Clausen, a 
coxswain of the New York, a stowaway for the perilous 
enterprise. 

It was 4. 30 A. M. when Admiral Sampson finally left 
the Merrimac, after a final inspection of the work done. 
Day was already dawning in the eastern sky, and to 
most of those within view the hour seemed too late. It 
certainly seemed so to the admiral ; yet to the general 
surprise the collier was seen to be in motion, and a cry 
arose, ' ' She is going in !' ' 

At this cry, Admiral Sampson seized the megaphone, 
and hailed the torpedo-boat Porter, which lay near at 
hand. ' ' Porter, there ! Tell the Merrimac to return 
immediately." 

The Merrimac was headed directly towards the throat 
of the channel. The Porter darted after her, smoke 
pouring from her stacks. Darkness had vanished, and 
all eyes watched the swift little craft as she flew in the 
wake of the big collier. They were both within range 
of the Spanish guns when the Porter darted across the 
bows of the Merrimac, heading her off. A sigh of relief 
went up ; to venture under the Spanish guns in full day- 



202 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

light seemed fatal temerity. Yet the Porter was seen 
returning, while the Merrimac held her place, Hobson 
signalling for permission to go on. He thought he could 
do it. The admiral displayed a peremptory order to 
return, and the lumbering collier slowly came back. 

The 2d of June passed wearily for the men, whose 
nerves were strung to high tension for the perilous task, 
and at about three o' clock in the morning of the 3d the 
devoted vessel again got under weigh, heading through 
the darkness for the harbor and hoping to get well in 
before being seen. Not a light was shown, and it needed 
no small skill to hit the narrow channel squarely in the 
gloom. Clouds covered the moon as the dark vessel 
stole in towards the coast, heading eastward, while in 
the rear followed a steam launch from the New York, 
manned by Cadet J. W. Powell and four men, ready to 
pick up any member of the Merrimac' s crew who should 
escape. 

From the deck of the New York nothing could be 
seen of the collier after she passed under the shadow of 
the hills. All eyes were anxiously peering into the 
gloom and all ears were alert for a sound, but for a time 
silence and darkness prevailed. Then the gloom was 
broken by a flash from Morro Castle, and the sound of a 
distant gun boomed across the waves. Other flashes 
followed from the battery opposite, and for about twenty 
minutes flash succeeded flash rapidly in the narrow 
space. The Merrimac was meeting her doom. At 6. 15 
A.M. Powell and the launch returned, followed by spite- 
ful but ill-aimed shots from the Spanish guns. The 
brave cadet had gone directly under the batteries in the 
hope of picking up some of the Merrimac' s men, but 
returned disappointed. Hobson and his brave crew had 




Copyright, 1898, by Arkell Publishing Company 

LIEUTENANT HOBSON ON THE MERRIMAC 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 203 

gone to the depths in their sinking ship or were prison- 
ers in Spanish hands. The launch had followed the 
Merrimac until it had seen her headed squarely in for 
the harbor, the first shot being fired when the collier 
was about two hundred yards from the entrance. After 
that the firing rapidly increased, and the smoke, which 
hung heavily, hid the vessel from view. Then came the 
explosion of the torpedoes. Powell waited till full day 
under the cliffs, and before leaving saw a spar of the 
Merrimac rising out of the water of the channel. The 
sinking had been a success, whatever the fate of the 
men. 

For the rest of the story we must turn to Lieutenant 
Hobson's narrative, given a month later. His purpose 
had been to take the Merrimac into the channel past the 
Estrella battery and sink her in the narrowest part of 
the passage, dropping the anchor and handling the 
rudder so as to turn her athwart the stream. She was 
longer : than the channel's breadth, and it was hoped to 
close it up completely. When the proper point was 
reached, Hobson proposed to stop the engines, drop the 
anchors, put the helm hard aport, open the sea connec- 
tions, and touch off the torpedoes, of which ten lay on 
the port-side of the ship, each containing eighty-two 
pounds of gunpowder, and the whole so connected that 
they could be fired in train. Two men were below, one 
to reverse the engines, the other to break open the sea 
connections with a sledge-hammer. The men on deck 
were to drop the anchor and set the helm. Then 
Hobson would touch the button setting off the torpedoes, 
and all were to leap overboard and swim to the dingy 
that was towed astern, and in which they hoped to 
escape. 



2o 4 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

This plan worked fairly well, and would have been 
completely successful but for one or two contingencies 
which seriously affected the result. The narrow channel 
was entered at about the hour of three, the Merrimac 
steaming in under the guns of the Morro through a dense 
darkness and a stillness like that of death. Silently on- 
ward she moved, but the Spanish were on the alert. 
The stillness was broken by the wash of a small picket- 
boat that approached from the shore and ran under the 
Merrimac' s stern, firing several shots at the suspicious 
craft. One of these carried away the rudder, and put 
an end to the project of steering the ship athwart the 
channel. Another perhaps wrecked the dingy in tow. 

The remainder of the adventure was highly exciting. 
The picket-boat hastened to give the alarm, and in a 
brief time the guns of the shore batteries, followed by 
those of the ships in the harbor, were pouring their fire 
upon the dark hulk. The Spaniards thought that an 
American battle-ship was trying to force its way into the 
port, and did not know but that the whole fleet was fol- 
lowing in its train. The Merrimac drove onward at her 
full speed, trembling violently as a submarine mine went 
off harmlessly in her wake. The deep gloom and her 
rapid motion saved her from destruction. 

At length the desired position was reached. At Hob- 
son' s signal the engines were reversed, the anchor was 
dropped, and the helm set. To his disappointment, the 
ship refused to answer her helm. Only then did he 
learn that the rudder had been lost. The plan of setting 
her lengthwise across the channel had failed and the 
final task remained. Hobson touched the electric but- 
ton connected with the torpedoes, and, as a sullen roar 
broke out beneath them and the ship heavily lurched 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 205 

and rolled, the men, who had stripped to their under- 
clothing to facilitate swimming, leaped over the side. 
Some of them were thrown over the rail by the shock 
and the lurching of the ship. Down she went with a 
surge at the bow, loud cheers from the forts and ships 
greeting her as she sank. The defenders thought they 
had sent to the depths one of the American ships-of- 
war. 

The dingy being wrecked, the only resource of the 
fugitives was an old catamaran which at the last moment 
had been placed on the collier's deck. This float lay on 
the roof of the midship house, and, that it should not 
be lost in the suction made by the sinking ship, it had 
been tied to the taffrail, giving it slack line enough to 
let it float loose after the ship had sunk into her resting- 
place. 

In continuation of our narrative, we cannot do better 
than quote from Lieutenant Hobson, giving his graphic 
account of the thrilling experiences of himself and men 
after their plunge into the waters of the channel : 

' ' I swam away from the ship as soon as I struck the 
water, but I could feel the eddies drawing me backward 
in spite of all I could do. That did not last very long, 
however, and, as soon as I felt the tugging cease, I 
turned and struck out for the float, which I could see 
dimly bobbing up and down over the sunken hull. 

"The Merrimac's masts were plainly visible, and I 
could see the heads of my seven men as they followed 
my example and made for the float also. We had ex- 
pected, of course, that the Spaniards would investigate 
the wreck, but we had no idea that they would be at it 
as quickly as they were. Before we could get to the 
float, several row-boats and launches came around the 



2 o6 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

bluff from inside the harbor. They had officers on 
board and armed marines as well, and they searched 
that passage, rowing backward and forward, until the 
next morning. It was only by good luck that we got 
to the float at all, for they were upon us so quickly that 
we had barely concealed ourselves when a boat with 
quite a large party on board was right beside us. 

' ' Unfortunately, we thought then, but it turned out 
afterwards that nothing more fortunate than that could 
have happened to us, the rope with which we had se- 
cured the float to the ship was too short to allow it to 
swing free, and when we reached it we found that one 
of the pontoons was entirely out of the water and the 
other one was submerged. Had the raft lain flat on the 
water we could not have got under it, and would have 
had to climb up on it, to be an excellent target for the 
first party of marines that arrived. As it was, we could 
get under the raft, and, by putting our hands through 
the crevices between the slats which formed its deck, we 
could hold our heads out of water and still be unseen. 
That is what we did, and all night long we stayed there 
with our noses and mouths barely out of the water. 

' ' None of us expected to get out of the affair alive, 
but luckily the Spaniards did not think of the apparently 
damaged, half-sunken raft floating about beside the 
wreck. They came to within a cable's length of us at 
intervals of only a few minutes all night. We could 
hear their words distinctly, and even in the darkness 
could distinguish an occasional glint of light on the rifle- 
barrels of the marines and on the lace of the officers' 
uniforms. We were afraid to speak above a whisper, 
and for a good while, in fact whenever they were near 
us, we breathed as easily as we could. I ordered my 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 207 

men not to speak unless to address me, and with one 
exception they obeyed. 

"After we had been there an hour or two the water, 
which we found rather warm at first, began to get cold, 
and my fingers ached where the wood was pressing into 
them. The clouds, which were running before a pretty 
stiff breeze when we went in, blew over, and then by the 
starlight we could see the boats when they came out of 
the shadows of the cliffs on either side, and even when 
we could not see them we knew that they were still near, 
because we could hear very plainly the splash of the oars 
and the grinding of the oarlocks. 

" Our teeth began to chatter before very long, and I 
was in constant fear that the Spaniards would hear us 
when they came close. It was so still that the chatter- 
ing sound seemed to us as loud as a hammer, but the 
Spaniards' ears were not sharp enough to hear it. We 
could hear sounds from the shore almost as distinctly as 
if we had been there, we were so close to the surface of 
the water, which is an excellent conductor, and the voices 
of the men in the boats sounded as clear as a bell. My 
men tried to keep their teeth still, but it was hard 
work, and not attended with any great success at the 
best. 

" We all knew that we would be shot if discovered by 
an ordinary seaman or a marine, and I ordered my men 
not to stir, as the boats having officers on board kept 
well in the distance. One of my men disobeyed orders 
and started to swim ashore, and I had to call him back. 
He obeyed at once, but my voice seemed to create some 
commotion among the boats, and several of them ap- 
peared close beside us before the disturbance in the 
water made by the man swimming had disappeared. 



208 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

We thought it was all up with us then, but the boats 
went away into the shadows again. 

"There was much speculation among the Spaniards 
as to what the ship was and what we intended to do 
next. I could understand many of the words, and 
gathered from what I heard that the officers had taken 
in the situation at once, but were astounded at the au- 
dacity of the thing. The boats, I also learned, were 
from the fleet, and I felt better, because I had more 
faith in a Spanish sailor than I had in a Spanish soldier. 

"When daylight came a steam launch full of officers 
and marines came out from behind the cliff that hid the 
fleet and harbor and advanced towards us. All the men 
on board were looking curiously in our direction. They 
did not see us. Knowing that some one of rank must be 
on board, I waited until the launch was quite close and 
hailed her. 

"My voice produced the utmost consternation on 
board. Every one sprang up, the marines crowded 
to the bow, and the launch's engines were reversed. 
She not only stopped, but she backed off until nearly a 
quarter of a mile away, where she stayed. The marines 
stood ready to fire at the word of command when we 
clambered out from under the float. There were ten of 
the marines, and they would have fired in a minute had 
they not been restrained. 

' ' I swam towards the launch and then she started 
towards me. I called out in Spanish : ' Is there an 
officer on board ?' An officer answered in the affirma- 
tive, and then I shouted in Spanish again : ' I have 
seven men to surrender.' I continued swimming, and 
was seized and pulled out of the water. 

"As I looked up when they were dragging me into 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 209 

the launch, I saw that it was Admiral Cervera himself 
who had hold of me. He looked at me rather dubiously 
at first, because I had been down in the engine-room of 
the Merrimac, where I got covered with oil, and that, 
with the soot and coal-dust, made my appearance most 
disreputable. I had put on my officer's belt before 
sinking the Merrimac, as a means of identification, no 
matter what happened to me, and when I pointed to it 
in the launch the admiral understood and seemed satis- 
fied. The first words he said to me when he learned 
who I was were ' Bienvenido sea usted, ' which means 
' You are welcome. ' My treatment by the naval officers 
and that of my men also was courteous all the time that 
I was a prisoner. They heard my story, as much of it 
as I could tell, but sought to learn nothing more. 

"Sharks? No, we did not have time to think of 
them that night," said Lieutenant Hobson in reply to a 
question. ' ' We saw a great many things, though, and 
went through a great many experiences. When we 
started out from the fleet I tied to my belt a flask of 
medicated water, supplied to me by my ship's surgeon. 
The frequency with which we all felt thirsty on the short 
run into the passage and the dryness of my mouth and 
lips made me believe that I was frightened. The men 
felt the same, and all the way the flask went from hand 
to hand. Once I felt my pulse to see if I was frightened, 
but to my surprise I found it normal. Later we forgot 
all about it, and when we got into the water there was 
no need for the flask." 

The prisoners were taken ashore and placed in a cell 
in Morro Castle, the solid doors of the cell being kept 
closed for an hour or two, but afterwards left open by 
order of the admiral. This gave them a view of the 

14 



210 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

harbor, the city, and the Spanish fleet, while from the 
windows they could see and hear the shells during the 
bombardment that took place some days afterwards. 
Hobson's description of the sounds made by these shells 
is well worth quoting. 

"The windows in the side of our cell," he says, 
' ' opened west across the harbor entrance, and we could 
hear and see the shells as they struck. We knew that 
we would not be fired upon, as word had gone out as to 
where we were, so we sat at the windows and watched 
the shells. Each one sang a different tune as it went 
by. The smaller shells moaned or screeched as they 
passed, but the 13-inch shells left a sound behind them 
like that of the sudden and continued smashing of a 
huge pane of glass. The crackling was sharp and 
metallic, something like sharp thunder without the roar, 
and the sound continued, but decreased, after the shell 
had gone. In many instances the shells struck project- 
ing points of rock, and, ricocheting, spun end over end 
across the hills. The sound they made as they struck 
again and again was like the short, sharp puffs of a 
locomotive starting with a heavy train. ' ' 

Meanwhile, on board the fleet the escape of the ad- 
venturers was unknown, and dread of their destruction 
prevailed. This feeling of depression was put an end 
to by the chivalry of Admiral Cervera, who sent Captain 
Ovideo, his chief of staff, to the fleet under a flag of 
truce to acquaint the American admiral with their safety 
and to make an offer for their exchange. Captain Ovideo 
was received by Admiral Sampson on the New York, 
and, after salutes had been exchanged, delivered the 
following message : 

"Admiral Cervera, the commander of the Spanish 






THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 211 

fleet, is most profoundly impressed with the brilliant 
courage shown by the men who sank the steamer Mer- 
rimac in our harbor, and in admiration of their courage 
he has directed me to say to their countrymen that they 
are alive, and, with the exception of two of the men 
who were slightly hurt, they are uninjured. They are 
now prisoners of war, and are being well cared for, and 
will be treated with every consideration. ' ' 

The captain was given a courteous reception in the 
cabin of the New York, and, after an interview on the 
subject of exchanging the prisoners, returned with money 
and clothing sent them by Admiral Sampson. The 
courtesy of the Spanish admiral sent a thrill of admira- 
tion throughout the fleet, and throughout the country 
when it became known, and insured the gallant Spaniard 
a kind reception if the fortune of war should deliver him 
into American hands. 

The brave Cervera estimated the boldness of the ex- 
ploit at its full value, and treated the captives with great 
consideration while they remained in his hands. For 
some time the fleet desisted from firing on the Morro, 
fearing that the prisoners might be injured. They were 
kept there, however, but four days, when Cervera turned 
them over to General Linares, commander of the Span- 
ish forces in the city, who was much less favorably dis- 
posed towards them. 

In regard to the estimation in the navy of this most 
daring deed, we may quote from a remark of Com- 
modore Schley to a correspondent of the Associated 
Press. Pointing towards the gray walls of Morro Castle, 
where Lieutenant Hobson and his brave men were said to 
be incarcerated, the commodore spoke as follows : " His- 
tory does not record an act of finer heroism than that of 



212 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

the gallant men who are prisoners over there. I watched 
the Merrimac as she made her way to the entrance of 
the harbor, and my heart sank as I saw the perfect hell 
of fire that fell on the devoted men. I did not think it 
was possible one of them could have gone through it 
alive. They went into the jaws of death. It was 
Balaklava over again without the means of defence which 
the Light Brigade had. Hobson led a forlorn hope, 
without the power to cut his way out. But fortune once 
more favored the brave, and I hope he will have the 
recognition and promotion he deserves. His name will 
live as long as the heroes of the world are remembered. ' ' 
This feeling of the people was shared by the govern- 
ment, and steps were at once taken to reward the gallant 
lieutenant and his men by promotion. Efforts were 
made for their speedy release and to learn what treat- 
ment they were receiving. Anxiety on this last point 
was set at rest by a telegram from Mr. W. F. Ramsden, 
the British consul at Santiago, dated June 10, in reply to 
one from the New York Herald. It said : 

"Replying to your telegram, Hobson and men well 
cared for by authorities. Have myself just seen him. 

" Ramsden." 

Mr. Ramsden, in fact, was very kind to the prisoners, 
visiting them on several occasions and supplying them 
with food of a superior kind to that provided by the 
authorities. Cervera also visited them, and, aside from 
the discomfort of being held as prisoners in a half-starved 
city, they received very considerate treatment. 

The story of their release comes later in point of time. 
It may, however, be properly given here as a close to 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 213 

the narrative of their adventure. Cervera's promise of 
a speedy exchange was not concurred in by the Spanish 
authorities ; difficulties were thrown in the way, and it 
was not until after July 1, when the situation had mate- 
rially changed at Santiago, that a consent to the exchange 
was given. A Spanish lieutenant and fourteen privates 
were offered on the American side in exchange for Hob- 
son and his seven men. 

On July 7 the exchange took place. At that date 
Santiago was beleaguered by an American army and 
Admiral Cervera a prisoner on the American fleet, his 
proud squadron being laid in ruin on the Cuban coast. 
Leaving the Reina Mercedes hospital, on the outskirts 
of Santiago, where they had been confined, in charge of 
Major Irles, a Spanish staff-officer, the captives were 
conducted to a meeting-place between the lines, Hobson 
on horseback, his men, in new uniforms, following on 
foot. Colonel John Jacob Astor and Lieutenant Miloy 
conducted the Spanish prisoners. The choice of two 
lieutenants was offered, and Adolfo Aries, of the aristo- 
cratic First Provisional Regiment of Barcelona, was 
chosen in exchange for Lieutenant Hobson. 

As the gallant eight came up the trail leading to the 
American lines through an avenue of palms that arched 
from the high banks across the road, the soldiers stood 
in reverent silence, baring their heads as the hero ap- 
proached, while the band struck up " The Star-Spangled 
Banner." Then came a cry for cheers and a welcoming 
roar from all the men in sight, the Rough Riders break- 
ing into a cowboy yell. The men were past restraint, 
and as Hobson rode slowly through the lines, the ranks 
were everywhere broken, and men rushed eagerly to 
grasp him and his men by the hand. 



214 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

It was the same all the way to Siboney, — men shouting, 
cheering, rushing to shake hands, fairly wild with excite- 
ment. A short distance from the shore lay the New 
York, waiting to take them on board. There the en- 
thusiasm was equally great, the men growing delirious 
with delight when Hobson set foot on deck. Captain 
Chadwick had escorted him to his vessel, and there 
Admiral Sampson was one of the first to welcome him, 
almost embracing him in the warmth of his greeting, 
while the officers of the ship were no less earnest and 
ardent in their reception of their gallant comrade. 

The returning hero seemed astonished at this tumult- 
uous applause. Locked in a Spanish prison, he knew 
nothing of how his fellow-countrymen regarded his 
exploit, which, as he modestly remarked, ' ' was not 
much of a feat." In this he did not find many to agree 
with him. People thought it very much of a feat, 
and days passed before Hobson was allowed to sink 
quietly back into the duties of his office, his heroic deed 
having passed into history. 



CHAPTER XII. 

THE FIRST FIGHT ON CUBAN SOIL. 

Carefully as Lieutenant Hobson's enterprise had 
been managed, and cool as he had been in carrying out 
its every detail, it proved practically a failure. The loss 
of the rudder had rendered it impossible to handle the 
vessel, and she had sunk along instead of across the 
channel, leaving space for a war-ship to pass by her side. 
Thus the services of the fleet were still necessary to hold 
the Spanish ships in check, and none could be spared 
from the blockade. The necessity of alertness was to be 
demonstrated before many weeks by a startling event. 
It was still a matter of doubt, however, whether the 
whole of Admiral Cervera's squadron lay within. Not 
all the ships had been seen, and it was not sure but that 
some of them might still be in the open seas, prowling 
for prey in the West India or North Atlantic waters. It 
was known that the torpedo-boat destroyer Terror was 
still at large, and it was just possible that others might be 
outside of Santiago harbor. This question it was im- 
portant to settle definitely. 

For this purpose, Commodore Schley, after his bom- 
bardment of the Santiago forts, opened communication 
with the insurgents at a point on the coast about eighteen 
miles east of the city. They were asked to send scouts 
to the vicinity of the city and try to learn the number 
and names of the vessels then in the harbor. On Fri- 
day, June 3, Lieutenant Sharp, of the Vixen, visited the 

215 






216 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

place of rendezvous and received from the insurgents a 
map of the harbor, showing the entire Cape Verde fleet, 
with the exception of one of the torpedo-boats. They 
lay at the upper extremity of the harbor, under the guns 
of Blanco battery. 

This information, definite as it appeared, was not fully 
satisfactory to Admiral Sampson, who seems to have 
preferred American to Cuban eyes as means of accurate 
observation. He therefore despatched Lieutenant Blue, 
a daring young officer of the fleet, on an enterprise 
only second in peril to that performed by Lieutenant 
Hobson. Leaving shipboard, the lieutenant made a 
detour of seventy miles around the harbor of Santiago, 
counting and inspecting the ships that lay there from 
commanding points of observation on the high hills sur- 
rounding, and satisfying himself beyond doubt that all 
the ships of the squadron, with the exception of the 
Terror, were there. This tour of observation in a hostile 
country was one that demanded no small degree of cour- 
age and resolution. In military law he would, if taken, 
have been adjudged a spy, and in all probability would 
have been hanged as one. It was simply another in- 
stance of that intrepidity which seems so common a trait 
of the American sailor and soldier. 

The fact of the presence of the Spanish fleet being 
definitely established, the blockade went on, its monot- 
ony broken by occasional stirring incidents. On the 
night of June 3 a second attempt to use their torpedoes 
against the blockading ships was made by the Spaniards. 
It was defeated by the sharp lookout kept up on the 
American fleet. Shortly after ten o'clock a flash of 
colored lights on the deck of the New Orleans gave 
warning that an enemy was in sight. A second signal 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 217 

indicated that a torpedo-boat had been seen. Immedi- 
ately night signals flashed around the six or seven miles' 
circuit of the blockading squadron, while shots came 
from the rapid-fire battery of the New Orleans. The 
New York sought the locality at full speed, hoping to 
shut off the daring stranger from the harbor. 

" A torpedo-boat one point forward on the port-beam, 
sir ; headed this way, ' ' reported Ensign Mustin to Cap- 
tain Chadwick, and for some minutes the guns of the 
flag-ship boomed out through the nignt. The Oregon, 
coming up to the eastward, followed with two shots 
from her big guns. Then the signal ' ' Cease firing' ' 
was given. The search-lights showed no signs of an 
enemy. The prowling craft had escaped. That it had 
not been a false alarm was proved the next morning, 
when the torpedo-boat Porter found two loaded torpe- 
does floating off shore. They had evidently been dis- 
charged at the ships, but had missed their mark. One 
of them was taken on board the Porter, the other sank 
as they were seeking to lift it. The one recovered was 
a 14-inch Whitehead torpedo, worth about $3500, in 
perfect condition, and calculated to have sunk any ship 
against which it struck. The result added another to 
the numerous failures in the attempted use of torpedo- 
boats. 

A second bombardment of the forts at Santiago was 
made on June 7, the large vessels of the American fleet 
pouring in a steady and effective fire from 7.45 until 
nearly 11 a.m. The fleet formed in double column, six 
miles off Morro Castle, and steamed slowly along three 
thousand yards off shore, the Brooklyn leading one 
column, followed by the Marblehead, Texas, and Mass- 
achusetts, and moving westward. In the second column, 



218 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

headed eastward, the New York led, the New Orleans, 
Yankee, Iowa, and Oregon following. A sharp fire was 
directed against all the forts with the exception of the 
Morro, which was saved from attack by the supposed 
presence of Lieutenant Hobson and his men. 

The bombardment appeared to be very effective, the 
Spanish fire weakening until it ceased entirely. The 
Estrella and Catalina batteries seemed to have particu- 
larly suffered, while considerable injury was done to the 
Reina Mercedes, the only Spanish ship within reach. 
Throughout the engagement not an American ship was 
hit and no American was injured. The Spaniards fired 
with their usual lack of aim, wasting their projectiles idly 
upon the waters of the harbor. The attack was specially 
directed against Aguadores, a small town on the coast 
a little to the east of the harbor entrance. A fort re- 
cently constructed there was completely wrecked, and a 
party of marines were landed at Baiquiri, some distance 
east of Aguadores, and near a station on the railroad 
running to Santiago. They were attacked by Spanish 
infantry and cavalry, but held their ground, being aided 
by a neighboring force of Cuban insurgents. The pur- 
pose of this landing was probably to hold the point as a 
landing-place for the expected troops ; but the position 
was not maintained. 

On the same day a similar movement was made near 
the mouth of the fine harbor of Guantanamo, which lies 
some forty-five miles along the coast east of Santiago 
harbor. This bay is a very fine one, the harbor being 
capacious and with forty feet depth of water. The 
town lies some six miles inland from the mouth of the 
bay. The Marblehead and the Yankee, under orders 
from Admiral Sampson, entered the lower bay on the 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 219 

date mentioned, drove a Spanish gunboat into the inte- 
rior harbor, and silenced the batteries after a few minutes' 
bombardment. On Friday, the 10th, a landing was 
effected, forty marines from the Oregon going ashore 
and occupying the western entrance to the bay. Soon 
after the troop-ship Panther, with six hundred marines, 
arrived, and these were landed without opposition, the 
Spanish having been driven back by the fire of the 
Marblehead the day before. The marines found evidence 
that the Spaniards had left in panic haste, — watches, 
hammocks, and ammunition being left scattered about 
their works. The landing-party, under command of 
Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. Huntington, made its way 
up the rocky hill-side to the deserted earthworks on top, 
and soon the American flag was flying from the flagstaff 
of the captured Spanish camp. 

The position of this force on the crest of the hill to 
which it had climbed was an exposed one. It occupied 
a bare spot surrounded on all sides by heavy brush, the 
ground descending inward into a ravine, whose chaparral 
offered close cover to the Spanish bush-fighters, while 
the American camp, outlined on the bare crest against 
the sky, seemed as if intended as a target for rifle-fire 
from below. Only for the aimless character of Spanish 
marksmanship, the marines must have suffered severely 
for their incautious temerity. 

The guerillas had gathered thickly in the brush, and 
at five o'clock on Saturday afternoon, the day after the 
landing, a brisk fire told of the presence of an unseen 
foe. It was answered sharply from the camp, the men 
sheltering themselves as best they could and firing at 
random into the bushes. The exact position of the 
enemy could not be discovered on account of their use 



220 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

of smokeless powder. This firing was kept up all night 
long, ending only at six o'clock on Sunday morning, 
when reinforcements from the Marblehead joined the 
beleaguered troops. The loss on the American side was 
small, considering the advantage in position of the 
enemy, being but three men killed and one wounded. 
Among the killed was Surgeon John Blair Gibbs, son of 
Major Gibbs, one of the victims of the Custer massacre. 
The loss of the Spaniards was unknown. Fears were 
entertained that the advance pickets, under Lieutenants 
Neville and Shaw, had been cut off by the foe ; but during 
the morning these officers appeared in camp with their 
thirty men, much exhausted by their long term of picket 
duty and all-night fight with the enemy, but otherwise 
none the worse for this arduous service. During most 
of the time they had been surrounded by a superior 
force, but had firmly held their ground, inflicting con- 
siderable damage and receiving none. 

Shortly after midnight a fierce assault was made upon 
the camp, the Spanish charging boldly up the southwest 
slope. They were met by rapid volleys from the marines 
who encircled the inner side of the crest, and broke 
before they were one-third of the way to the top. Some 
of them came farther up, and at points there was almost 
a hand-to-hand struggle. It was during this charge that 
Surgeon Gibbs fell. As a rule, however, the Spaniards 
fought under cover, creeping up as close as they dared 
to the American line and delivering their fire from the 
brush. It was a mode of warfare in which they displayed 
an Indian-like skill, and which they had long practised 
in their contest with the Cubans. 

On Sunday morning Colonel Huntington decided to 
change the position of his camp, the tents being removed 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 221 

from the crest and pitched on the side of the hill facing 
the harbor, where they were under the protection of the 
guns of the war-ships. The crest was given up to bat- 
teries and rifle-pits, two 3-inch guns being drawn up the 
hill and mounted on the works in expectation of a second 
attack on Sunday night. Other guns of smaller caliber 
and two Colt machine-guns were also mounted. The 
looked-for attack began shortly after dark and was kept 
up all night, the firing being incessant, but not very 
effective. Two of the marines were killed and three in- 
jured. During the night the Spaniards made an assault 
on the camp on the hill-side, and the Marblehead, under 
the mistaken idea that the Americans had been driven 
out, threw several shells into the place, fortunately with- 
out harm. The attack was easily repulsed by the few 
marines in camp. 

The night battle was a picturesque and striking spec- 
tacle, tongues of fire darting from every bush encircling 
the camp, while the search-lights of the ships swept back 
and forth over the hills, revealing the lurking enemy to 
the marines on the crest. These gleams of light were 
accompanied by a strange variety of sounds, including 
the crack of the Mauser rifles, the twitter of the long 
steel bullets overhead, the rattle of the machine-guns, the 
crash of the field-guns as they drove their canister into 
the thicket, the sharp reports of the rapid-fire 1 -pounders 
in the ship launches below, and an occasional screech 
from the large guns of the Marblehead. 

Lieutenant Neville was again sent out on scout duty, 
and attacked a small stone fort, from which the Span- 
iards were driven with loss, fifteen dead bodies being 
found within. On Monday the marines received an im- 
portant reinforcement, being joined by about sixty Cuban 



222 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

allies, whose acquaintance with the country and with the 
Spanish method of righting made them of great value. 
General Garcia had sent General Rabi, his chief of staff, 
with about one thousand men, to occupy Ascerraderos, 
a village on the coast to the west of Santiago, following 
up this movement with the main body of his forces, and 
sending a detachment to reinforce the marines. 

During Monday the works on Crest Hill were strength- 
ened, and a body of Cubans and marines was sent to 
establish strong outposts a mile in advance. This gave 
the battalion a rest during Monday night, and the next 
day an attack was made on the Spanish camp, which 
scouts had located at a point about four miles inland, 
near the only well to be found for miles around. A force 
of marines under Captain Elliott and of Cubans under 
Colonel Thomas left the camp on Tuesday morning, and 
about eleven o' clock caught sight from a hill-top of the 
Spanish quarters on a brush-covered ridge below. Or- 
ders for an immediate attack were given, and a spirited 
charge was made, the troops coming close up before 
they were discovered by the foe. A sharp engagement 
followed, the Spaniards resisting for some twenty min- 
utes the onset of the marines. Then they broke for a 
thicket in the rear, the American bullets pouring into 
the fleeing line with deadly effect. Resistance was con- 
tinued until about 3.30 p.m., by which time the rout 
was complete, when the assailants returned, burned the 
camp buildings, and destroyed the well by filling it up 
with earth and stones. No other drinking water was to 
be had nearer than Guantanamo, several miles away. 
An attempt was made by Captain Elliott to cut off the 
enemy's retreat by climbing through cactus and brush 
a high hill in the rear, but the misdirected fire of the 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 223 

Dolphin checked this movement and gave the Spaniards 
an opportunity to escape. 

The bodies of about forty dead Spaniards were found 
in the vicinity of the block-house and eighteen prisoners 
were taken. The Cubans had two men killed and four 
wounded, and the marines two wounded, while twenty- 
three were overcome by the intense heat. In truth, the 
heat seemed more deadly than Spanish bullets, which 
were fired without regard to aim. This affair ended the 
conflict, the Spanish having been too severely punished 
to make any new assault on the camp of the marines. 

The experience of the marines taught some useful les- 
sons. It showed that the Spaniards were shrewd and 
daring bush-fighters, and that American camps needed 
to be carefully protected against night attacks. It also 
proved that bullets from magazine rifles might be wasted 
at an extraordinary rate without execution under the 
shades of night. In the daylight attacks the Spaniards 
had concealed themselves in the brush by wearing plan- 
tain leaves on their foreheads in place of hats. They 
also, wearing bark-colored trousers and tying green 
branches round their waists, had shown themselves able 
to move slowly across open spaces without being de- 
tected. Another trick was to make a moving screen of 
two or three large palm leaves, which formed an excel- 
lent disguise in the chaparral, from which stunted palms 
everywhere rose. 

The Cuban allies far surpassed the marines in detect- 
ing these tricks, with which they were thoroughly fa- 
miliar, having often practised them against the Spaniards. 
These men, mostly negroes, were keen-eyed woodsmen, 
well versed in bush-fighting, in which they displayed a 
daring that called forth American admiration. But they 



224 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

were wildly reckless in handling the magazine rifles with 
which they had been supplied, and as wretched in marks- 
manship as the Spanish troops. 

The final engagement in the bay of Guantanamo was 
the shelling, on June 16, of the fort and earthworks at Cai- 
manera, a town on the west side of the bay some distance 
inward from the camp of the marines. These works were 
demolished, and all resistance was brought to an end. 
On the same day the fleet made a third bombardment of 
the forts at the mouth of Santiago harbor, with the ex- 
ception of the Morro, where Lieutenant Hobson was 
supposed to be confined. The affair continued for about 
an hour, the Spaniards replying briskly but wildly, while 
in the end most of their guns were abandoned. Not a 
ship was struck nor a man hurt on the American side. 
On the other hand, the batteries showed signs of being 
seriously injured, and many of their guns appeared to 
be dismounted. 

The interesting feature of this affair, however, was the 
work of the dynamite boat Vesuvius. The dynamite 
guns carried by this vessel had been tried with good 
effect on land, but they had never been tested at sea, 
and the dread that the gun-cotton cartridges might ex- 
plode within the tubes and blow the vessel to fragments 
made naval officers fearful of them. In consequence, 
the Vesuvius had been used as a despatch-boat, and 
only on this occasion was permission given for a trial of 
her guns. At midnight of the day preceding the bom- 
bardment she drew cautiously in and fired three of her 
250-pound projectiles with perfect safety to the vessel. 
From two of these no report came. The third exploded 
with terrific violence on Cayo Smith, a frightful fiery 
gleam illuminating the harbor. From the ships the next 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 225 

morning a deep crater appeared on the side of the 
island, though subsequent observation indicated that no 
great harm had been done. On June 24 the Vesuvius 
performed a service of a different character, entering 
the harbor at night and passing unobserved around the 
wreck of the Merrimac. The result of the reconnoissance 
was to prove that the channel had not been closed, and 
that a battle-ship could pass in safety on either side of 
the sunken collier. 

On the 20th occurred the first landing of officers of 
the regular army on Cuban soil. This was at Ascerra- 
deros, twelve miles west of Santiago, where General 
Garcia had established his camp. General Shafter, com- 
mander of the army of invasion, with his staff, landed for 
a conference with the Cuban general, accompanied by 
Admiral Sampson and his chief of staff. No soldiers or 
sailors were landed, the escort of ragged Cuban soldiers 
sufficing. The meeting took place in a very picturesque 
location, on the summit of a high cliff that overlooked 
a valley green with the royal palm, while beyond the 
white breakers at the beach stretched far away the calm 
blue sea, dotted thickly with transports and ships-of- 
war. 

The three commanders took their seats under the 
palm-leaf roof of an open hut on which the sun's rays fell 
hotly. Outside stood five half-naked negro sentries, 
and beyond were grouped hundreds of Cubans, officers 
and men commingled, conversing as well as they could 
with the staff-officers from the fleet. 

Plans for the coming attack on Santiago were dis- 
cussed and arrangements for the co-operation of the 
allied forces settled, a map of the surrounding country 
being frequently consulted. This done, the conference 

15 



I 



226 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

ended, the three principal actors in the drama about to 
be played bade one another adieu, and the Americans 
returned to their boats, leaving their Cuban allies to 
seek again their lurking-places in the brush. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

THE ARMY OF INVASION. 

On the 23d of April President McKinley, as already- 
stated, called forth a volunteer force of 125,000 men for 
two years' service, apportioning them among the States 
and Territories in accordance with population. These 
were recruited from the existing National Guard organi- 
zations, vacancies being filled under a very careful system 
of health inspection. On May 23 a second call was 
issued, for 75,000 men, under similar conditions, though 
without restriction to the National Guards. The regu- 
lar army was also increased by filling up the regiments 
to their full quotas, its limit being 62,000 men, and 
several special forces were called for, making the total 
strength of the army, when fully recruited, 278,500 
men. 

This force was to be made up as follows : Regular 
army, 62,000 ; volunteer, first call, 125,000, second call, 
75,000 ; three special cavalry regiments, 3000 ; new 
engineer force, 3500 ; and ten regiments of volunteer 
infantry immune from yellow fever, 10,000. The last, 
composed of men who had recovered from or been ex- 
posed to this fever, were intended for use in infected 
districts. The first assignment of commanding officers, 
made public May 16, included the following major- 
generals : Wesley Merritt, in command of the Depart- 
ment of the Pacific (including the Philippines); John R. 
Brooke, in command of the First Corps and the De- 

227 



228 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

partment of the Gulf ; William M. Graham, of the 
Second Corps, Camp Alger, Falls Church, Virginia ; 
James F. Wade, of the Third Corps, Chickamauga, 
Georgia ; John J. Coppinger, of the Fourth Corps, Mo- 
bile, Alabama ; William R. Shafter, of the Fifth Corps, 
Tampa, Florida ; James H. Wilson, of the Sixth Corps, 
Chickamauga, Georgia ; Fitzhugh Lee, of the Seventh 
Corps, Tampa, Florida ; Joseph H. Wheeler, in com- 
mand of the Cavalry Division, Tampa, Florida. Major- 
General Elwell S. Otis was made second in command to 
General Merritt. The whole army was under the com- 
mand of Major-General Nelson A. Miles. Various sub- 
sequent appointments were made of major- and brigadier- 
generals and minor officers, some of which failed to win 
public approbation, since political influences were claimed 
to have controlled their selection. 

This was not the only adverse criticism made. The 
whole management of military affairs was sharply called 
in question by some observers, the War Department 
and the ' ' Board of Strategy' ' being severely taken to 
task for alleged neglect of the troops. These charges 
of the hostile press were particularly devoted to the 
state of affairs at Tampa, Florida, where, it was claimed, 
the soldiers had been grossly neglected, the men being 
dumped down at a railway siding like so many emi- 
grants, and left to seek what quarters they could find 
in the burning sand, no preparations being made for 
them. It was said that they lacked suitable clothing 
and food, were not properly drilled, and were in every 
respect shamefully treated. And the reason given for 
this was the alleged incompetence of their officers, few of 
whom, it was said, had any knowledge of military affairs, 
while General Wheeler, a famous Confederate cavalry 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 229 

leader of the Civil War, was declared to be incompetent 
through age. 

These charges were strongly denied by Richard Hard- 
ing Davis, a newspaper correspondent, who quoted from 
General Miles, Colonel Pope, the chief surgeon of the 
Fifth Corps, and others, including a German military 
attache, to prove that the army was in an excellent state 
of health, well fed and cared for, thoroughly equipped 
and disciplined. "I have never been so proud," said 
General Miles, " as I was yesterday when I rode through 
the camps of the Fifth Army Corps and saw the mag- 
nificent condition and physical perfection of our men. 
There is no army corps anywhere in the world that is 
better supplied with men and officers of courage, forti- 
tude, and intelligence." 

This refers in particular to the regulars. The volun- 
teers were, necessarily, generally in charge of inex- 
perienced officers, and for a time suffered hardships. 
This was in a measure unavoidable in a country with- 
out a large standing army and suddenly plunged from 
peace into war. " I do not believe," said General Alger, 
Secretary of War, ( ' that there ever was a nation on 
earth that attempted to embark in a war of such magni- 
tude while so utterly unprovided with everything neces- 
ary for a campaign. When war was declared," he 
further remarked, "we were unprepared, yet obstacles 
almost insurmountable have been overcome. I do not 
believe that history records an instance where so much 
has been done in a military campaign of this magnitude 
in the brief time that has elapsed since hostilities began. 
When the people have learned the actual condition of 
affairs and realize what an enormous task we have per- 
formed in the brief time allowed us by the circumstances 



230 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

of war, they will be entirely satisfied. The critics will 
be answered, and the enemies of our army will have no 
ground to stand on. ' ' 

This was written on June 10. By July 24, three 
months from the beginning of the war, two hundred and 
sixty-one thousand men had been mustered into service, 
fully equipped, and prepared to take the field, — some 
of them having shown their discipline and fighting 
qualities by experience in battle. The seeming slow- 
ness in filling up the ranks was due to the severe tests 
applied to recruits, the physical examination being of 
the most searching character. This was specially the 
case with the regulars, not more than one in four of the 
applicants being accepted. The men obtained were of 
the best fighting material, and showed excellent aptitude 
for military discipline and instruction. In fact, it is 
doubtful if an army in better physical condition ever 
took the field, and the recruiting, mustering, equipping, 
and bringing into service of so large, carefully selected, 
and well trained an army within ninety days was looked 
upon by many as a remarkable achievement, and excited 
the surprise and admiration of military observers from 
Europe. 

Of one portion of the army something further may be 
said, from the large place which it filled in the public 
estimation. This was the special cavalry corps, com- 
posed of three regiments known popularly as ' ' Rough 
Riders," they being made up of cowboys and others 
thoroughly trained in horsemanship. Two of these 
regiments had been recruited in the West, and were 
commanded respectively by Colonel Melvin Grigsby and 
Colonel Jay L. Torrey, men of great influence with the 
cowboys, who made up the bulk of their forces. The 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 231 

third had been recruited by Theodore Roosevelt, who 
had resigned his position as assistant secretary of the navy 
for the purpose of taking part in the actual campaigning. 
This regiment was commanded by Colonel Leonard 
Wood, Roosevelt having voluntarily retired to the post 
of lieutenant-colonel as better befitting his lack of mili- 
tary experience. But the public persisted in speaking 
of the regiment as "Roosevelt's Rough Riders." It, 
like the others, had been principally recruited in the 
West, but contained about twelve per cent, of business 
and professional men from the Eastern cities, including 
college graduates and representatives of families of high 
social standing. These men were experts in horseman- 
ship and physical exercises, and showed themselves the 
equals of their cowboy companions in the saddle. 

Before they left camp the Rough Riders were drilled 
to charge standing in their stirrups, the horses being 
trained to wheel and stop short at word of command, 
and the men riding with a reckless abandon calculated 
seriously to try the nerves of foot-soldiers. Armed with 
machetes, rifles, and revolvers, this corps would prob- 
ably have proved almost irresistible in the charge. As 
it proved, however, fortune put the Rough Riders into 
the battlefield on foot, and their record in war was made 
as infantry. 

Early in June a large fleet of transports, thirty-five 
in number, gathered in Tampa Bay for the conveyance 
of a strong military force to Santiago de Cuba, this place 
having, in consequence of the presence there of the 
Spanish fleet, been selected as the first point of attack. 
The force to be sent consisted of the Fifth Army Corps, 
under Major-General Shafter, and four regiments of 
General Coppinger's corps from Mobile. Two regi- 



232 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

ments of volunteer infantry were chosen to accompany 
the expedition, the Seventy-first New York and the 
Second Massachusetts, and eight troops of volunteer 
cavalry selected from Roosevelt's Rough Riders. In 
addition, there were four batteries of light and two of 
heavy artillery, a battalion of engineers, signal and hos- 
pital corps, etc. , the whole making a grand total of over 
fifteen thousand men. 

The sinking of the Merrimac in the channel of San- 
tiago harbor, with the assumed locking up of the Span- 
ish fleet in that haven of refuge, was immediately fol- 
lowed by active preparations for the despatch of this 
army, the embarkation of troops beginning on Monday, 
June 6. On Wednesday afternoon, after a number of 
them had put to sea, came a hasty order for their recall, 
and the Castine was despatched to bring them back. 
One transport, the City of Washington, had made such 
progress that the coast of Cuba was sighted before the 
order of recall reached her. It was Saturday before she 
and the Castine returned. 

The cause of this delay was said to be due to reports 
that war-vessels had left Barcelona, Spain, bound for 
Cuban waters, and that suspicious-looking vessels, with 
military tops, had been seen off Florida. That this was 
the actual cause, however, may well be questioned, and 
the delay has been claimed as due to that general lack 
of efficient management that afterwards declared itself. 
Whatever its cause, it was unfortunate for the men, who 
for more than a week were kept packed in the close 
transports, with the thermometer near ioo° F., many 
cases of heat-prostration, even among the seasoned 
regulars, being the result. 

The start finally took place on the 14th, the transports 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 233 

being convoyed by a squadron of war-vessels, with the 
battle-ship Indiana in the lead. At ten o'clock A. m. came 
the signal for sailing, which was greeted by wild cheers 
from the men, who were eager to leave that stifling at- 
mosphere, and in a few minutes the leading vessels of 
the fleet were gliding down the bay. On reaching the 
Florida Straits the transports were formed into three 
lines, about one thousand yards apart, the ships in each 
line being separated by six hundred yards. The war- 
vessels gathered on their flanks, on the alert by day, and 
at night sweeping the waters towards Cuba with their 
search-lights. No lights were allowed to be shown on 
the transports. Fortunately, the winds kept down and 
the sea was smooth, but the journey was a dull and 
tedious one, with not the show of an enemy to break its 
monotony, and it was with joy that the weary soldiers 
beheld, a week after they had set sail, the blockading 
fleet before Santiago. The horses and mules on the 
transports suffered severely during the voyage, many of 
them dying ; but the men bore the journey well, a few 
cases of typhoid fever being the only serious ailments. 

The news of the arrival of the troops came to Wash- 
ington by direct cable message from Guantanamo Bay, 
via the wires of the French Cable Company running 
from Santiago to Cape Haytien. This, the first direct 
communication by telegraph with the seat of war, was 
received with the highest gratification by the govern- 
ment. It had been supposed that Guantanamo Bay was 
being held by its force of marines as a point of debarka- 
tion for the troops. But the distance to be traversed, 
over a hilly country, without suitable roads, rendered 
that locality inadvisable, and the place finally selected 
was the village of Baiquiri, about fifteen miles east of the 



234 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

mouth of Santiago harbor. From here a road led to 
Santiago and a railroad followed the coast to a terminus 
on the harbor. Midway lay Juragua, another locality 
considered in connection with the landing, and which 
was bombarded on the morning of the 2 2d as a feint to 
distract attention from the real point chosen. For the 
same purpose colliers were sent to the west of the harbor, 
the Spaniards mistaking them for transports. 

During the preceding night many of the troop-ships 
had drawn in towards the shore, while in the thickets 
and mountain fastnesses on land Cuban insurgents were 
gathered thickly, watching, gun in hand, every road and 
mountain-path along which Spanish reinforcements could 
come. The day had not far advanced before tongues of 
flame and clouds of smoke rising from Baiquiri indicated 
that the Spaniards had fired and abandoned that place. 
The only evidence of Spanish occupation on the previous 
day had been a flag flying at the summit of a steep, 
rocky hill that offered excellent opportunities for defence. 
But with day-dawn this flag was seen to have vanished. 
The hill, like the village, had been abandoned. 

The bombardment of Jaragua was followed by a sharp 
fire upon Baiquiri from the guns of the New Orleans. 
No response came, and in a few minutes more the waters 
were enlivened by a flotilla of small boats filled with 
troops and headed by launches, moving swiftly in to- 
wards the shore. The lighters sent with the expedition 
had been lost during the voyage. In a brief time more 
the foremost of the landing-party gladly set foot on 
Cuban soil, each man in full fighting trim, carrying three 
days' rations, a shelter-tent, a rifle, and two hundred 
cartridges, ready to fight or march at a moment's notice. 
Landing was no easy matter. There was at this point a 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 235 

fine pier built by the iron-mining company, but the surf 
broke roughly against it, and the men were obliged to 
fling their rifles up first and scramble up the trestle-work 
after them. As they reached solid ground, they at once 
lined up in companies and regiments and marched away, 
making room for their successors. 

The Eighth Infantry was the first to land, followed by 
the First, General Shatter's old regiment. Other organ- 
izations rapidly followed, and by nightfall some six 
thousand soldiers were encamped in the hilly country 
around Baiquiri. General Lawton threw out a strong 
detachment to a point about six miles west, on the road 
to Santiago, and another to the north of the village, the 
remainder being quartered in the houses, few of which 
had been burned, and under their tents in the adjoining 
fields. The place was deserted when the troops arrived, 
but fugitive women and children soon appeared from the 
surrounding thickets and sought their homes. During 
the following two days the remainder of the troops were 
landed, and the occupation in force of Cuban soil was 
fairly inaugurated. The work of landing the siege-guns, 
horses, and other heavy supplies followed, but was 
prosecuted with difficulty on account of the lack of 
lighters and of landing facilities in general. 

In fact, as time revealed, the whole business had been 
inefficiently managed, guns and other necessaries of the 
expedition being left at Tampa, while requisite parts of 
the artillery that were brought were scattered carelessly 
through several ships. As a result, the army was by no 
means in the best condition for an advance on a fortified 
place, and there was abundant reason for delay until all 
the essentials of a campaign were at hand. But delay 
under Cuban suns and rains was a dangerous alternative. 



236 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

Yellow fever might prove a more deadly enemy than 
Spanish troops, and the commanding general, while 
doubtless deploring the position in which the haste and 
heedlessness of incompetent aids had placed him, seems 
to have felt that wisdom demanded an immediate ad- 
vance. At all events, no delay was made, the troops 
being at once set in motion towards the enemy's lines of 
defence. On the day of landing a reinforcement of six- 
teen hundred men, comprising the Thirty-third and one 
battalion of the Thirty-fourth Michigan Volunteers, set 
sail on the Yale from Hampton Roads, and other rein- 
forcements were rapidly preparing to follow. 

The advance began on the 23d, the Cubans serving as 
skirmishers in front of General Shafter's army, and 
having several brushes with the retreating Spaniards as 
the latter fell back. Colonel Wagner, with fifty picked 
men from General Lawton's brigade, formed the skir- 
mish line, assisted by some two hundred Cuban scouts, 
whose familiarity with the country and the Spanish mode 
of fighting rendered them of much utility. Juragua, 
some eight miles from the landing-place, was reached 
without a check, the guns of the fleet protecting the 
movement up to that point. The Spaniards seemed to 
have left the place in haste after an ineffectual attempt to 
burn it. 

The scouting party pushed on to the west, and at a 
short distance came suddenly upon a party of Spanish 
soldiers, who exchanged shots briskly with the Cubans, 
two of whom were killed and eight wounded. As the 
skirmishers fell back, the Twenty-second regulars came 
up at the double quick, drawn by the firing ; but the 
Spaniards were already in retreat and had sought the 
shelter of the woods. By night a junction was effected 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 237 

between the main divisions of the army of invasion at a 
point on the high ground back from the coast, and 
within ten miles of Morro Castle. 

At nightfall of the 25th all the troops were on shore, 
and the Cubans of Garcia' s army, some three thousand 
in number, had been brought by water from Ascerrade- 
ros, west of the harbor, and landed at Juragua. Most 
of the horses, also, were on firm land. With a single 
steam barge and a fleet of small boats, General Shafter 
had landed over fifteen thousand men, hundreds of 
horses and mules, and a large quantity of supplies on 
a difficult beach, only two men losing their lives and 
about fifty animals being drowned. The animals had 
to be pushed in the water and towed ashore. Of the 
supplies, hardly a package was lost. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

THE RAID OF THE ROUGH RIDERS. 

While the work of landing the army of invasion and 
its supplies was still in progress, the first battle had 
taken place on Cuban soil. The Spaniards had made a 
stand in force, and the vanguard of the army had re- 
ceived its baptism of fire. Raw as the troops were and 
difficult as the ground, they had behaved with conspicu- 
ous gallantry, winning victory in the face of much larger 
forces placed in ambush and with every advantage of 
position. This battle merits special attention as the first, 
with the exception of the minor affair at Guantanamo 
Bay, fought by American soldiers since the close of the 
Civil War, thirty-three years before. In it sons of the 
South and of the North fought side by side, and proved 
themselves worthy the reputation for courage and daring 
which their fathers had won on many a hard-fought field 
a third of a century in the past. 

The men who had the honor of taking part in this 
initial engagement were all of the cavalry arm of the 
service, horsemen serving as infantry. The position 
was one in which horses could not have been employed 
had there been any to use. The force consisted of eight 
troops of Colonel Wood's regiment, Roosevelt's Rough 
Riders as they will be known in history, and four troops 
each of the First and the Tenth Cavalry, a total force 
of nine hundred and sixty-four men, constituting nearly 
the whole of General Wheeler's cavalry command. 
238 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 239 

On the 23d, Wheeler, under orders from the com- 
manding general, proceeded to Siboney, to find that the 
enemy had withdrawn from that place towards Sevilla, 
skirmishing with the Cuban scouts as they retreated. 
He rode out to the front and found that the Spanish had 
halted and established themselves at a point about three 
miles in advance. Studying the ground with the aid of 
General Castillo, in command of the Cubans, Wheeler 
determined to make an attack on the enemy at daybreak 
of the 24th, a rough map of the country being drawn as 
an aid to the projected movement. 

The country was rougher than any map that could be 
made of it. The theory was that it was traversed by 
roads ; but in effect these roads were simply rude paths 
through a dense tropical forest, along which ox-teams 
could laboriously make their way in dry weather, but 
which in wet weather were impassable to teams and al- 
most so to men on horseback. There were no bridges, 
and the rains made torrents of the streams that crossed 
the roads. In the subsequent movement of the army 
new roads had to be made before a single wagon-train 
could get through, and the bridges built for this purpose 
were repeatedly swept away. As a consequence, on 
several occasions the army had to depend on pack-trains, 
and the movement of supplies to the front became a very 
difficult operation. As for the siege-guns, landed with 
difficulty, not one got beyond Siboney. 

The roads to be traversed by General Wheeler's force 
were of the character here described. There were two 
of them, one following the foot of the hill upon which 
the Spaniards had made their stand, the other ascending 
the slope. These so-called roads were little more than 
gullies, rough and narrow and at places almost impass- 



2 4 o THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

able. On both sides they were lined by prickly cactus- 
bushes, while the underbrush was so thick that it was 
impossible to see ten feet on either side. The conditions 
were favorable for a murderous ambuscade, and this was 
the one mode of fighting in which the Spanish soldiers 
excelled. 

The enemy, doubtless having good reason to look for 
an advance of the invaders along these roads in their 
movement towards Sevilla, had prepared to give them a 
warm reception. On the hill-slopes had been erected 
two block-houses, flanked by irregular intrenchments of 
stones and felled trees. Behind these and in the thick 
underbrush on both sides of the trail a large body of 
Spaniards had posted themselves, considerably outnum- 
bering General Wheeler's force, and expecting to check 
his advance with ease. Hitherto they had fought with 
Cubans only, and judged their new foes from experience 
of their old. As the Spaniards could not be seen, their 
numbers could be estimated only by the weight of their 
fire, which was constant and heavy and much more accu- 
rate than had been expected. 

There were practically two battles, — General Young 
leading the regulars along the road at the base of the 
hill, with the design of making a feint on the enemy's 
front, and Colonel Wood leading the Rough Riders 
along the ascending trail, proposing to attack them in 
flank. As a result, when the enemy was reached the 
two detachments were about a mile apart. The first part 
of the journey of the Rough Riders was over steep hills 
several hundred feet high. The men carried two hun- 
dred rounds of ammunition and heavy camp equipment. 
Although this was done easily in the early morning, the 
weather became intensely hot as the day advanced, and 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 241 

the sun beat down severely upon the cowboys and East- 
ern athletes as they toiled up the grade with their heavy 
packs, frequent rests becoming necessary. The trail was 
so narrow that for the greater part of the way the men 
had to proceed in single file. One by one the men, 
unable to endure the sweltering heat, threw away their 
blankets and tent-rolls and emptied their canteens, re- 
taining only their arms and cartridges. 

The first intimation that there were Spaniards in the 
vicinity was when they reached a point three or four miles 
back from the coast, when the low cuckoo calls of the 
Spanish soldiers were heard in the brush. It was difficult 
to locate the exact point from which these sounds came. 
The men were ordered to speak in whispers, and frequent 
halts were made. Finally, a place was reached, about 
eight o' clock, where the trail opened into a space covered 
with high grass on the right-hand side of the trail and 
the thickest kind of bramble and underbrush on the 
other. A barbed-wire fence also ran along the left side. 
The dead body of a Cuban was found on the side of the 
road and the heads of several Spaniards were seen in the 
bushes for a moment. 

It was not until then that the men were permitted to 
load their carbines. When the order to load was given, 
they acted on it with a will, and displayed the greatest 
eagerness to make an attack. At this time the sound of 
firing was heard a mile or two to the right, apparently 
coming from the hills beyond the thicket. It was the 
regulars replying to the Spaniards, who had opened on 
them from the thicket. In addition to rapid rifle-fire the 
boom of Hotchkiss guns could be heard. Hardly two 
minutes elapsed before Mauser rifles commenced to crack 
in the thicket, and a hundred bullets whistled over the 

16 



242 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

heads of the Rough Riders, cutting the leaves from the 
trees and sending chips flying from the fence-posts by 
the side of the men. The Spaniards had opened and 
were pouring in a heavy fire, which had a disastrous 
effect. 

Sergeant Hamilton Fish was the first man to fall. He 
was shot through the breast and lived but twenty min- 
utes, giving a small hunting-case watch from his belt as 
a souvenir to a messmate. Captain Capron and others 
rallied around him, firing into the bush, but they were 
in the thick of the Spanish fire, and the captain soon fell 
with a mortal wound. Dead and wounded were falling 
all around, but the men held their ground, seemingly 
without a thought of retreat. Our troops had evidently 
fallen into an ambush held by a much superior force, and 
Captain Capron' s troop, in the advance, were in a hot 
place, the Spanish fire pouring upon them in volleys. 

This was a state of affairs that called for either a retreat 
or a charge. Of the former no thought was entertained. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt at the head of one wing, 
and Colonel Wood and Major Brodie leading the other, 
advanced in open order on the foe, Major Brodie falling 
wounded before the troops had advanced one hundred 
yards. An order for a general charge was now given, 
and with a yell the men sprang forward. Roosevelt, 
snatching a rifle and ammunition-belt from a wounded 
soldier, led the way at the head of his men, cheering 
and yelling as loudly as the best of them. 

For a period the bullets were singing like a swarm 
of bees all around them, and at every instant men fell 
from the ranks. On the right wing Captain McClintock 
had his leg broken by a bullet from a machine-gun, 
while four of his men went down. At the same time 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 243 

Captain Luna lost nine of his men. Then the reserves, 
Troops K and E, were ordered up. There was no hesi- 
tation. Colonel Wood, with the right wing, charged 
straight at a block-house about eight hundred yards 
away, and Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt, on the left, 
charged at the same time. Up the men went with their 
cowboy yell, never stopping to return the fire of the 
Spaniards, but keeping on with a grim determination to 
capture the block-house or die in the attempt. That 
charge was the last. By the time the American advance 
had got within six hundred yards of the block-house the 
Spaniards abandoned it, not having the resolution to 
stand that furious rush, and in the next moment were 
flying at their utmost speed through the brush beyond, 
followed by a hail of bullets from the victorious troops. 

While this hot battle had been taking place on the 
hill, the regulars under General Young were having as 
lively a time below. The battle here began in much 
the same manner as above, and when the machine-guns 
poured their rain of bullets into the brush, the Spanish 
from their lurking-places on the hill-side sent volleys at 
the gunners below. A charge was now made up the hill 
by part of the force, while the remainder covered with 
their rifles every point from which the Spanish shots 
came. Back through the thicket, step by step, went 
the enemy, firing as they retreated, and finally seeking 
refuge in the block-house in front of Colonel Wood's 
command. They were dislodged with their comrades 
by the irresistible charge of Wood and Roosevelt and 
their men. In the words of General Young, the battle 
was one of the sharpest he had ever experienced. It 
was only the quick and constant fire of the troopers, 
whether they could see the enemy or not, that forced 



244 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

the Spanish so soon from their ambuscade. Reinforce- 
ments had been ordered forward from Juragua, but the 
march was a long one and the fight was over before they 
arrived. 

In the two hours' fighting, during which the volun- 
teers battled against a concealed enemy, many deeds of 
heroism were done. One of the men of Troop E, 
desperately wounded, was lying squarely between the 
lines of fire. Surgeon Church hurried to his side, and, 
with bullets pelting all around him, calmly dressed the 
man's wound, bandaged it, and walked unconcernedly 
back, soon returning with two men and a litter. The 
wounded man was placed on the litter and brought into 
our lines. Another soldier of Troop L, concealing him- 
self as best he could behind a tree, gave up his place to 
a wounded companion, and in a moment or so later was 
himself wounded. 

Sergeant Bell stood by the side of Captain Capron 
when the latter was mortally hit. He had seen that he 
was fighting against terrible odds, but he never flinched. 
' ' Give me your gun a minute, ' ' he said to the sergeant, 
and, kneeling down, he deliberately aimed and fired two 
shots in quick succession. At each a Spaniard was seen 
to fall. Bell, in the mean time, had seized a dead com- 
rade's gun and knelt beside his captain and fired steadily. 
When Captain Capron fell he gave the sergeant a parting 
message to his wife and father, bade him good-by in a 
cheerful voice, and was then borne away dying. 

A private was shot through the thigh, the bullet enter- 
ing at the side and going out at the back. He made 
his way to the field hospital and was told nothing could 
be done for him. Returning to the front, he crawled 
along, firing with the rest. 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 245 

Colonel Wood, who was at the front throughout the 
entire action, saw a- trooper apparently skulking, fifty feet 
in the rear of the firing-line, and ordered him sharply 
to advance. The boy rose and hurried forward, limping. 
As he took his place and raised his carbine, he said, — 

' ' My leg is a little stiff, sir. ' ' 

Colonel Wood looked, and saw that a bullet had 
ploughed along the trooper's leg for twelve inches. 

The ground was uneven, and the advance was im- 
peded by vines an inch thick, trailing bushes, and cactus 
plants, known as Spanish bayonets, which tear the flesh 
and clothes. Through this the men fought their way, 
falling, stumbling, wet with perspiration, panting for 
breath, but obeying Colonel Wood's commands instantly. 

The Rough Riders disproved all that had been said 
in criticism of them when the organization was formed. 
The cowboys observed perfect discipline, and the East- 
ern element in Troop K, from clubs and colleges, acted 
with the greatest coolness and intelligence. 

The spirit of Mr. Marshall, a correspondent of the 
New York Journal, was as admirable as that of any 
soldier on the field. He was shot in the first firing-line, 
and though the bullet passed within an inch of his spine 
and threw him into frequent and terrible convulsions, he 
continued in his intervals of consciousness to write his 
account of the fight and gave it to a wounded soldier to 
be forwarded to his paper. This devotion to duty by a 
man who believed he was dying was as fine as any of the 
many courageous and inspiring deeds that occurred 
during the two hours of breathless, desperate fighting. 

The result of the battle was to give the Americans 
possession of La Quasimas, the point of meeting of the 
hill-side and the valley roads. The complete exhaustion 



246 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

of the men, from their exertions and the great heat, pre- 
vented their continuing the pursuit, and they contented 
themselves with holding the ground they had gained. 
The total loss on the American side was sixteen killed 
and fifty-two wounded. That of the Spaniards could 
not be told, but from the number of dead found it must 
have been much more severe. The engagement, in the 
words of General Wheeler, ' ' inspired our troops, and 
must have had a bad effect upon the spirits of the Span- 
ish soldiers. It also gave our army the beautiful and 
well-watered country in which we established our encamp- 
ments, with a full view of Santiago and the surrounding 
country, and enabled us to reconnoitre close up to the 
fortifications of that place." 

An interesting commentary on this pioneer battle is 
contained in the words of a Spanish soldier who was in 
the battle and was afterwards captured by the Cubans. 
He said of the volunteers : 

' ' They did not fight like other soldiers. When we 
fired a volley, they advanced instead of going back. 
The more we fired the nearer they came to us. We are 
not used to fighting with men who act in that way." 

In other words, they were not fighting with Cuban in- 
surgents, and the tactics used in guerilla warfare did not 
apply. Under the fire which the Americans faced they 
could without dishonor have fallen back. But, instead, 
they kept on in a steady, cool advance, which only ceased 
when they were in possession of the enemy's base and 
the Spaniards were in full retreat. 



CHAPTER XV. 

THE BATTLE OF SANTIAGO. 

The victory on the hill-side cleared the way to the 
vicinity of Santiago, since the enemy evacuated Sevilla — 
some miles in advance, where it had been expected a 
stand in force would be made — on the night of the 24th, 
and the American army occupied this post without a 
shot. Here the army was delayed for several days 
from the difficulty in getting subsistence stores to the 
front. It was not considered safe to move unless each 
man had at least three days' rations in his knapsack, 
and this was impossible in the wretched condition of the 
roads, which were converted into mud gullies by the 
frequent rains. Pack-trains alone could get through, 
and these could supply the army with food only from 
day to day. To make the road passable for wagon- 
trains, artillery, and ambulances was a task of the utmost 
difficulty, which seriously taxed the skill of the en- 
gineers and the endurance of officers and men. From 
Baiquiri the way ran through a tangle of tropical under- 
growth and over treacherous swamps bordering streams 
for a distance of twelve miles. The engineers were kept 
busy levelling the track, filling pits, and bridging the 
streams, while a large force with axes, aided by Cubans 
with machetes, hacked down trees and cleared out the 
underbrush, widening the narrow way. All this neces- 
sarily took time, and kept the army in a waiting state. 

Meanwhile, a thorough reconnoissance of the country 

247 



248 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

was being made, which, with information gained from 
the Cubans, who claimed exact acquaintance with it, 
enabled a fairly accurate map to be drawn. The daring 
scouts advanced to the very trenches of the enemy, near 
enough to hear the sentries on picket duty talking. 
Lieutenant Smith, of the Fourth Infantry, pushed for- 
ward as far as El Caney without meeting any Spanish 
troops, and Captain Wright, of General Bates's staff, 
followed the line of the railroad from Juragua to within 
two and a half miles of the city. Lieutenant Blue, of 
the gunboat Suwanee, repeated his exploit of a fortnight 
before, making a tour of some sixty miles in extent 
around the city and again counting the Spanish ships at 
anchor in the bay. He ventured close up to the enemy's 
batteries, and at one point in his journey reached a 
Cuban outpost which faced an outpost of the Spaniards 
only four hundred yards away. The lieutenant's account 
of what took place forms a sarcastic commentary upon 
the character of the former Cuban war. 

" They popped away at one another all the time," he 
said ; "but I do not think the Cubans hurt the Spanish 
very much, and I know the Spanish did not hurt the 
Cubans." 

On June 27 the front rested on the small stream 
known as the Rio Guama, and extended from the crest 
of the Sevilla hills for a mile and a half into the interior. 
General Kent's men lay encamped along the railroad, 
their advance being not far from Morro Castle. General 
Lawton's division occupied the road to Santiago, the 
Third Brigade, which formed the centre, lying across 
the road and the river, the First Brigade forming the 
left flank, and the Second Brigade holding the opposite 
position on the right flank. General Wheeler, with the 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 249 

dismounted cavalry, lay in the rear, between the Sevilla 
hills and the Rio Guama. At Siboney was a brigade of 
reinforcements which had just landed from the Yale, and 
others were hourly expected on the Harvard. Drinking 
water for the troops was obtained from the Rio Guama, 
a stream fed by mountain springs and yielding excellent 
water. The fare, consisting of hardtack, bacon, and 
coffee, was hardly suited to the climate, and the men 
could not be kept from eating the great variety of tropical 
fruits — mangoes, oranges, etc. — which abounded in the 
woodland, though strict orders had been given to the 
contrary. Limes and the milk from green cocoanuts 
were alone considered safe to indulge in, but the attrac- 
tion of the other fruits proved too great to resist. 

General Shatter landed on the 27th, and rode at once 
to the front, in order to consult with General Wheeler 
and the division commanders and look over the field of 
operations. A few cases of sickness had appeared, due 
to the intense heat of midday, the dampness of the 
climate, and the inadequate equipment of the troops. 
The nights were cool, and many of the men seriously 
felt the need of the blankets and woollen clothing which 
they had thrown away in the distress of the march, and 
which the Cubans had hastened to pick up. The inor- 
dinate indulgence of many in the forbidden fruits of the 
country aided in producing sickness, and it became 
necessary to provide a fixed hospital. This was estab- 
lished at Siboney, trained nurses and the necessary con- 
veniences being landed from the transport Iroquois. The 
dreaded scourge of yellow fever had not yet appeared 
among the troops, but some cases were reported by the 
Cubans, and it might at any time attack the unacclimated 
Americans. 



250 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

Though the enemy had withdrawn from their outpost 
positions, there was reason to believe that a stubborn 
defence of their interior works would be made. Scouts 
reported that the top of every hill north and east of the 
city was occupied by block-houses, whence the move- 
ments of the invading army could be observed, while 
intrenchments were visible on every knoll and bit of 
high ground fronting the city itself. These trenches 
were dug to suit the conformation of the ground, over- 
lapping where breaks in the line occurred, thus securing 
safe retreat to an inner line if an outer trench should be 
captured. Four parallel lines of rifle-pits, shoulder deep, 
were reported as existing, in front of which were marked 
ranges and several rows of barbed-wire fences. The 
work of defence had been carefully provided for, and to 
many experienced officers it appeared as if nothing could 
be done until more artillery was brought up, and that a 
regular siege might be necessary. 

This was not General Shafter's opinion. The situa- 
tion was a difficult one and delay was dangerous. With 
a large body of unacclimated men, exposed to hot suns 
by day and cool winds by night, under tropical rains 
that kept the ground constantly moist, immediate action 
seemed imperatively necessary. Sickness threatened, 
and fever might prove more difficult to combat than the 
Spaniards with all their rifle-pits and wire fences. And 
deliberation does not seem to have been General Shafter's 
idea of war. Whatever might have been done under a 
more cautious commander, we are only concerned with 
what was done, and that was to throw the American 
army upon the Spanish works within a week from the 
day they completed their landing on Cuban soil. 

At set of sun on the closing day of June a general 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 251 

order was issued commanding an advance in force at 
daybreak on the morrow, and before midnight every 
man in the army knew that a desperate struggle was at 
hand. The news put the men in a fever of excitement ; 
cheering and singing banished sleep for the remainder 
of the night, and from end to end of the line rang the 
improvised strain, — 

"There'll be a hot time in Santiago to-morrow." 

At four o'clock in the morning of July 1, hundreds of 
bugles rang out the reveille ; and before the sun had 
risen the line was complete. At the extreme left was 
General Duffield with the Thirty-third Michigan, his 
command having reached the Aguadores bridge by train. 
Next to the northeast was General Kent's division, a 
mile and a half from the sea and held as a reserve force. 
The centre of the line was held by a cavalry division 
which, until General Wheeler arrived at noon, was com- 
manded by General Sumner. Owing to General Young's 
illness, Colonel Wood of the Rough Riders commanded 
his brigade, which consisted of the First volunteer, the 
First regular, the Tenth regular, and one battalion of the 
Ninth regular cavalry, all dismounted with the excep- 
tion of two troops. On the extreme right was General 
Lawton's division, fully five miles from the sea. 

Military balloons were in use by the signal corps for 
the purpose of gaining exact information of the location 
of the enemy and the character of their defences. One 
! of these was sent up on the morning of the battle, rising 
over the tree-tops and being guided along three miles of 
the road towards the lines of the enemy. Photographs 
were taken of the fortifications as it proceeded, the 



252 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

Spaniards firing at it whenever it halted for this purpose. 
It approached until it hung over San Juan, not more 
than five hundred yards from the enemy, who for five 
minutes vainly sought to puncture it. In the end, how- 
ever, it was pierced and came down with a run, its mis- 
sion ended for that day of battle. 

The balloon had been of some service, but on the 
whole did more harm than good. The position of the 
advancing troops, masked by the bushes from the enemy, 
was revealed by this trailing globe, which served as a 
signal to direct the fire of the Spaniards. As a result 
the advancing lines suffered severely, the observation 
balloon being responsible for a considerable increase in 
dead and wounded in the American ranks. The soldiers 
had nothing but anathemas for this new idea in warfare. 

The conflict of July i was mainly concentrated about 
two strong positions of the enemy. General Lawton's 
division, forming the right wing of the army, faced the 
picturesque old town of El Caney, a suburban place of 
residence for wealthy citizens of Santiago, from which it 
lay about four miles to the northeast. Looking down 
from the ridge which they occupied, Lawton's men saw 
in the broad valley below them this quaint old town. 
The valley was three miles wide. It had been a garden 
spot in times of peace, but now the abandoned planta- 
tions were filled with a rank tropical growth, including 
numbers of the formerly cultivated cocoanut- and mango- 
trees. Bordering it on the west rose a low ridge, on 
which were visible the Spanish barracks and a large red 
building flying the Red Cross flag. This was the Reina 
Mercedes Hospital, then the prison of Lieutenant Hob- 
son and his gallant seven. Opposite, on the northern 
side of the valley, extended a broad plateau, accessible 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 253 

by a good road. This was the key to Santiago, since 
artillery planted there would command the city. To 
win it was the purpose of General Lavvton's proposed 
move. 

East of the city, in front of Colonel Wood's brigade, 
lay the village of San Juan, crowning a steep hill which 
was well fortified and defended by cannon, and which 
threatened, in the absence of sufficient artillery, to be 
very difficult to take. Barracks and other buildings oc- 
cupied the crest. Nearer the coast, where the railroad 
crossed San Juan River, stood the village of Aguadores, 
garrisoned by Spanish troops. 

The condition of the Americans was excellent. De- 
spite the drenching rains and the hot sun, little sickness 
had shown itself, and the men were eager for the fight. 
In preparation for the final assault upon Santiago sixty 
tried men in each brigade, non-commissioned officers 
and privates, had been promoted to be wire-clippers, 
their duty being to precede the firing-line about two or 
three hundred yards for the purpose of cutting the 
barbed-wire fences that obstructed the way to the city. 
Their mission was a most hazardous one, as they would 
be exposed to the fire of their comrades as well as that 
of the enemy. But in the general enthusiasm there was 
no difficulty in obtaining volunteers for this perilous task. 
The use of barbed wire was a new device in defensive 
warfare, and could be met only by some such method 
as this. 

The great disadvantage of the army lay in the lack of 
artillery. The heavy siege-guns were still at Baiquiri. 
It had proved impossible to convey them over the 
muddy roads, and General Shatter concluded not to 
wait for them. The only guns at the front" were four 



254 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

batteries of light artillery, sixteen guns in all, where fully 
five times that many should have been in the line. Of 
these only eight were actually brought into use. It was 
a battle in which infantry did the work of artillery, and 
did it well and nobly, though suffering severely from the 
lack of guns. 

At five o'clock in the morning of the ist General 
Lawton's troops were put in motion, preceded by a bat- 
tery of the First Artillery under Captain Allyn Capron, 
father of the Captain Capron who fell at La Quasimas. 
The plan of the battle was for Captain Capron' s battery, 
which held a position in the centre, above General Lud- 
low, to shell the fort near the town ; for General Chaffee 
to close in as soon as the artillery had reduced the fort 
and driven the Spaniards towards Santiago ; for General 
Ludlow to lie in the road below the hill on which Cap- 
tain Capron' s battery was stationed and swing in on 
General Chaffee's left, and for Colonel Miles' s brigade 
to keep close to General Ludlow's right, and by a si- 
multaneous movement sweep the Spaniards in towards 
Caney. At 6.40 the battery opened fire upon the fort, 
the first shot falling close by, the second hitting it fairly. 
This accurate firing was too much for the valor of the 
garrison, who ran in a body down the hill towards the 
town. The covered way in front of the fort, however, 
was held by the Spanish troops, who maintained an 
obstinate fire upon our men as they advanced slowly 
through the brush and groves, firing only an occasional 
shot. 

Captain Capron' s battery opened on the enemy at 
once and tore up the ground with shells. A number of 
these were sent entirely through the fort, tearing down 
large sections of the walls. This fine marksmanship was 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 



255 



of great service, the battery stopping the fire of the 
Spanish soldiers, who opened repeatedly from the cov- 
ered-way pits. By eight o'clock General Chaffee's 
brigade was pressing in towards the town, and the firing 
at intervals was very warm. It was difficult, however, 
to see anything of the battle, owing to the rolling nature 
of the ground and the dense vegetation that obscured the 
view in almost every direction. 

The firing continued heavy, but the Spaniards in the 
covered way made a most obstinate defence and refused 
to yield an inch. Time and again the shells from Cap- 
tain Capron's battery drove them to cover, but as soon 
as his fire ceased they were up and at it again. In con- 
sequence, despite the hot fire of the American troops, 
they were able to make but little apparent progress 
during the morning, although eventually they steadily 
drew in and enclosed the town on all sides. 

Up to the middle of the day the Second Massachusetts 
sustained the heaviest losses, although other regiments 
were more actively engaged. During the afternoon 
the conflict continued with the greatest obstinacy, the 
Spaniards fighting under cover and the Americans in the 
open. The Spaniards fought with unexpected courage 
and persistence, clinging to their positions with an un- 
yielding determination that caused great loss on the 
American side. General Lawton's report emphasizes at 
once the difficulties overcome by the Americans and the 
valor of the Spaniards. He says, — 

" It may not be out of place to call attention to the 
peculiar character of the battle, it having been fought 
against an enemy fortified and intrenched within a com- 
pact town of stone and concrete houses, some with walls 
several feet thick, and supported by a number of Covered 



256 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

forts cut in solid stone, and the enemy continuing to re- 
sist until nearly every man was killed or wounded, — a 
desperation apparently predetermined." 

At noon it became evident that the fire from the 
covered way could not be stopped by the artillery alone, 
and that no permanent advance could be made until the 
place was taken, and General Lavvton decided to capture 
it by assault. Accordingly he sent a messenger to Gen- 
eral Chaffee with instructions to take the position by a 
charge. General Chaffee thereupon closed in with his 
men rapidly from the north, while Captain Capron main- 
tained a heavy fire on the fort, keeping the Spaniards in 
the covered way and making hole after hole in the stone 
walls. Shortly afterwards he threw a shot from the bat- 
tery which tore away the flagstaff, bringing the Spanish 
flag to the ground. It was not raised again. 

At three o'clock the advanced line of General Chaffee's 
skirmishers, the Seventh Infantry, began to appear on 
the edge of the woods below the fort, and by rapid rushes 
advanced up the hill towards it. No shot was fired as 
they swept forward, and it was evident that the covered 
way had been abandoned. In a few minutes the American 
troops were thick around the fort, which commanded the 
north side of the town. The Spaniards were completely 
surrounded. The main part of the army was between 
them and Santiago, and General Lawton's division was 
around them on the other three sides. They retreated 
to buildings in the town, and made a gallant defence, 
but from the time General Chaffee's men took the stone 
fort they were lost troops to Spain. 

Rather than attempt to take the town by a general 
assault, without the aid of artillery, which must certainly 
result in a great loss of life, General Lawton decided to 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 257 

order forward artillery to shell it at close range. Al- 
though the road from the hill to the edge of the town 
was nearly impassable for artillery, Captain Capron made 
the effort, and by five o'clock had his guns in position 
to open upon it. 

For some time General Chaffee's brigade held its posi- 
tion behind the stone fort, and then began the descent 
towards the town, firing rapid volleys as it advanced. 
General Ludlow and Colonel Miles pressed closely in 
on the other sides, and at nightfall El Caney was practi- 
cally in the hands of the Americans, and a large number 
of prisoners had been taken. 

The valley in which this battle was fought was inter- 
sected by several ridges of fifty feet or less in height. 
Groves of cocoanut- and mango-trees rose here and there, 
divided by broad fields of grass, often waist-high. It 
was in crossing the ridges and open spaces that the 
Americans suffered most severely, and this was particu- 
larly the case with Ludlow's and Miles' s men, who were 
compelled to make their final charges across an open 
space through which the Spanish fire swept with deadly 
effect. 

No finer work has ever been done by soldiers than was 
done by these brigades as they closed in on the town. 
The Spanish blazed at them with Mausers and machine- 
guns, but without checking their advance ; nothing could 
stop them. They pushed in closer and closer during 
the afternoon, and by the time General Chaffee's men 
were in form Miles and Ludlow were on the skirts of 
the town, holding on with tenacity and preventing the 
Spaniards from retreating towards Santiago, while Chaf- 
fee closed in on the right. 

As evidence of the opinion of American courage en- 
17 



258 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

tertained by the Spanish, a quotation from the narrative 
of an officer who took part in the battle will be in 
place : 

"The enemy's fire was incessant, and we answered 
with equal rapidity. I have never seen anything to 
equal the courage and dash of those Americans, who, 
stripped to the waist, offered their naked breasts to our 
murderous fire, and literally threw themselves on our 
trenches, on the very muzzles of our guns. 

"Our execution must have been terrible. We had 
the advantage of our position and mowed them down by 
the hundreds, but they never retreated or fell back an 
inch. As one man fell shot through the heart, another 
would take his place, with grim determination and un- 
flinching devotion to duty in every line of his face. 
Their gallantry was heroic. We wondered at these 
men, who fought like lions and fell like men, courting a 
wholesale massacre, which could well have been avoided 
had they only kept up their firing without storming our 
trenches. ' ' 

On the extreme left General Duffield had begun the 
day's fighting by an attack on the coast village of Agua- 
dores, in which he was aided by the fire of the war- 
vessels New York, Gloucester, and Suwanee, which 
actively shelled the fort and the rifle-pits, driving all the 
Spaniards from the vicinity. The railroad bridge which 
crossed the little San Juan River was down, and the 
troops were unable to occupy the town, though the 
Spaniards did not seem inclined to hold it. 

Meanwhile, a hot engagement had been in progress at 
San Juan, between Aguadores and El Caney and on the 
main road from Siboney to Santiago. Here was, as has 
been said, a steep hill, strongly fortified, and likely to 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 259 

be very difficult to take in the absence of sufficient 
artillery. On the morning of July 1 Wheeler's cav- 
alry division moved forward by the Santiago road and 
formed its line with its left near the road, and Kent's 
infantry division did the same, its right joining the left 
of the cavalry division. The men were all compelled to 
wade the San Juan River to get into line, and this they 
did under a very heavy infantry and artillery fire from 
the Spanish works on the crest of the hill, which rose 
before them some three hundred feet high. Men and offi- 
cers fell in numbers as they emerged into the open space 
in full view of the enemy, and their position became a 
very trying one. 

A charge by these troops seems not to have been con- 
templated, they being held in column on the road to 
reinforce General Lawton, if necessary, while Grimes's 
battery made a diversion on the left. But when the 
Spanish guns began to drop shells over the road 
which they occupied, and when word of General 
Lawton' s success reached them, a movement of advance 
or retreat became necessary. Anything was better than 
to remain where they were. It was, as we have before 
said, the observation balloon, which was drawn forward 
by the troops as they advanced and hung in the air above 
them, that directed the fire of the Spanish artillerymen, 
whose shells reached the waiting columns in the road 
and caused severe loss. 

Grimes's battery took a position in the little town of 
El Paso, from which the Spaniards had been driven by 
the sharp musketry fire of the cavalry division, and 
from here it protected the advance by pouring a steady 
fire into the Spanish works. 

The line was no sooner formed than an advance began, 



260 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

as if by a general impulse. The men simply could not 
stand at rest under the punishment they were receiving. 
" It was evident," said General Wheeler in his report, 
"that we were as much under fire in forming the line 
as we could be by an advance, and I therefore pressed 
the command forward from the covering under which it 
was formed. It emerged into open space in full view of 
the enemy, who occupied breastworks and batteries on 
the crest of the hill which overlooks Santiago, officers 
and men falling at every step. The troops advanced 
gallantly, soon reached the foot of the hill, and ascended, 
driving the enemy from their works and occupying them 
on the crest of the hill. To accomplish this required 
courage and determination of a high order on the part of 
the officers and men, and the losses were very severe." 

In the charge of the Rough Riders, Colonel Roose- 
velt led the way, the only mounted man in the line. It 
was little short of a miracle that he came through that 
desperate charge alive. In truth, the whole line be- 
haved with the most conspicuous gallantry, and that 
wild climb up a steep hill in the face of a murderous fire 
was one of the most courageous actions ever performed 
by American troops. Apparently, the Spanish, though 
well capable of bearing punishment when intrenched, 
could not stand such a charge. In the reports of the 
battle from Santiago the American troops were claimed 
to have been beaten, the Spaniards retiring only because 
the Americans " persisted in fighting. " Evidently they 
belonged to the class of men who ' ' do not know when 
they are whipped. ' ' 

C. E. Hand, the correspondent of the London Daily 
Mail, thus graphically describes the taking of the San 
Juan heights, as seen by him from a distance : 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 261 

' ' When afternoon came — I lost exact count of time — 
there was still a jumble of volleying over by Caney. 
But in front our men were away out of sight behind a 
ridge far ahead. Beyond there arose a long, steepish 
ascent, crowned by the block-house upon which artillery 
had opened fire in the morning. 

" Suddenly, as we looked through our glasses, we saw 
a little black ant go scrambling quickly up this hill, and 
an inch or two behind him a ragged line of other little 
ants, and then another line of ants at another part of the 
hill, and then another, until it seemed as if somebody 
had dug a stick into a great ants' nest down in the 
valley, and all the ants were scrambling away up-hill. 
Then the volley firing began ten times more furious than 
before ; from the right beyond the top of the ridge burst 
upon the ants a terrible fire of shells ; from the block- 
house in front of them machine-guns sounded their con- 
tinuous rattle. But the ants swept up the hill. They 
seemed to us to thin out as they went forward ; but they 
still went forward. It was incredible, but it was grand. 
The boys were storming the hill. The military authori- 
ties were most surprised. They were not surprised at 
these splendid athletic dare-devils of ours doing it, but 
that a military commander should have allowed a forti- 
fied and intrenched position to be assailed by an infantry 
charge up the side of a long, exposed hill, swept by a 
terrible artillery fire, frightened them, not so much by 
its audacity as by its terrible cost in human life. 

"As they neared the top the different lines came 
nearer together. One moment they went a little more 
slowly, then they nearly stopped, then they went on 
again faster than ever, and then all of us sitting there on 
the top of the battery cried with excitement. For the 



262 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 



ants were scrambling all round the block-house on the 
ridge, and in a moment or two we saw them inside it. 
But then our hearts swelled up into our throats, for a 
fearful fire came from somewhere beyond the block- 
house and from somewhere to the right of it and some- 
where to the left of it. Then we saw the ants come 
scrambling down the hill again. They had taken a 
position which they had not the force to hold. But a 
moment or two and up they scrambled again, more of 



\ ElCaney ,f 



KB Americana 
I | Spanish 




*$&* 



them, and more quickly than before, and up the other 
face of the hill to the left went other lines, and the ridge 
was taken, and the block-house was ours, and the 
trenches were full of dead Spaniards. 

" It was a grand achievement, — for the soldiers who 
shared it, — this storming of the hill leading up from the 
San Juan River to the ridge before the main fort. We 
could tell so much at two thousand five hundred and 
sixty yards. But we also knew that it had cost them 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 263 

dear. Later on we knew only too well how heavy the 
cost was." 

At nightfall the Americans held every point for which 
they had fought, and two thousand prisoners were in 
their hands, the fruits of the capture of El Caney. 
General Lawton occupied the plateau on the north, 
Generals Kent and Wheeler held the position at San 
Juan, and Aguadores had been evacuated by the enemy. 
The army had fought its way across two and a half miles 
of strongly fortified and hotly contested country, and 
reached a position in which its guns commanded the city 
of Santiago. In this work nearly the entire army had 
been engaged, with four thousand of Garcia' s Cuban 
auxiliaries. But this success had not been gained with- 
out severe loss, hundreds of killed and wounded attest- 
ing the valor with which the Americans had fought and 
the persistency with which the Spaniards had held their 
ground. 

The Spanish retreat from the crest of San Juan hill 
was precipitate, but the men were too exhausted to 
follow, while their shoes were soaked with water from 
wading the San Juan and their clothes were drenched 
with rain. It was afterwards asserted that had the pur- 
suit been continued the demoralized Spaniards would 
have surrendered that night, but a pursuit was physically 
impossible. Yet, despite the exhausted condition of 
the men, they labored during the night in erecting 
breastworks, doing their best to excavate the rocky soil 
with shovels and picks. General Wheeler was appealed 
to by many officers to withdraw and take up a stronger 
position farther back, his lines being so thin on account 
of his losses during the day, and his men so worn out 
that it seemed doubtful if they could hold their own 



264 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

against an assault. He refused, however, fearing to lose 
prestige for the troops by a reverse movement. 

At dawn on Saturday the battle began again, the 
Spaniards making a desperate effort on that day to re- 
gain the positions they had lost. The four batteries of 
artillery were placed in position, and opened fire on the 
San Juan quarter of the city and the works in front of 
the American right. One of these batteries, that of 
Major Diffenbach, was advanced to a position within four 
hundred yards of the Spanish lines, where it was exposed 
to so hot a fire that the men could load only while lying 
down, and were soon forced to withdraw. The fleet in 
the harbor added to the din of battle, Admiral Cervera 
sending in many shells which exploded close to the in- 
trenchments. Admiral Sampson also took part in the 
work, his great guns at intervals sending shells which 
exploded within the city limits. 

On this day the Americans fought mainly on the de- 
fensive, holding the earthworks which they had thrown 
up during the night, and from which the enemy sought 
in vain to dislodge them. At about ten o'clock the 
Spanish infantry made a vigorous charge upon the 
American lines, driving back the men in one or two 
places. But they quickly rallied, and in turn drove the 
enemy into their trenches, numbers of them falling before 
the hot rifle-fire of the American troops. The loss this 
day was small, as the men fought mainly under cover. 
The Spaniards lost heavily. One result of the morn- 
ing's fight was the capture of two hundred Spanish 
soldiers and sixty-two officers, who were marched to the 
rear with the prisoners of the day before. 

An element of the fight that exasperated the men was 
the discovery of many sharp-shooters in the trees along 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 265 

the trail. The courage of these guerillas cannot be over- 
estimated, as they were absolutely cut off from their 
own forces, but their barbarity is beyond belief. They 
kept up a steady fire on a dressing-station of the field 
hospital, and before their hiding-places were discovered 
had killed and wounded many surgeons and others of 
the hospital corps, besides soldiers who were already 
wounded. A detail was sent into the woods to scout 
for these men, and a number of them were discovered in 
the branches of trees and disposed of. Their programme 
also included picking off officers and aides passing be- 
neath them along the trail. For a long time their fire 
was supposed to be spent bullets of the enemy. 

On the 3d the army rested, so far as the fire of the 
enemy would permit. The lack of artillery prevented 
any farther advance, and little reply was made to the 
infantry fire during the night. The situation was as 
follows : Santiago rises from the harbor to the crest of a 
long hill, three-quarters of a mile back from which rise 
the hills of San Juan, which were held by our army. El 
Caney and the commanding plateau to the north were 
in American possession. In these positions the troops 
had strongly intrenched themselves, but they were nearly 
exhausted from their long and severe struggle in the 
heat and rain, and from the lack of sleep and of food. 
Their position would have been a critical one had the 
enemy been in any condition for an assault in force. But 
they had suffered still more severely than the Americans, 
and equally needed rest and recuperation. 

This battle was fought with the general in command 
invalided two miles in the rear. He had been overcome 
by the heat on the day before its opening, and lay in his 
tent. General Wheeler was also sick, but rose from his 



266 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

bed and reached the front about noon. The losses of 
the three days' fight, as reported by General Shafter, 
were 21 officers and 205 men killed, 77 officers and 1197 
men wounded, 84 men missing, making a total of 1584. 
The Spanish loss was much heavier, as they clung to 
their rifle-pits until they were shot dead in windrows. 
General Linares, their commander-in-chief, was badly 
wounded, and General Vara del Rey, their second in 
command, was killed upon the field. 

The work of the American soldiers in this desperate 
conflict was of the most admirable character. Not a 
man of them had ever faced an army in battle before. 
They were very largely raw troops, only about two 
months in service. They confronted an enemy their 
equal in numbers and strongly posted in intrenchments 
and rifle-pits, which they held with obstinate energy. 
They were sadly deficient in artillery, and had to trust 
mainly to the rifle and the bayonet. Yet, with a vim 
and valor which foreign observers designated as superb, 
they rushed upon the works of the foe, pushing forward 
with grim determination, never for a moment giving 
way, inspired apparently by the single thought that they 
were there to win the posts of the enemy, and must do 
it through blood and death, and persisting until all these 
posts were in their hands, their defenders dead, captive, 
or in flight. It was truly a remarkable instance of Amer- 
ican courage and self-reliance, and the battle of Santiago 
must take its place in history among the most glorious 
of those in which American soldiers have fought. 



\ I 



CHAPTER XVI. 

THE FATE OF CERVERA'S FLEET. 

While the army was doing such good work on shore 
the navy was doing as good work at sea, the final day of 
the land battle, July 3, being made famous by one of the 
most brilliant exploits in the history of the American 
navy. Before describing this event, however, there are 
some minor naval occurrences to be mentioned. It has 
already been stated that one of Cervera's ships, the 
torpedo-boat destroyer Terror, did not accompany the 
fleet to Santiago. It remained at Fort-de-France, Mar- 
tinique, and apprehensions were entertained that its pur- 
pose there was the capture of the Harvard, then repairing 
in that port. Under the rules of international law, how- 
ever, the Terror was not allowed to leave harbor until 
the Harvard had time to make a good offing, and the 
threatened attack did not take place. 

The Terror was next heard from at San Juan, Porto 
Rico, where, during the last week in June, it made an 
attack on the auxiliary cruiser Yale. A dash was made 
by the destroyer for the great liner, but its assault was 
met by a sharp fire from the rapid-fire guns of the Yale. 
These were so effectively served that three shots sufficed. 
An officer and two men were killed and several men 
wounded on the Terror, which dropped back under the 
batteries with difficulty and was towed into the harbor in 
a sinking condition. 

On the 28th of June President McKinley issued a 

267 



268 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

proclamation extending the blockade to the southern 
coast of Cuba, from Cape Francis to Cape Cruz, and 
also to San Juan, Porto Rico. This increased the length 
of blockaded coast fourfold, adding five hundred miles 
of coast-line to the sections already under guard. The 
new line lay in the great bight of the south Cuban coast, 
a region of shallow water with few ports, so that the fresh 
work laid out for the mosquito fleet was not very difficult 
to perform. 

The only remaining event of importance was an attack 
by three small vessels of Admiral Sampson's fleet on 
the Spanish squadron at Manzanillo, during which two 
Spanish gunboats, a sloop, and a pontoon were sunk 
and a torpedo-boat and several gunboats considerably 
damaged. This work was done by three small craft, the 
Hist, the Hornet, and the Wampatuck, which unex- 
pectedly found nine vessels in the harbor, flanked by 
shore batteries. The Hist, formerly a yacht, was hit 
eleven times, and the Hornet, also a steam yacht, was 
disabled by a shell that cut her main steam-pipe. JSTo 
lives were lost, however, and the little boats kept pluckily 
to their work, with the results above mentioned, until the 
injury to the Hornet compelled their withdrawal, the 
Wampatuck towing the disabled vessel out to sea. 

We have hitherto said nothing about Spain's remain- 
ing ships, the home squadron, composed of her single 
battle-ship, the Pelayo, an armored cruiser, the Carlos 
V., several torpedo-boat destroyers, and a number of 
other vessels likely to prove of very little service in com- 
bat. This squadron, commanded by Admiral Camara, 
had been kept in port at Cadiz, Spain, the government 
indulging in threats to use it for various purposes, but 
remaining apparently at a loss how to employ it to the 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 269 

best advantage. The first evidence that the Spanish 
cabinet had made up its mind came on June 22, when 
an English captain reported that he had seen the Cadiz 
squadron in the Mediterranean bound eastward. It con- 
sisted of fifteen ships, three of them being torpedo-boats, 
and several of them transports laden with troops. The 
secret was out. Manila was the goal. Admiral Dewey 
was to be attacked. On the 27th news came that the 
Spanish squadron had appeared at Port Said, at the 
western end of the Suez Canal. 

This news called forth instant action on the part of 
the United States. An ' ' Eastern Squadron' ' was at 
once formed, under Admiral Watson, including the bat- 
tle-ships Iowa and Oregon and a number of cruisers and 
colliers, with orders to proceed to the Spanish coast, 
with the purpose of forcing Camara to return or of fol- 
lowing him to the Philippine Islands. As events turned 
out, it was not necessary for this squadron to sail. 
Camara was delayed at Port Said through difficulty in 
obtaining coal, but finally passed through the Suez Canal 
into the Red Sea, only to be hastily recalled to protect 
the coast of Spain. Soon his squadron was lumbering 
back through the Mediterranean, the ships the worse for 
wear. A threat had sufficed to save Dewey from the 
proposed attack, and the sailing of Watson's fleet was 
deferred. Various later dates were fixed for its sailing, 
but subsequent events prevented its setting out at all. 

Meanwhile, Sampson's fleet was diligently keeping 

up the blockade of Santiago, occasionally exchanging 

I shots with the forts, but principally maintaining a vigi- 

' lant watch over Cervera's ships. As to the manner in 

I which this work was performed, we may quote from the 

admiral's report : 



270 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

' ' The harbor of Santiago is naturally easy to blockade, 
there being but one entrance, and that a narrow one, 
the deep water extending close up to the shore-line, pre- 
senting no difficulties of navigation outside of the en- 
trance. At the time of my arrival before the port, June 
i, the moon was at its full, and there was sufficient light 
during the night to enable any movement outside of the 
entrance to be detected, but with the waning of the 
moon and the coming of dark nights there was opportu- 
nity for the enemy to escape, or for his torpedo-boats to 
make an attack upon the blockading vessels. It was 
ascertained with fair conclusiveness that the Merrimac, 
so gallantly taken into the channel on June 3, did not 
obstruct it. I therefore maintained the blockade as 
follows : To the battle-ships was assigned the duty, in 
turn, of lighting the channel. Moving up to the port, 
at a distance of from one to two miles from the Morro, 
dependent upon the condition of the atmosphere, they 
threw a search-light beam directly up the channel, and 
held it steadily there. This lightened up the entire 
breadth of the channel for half a mile inside of the en- 
trance so brilliantly that the movement of small boats 
could be detected. Why the batteries never opened fire 
upon the search-light ship was always a matter of surprise 
to me, but they never did. Stationed close to the en- 
trance of the port were three picket launches, and at a 
little distance further out three small picket vessels, usu- 
ally converted yachts, and, when they were available, 
one or two of our torpedo-boats. With this arrange- I 
ment there was at least a certainty that nothing could 
get out of the harbor undetected. After the arrival of | 
the army, when the situation forced upon the Spanish I 
admiral a decision, our vigilance increased. The night 






THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 271 

blockading distance was reduced to two miles for all 
vessels, and a battle-ship was placed alongside the search- 
light ship, with her broadside trained upon the channel 
in readiness to fire the instant a Spanish ship should ap- 
pear. The commanding officers merit great praise for 
the perfect manner in which they entered into this plan 
and put it into execution." 

On July 1, during the battle on shore, the blockading 
fleet kept up a steady fire, elevating their great guns and 
sending shells into the water-line streets of Santiago, 
some six miles away. This work was continued at in- 
tervals for about nine hours on that day, and in the early 
morning of the 2d the work of bombardment was re- 
sumed, Morro Castle being now the main object of attack. 
For two or three hours shells were thrown into this ven- 
erable fortification, one shot from the Oregon bringing 
down the Spanish flag. The ships then withdrew to 
their blockading stations, and the men were given an 
opportunity to rest. They needed it, for terrible work 
awaited them during the next day. 

The threatened capture of Santiago had put the Spanish 
admiral in an awkward position. If brought between 
the fire of fleet and army he might have to yield without 
a fight. This was not to the brave Cervera's taste nor 
to that of his superiors, for he received peremptory orders 
from Madrid to leave the harbor. Apparently, it was be- 
lieved that his fleet was strong and swift enough to engage 
and outsail the American ships. Cervera and his cap- 
tains decided to make their dash for liberty on the night of 
Saturday, July 2, the pilots expecting to avail themselves 
of the search-lights of the American ships as guides in 
passing the wreck of the Merrimac. Cervera' s orders were 
to steam at full speed to the westward after clearing the 



272 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

harbor, and to concentrate their fire upon the Brooklyn, 
neglecting the other ships unless forced to attack them. 
He hoped by disabling the Brooklyn to dispose of the 
swiftest and most dreaded of his enemies, trusting to the 
speed of his vessels to run away from the battle-ships. 
Reasons satisfactory to himself, however, induced the 
Spanish admiral to change his purpose of a midnight 
flight, and to defer the hazardous enterprise till the 
morning of Sunday, July 3. 

On that eventful morning the American fleet lacked 
much of its strength. The Massachusetts was at Guan- 
tanamo Bay coaling. With her were the New Orleans 
and the Newark. The New York was also absent, having 
steamed along the coast to Baiquiri to enable Admiral 
Sampson to confer with General Shafter. This weaken- 
ing of the fleet had not escaped the eyes of the Spanish 
scouts, and served to confirm Admiral Cervera in his 
purpose. The large ships left on blockade consisted of 
the battle-ships Iowa, Indiana, Oregon, and Texas, and 
Schley's flag-ship, the Brooklyn. The Iowa lay a mile 
out beyond the other vessels, trying to fix her forward 
turret, which was out of repair, and the Indiana was en- 
gaged in similar work. The distances of the ships from 
the harbor's mouth varied from four thousand to six 
thousand yards. The Brooklyn and the yacht Vixen 
were the only ships west of the entrance, the others 
having drifted well to the east. 

Several times during the morning the lookout of the 
Brooklyn had reported smoke in the harbor, and at about 
9.30 Navigator Hodgson called to him from the bridge, 
"Isn't that smoke moving?" His question was an- 
swered by almost a yell from the lookout. " There's a 
big ship coming out of the harbor, sir !' ' Hodgson sat- 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 273 

isfied himself by a rapid glance of the truth of this stirring 
report, seized the megaphone, and shouted in vigorous 
tones, " After bridge, there! Tell the commodore the 
enemy's fleet is coming out!" 

In an instant the Sunday morning calm on the deck 
was changed into intense excitement. " Clear the ship 
for action !" cried the commodore. The signal of the 
exciting news flew to the masthead as a warning to the 
other vessels, and from all parts of the ship the men 
rushed to their quarters. Down below the stokers 
hurled coal into the furnaces, in the turrets the gun 
crews hastily made ready their pieces, the ammunition- 
hoist was brought into active service, and in every sec- 
tion of the big ship every man was on the alert as the 
news spread with magical rapidity. 

The signal from the Brooklyn was matched by one 
from the Iowa, on whose deck the trail of drifting smoke 
had been seen at the same instant, the bow of the lead- 
ing Spanish ship quickly appearing in the narrow 
channel beside the sunken Merrimac. ' ' There come 
the Spaniards out of the harbor!" rose in a shout. 
"Clear ship for action!" roared the answering com- 
mand, as the Spanish vessels were seen rushing in ' ' line 
ahead' ' around Socapa Point and heading for the open 
sea. The Infanta Maria Teresa, Cerv-era's flag-ship, led 
the line, followed by theVizcaya, the Almirante Oquendo, 
and the Cristobal Colon. They were quickly followed 
by the two torpedo-boat destroyers. 

"Full speed ahead! Open fire!" shouted Commo- 
dore Schley. A stunning roar answered his words, as 
the shells from the 8- and 5-inch port guns of the 
Brooklyn began to scream in their rapid flight towards 
the fugitives. The other ships were as alert. As the 

18 



274 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

Spaniards cleared the harbor and were observed to head 
to the west, the Oregon began to swing round in the 
same direction. The Texas was already reaching the 
Maria Teresa with her shells. The Iowa and the Indiana 
were as quick. Hardly a minute passed from the first 
alarm before the whistling shriek of a rapid-fire shell was 
heard from the Iowa's deck, and within two minutes 
every gun on the ship was cast loose, manned, loaded, 
and ready for the signal to fire. 

Five minutes previously the great ships had been 
swinging lazily on the long rollers of the sea, the men at 
Sunday "quarters for inspection," none of them think- 
ing of aught but the monotony of every-day duty. 
Now every ship was belching clouds of black smoke 
into the air, every man was at his post, his nerves strung 
to fighting pitch, every gun ready for action, and every 
ship moving with rapidly-increasing speed towards the 
fugitives. Not many minutes passed before a fire was 
concentrated upon the Spanish ships such as had hardly 
if ever been equalled before, and with a precision of aim 
that had never been surpassed. The fugitive ships were 
being rapidly torn and rent by a frightful shower of 
shells, some of them of enormous size and terrible 
powers of destruction. 

The position of the Brooklyn, as the most westerly of 
the blockading fleet, rendered easy of accomplishment 
Cervera's purpose of concentrating his fire on this vessel, 
and for some ten minutes she was made the target of 
three of the enemy's ships at the short range of fifteen 
hundred yards, and of the west battery at three thousand 
yards distance. The fire poured upon her was terrific, 
but the harm done was next to nothing, owing to the 
unskilful handling of the Spanish guns. At the end of 



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W. R. Hearst 
CERVERA 


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THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 275 

the interval named the other vessels, which were closing 
in rapidly, diverted the fire of the enemy and relieved 
the Brooklyn from this somewhat too close attention. 

While the Spanish ships were wasting nearly all their 
shells upon the sea, the fire of the American gunners 
was remarkably accurate. " Fire deliberately, and don't 
waste a shot," was Schley's order to his gunners, and 
they worked the guns as carefully as if on practice duty. 
1 ' I have never before witnessed such deadly and fatally 
accurate shooting as was done by the ships of your com- 
mand as they closed in on the Spanish squadron," said 
Schley in his report to the admiral ; and the outcome 
indicated that this statement was in no sense too strong. 
The results of the terrific bombardment were, indeed, mo- 
mentous. In twenty-five minutes after the first Spanish 
vessel had been sighted only two ships of the squadron 
remained afloat. Two of the cruisers were on fire and 
beached and the torpedo-boats were sunk. 

The Maria Teresa, Cervera's flag-ship, was the first to 
succumb. A shell from the Brooklyn exploded in the 
admiral's cabin, and in a minute the after part of the ship 
was in flames. One from the Texas pierced the side 
armor and exploded in the engine-room, breaking the 
main steam-pipe. Shells were bursting all around the 
bridge and riddling the hull of the ship. The engineer 
was signalled to start the pumps. No reply came, and 
it was found that every one in that part of the ship had 
been killed. Most of the men had been driven from 
the guns, the flames were increasing, and resistance had 
become hopeless. The captain gave orders to beach the 
ship and haul down the flag. As he spoke, he was struck 
by a shell, and his career came to an end, the second 
captain taking command. So fast and furious was the 



276 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

American fire that the smoke of bursting shells hid the 
fact that the flag was down, and the fire did not cease 
until a white blanket was run up to the peak. 

The Almirante Oquendo was receiving as frightful a 
baptism of fire. The Iowa, after paying her attentions to 
the Maria Teresa, was left in the rear by that vessel and 
found herself opposite the Oquendo at a distance of 
eleven hundred yards. Her entire battery, including the 
rapid-fire guns, was now opened on this vessel, and at 
that distance their work was terrible. Eight-inch shells 
were seen to explode inside the Spanish ship, two pro- 
jectiles piercing her at the same moment, one forward 
and the other aft. For a moment her engines stopped 
and she lost headway, but she immediately regained her 
speed and drew ahead of the Iowa, only to come under 
the guns of the Oregon and the Texas, by which she was 
cruelly pounded. This punishment was more than she 
could endure ; she was soon a mass of flames and, like 
the Teresa, was headed for the shore. Less than half an 
hour had passed when these vessels met their fate, at a 
point six or seven miles from the harbor's mouth. We 
have said nothing here of the part taken by the Indiana, 
but she was doing her full share in the work of destruc- 
tion, filling the air with the screech of her shells and 
hurling her great projectiles fiercely upon the foe. Like 
blood-hounds in the chase, the whole squadron was hot 
upon the heels of the fleeing prey. 

The Vizcaya as yet had not been badly hit, and her 
captain determined to make an effort to ram the Brook- 
lyn, the nearest and fastest of the American ships, with 
the hope that the Colon and the Oquendo might get 
away. The flames on the Teresa showed that she was 
already past escape. This effort failed through the rapid 






THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 277 

circling of the Brooklyn, which in turn made an attempt 
to ram and force the Vizcaya towards the shore. An 
exchange of fire now ensued, the shells of the Vizcaya 
going wild, while those of the Brooklyn crashed into her 
side. One shell went along the entire gun-deck, killing 
half the men on it and wounding most of the remainder. 
The Oregon also got in some effective shells, the fire 
growing so hot that the men were driven in terror from 
their guns. The Vizcaya was burning when a final 
shell from the Oregon hit the superstructure, and Cap- 
tain Eulate gave the order to haul down the flag and 
beach the ship. This was at Ascerraderos, twenty miles 
west of Santiago Bay. The hour was 10.50. The ship 
burned fiercely as she lay at the beach, and she blew up 
during the night. 

Only one of the Spanish cruisers, the Cristobal Colon, 
the fastest of them all, remained afloat. She had as yet 
escaped injury, had passed all her consorts, and when 
the Vizcaya went ashore was about six miles ahead of 
the Brooklyn, the Oregon being a mile and a half and 
the Texas three miles farther astern. For an hour the 
chase continued, the Colon hugging the shore. But her 
spurt was finished, and the Brooklyn and the Oregon — 
the latter developing an unexpected speed — were gaining 
on her mile by mile. The Colon would have to round 
Cape Cruz by a long detour to escape her pursuers, and 
Schley put the Brooklyn on a straight course for this 
cape, signalling the Oregon to keep on the Colon's 
track. 

Another hour passed ; both the pursuers had gained ; 
at 12.50, on signal from the Brooklyn, the Oregon fired 
one of her 13-inch guns. The huge shell struck the 
water not far behind the Colon, then four miles away. 



278 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

Another was tried, and fell beyond her. The Brooklyn 
followed with her 8-inch guns, one shell going through 
the Colon above her armor-belt. At 1.05 both ships 
were pounding away at the fugitive, which returned the 
fire in an ineffective manner. This was kept up for some 
fifteen minutes ; the Colon was rapidly losing ground ; 
her hope of escape was at an end. At 1.20 she gave up 
the fight, hauled down her flag, and turned her prow to 
the shore. She touched land at Rio Torquino, after a 
flight for life of forty-eight miles. 

Admiral Sampson's flag-ship, which had been recalled 
in haste and had followed the chase at her utmost speed, 
but too late to take part in the contest, came up while 
Captain Cook, of the Brooklyn, was receiving the sur- 
render of the Colon's crew. Commodore Schley had 
directed that the officers should retain all their personal 
effects, a courtesy which the admiral confirmed. The 
Colon had not been injured by the firing and but little 
by beaching, but her sea-valves had been opened by the 
crew, and as she slipped off the steep beach into the sea 
she began to sink. To prevent her total loss she was 
pushed bodily on the beach by the New York, where she 
sank in shoal water, in a location where it was hoped 
she might be saved. 

While this work was being done by the battle-ships and 
cruisers, the little Gloucester, a yacht converted into a 
gunboat, was attending to the torpedo-boats, which had 
followed their consorts from the harbor. On their 
appearance, the Gloucester, which, under the command 
of Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, formerly of the 
Maine, had been in the thick of the fight with the larger 
vessels, dashed for them under a high head of steam, and 
when at short range poured in a fierce volley from her 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 279 

rapid-fire guns. The Indiana and others of the vessels 
had been firing at them from their secondary batteries, 
but they desisted through fear of injuring their little 
consort, and the Gloucester completed the work alone, 
riddling them with an accurate and deadly fire. Twenty 
minutes sufficed to end the career of the destroyers. At 
the close of that time the Furor and the Pluton were 
both sunk and two-thirds of their people were killed. 

This ended the fight. The character of the result can 
be shown in the brief statement that the Spanish had 
about six hundred men killed ; the American loss was 
one man killed and one wounded : the Spanish ships were 
helpless wrecks ; the American ships were almost unin- 
jured. The victory parallels that of Manila Bay in the 
utter destruction of the Spanish fleet and the marvellous 
immunity from injury of the Americans, both men and 
ships. The record of the battle is of interest in showing 
that the great guns had little to do with the result. Only 
two of the huge projectiles of the 12- or 13-inch turret 
guns struck a vessel, both these being put through the 
Maria Teresa. The 8-inch, 6-inch, 5-inch, and 6-pound 
projectiles did the bulk of the work and proved fright- 
fully destructive. One of the most important lessons 
learned from the fight was the danger of wood-work on 
a war-ship. Every one of the Spanish ships was set on 
fire by the American shells, the crews being forced to 
spend their energy in fighting the fire. On the Vizcaya 
the water-mains were shot away, so that this was im- 
possible. Another lesson was the difficulty of sending 
messages through the ships, voice-tubes being useless in 
the great noise and messengers too slow. Some new 
invention for this purpose seems called for. The con- 
ning-towers were not used, the officers seeking the bridge 



) 



280 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

in preference. And the delicate range-finders, so useful 
in target-practice, were soon put out of order in the action, 
and the old system of angling on the mast-head height 
of the enemy had to be made use of. 

The battle ended, a new state of affairs came into play. 
The impulse to destroy was immediately succeeded by 
the impulse to save, and the American sailors took as 
great risks in the effort to rescue their late foes as they 
had done in the fight. In past warfare, destruction 
was the one and only thing considered. In modern war- 
fare, the sentiment of mercy quickly follows the battle 
rage ; and this was never more fully exemplified than in 
the battle with Cervera's fleet. Captain Evans, of the 
Iowa, tells a story of his highly commendable efforts to 
save the crew of the Vizcaya, whose sides were just before 
being rent by the murderous fire of his guns. Heading 
for this ship, which was furiously burning fore and aft, he 
lowered all his boats and sent them to the assistance of the 
unfortunate men, who were being roasted on the decks, 
drowned or mutilated by sharks in the water, or fired at 
by Cuban insurgents on shore. 

The men of the Iowa worked manfully and saved 
numbers of the wounded, one man clambering up the 
side of the Vizcaya and rescuing three at the risk of his 
life. In all, thirty officers and two hundred and seventy- 
two men of the Vizcaya were thus taken off, and were 
clothed, fed, and tenderly cared for by their American 
hosts. 

The torpedo-boat Ericsson and the little Hist aided in 
this work, while the Harvard and the Gloucester en- 
gaged in the same errand of mercy with the Maria Teresa 
and the Oquendo. ' ' This rescue of prisoners, ' ' says 
Admiral Sampson in his report, ' ' including the wounded 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 281 

from the burning Spanish vessels, was the occasion of 
some of the most daring and gallant conduct of the day. 
The ships were burning fore and aft, their guns and 
reserve ammunition were exploding, and it was not 
known at what moment the fire would reach the main 
magazines. In addition to this a heavy surf was running 
just inside of the Spanish ships. But no risk deterred 
our officers and men until their work of humanity was 
complete." 

Of the incidents of the battle, one of the most memor- 
able was the rebuke of Captain Philip, of the Texas, to 
his men, who were greeting the Spanish surrender with 
cheers, — 

' ' Don' t cheer, boys ; the poor devils are dying. ' ' 

In these words we have the true spirit of nineteenth- 
century war, at least as viewed from the American stand- 
point, and the remark of the gallant and humane captain 
is likely to go down in history among the epoch-making 
phrases of modern times. 

By midnight the Harvard had nine hundred and 
seventy-six prisoners on board, a great number of them 
wounded. The Gloucester rescued Admiral Cervera, 
who had swam ashore from his wrecked ship with the 
aid of his son. He was nearly naked when rescued, 
and was supplied with a thin suit of flannel by Lieu- 
tenant-Commander Wainwright, of the Gloucester, who 
soon after delivered him to the Iowa. As the captive 
admiral came on board bareheaded and half-dressed, 
Captain Evans received him with a full admiral's guard, 
the crew cheering him vociferously. He was bitterly 
depressed, but the kindness and courtesy of his new host 
brought tears of gratitude to his eyes. His treatment 
of Lieutenant Hobson had assured him in advance a 



282 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

considerate reception by the officers of the fleet, and 
had given him a warm place in the American heart. 

A few words will complete our story of the destruction 
of the Spanish fleet. The Reina Mercedes, a dilapidated 
Spanish cruiser which Cervera had found and had left in 
the harbor of Santiago, made her appearance just after 
midnight of July 4, slowly drifting out of the narrow en- 
trance, as if with intention to escape. In a moment all 
the ships within reach opened upon her, pounding her 
with a frightful hail of shells. A few minutes sufficed. 
She sank to the bottom on the beach under El Morro, 
part of her hull and her masts and stacks being above 
water. She had probably been sent out with the pur- 
pose of blocking the channel against the American ships. 
During this brief work the shore batteries opened on the 
ships, and a 6-inch shell fell on the forward deck of the 
Indiana, exploding below in the men's sleeping-rooms. 
Fortunately, they were all at quarters and no one was 
hurt. The remarkable good fortune of the American 
sailors continued to the end. 

Shortly afterwards an effort of a Spanish cruiser to 
escape from Havana harbor was made, with similar result. 
She was overhauled near Mariel in an attempt to run the 
blockade, and sent to the bottom by the hot fire of the 
mosquito fleet. 

During the battle of the 3d an example of special 
gallantry was displayed on the Brooklyn, which may be 
given in the words of Captain Cook, commander of that 
ship : 

"When all did their duty manfully, it is a difficult 
matter to select individuals for special mention. There 
are some, however, who deserve to be brought to notice 
by name for conduct that displayed in a conspicuous 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 283 

manner courage, intelligence, and devotion to duty. 
During the early part of the action a cartridge became 
jammed in the bore of the starboard forward 6-pounder, 
and in the effort to withdraw it the case became detached 
from the projectile, leaving the latter fast in the bore 
and impossible to extract from the rear. 

' ' Corporal Robert Gray, of the port gun, asked and 
obtained permission to attempt to drive the shell out 
with the rammer. To do this it was necessary to go 
out on the gun, hanging over the water, and the under- 
taking was full of difficulties and danger, the latter due 
in a great measure to the blast of the 8-inch turret guns 
firing overhead. The gun was hot, and it was necessary 
to cling to the 'Jacob's ladder' with one hand while 
endeavoring to manipulate the long rammer with the 
other. After a brave effort, he was forced to give up, 
and was ordered in. 

"Quarter-Gunner Smith then came, sent by Exec- 
utive Officer Mason, and promptly placed himself in 
the dangerous position outside the gun-port, where he 
worked and failed, as the corporal had done. Neither 
had been able to get the rammer into the bore, and there 
seemed nothing left to do but dismount the gun. 

"At this juncture Private MacNeal, one of the gun's 
crew, volunteered to go out and make a final effort. 
The gun was so important, the starboard battery being 
engaged, that, as a forlorn hope, he was permitted to 
make the attempt. He pushed boldly out and set to 
work. The guns of the forward 8-inch turret were fir- 
ing, almost knocking him overboard, and the enemy's 
shots were coming with frequency into his immediate 
neighborhood. At this time the chief yeoman was killed 
on the other side of the deck. NacNeal never paused 



284 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

in his work. The rammer was finally placed in the bore 
and the shell ejected, and MacNeal resumed his duties 
as coolly as if what he had done were a matter of every- 
day routine. ' ' 

This chapter may be fitly concluded with Commodore 
Schley's account of his consideration of the men below 
decks, and his interesting description of how the only 
man killed on the American side in the battle met his 
death. He said, — 

' ' I took it for granted that every man on the ship was 
just as much interested in how the fight was going as I 
was, but the men behind the casements and those below 
decks, of course, could not see what was going on. 
During the battle I sent orderlies among them telling 
them what was happening and what effect their shots 
were having. 

" Then, when the Vizcaya struck and only the Colon 
was left, I sent orderlies down to the stokeholes and 
engine-room, where the men were working away like 
heroes in the terrible temperature. 

" 'Now, boys,' I sent them word, 'it all depends on 
you. Everything is sunk except the Colon, and she is 
trying to get away. We don' t want her to, and every- 
thing depends on you.' 

" They responded nobly, and we got her." 

Of the death of young Ellis, the only man killed on 
the Brooklyn, he said, — 

" He was a bright lad, from Brooklyn, who enlisted 
to go before the mast ; but he was a hard worker, studied 
navigation with the young officers of the ship, and had 
risen to the rank of yeoman. 

"As I stood talking with Captain Cook, while we 
finished the Vizcaya, it seemed that our shots were 




' *^^v^^*^^ r 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 285 

falling a little short. I turned to Ellis, who stood near, 
and asked him what the range was. He replied, ' Seven- 
teen hundred yards.' 

' ' I have pretty keen eyesight, and it seldom deceives 
me as to distances, and I told him I thought it was 
slightly more than that. ' I just took it, sir, but I'll try 
it again,' he said, and stepped off to one side about eight 
feet to get the range. 

" He had just raised his instrument to his eye when a 
shell struck him full in the face and carried away all 
of his head above the mouth. A great deal of blood 
spurted around, and the men near were rattled for a 
moment. 

"Shells are queer things," he continued, after a 
moment's silence. "I noticed one man standing with 
his hand grasping a hammock rail as a shell struck the 
ship, ricocheted, and burst. One piece of the metal cut 
the rail on one side of his hand, another on the other 
side, so that he was left standing with a short section of 
the rail still grasped in his hand. Another portion of 
the shell passed over his shoulder and another between 
his legs. He was surprised, but wasn' t hurt. 



CHAPTER XVII. 

THE SIEGE AND FALL OF SANTIAGO. 

On July 3, at 8.30 a.m., General Shafter sent a flag 
of truce to the Spanish lines with a letter, in which he 
threatened to shell Santiago unless surrender was made, 
and gave until ten o'clock of the next morning for the 
removal of the women and children and the citizens of 
foreign countries. This was no empty threat, for the 
positions gained during the battle of the 1st and 2d had 
given his batteries command of the city, which lay under 
his guns. General Jose Toral, who had succeeded to 
the command of the Spanish forces on account of the 
serious wounding of General Linares, replied that he 
would not surrender, but would inform the consuls and 
people of the permission to remove. At the request of 
the foreign consuls, the bombardment was deferred until 
noon of the 5th, it being stated that fifteen thousand or 
more people, many of them old, would probably leave 
the city. 

The offer to escape was gladly taken advantage of by 
the people of Santiago, particularly by those of foreign 
birth, and during the next day there was a pitiful scene 
as the fugitives swarmed in hosts out of the city and 
trudged wearily over the road to El Caney, San Luis, 
and other towns in the vicinity. All day long the hegira 
continued, the fugitives struggling painfully onward un- 
der the blazing sun, and over a road in many places 
ankle-deep in mud. Tottering old men and women 
286 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 287 

supported by their children, mothers carrying their in- 
fants, rich and poor, white and black, cultured and ig- 
norant, all fled in terror from the horrors of an expected 
bombardment that was never to come. 

Most of them made their way to El Caney, in which 
town, with accommodations for not more than five hun- 
dred people, over five thousand slept that night, crowded 
into the deserted houses and camping out on the veran- 
das and in the rain-soaked streets. At dawn of the 
next day hundreds who had been overtaken on the road 
by the darkness began to come in, and the flood con- 
tinued until a multitude of fugitives, estimated at fifteen 
thousand, overflowed the little town. They had not 
been permitted to bring food, and there was none in the 
town, so that those with money were as destitute as those 
without. Pathetic sights were to be seen on all sides. 
Ladies of good birth, supported by frail girls, came feebly 
into the town, seeking to hide their faces from the vul- 
gar gaze of the ignorant and coarse who surged about 
them. Despair filled all countenances, hunger threat- 
ened the miserable multitude with death, the scene being 
a reproduction on a minor scale of the results of General 
Weyler's brutal reconcentration order. 

General Shafter was appealed to for the support of 
the miserable throng. This he was not well able to 
afford, but promised to give them a limited daily supply 
of food, the necessities of the troops and the difficulty 
of getting supplies to the front standing greatly in the 
way of his feeding this starving multitude. In this di- 
lemma, Clara Barton and the Red Cross officials did 
noble work, making the most earnest efforts to feed the 
starving. But it was a difficult task, the tides and the 
surf standing greatly in the way of landing supplies, 



288 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

while transportation was very difficult to obtain, and the 
roads between the landing-place and the front were al- 
most impassable. 

The wounded in the late battle were in as deplorable 
a state as the refugees. The field hospitals were inade- 
quately supplied with the simplest necessaries for the 
care of the sick, — medicines, beds, tents, all requisites, 
being greatly lacking. In many cases only the packages 
of "first aid for the wounded," which the soldiers car- 
ried with them, were available, while the wounded, on 
being taken from the operating-tables, had to be laid on 
the ground, often without a blanket between them and 
the rain-soaked soil or shelter from the scorching Cuban 
sun. 

The result of this unfortunate state of affairs was a new 
hegira, many of the wounded painfully dragging them- 
selves down the long, winding, muddy road to Siboney, 
where the general hospital had been established, the field 
hospitals being devoted to those too badly hurt to be 
moved. Improvised ambulances, principally composed 
of army-wagons, were crowded with men who could not 
walk, and whose ride over the rutted roads in these 
rough vehicles was an awful experience. But of these 
there was not enough, and numbers of feeble, bullet- 
pierced unfortunates were forced to drag themselves on 
foot along that dreary road, which wound for a distance 
of eight miles around the bases of the hills, and several 
miles farther for those who set out from El Caney. Nor 
was the weary drag of the wounded over this wheel- 
scarred and water-soaked trail all that had to be endured. 
Ruthless Spanish guerillas lay hid in the branches of 
trees that lined the way, and whistling bullets added to 
the terrors of that dreadful journey. The sharp-shooting 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 289 

was not very straight, but now and then a wounded 
soldier was killed. The vandals, however, did not do 
their heartless work with impunity. Some of the men 
had brought their rifles and fired back at the flash. One 
of these tells that he took the rifle of a fallen man and 
fired in succession from different points to give the im- 
pression that there were men in the lines able to shoot 
in all directions. All night long and until the middle of 
the next day the dreadful march kept up, many of the 
bleeding plodders ending their life's march on that 
terrible road. It formed a painful epilogue to a day of 
battle and blood. 

A striking feature of the case was the cheerfulness with 
which the soldiers endured their painful journey. In 
evidence of this, we cannot do better than quote from a 
correspondent of the London Daily Mail : 

' ' Besides the wagons there came along from the front 
men borne on hand-litters, some lying face downward, 
writhing at intervals in awful convulsions, others lying 
motionless on the flat of their backs, with their hats 
placed over their faces for shade. And there also came 
men, dozens of them, afoot, painfully limping, with one 
arm thrown over the shoulders of a comrade and the 
other arm helplessly dangling. 

" ' How much farther to the hospital, neighbor?' they 
would despairingly ask. 

" ' Only a quarter of a mile or so, neighbor,' I would 
answer ; and, with a smile of hope at the thought that, 
after all, they would be able to achieve the journey, they 
would hobble along. 

" But the ammunition-wagons and the few ambulance 
wagons did not carry them all. For hobbling down the 
steep bank from the hospital came bandaged men on 

19 



2QO THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

foot. They sat down for awhile on the bank, as far as 
they could get from the jumble of mules and wagons in 
the lane, and then, setting their faces towards Siboney, 
they commenced — to walk it. They were the men whose 
injuries were too slight for wagon-room to be given 
them. There was not enough wagon-accommodation 
for the men whose wounds rendered them helplessly 
prostrate. So let the men who had mere arm- and 
shoulder-wounds, simply flesh-wounds, or only one in- 
jured leg or foot, walk it : Siboney was only eight miles 
away. 

' ' True, it was a fearfully bad road, but then the plain 
fact was that there was not enough wagons for all, and 
it was better for these men to be at the base hospital, 
and better that they should make room at the division 
hospital, even if they had to make the journey on foot. 

" There was one man on the road whose left foot was 
heavily bandaged and drawn up from the ground. He 
had provided himself with a sort of rough crutch made 
of the forked limb of a tree, which he had padded with 
a bundle of clothes. With the assistance of this and a 
short stick he was paddling briskly along when I over- 
took him. 

' ' ' Where did they get you, neighbor ?' I asked him. 

" 'Oh, durn their skins !' he said, in the cheerfullest 
way, turning to me with a smile ; ' they got me twice, — 
a splinter of a shell in the foot, and a bullet through the 
calf of the same leg when I was being carried back from 
the firing-line.' 

" ' A sharp-shooter?' 

' ' ' The fellow was up in a tree. ' 

''And you're walking back to Siboney. Wasn't 
there room for you to ride ?' 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 291 

' ' I expected an angry outburst of indignation in reply- 
to this question. But I was mistaken. In a plain, 
matter-of-fact way, he said, — 

" 'Guess not. They wanted all the riding- room for 
worst cases 'n mine. Thank God, my two wounds are 
both in the same leg, so I can walk quite good and spry. 
They told me I'd be better off down at the landing 
yonder ; so I got these crutches and made a break. ' 

' ' ' And how are you getting along ?' I asked. 

" ' Good and well,' he said, as cheerfully as might be; 
'just good and easy.' And with his one sound leg and 
his two sticks he went cheerfully paddling along. 

" It was just the same with other walking wounded 
men. They were all beautifully cheerful. And not 
merely cheerful. They were all absolutely unconscious 
that they were undergoing any unnecessary hardships or 
sufferings. They knew now that war was no picnic, and 
they were not complaining at the absence of picnic fare. 
Some of them had lain out all the night, with the dew 
falling on them where the bullets had dropped them, be- 
fore their turn came with the overworked field surgeons. 

" ' There were only sixty doctors with the outfit,' they 
explained, 'and, naturally, they couldn't 'tend every- 
body at once.' 

"That seemed to them a quite sufficient explanation. 
It did not occur to them that there ought to have been 
more doctors, more ambulances. Some of them seemed 
to have a faint glimmering of a notion that there might 
perhaps have been fewer wounded ; but then that was so 
obvious to everybody. The conditions subsequent to 
the battle they accepted as the conditions proper and 
natural to the circumstances. The cheerful fellow with 
the improvised crutches was so filled with thankfulness 



292 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

at the possession of his tree-branch that it never occurred 
to him that he had reason to complain of the absence of 
proper crutches. I happened by chance to know that 
packed away in the hold of one of the transports lying 
out in Siboney Bay there were cases full of crutches, and 
I was on the point of blurting out an indignant statement 
of the fact when I remembered that the knowledge 
would not make his walk easier. So I said nothing 
about it." 

The impossibility of supplying the many thousands of 
refugees at El Caney with army rations soon started a 
new movement towards the army base at Siboney, and 
within a day or two thousands of these miserables were 
plodding along the muddy road in the trail of the 
wounded, women, and children, dragging wearily on, 
staggering and slipping under the burdens they bore, 
and ready to endure any privations to escape from the 
horrors of a bombarded city. Fortunately, nature pro- 
vided one alleviation from the suffering which all endured. 
The woods were full of mango-trees, bountifully laden 
with fruit, then ripe and at its best. This fruit is of the 
size and shape of a pippin apple, of a deep yellow color, 
and rich and luscious in taste. Just then it was the most 
precious of nature's gifts. 

The truce which had been granted in order that non- 
combatants might leave the city was extended for more 
than a week in hope that the Spaniards might by a sur- 
render avoid the necessity of further bloodshed. There 
was no truce, however, in the preparations for attack and 
defence. Active measures for bombardment were taken 
on the American side, new batteries being brought up 
from the rear and planted in commanding positions. 
Three of these were posted on El Paso ridge, twenty-four 



' I 







THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 293 

hundred yards from the city, while the batteries of Cap- 
tains Capron and Grimes, which had done such good 
service in the battle, were placed in the rear of General 
Lawton's division, fifteen hundred yards north of the 
road. In firing they would have to shell the town over 
the heads of the troops ; but this could be safely done 
from their elevated position. 

Twelve mortars had been brought to the front, and 
were mounted in a battery ready for use. A dynamite 
gun which had played its part in the battle of San Juan 
was depended upon to do effective work in the coming 
bombardment, its twenty-pound charges of gun-cotton 
being likely to cause havoc in the Spanish trenches. 
The navy was also expected to play an imposing part in 
case hostilities were reopened, Admiral Sampson promis- 
ing to drop a shell into the city every five minutes, or 
every two minutes if deemed necessary. 

On the Spanish side similar activity was displayed, 
the trenches being deepened and extended and guns 
mounted in position for active work. Some of these 
guns were of much heavier caliber than any the American 
army had been able to get to the front, but many of them 
were of antiquated pattern and not likely to do serious 
damage. There were, however, a fair show of modern 
guns, capable of excellent performance, and the works of 
defence were very strong. The principal weakness was 
a deficiency of food and water. The main aqueduct 
leading to the city was cut by the Americans on the nth, 
yielding them an abundance of excellent water of which 
they had deprived the enemy. 

At the end of the truce the American lines extended 
around the city in the shape of a horseshoe, five miles 
in length. The side of the hills facing the city was a 



294 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

succession of bomb-proof rifle-pits, trenches, and re- 
doubts, looking like the openings of so many mines, and 
threatening to turn the Spanish works into pits of death. 
General Garcia, with the Cubans, hitherto of little service, 
had been thrown out on the roads of approach from the 
west to cut off reinforcement sseeking to enter the city, 
which was not invested on that side, and it seemed to be 
but a question of hours when surrender would become 
inevitable. 

General Toral, acting commander-in-chief, was fully 
aware of his desperate position, and at noon on the 9th, 
the hour fixed for the beginning of the bombardment, 
sent a flag of truce to the American lines with an impor- 
tant proposition. The little group of officers under the 
flag were met and escorted to comfortable quarters, while 
the letter they bore was taken to General Shafter's tent, 
two miles in the rear. It conveyed an offer from General 
Toral to surrender the city, provided his army might 
capitulate "with honor." This, he stated, meant that 
they should march from the city with colors flying and 
arms in hand, and go unmolested whither they would. 
Surrender under any other conditions, he said, was im- 
possible and could not be considered. 

This proposal Shafter unhesitatingly refused, but 
agreed to extend the truce until Sunday at noon, so that 
he might communicate with his government. During 
Sunday he notified General Toral that no terms but 
unconditional surrender could be granted. These the 
Spanish general declined to consider, and at four o'clock, 
to which hour the truce had been extended, a fire from 
the Spanish trenches began. It was answered from the 
American works, and until dark a hot fire was kept up, 
the fleet joining in from its position five miles away, and 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 295 

for an hour dropping shells at intervals of two minutes. 
Most of these, however, fell short and wasted their energy 
on the waters of the bay, the intervening cliffs, over 
which the shells had to be thrown, preventing the guns 
from doing their best work. The Spanish return to the 
severe American fire was so weak that fear was enter- 
tained that the enemy might have withdrawn from the 
city, leaving a few men in the trenches. Shafter's army, 
on the contrary, had been strongly reinforced during the 
truce, and now numbered nearly twenty-six thousand 
men, of whom about twenty-three thousand were avail- 
able for duty. 

The bombardment continued on Monday, the nth, 
the army and navy joining in the work, while the reply 
from the Spanish guns continued very weak. Step by 
step the Americans advanced, entering several of the 
Spanish trenches, in which they found no soldiers and 
only dummy wooden guns. At one p.m. the booming of 
the guns ceased, and Shafter again sent a flag of truce 
into the city, once more demanding its unconditional sur- 
render. While he awaited a reply he extended his lines 
on the north down to the bay, thus completing the inves- 
titure of the place and placing a barrier of American guns 
between the Spaniards in the city and any reinforcements 
which might seek to enter from the west. This line, as 
yet a thin one, was composed of General Lawton's divi- 
sion, whose flank occupied the little town of Caimenes, 
on the harbor's edge, the trenches vacated by Lawton's 
men being occupied by reinforcements from Juragua. 
Ten batteries of light artillery had also been landed, and 
were ordered to be rushed to the front. 

General Toral delayed his reply to General Shafter's 
demand until eight o'clock on the morning of the 12th, 



296 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

when he sent a defiant message, saying in effect that if 
the Americans wanted Santiago they could come and 
take it. Unconditional surrender, he declared, was un- 
reasonable and impossible, and he was ready to meet an 
attack whenever the invading army chose to make one. 
The white flag which had been flying over the city during 
the truce was withdrawn, and defiance was the order of 
the day. 

General Shafter accepted this reply as final, and, while 
not ordering an immediate bombardment, he made rapid 
preparations for a severe struggle. In truth, the state of 
the weather was far from favorable to active operations. 
For two days the army had learned to the full what is 
meant by the rainy season in Cuba, fierce thunder- 
showers coming in rapid succession with an almost in- 
cessant downpour of rain. The rifle-pits and trenches 
were flooded, and the men who sought to sleep under 
their shelter-tents were drenched to the skin, the canvas 
proving unable to keep out the pitiless floods of rain. 
Cooking was impossible ; not a stick of dry wood could 
be found. There was nothing to eat but hardtack. The 
trail to the front was in a frightful condition, the streams 
and the fords being swollen and the soft soil everywhere 
cut into deep ruts by the wheels of the supply-wagons. 
Through this violent tropical storm General Miles, com- 
mander-in-chief of the armies of the United States, who 
had just landed, rode to the front, his horse in many 
places sinking to its knees in the mud as it toiled despond- 
ently onward. Bad as conditions were in the American 
camp, they were still worse in that of the refugees, for 
whom it had become next to impossible to provide food, 
and most of whom were exposed without shelter to the 
drenching floods. 







Maj.-Gen. Nelson A. Miles Maj.-Gen. Wesley Merritt 




Maj.-Gen. Joseph H. Wheeler Maj.-Gen. William R. Shafter 




Col. Theodore Roosevelt Maj.-Gen. Fitzhugh Lee 

UNITED STATES ARMY COMMANDERS 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 297 

The bad conditions in the American army due to the 
rains were added to by the yellow fever, which had 
broken out in the camps, probably through infection 
from some of the refugees. General Miles found the 
buildings at Siboney so shockingly lacking in sanitary 
conditions that he had them set on fire as the most avail- 
able means of cleaning them, several wooden buildings, 
including the one he had himself temporarily occupied, 
being reduced to ashes. The debris being removed, 
fresh, clean tents were provided, with a ditch around 
each to carry off the rain. To these the sick were re- 
moved. The wounded, except those who were only 
slightly hurt, had already been placed on hospital-ships 
for conveyance to the cooler climate of the north. 

On reaching the front, General Miles showed no in- 
tention of superseding General Shafter in command, but, 
in fear of a possible epidemic of yellow fever, pressed 
for an immediate settlement of the surrender question. 
As a final attempt at a peaceable solution of the prob- 
lem, an offer was made to General Toral, under sanction 
from the government, to send all his troops, if surren- 
dered, back to Spain. At eight o'clock on Wednesday, 
the 13th, Generals Miles and Shafter, with their respec- 
tive staffs, rode to the front under a flag of truce and 
sent a request to General Toral for a personal interview. 
This was acceded to, and at nine o'clock Miles, Shafter, 
Wheeler, and others of the American commanding offi- 
cers crossed the intrenchments and rode into the valley 
beyond. Here they were met by General Toral and his 
chief of staff under a spreading mango-tree midway be- 
tween the lines, and an interview of an hour's length 
took place. 

Toral was offered the alternative of being sent home 



298 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

with his army or of leaving Santiago province with his 
troops, but without their arms. He replied that he had 
no discretion. He had been granted permission by his 
government to evacuate Santiago, but nothing more. 
He could accept no other terms without permission from 
Madrid. He was accordingly given until noon of the 
14th for a final answer. 

"If he refuses," said General Shafter on his return, 
" I will open on him at twelve o'clock to-morrow with 
every gun I have, and will have the assistance of the 
navy, which is ready to bombard the city with 13-inch 
shells. ' ' Evidently the case had reached a climax. 

On the previous day the wounded General Linares, 
the Spanish commander-in-chief, had telegraphed an 
urgent appeal to Madrid, showing clearly the hopeless- 
ness of the situation. They had but half forage for the 
horses and no food but rice for the men, he said. The 
works were so thinly held that even the sick had to serve 
in the trenches. It would be impossible, in their weak- 
ened condition, to break through the enemy's lines, and 
there was no hope of aid from without. He drew a 
pathetic picture of the condition of the men under his 
command, and made a moving appeal for authority to 
obtain what terms they could, ending with the usual 
rodomontade that they would all die in their tracks if 
ordered to do so. 

This and Toral's appeal brought Madrid to its senses. 
The proposed bombardment did not take place, being 
prevented by an agreement to surrender on the terms 
proposed. " Santiago surrendered at three," came the 
significant despatch to the President at Washington, and 
soon the exhilarating news passed from end to end of 
the land. The strained situation at Santiago was at an 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 299 

end, and what seemed to many the decisive turning- 
point in the war was reached. 

Shortly after midnight, on the morning of July 15, the 
preliminary basis for the capitulation of the Spanish 
forces in Eastern Cuba was agreed to and signed under 
a picturesque cieba-tree half-way between the lines. 
Efforts to obtain further delay and further consent from 
Madrid had been made, but the American commissioners 
insisted upon final action then and there, only consenting 
to substitute the word "capitulation" for the' harsher 
word "surrender." As for Toral's desire to take the 
arms of his men back to Spain, as a concession to Span- 
ish honor, the utmost the commissioners would do was 
to offer to recommend it to Washington. With this un- 
derstanding the papers were signed. The conference 
had lasted, with intermissions, from two o'clock in the 
afternoon until midnight. Further delay followed, due 
to Toral's desire to obtain an authorization of his action 
from Madrid. It duly came, Sagasta, the Spanish prime 
minister, being fully convinced that a longer struggle in 
that quarter was useless and perilous, and on the morn- 
ing of the 1 6th the following letter, couched in English 
' ' as she is wrote' ' in Spain, reached the American 
lines : 

"Santiago de Cuba, July 16. 
"To His Excellency, Commander-in-Chief of the 
American forces. 

" Excellent Sir, — I am now authorized by my gov- 
ernment to capitulate. I have the honor to so apprise 
you, and requesting that you design the hour and place 
where my representatives shall appear to compare with 
those of your excellency to effect the articles of capitula- 
tion, on the basis of what has been agreed upon to this date 



300 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

in due time. I wish to manifest my desire to know the 
resolutions of the United States government respecting 
the return of army, so as to note on the capitulations, 
also the great courtesy of your great graces and return 
for the great generosity and impulse for the Spanish 
soldiers, and allow them to return to the peninsula with 
the honors the American army do them the honor to 
acknowledge as dutifully descended. 

"Jose Toral, 
' ' General Commanding Fourth Army Corps. 
"General Shafter, 

' ' Commanding American Forces. ' ' 

The receipt of this letter was followed by the follow- 
ing despatch from Shafter to Washington : 

"Head-Quarters near Santiago, July i5. 
"Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington. 

"The conditions of capitulation include all forces and 
war-material in described territory. The United States 
agrees, with as little delay as possible, to transport all 
Spanish troops in district to kingdom of Spain, the 
troops, as far as possible, to embark near to the garrisons 
they now occupy. Officers to retain their side-arms, 
and officers and men to retain their personal property. 
Spanish authorized to take military archives belonging 
to surrendered district. All Spanish forces known as 
volunteers, Moirilizadves, and guerillas who wish to re- 
main in Cuba may do so under parole during present 
war, giving up their arms. Spanish forces march out of 
Santiago with honors of war, depositing their arms at a 
point mutually agreed upon, to await disposition of the 
United States government, it being understood United 
States commissioners will recommend that the Spanish 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 301 

soldiers return to Spain with arms so bravely defended. 
This leaves the question of return of arms entirely in 
the hands of the government. I invite attention to the 
fact that several thousand surrendered, said by General 
Toral to be about twelve thousand, against whom a shot 
has not been fired. The return to Spain of the troops 
in this district amounts to about twenty-four thousand, 
according to General Toral. 

" W. R. Shafter, 

" U. S. Volunteers :" 

At nine o'clock in the evening a further message was 
made public at the White House, saying: "The sur- 
render has been definitely settled, and the city will be 
turned over to-morrow morning, and the troops will be 
marched out as prisoners of war. The Spanish colors 
will be hauled down at nine o'clock and the American 
flag hoisted." In response, President McKinley and 
Secretary Alger thanked the victorious general and army 
in the following congratulatory words : 

"To General Shafter, Commanding, Front, near 
Santiago, Playa. 
' ' The President of the United States sends to you 
and your brave army the profound thanks of the Ameri- 
can people for the brilliant achievements at Santiago, 
resulting in the surrender of the city and all of the 
Spanish troops and territory under General Toral. 
Your splendid command has endured not only the hard- 
ships and sacrifices incident to the campaign and battle, 
but in stress of heat and weather has triumphed over 
obstacles which would have overcome men less brave 
and determined. One and all have displayed the most 






302 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

conspicuous gallantry and earned the gratitude of the 
nation. The hearts of the people turn with tender sym- 
pathy to the sick and the wounded. May the Father of 
Mercies protect and comfort them. 

' ' William McKinley. ' ' 

'•To Major-General Shafter, Front, near Santi- 
ago, Playa. 

" I cannot express in words my gratitude to you and 
your heroic men. Your work has been well done. 
God bless you all. 

" R. A. Alger, 

" Secretary of War." 

Shafter' s reply, reaching Washington on the evening 
of the 1 6th, said : 

"To the President: 

"I thank you, and my army thanks you, for your 
congratulatory telegram of to-day. I am proud to say 
every one in it performed his duty gallantly. Your 
message will be read to every regiment in the army at 

noon to-morrow. 

" Shafter, 

' ' Major- General. ' ' 

Shafter and the army richly deserved congratulation, 
for they had accomplished much more than the capture 
of Santiago and its garrison. The territory surrendered 
by General Toral included a large portion of the province 
of Santiago de Cuba, embracing the eastern extremity of 
the island. The surrendered territory lay east of a line 
drawn from Ascerraderos, twenty-five miles west of San- 
tiago, northward to Dos Palmas, and thence northeast- 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 303 

ward to Sagua de Tanamo on the northern coast. This 
district embraced some five thousand square miles of 
territory and a population of more than one hundred and 
twenty-five thousand, and contained the four important 
cities of Santiago, Guantanamo, Sagua, and Baracoa. 
These cities and other points had their garrisons, equal- 
ling in total number those in Santiago, making the total 
number of prisoners included in the surrender, as esti- 
mated by Toral, twenty-two thousand seven hundred and 
eighty-nine. Officers and troops were at once sent, 
accompanied by Spanish officers, to receive the sur- 
render of those interior garrisons. In Santiago over ten 
thousand rifles and about ten million rounds of ammu- 
nition were sent in to the American ordnance officer. 

At exactly nine o'clock on the morning of Monday, 
July 18, the Spanish flag was lowered from the staff 
crowning the heights on which stood the venerable an- 
tiquity known as Morro Castle, which, mediaeval as it 
was, had borne its several bombardments with the best 
of modern guns with little material harm. This immu- 
nity was mainly due to its elevated situation. Immedi- 
ately after the lowering of the flag, Lieutenants Hobson 
and Palmer entered the harbor in steam launches, pene- 
trating as far as the firing station of the submarine mines. 
These mines were all exploded in the afternoon, and 
once more Santiago harbor was open to the commerce 
of the world. Shortly after noon, Commodore Schley 
and Captain Cook, of the Brooklyn, entered the harbor 
and made an inspection of the condition of affairs. The 
main result of their reconnoissance was to discover that 
the batteries had borne their bombardments remarkably 
well, conveying the lesson that in the duel between ships 
and land defences the latter have largely the advantage. 



304 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

The conclusion reached from a later and more complete 
inspection was that ' ' over two million dollars' worth of 
ammunition thrown at the batteries defending Santiago 
harbor was absolutely harmless in its effect, so far as the 
reducing of the batteries was concerned, and simply bore 
out the well-known fact that it is a waste of time and 
money to bombard earthworks." And this bombard- 
ment had been done by the same men who had effect- 
ually proved their skill in gunnery on the Spanish fleet 
under conditions of unusual haste and excitement. 

Shortly after six o'clock on Monday morning, July 
1 8, Lieutenant Crook, of General Shatter's staff, entered 
the city and received a surrender of all the arms in the 
arsenal. At about seven o'clock General Toral sent his 
sword to General Shafter in evidence of his submission, 
and about nine o'clock Shafter and his generals, with 
mounted escorts of one hundred picked men of the 
Second Cavalry, rode over the trenches to the open 
ground beyond, midway to the deserted Spanish works. 
On the crest of the heights beyond the several regiments 
of the army were drawn up under arms ; comprising, as 
they did, a total of over twenty thousand men, and ex- 
tending along seven miles of intrenchments, they formed 
an imposing spectacle. 

On reaching the selected ground, General Shafter found 
confronting him General Toral and his staff, all mounted 
and in full uniform, followed by a select detachment of 
Spanish troops. The scene that followed was dramatic 
and picturesque. General Shafter, with his generals and 
their staffs grouped immediately in the rear, and the 
troops of cavalrymen with drawn sabres on the left, 
advanced to meet his vanquished foe. A few words of 
courteous greeting passed, and then the American gen- 






THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 305 

eral returned General Toral his sword, with words of 
compliment which seemed to touch him deeply and 
drew from him a warm response of thanks. The con- 
clusion of the ceremony was performed by the Spanish 
company, which in miniature represented the army, and, 
under Toral' s command, grounded arms, wheeled, and 
marched across the American lines to the place selected 
for the prisoners' camp. 

General Toral throughout the ceremony was deeply 
dejected. When General Shafter introduced him by 
name to each member of his staff, the Spanish general 
appeared to be a very broken man. He seemed to be 
about sixty years old and of frail constitution, though 
stern resolution was shown in every feature. The lines 
were strongly marked, and his face was deep drawn, as 
if he was in physical pain. He replied with an air of 
abstraction to the words addressed to him, and when he 
accompanied General Shafter, at the head of the escort, 
into the city to take formal possession of Santiago, he 
spoke but few words. The appealing faces of the starv- 
ing refugees streaming back into the city did not move 
him, nor did the groups of Spanish soldiers lining the 
road and gazing curiously at the fair-skinned, stalwart- 
framed conquerors. Only once did the faint shadow of 
a smile lurk about the corners of his mouth. This was 
when the cavalcade passed through a barbed-wire en- 
tanglement. No body of infantry could ever have got 
through this defence alive, and General Shafter' s remark 
about its resisting power found the first gratifying echo 
in the defeated general's heart. 

Farther along, the desperate character of the Spanish 
resistance, as planned, amazed our officers. Although 
primitive, it was well devised. Each approach to the 



3 o6 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

city was thrice barricaded and wired, and the barricades 
were high enough and sufficiently strong to withstand 
shrapnel. The slaughter among our troops would have 
been frightful had it ever become necessary to storm 
the city, General Shafter remarking that it would have 
cost him the lives of five thousand men to take the city 
by storm. 

The palace was reached soon after ten o'clock, the 
American generals being here introduced to the mu- 
nicipal authorities. At noon the closing ceremony took 
place, the American flag rising gracefully to the peak 
of the staff over the palace walls, and Santiago finally 
changed hands. After nearly four centuries of rule it 
had passed from the control of Spain and become for 
the time being an appanage of the great republic of the 
West. 






CHAPTER XVIII. 

EVENTS AFTER THE SURRENDER. 

With the raising of the stars and stripes over the gov- 
ernor's palace at Santiago, a remarkable change came 
upon that ancient city. Not many days before its in- 
habitants had been streaming outward in hopeless misery 
and destitution. Now they came hurrying back, many 
of them with smiling faces and hopeful hearts. The 
streets, silent and deserted on the day of the surrender, 
were thronged with people ; the houses, many of which 
had been looted by the Spanish soldiers, were occupied 
by their former inmates ; life in the deserted city had 
begun again. The roads were still filled with the home- 
coming refugees, plodding wearily but hopefully onward. 
In the city most of the people were gathered about 
the wharves, where the Red Cross steamer, the State of 
Texas, was unloading food for the needy. There were 
few signs of gloom on the faces of these people. Mercu- 
rial in disposition, they gazed with lively interest on the 
activity in the harbor, while smiles wreathed their faces 
at the prospect of getting other food than rice and salt 
meat. Of the better class of inhabitants, however, few 
had returned. Their houses were closed, and they 
remained at El Caney and their other places of refuge. 
Everywhere filth was in evidence in the streets, the odors 
were the reverse of salubrious, and all could see that to 
fit Santiago for American residence radical sanitary work 
needed to be done. 

3°7 



3 o8 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

In addition to the Red Cross steamer, several other 
large steamers were unloading cargoes of supplies and 
provisions, numbers of vessels flying the stars and stripes 
lay in the harbor, small boats were plying briskly to and 
fro, and everywhere bustle and activity replaced the recent 
death-like quiet of the scene. The great sheds along 
the water-front were being packed with merchandise, and 
the large stores rented on Marina Street were steadily 
receiving goods. A revival of commercial activity seemed 
to have been suddenly inaugurated. The electric-light 
plant was working, the ice-factory was busy, and the 
water-supply pipes were being repaired. Miss Barton 
was rapidly distributing supplies to the hungry and desti- 
tute, and, as with the turn of a kaleidoscope, the aspect 
of the whole city had changed. 

Between the American and Spanish soldiers the best 
of good feeling prevailed. A few days before they had 
been doing their best to kill one another ; now they met 
and mingled on the most friendly terms, victors and 
vanquished alike glad that the period of strife was at an 
end and the horrors of the siege were things of the 
past. The narrow, cobble-paved streets, grilling in the 
fierce sunshine, were filled with groups of chatting 
Spanish soldiers and of laughing and rollicking Ameri- 
cans, while about the plaza facing the palace and in the 
numerous airy cafes the officers of the opposing armies 
lounged and fraternized. The saloons remained closed 
by order of the military governor, to prevent the quarrels 
likely to arise from drunkenness, but business of other 
kinds showed marked symptoms of revival. Busiest of all 
were the pawnshops, which were doing a rushing busi- 
ness, goods of all kinds being offered by the people, the 
officers tendering for small loans their medals, spurs, and 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 309 

swords, and the civil employes their gold-headed canes 
of office. These in turn were bought by American 
officers and soldiers at fancy prices. Machetes in par- 
ticular were purchased in numbers as souvenirs of the 
war. 

An amusing story is told of one way in which the 
needy Castilian cavalry provided themselves with Ameri- 
can coin. Knowing that they would have to turn over 
their horses to the Americans as part of the spoils of 
victory, they contrived to do so in a profitable manner. 
It stood to reason that the invading soldiers would be 
glad of a meal of fresh meat after their diet of salt bacon 
and hardtack, and for a time meat was to be had in 
abundance at good prices at the local restaurants, until 
the hungry soldiers began to suspect that they were 
dining on horse-steaks, when the demand suddenly 
ceased. Then for a few days an active business went on 
in the sale of horses on the hoof, the chivalrous Spaniards 
deeming it better to sell cheap than to give up for nothing. 
As a result, when General Toral turned over the horses 
of his army on July 24, the sum total of Spanish steeds 
delivered was one hundred and forty-nine. 

General McKibben had been appointed temporary 
military governor of the city. He was succeeded by 
Colonel Wood, of the Rough Riders, who at once began 
a sanitary work that was sadly needed. The narrow 
streets, the malodorous alleys and by-ways of the city, 
were encumbered with refuse of every kind to an inde- 
scribable extent, while drainage and sanitary conditions 
in general were absolutely lacking. The people had 
lived for centuries in disregard of the simplest laws of 
hygiene, considering yellow fever a mysterious dispen- 
sation of Providence, and the only cleaning the city ever 



310 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

got came in the flushing of its streets by the fierce 
summer rains. Hundreds of carts were soon at work 
carrying the filth from the streets, and orders were given 
that every house should at once be cleaned, inside and 
out, an order which produced very inadequate results. 
In people who have been born and reared in filth, belief 
in the virtues of sanitation cannot be instilled in a day. 

Meanwhile, the Americans, while making the Spanish 
their friends, were making the Cubans their enemies. 
Bad blood had existed between them almost from the 
start, and it grew as the days went on. The Cubans, 
while brave enough in their own way, were not used to 
the open fighting of the Americans, and did not shine 
in the methods of regular warfare. The American sol- 
diers soon began to look upon them with contempt, 
which was changed to anger when their Cuban allies 
refused to lend their aid in road-making and hospital 
labors, preferring the pleasanter task of disposing of 
rations, an enjoyment of which they had long been de- 
prived. The insurgents were not as black as they were 
painted. The number of their wounded in the hospitals 
indicated that they had not feared to face the bullets of 
the enemy. The difficulty was perhaps largely due to 
ignorance of the language and misunderstanding of orders. 
But their evident disinclination to exert themselves in 
any useful way excited a scorn in the Americans which 
they took little pains to conceal. 

This difficulty between the soldiers was followed by 
one between their leaders, General Garcia taking deep 
offence because he had not been consulted in the terms 
of surrender and the subsequent steps for the govern- 
ment of the city. General Shafter personally invited 
him to go with him into the city on the occasion of the 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 311 

surrender, but he declined, sending the message, " I 
cannot be your guest under the Spanish flag." His 
leading cause of offence, however, was that the Spanish 
civil officers were left in power. It was explained that 
these officials were retained only until it would be con- 
venient to change them for others, but this explanation 
did not suffice to heal his wounded feelings. 

"The trouble with General Garcia was," said General 
Shafter, ' ' that he expected to be placed in command at 
this place ; in other words, that we would turn the city 
over to him. I explained to him fully that we were at 
war with Spain, and that the question of Cuban inde- 
pendence could not be considered by me. Another 
grievance was that, finding that several thousand men 
marched in without opposition from General Garcia, I 
extended my own lines in front of him and closed up 
the gap, as I saw that I had to depend upon my own 
men for any effective investment of the place." 

Shafter explained his attitude in a conciliatory letter 
to Garcia, but it failed to placate the offended Cuban 
general, who withdrew with his forces and marched in- 
wards towards Holguin, an interior town with a consider- 
able Spanish garrison. He proposed to resume the war 
of the insurrection on his own account, and cut loose 
from these American invaders, whom he conceived to be 
conducting the war for themselves. ' ' I have the most 
kindly feeling for General Garcia," said Shafter, "and 
sincerely regret that he has found cause for complaint, 
and that he should feel offended because he was not 
permitted to be a signatory party to the Spanish sur- 
render. It is idle, however, to argue the point, for, no 
matter how warmly one may sympathize with the Cubans, 
the proposition to install them in power immediately after 



3 i2 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

the surrender of the Spanish is untenable, and lacks 
support among Cubans themselves." 

Shafter not alone declined to place the Cubans in im- 
mediate power, but also failed to include any of them 
among the military guard in charge of the city, fearing 
evil results from their bitter hostility to the Spanish and 
a possible sacking of the deserted houses. This added 
to Garcia' s injured feeling and was another inciting cause 
in his removal of his troops. His action was not likely 
to prove to the advantage of the Cubans, as it added 
strength to the growing belief that they were not to be 
trusted in control, and that the United States would have 
to hold the reins of military rule over the island until its 
people had proved themselves capable of self-rule and 
the amenities of modern government. 

While this state of affairs ruled at Santiago, events of 
some interest were taking place elsewhere on the island. 
General Gomez, the Cuban commander-in-chief, had 
apparently remained dormant during the war, leaving 
all active operations to his subordinate ; but on July 3 
an expedition landed a large cargo of supplies for his 
army at Palo Alto, on the southern coast. It was the 
final expedition for the aid of the insurgents, and did 
not succeed in its purpose without risk and loss, Captain 
Nunez, brother of General Emilio Nunez, being killed in 
the attempt to land. 

On July 21 the last important naval engagement on 
the Cuban coast took place, four American war-ships 
entering the harbor of Nipe, on the northeast coast of 
Santiago province, where, after a furious bombardment, 
they took possession of the port. The vessels engaged 
were the Topeka, Annapolis, Wasp, and Leyden. The 
place was defended by three forts and the Spanish gun- 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 313 

boat Jorge Juan, the latter being attacked by the Topeka, 
which sent 4-inch shells crushing into her at such a rate 
that she went to the bottom within twenty minutes. The 
forts were as easily silenced, and the riflemen who had 
taken part in the engagement were quickly put to flight. 
The bay of Nipe, thus taken, is a large land-locked 
harbor, almost directly north of Santiago and about fifty 
miles distant. It lies two days nearer than Santiago to 
Key West and other American ports, has harborage for 
a host of vessels, and is a place which may become of 
much commercial importance under American control. 

Meanwhile, the several garrisons included in General 
Toral's capitulation were one by one making their sub- 
mission and marching to the camp at Santiago. Guan- 
tanamo was among the last to yield, its garrison, six 
thousand men in number, bringing the total of captives 
up to Toral's estimate of nearly twenty-three thousand 
men. The sending of this large body of prisoners to 
Spain in accordance with the terms of the capitulation 
was the next thing to be considered. It was not deemed 
safe to trust American transports within Spanish ports, 
and bids were asked from the shipmasters of neutral 
powers. An unlooked-for result followed, the lowest bid 
coming from Spain itself, the successful bidder being the 
Compania Transatlantica Espanola, of Barcelona. The 
fact that this was a Spanish company proved no hin- 
drance ; it was given the contract, and at once began 
preparations for conveying the Spanish soldiers home in 
Spanish ships. They were to be sent without their arms, 
the United States government holding in abeyance as 
yet the recommendation of the commissioners to honor 
them by a return of the arms which they had so bravely 
used. 



3 i 4 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

There remained another problem to be solved. On 
the coast of Cuba lay the wrecks of Spain's four best 
ships, the armored cruisers which had gone down in 
their daring rush for liberty. Two of these, the Vizcaya 
and the Almirante Oquendo, were wrecked beyond re- 
pair, so torn by shell and ruined by flame and explosion 
that they were useless hulks. But the remaining two 
were in much better condition, and might be saved as 
useful additions to the navy of the United States. It was 
thought possible to float the Maria Teresa without serious 
difficulty. The Cristobal Colon was in a more critical 
state. Little hurt as she was by shot or shell, she had 
been filled by the opening of her sea-valves, and lay upon 
her beam ends sunk upon a very shelving beach, where 
she was sure to be totally lost if a hurricane should 
arise. The task of raising her was given to Lieutenant 
Hobson, of Merrimac fame, who proposed to do so by 
the aid of external pontoons and internal air-bags, and 
also by pumping the water from her watertight compart- 
ments. 

In Santiago a special commission was appointed to 
investigate the city prison, the commissioners finding 
instances of gross injustice and criminal negligence which 
fully justified the rending of the city from the cruel hands 
of Spain. The prison records and the questioning of 
prisoners revealed shameful examples of injustice, — men 
and women having been thrown into cells and kept there 
for years without a trial for such a petty offence as speak- 
ing disrespectfully of the Spanish government. In many 
instances all records of the charges against untried prison- 
ers had been lost, the witnesses had died, the existing 
officials were ignorant why they were held, and in some 
cases the prisoners themselves had forgotten. One man 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 315 

named Jose Silvera, for a petty theft, the maximum 
penalty for which was six months' imprisonment, had 
been detained for fourteen years. Other cases of crying 
injustice were found, and the prisoners thus foully dealt 
with were released. It seemed indeed full time that the 
colonial dominion of Spain was brought to an end and 
mediaevalism replaced by modern civilization on Cuban 
soil. 

While these events were taking place in and about 
Santiago, the army of invasion had fallen into a de- 
plorable state. By men accustomed to the temperate 
climate of the north and exposed to the scorching suns 
and drenching rains of a Cuban summer, with little 
shelter from the humid atmosphere and the water-soaked 
soil, sickness could not well be avoided, and was likely 
to prove more dangerous than the bullets of the enemy. 
The difficulty of making the men observe sanitary pre- 
cautions added to the danger, and febrile disorders of a 
malarial character soon began to spread among the 
troops. The dreaded yellow fever, a disease indigenous 
to the soil, was not long in making its appearance, prob- 
ably through infection from the Santiago refugees, and 
fear of its rapid spread among the troops hastened the 
negotiations for the surrender of the Spanish army. 

The wounded were in less peril than the sick. For- 
tunately for them, the Mauser rifle, used by the Spanish 
soldiers, makes what surgeons call a " humane wound." 
During the Civil War, when a man was shot through 
the lungs by a bullet from a Springfield rifle, he was 
almost sure to die in a few days or a few months from 
consumption, pneumonia, or other affections brought on 
by the wound. This is not the case with the Mauser 
bullet, which does not lacerate the parts, and does not 



3 i6 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

crush bones so as to render amputation necessary. If not 
struck in a mortal spot, the wounded man is very apt to 
recover. Antiseptic treatment, which was practised in 
this war to an extent probably never before known in 
warfare, also had much to do with the remarkable per- 
centage of recoveries of our men. A small package 
marked "first aid to the wounded" was carried in the 
hip-pocket of each of the soldiers, and proved a most 
fortunate provision in the deficiency of medical supplies. 
It enabled the doctors at once to apply an antiseptic 
dressing to the wounds, causing them to heal without 
the appearance of inflammation or the formation of pus. 
The results were remarkable, the large percentage of re- 
coveries among the wounded being perhaps unequalled 
in any preceding war. The lack of medical supplies 
seems to have been more a misfortune than a fault of the 
surgical authorities. They had been brought in abun- 
dance in the transports, but in the general difficulty of 
landing the first attention had been given to the muni- 
tions of war, and the transports had been moved to make 
room for others before their medicines and surgical in- 
struments were put on shore. The means for making 
wounds were given precedence ; the means for healing 
wounds were left untouched in the holds of the ships. 
This was due mainly to the haste and confusion of the 
operations, though General Shafter did not escape blame 
through failure to respond satisfactorily to the appeals 
of the surgeons for aid in landing and transporting their 
stores. 

It was fortunate for the wounded that an improved 
method of treatment was adopted, for the arrangements 
for their comfort were of the most wretched character. 
The tents provided were far too few to accommodate 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 317 

the suffering, and many of the wounded soldiers were 
obliged to lie in the open air, exposed to a scorching 
sun-bath during part of the day and drenched with rain 
during the remainder. At Siboney little better provision 
was made, many of the wounded being obliged to lie on 
the water-soaked ground. The more severely wounded, 
however, were soon taken north on hospital-ships, leav- 
ing only the lighter cases to be dealt with on Cuban 
soil. 

Meanwhile, sickness was increasing with a rapidity 
that soon became alarming, nearly five thousand of the 
troops, almost a fourth part of the whole army, being 
down with various diseases by August 1. Three-fourths 
of these were cases of fever, and yellow fever had grown 
dangerously prevalent. When this state of affairs be- 
came known in the North, a sharp criticism of the War 
Department arose, this branch of the government being 
considered responsible for the condition of the army, 
which was believed to be due to lack of proper care and 
foresight. The trouble was not confined to Cuba, for 
at Camp Alger, in the immediate vicinity of Wash- 
ington, typhoid fever had become epidemic, and had 
existed since the formation of the camp. There was 
excellent reason to believe that the water-supply was 
contaminated and that the soldiers were being unneces- 
sarily kept in a dangerous locality. 

As the unfortunate situation at the front became better 
known, the adverse criticism grew more stringent, Sec- 
retary of War Alger and Surgeon-General Sternberg 
being sharply denounced by many newspapers, while 
General Shafter by no means escaped. Dr. Nicholas 
Senn, chief of the operating staff of the army at Santi- 
ago, and a man of the highest reputation in his profes- 



318 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

sion, made the following incriminating statement, under 
date of July 17 : 

"Siboney, Cuba, July 17. 

" In the present war with Spain every one knew that 
our army would be exposed to an unusual extent to 
disease and the debilitating effect of the tropical climate 
of Cuba. The invasion of the province of Santiago 
meant certain exposure to yellow fever infection. The 
commanding general must have been aware of this. It 
is said the seafaring men along the coast of Cuba fear 
Santiago more than any other port. Yellow fever reigns 
there more or less throughout the entire year. At 
Siboney and Baiquiri it is known as 'hill fever.' It 
appears that the precautions outlined by Colonel Green- 
leaf, chief surgeon of the army in the field, were entirely 
ignored by the commander of the invading force. 

' ' I was more than astonished when I arrived at 
Siboney, on July 7, to find that thousands of refugees 
from infected districts were permitted to enter the camps 
unmolested and mingle freely with our unsuspecting 
soldiers. All along the road, from the base of opera- 
tions to the line of intrenchments, could be seen at short 
intervals scenes which were sure to bring about disas- 
trous results. Our soldiers, in a strange land and 
among strange people, enjoyed at first the novelty, and 
were free in buying the fruits of the land and exchang- 
ing coins, not knowing how dearly they would be called 
upon to pay for such a questionable privilege. Houses 
and huts in which yellow fever had raged were visited 
freely, and the dangerous germs of the disease were 
inhaled, as a matter of course. The results of such 
intimate association of our susceptible troops with the 
natives could be readily foreseen. 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 319 

"It required only the usual time for the disease to 
make its appearance, and when it did so it was not in a 
single place, but all along the line from our intrench- 
ments to Siboney. 

' ' Dr. Guiteras, the yellow fever expert, recognized a 
few of the cases on the day of my arrival. He is ex- 
tremely cautious, and will only make a positive diagnosis 
in cases in which albumen is exhibited in combination 
with the usual symptoms which accompany the disease. 
On the recommendation of Dr. Guiteras, our isolation 
hospital was established a mile and a half from Siboney, 
and in less than three days it contained more than one 
hundred yellow fever patients, among them General 
Duffield, of Michigan, and Professor Victor C. Vaughn, 
of the University of Michigan. 

" During my first visit to the front I found two hun- 
dred fever patients near the First Division Hospital, most 
of them under shelter tents, others lying on the moist 
ground with nothing but a wet blanket to protect them. 

"The appearance of yellow fever cases in such a 
short time, in such large numbers, and originating in so 
many different localities simultaneously proved a source 
of surprise and alarm to the medical officers. They 
realized the danger and the necessity for the employ- 
ment of most energetic measures, but this could not be 
done without a hearty co-operation on the part of the 
general in command. 

"Major Lagarde applied to General Shafter for a 
detail of a company of infantry to aid him in fighting the 
disease. His request was promptly denied, under the 
pretence that all of the troops available were needed 
more at the front than in the rear. This action left the 
major powerless in checking the extension of the disease. 



320 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

Fortunately, Major-General Miles arrived in the nick of 
time, and with him Colonel Greenleaf, chief surgeon of 
the army in the field. 

' ' Colonel Greenleaf made the same request of General 
Shafter for troops to aid him in gaining control of the 
disease, but it was ignored as peremptorily as that of 
Major Lagarde. He now turned to General Miles, who 
placed at his disposal not only a battalion, but a whole 
regiment of colored troops. 

' ' The work of sanitation was then taken earnestly in 
hand. At present there are about eight hundred cases 
of yellow fever here. Fortunately the disease is of a 
mild type, the number of deaths being small. General 
Miles has done everything in his power to aid the 
medical officers in limiting and weeding out the disease. ' ' 

Correspondents with the army gave similar testimony, 
declaring that no precautions were taken to ward off 
yellow fever from the troops ; that ambulances and 
supply-wagons were used to carry sick refugees and 
afterwards employed, without disinfection, for the con- 
veyance of our wounded ; and that, if those in charge 
had specially desired to infect the regiments, they could 
not have adopted more effective methods. Only the 
fortunate circumstance mentioned by Dr. Senn, that the 
type of fever proved to be an extremely mild one, deaths 
being few and convalescence rapid, saved the army from 
a disaster greater than that of war. 

As the days went on and the number of the sick 
rapidly increased, the public excitement grew, enhanced 
by the persistent charges that red tape and official in- 
competency were largely responsible for the reprehensi- 
ble state of affairs. As regards this condition, further 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 321 

evidence was given on August 4 by the Rev. Drs. Henry 
C, McCook and Joseph Krauskopf, who had just returned 
from a visit to Santiago on behalf of the National Relief 
Commission. Dr. McCook gave the following account 
of his experiences : 

"The army was in an awful condition. The medical 
supplies were almost exhausted, some of the most im- 
portant remedies being absolutely run out. Many of 
the doctors were sick. Of the sick men in camp there 
was not one on a cot. There were no supplies, not 
even a change of clothing for the men that were stricken. 
They lay on the ground in their blankets, which the 
rains kept constantly in a damp or soaked condition. 
Once or twice a day came the torrential rains to drench 
them, and make them even more miserable than they 
would be from the sickness alone. Hundreds of men 
with dysentery and typhoid lay in this wretched condi- 
tion. With one-quarter of the army on the sick-list and 
a large part of the remainder convalescent, with pesti- 
lence among them, with the sun smiting them by day, 
and the rains keeping them damp in spite of the sun, 
with nature exhausted after the long battle, with inad- 
equacy of supplies and hospital equipments and clothing, 
and with lack of variety of food, the army was facing 
a terrible situation. 

" It was but the natural result of this awful condition 
of affairs that, as we went among the soldiers, we heard 
this appeal on all sides : ' Do you know the President or 
the Secretary? Won't you tell him for God's sake to 
take us away from here ? We are worn out, broken 
down, and we never will get well until we get a breath 
of other air. ' They were all anxious to get away, for 
they felt that to stay there would mean death. 



322 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

' ' Yet there was remarkable resolution left in the men, 
for all that. I believe if there had been a call to fight 
the troops would have been found ready. The condi- 
tions that surrounded them appalled them more than the 
prospect of battle could have done. They were dis- 
couraged and drooping, but if they had heard the bugle 
they would have gone in with a good deal of vim. 

' ' We at once went about the work of relieving the 
suffering that existed. Too great credit cannot be given 
to Major Summers, the surgeon, who went with us on 
the Resolute. He simply threw red tape to the winds. 
No sooner had we landed than surgeons of the various 
commands came to the ship for medicines and other 
supplies. The government stores were in charge of 
Major Summers, but he told the surgeons to take what 
they wanted. He comprehended that the first thing 
was to relieve the distress, and he didn't stop to con- 
sider requisitions and other forms of red tape. He told 
the surgeons he would take their receipts the following 
day, and they helped themselves to what was needed. ' ' 

Dr. Krauskopf gave similar testimony, stating that 
fearful blunders had been made, and that the medical 
supplies and delicacies sent by the Commission had 
arrived just in time to save many lives. ' ' The troops 
are all weak and totally unfit for work," he said. 

These converging testimonies as to the scandalous 
condition of affairs in the army at Santiago, and the de- 
nunciation of government officials that followed, at length 
aroused the War Department to action. On August 3 
General Shafter called the commanding and medical 
officers of the army together for conference, and read 
them a cable message which he had just received from 
Secretary Alger, ordering him, on the recommendation 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 323 

of Surgeon- General Sternberg, to move the army to San 
Luis, in the interior, a higher and presumably healthier 
location. 

This order, while apparently sufficient to meet the 
situation in the opinion of the officials named, proved 
the reverse of satisfactory to the army leaders, from 
whom it called forth energetic protests. Colonel Roose- 
velt was the first to give voice to the prevailing senti- 
ment in the following letter to General Shafter : 

" Major- General Shafter, — Sir : In a meeting of 
the general and medical officers called by you at the 
palace this morning we were all, as you know, unani- 
mous in our view of what should be done with the army. 
To keep us here, in the opinion of every officer com- 
manding a division or brigade, will simply involve the 
destruction of thousands. There is no possible reason 
for not shipping, practically, the entire command north 
at once. 

' ' Yellow fever cases are very few in the cavalry 
division, where I command one of the two brigades, 
and not one true case of yellow fever has occurred in 
this division, except among the men sent to the hospital 
at Siboney, where they have, I believe, contracted it. 
But in this division there have been fifteen hundred cases 
of malarial fever. Not a man has died from it, but the 
whole command is so weakened and shattered as to be 
ripe for dying like rotten sheep when a real yellow fever 
epidemic, instead of a fake epidemic like the present, 
strikes us, as it is bound to do if we stay here at the 
height of the sickness season, August and the beginning 
of September. Quarantine against malarial fever is much 
like quarantining against the toothache. 



324 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

"All of us are certain, as soon as the authorities at 
Washington fully appreciate the conditions of the army, 
to be sent home. If we are kept here, it will in all 
human possibility mean an appalling disaster, for the 
surgeons here estimate that over half the army, if kept 
here during the sickly season, will die. This is not only 
terrible from the stand-point of the individual lives lost, 
but it means ruin from the stand-point of the military 
efficiency of the flower of the American army, for the 
great bulk of the regulars are here with you. 

"The sick-list, large though it is, exceeding four 
thousand, affords but a faint idea of the debilitation of 
the army. Not ten per cent, are fit for active work. 
Six weeks on the north Maine coast, for instance, or 
elsewhere, where the yellow fever germ cannot possibly 
propagate, would make us all as fit as fighting cocks, 
able as we are eager to take a leading part in the great 
campaign against Havana in the fall, even if we are not 
allowed to try Porto Rico. 

"We can be moved north, if moved at once, with 
absolute safety to the country, although, of course, it 
would have been infinitely better if we had been moved 
north or to Porto Rico two weeks ago. If there were 
any object in keeping us here, we would face yellow 
fever with as much indifference as we face bullets, but 
there is no object in it. The four immune regiments 
ordered here are sufficient to garrison the city and sur- 
rounding towns, and there is absolutely nothing for us 
to do here, and there has not been since the city sur- 
rendered. It is impossible to move into the interior. 
Every shifting of camp doubles the sick rate in our 
present weakened condition, and, anyhow, the interior 
is rather worse than the coast, as I have found by actual 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 325 

reconnoissance. Our present camps are as healthy as 
any camps at this end of the island can be. 

' ' I write only because I cannot see our men who fought 
so bravely, and who have endured the extreme hardship 
and danger so uncomplainingly, go to destruction with- 
out striving, so far as lies in me, to avert a doom as 
fearful as it is unnecessary and undeserved. 

" Yours respectfully, 

"Theodore Roosevelt, 

" Colonel Commanding First Brigade." 

This energetic demand broke the ice of military eti- 
quette. The remaining leading officers of the army were 
thoroughly in sympathy with Colonel Roosevelt in this 
view, and expressed their sentiments in an unusual and 
decisive manner. This took the form of a sort of "Round 
Robin" communication to the commanding general, 
signed by all the general officers, saying that the army 
" must be moved at once or perish," that to move it to 
the interior would be as bad as to leave it where it was, 
and that any one who stood in the way of its removal 
north would be responsible for its virtual destruction. 
It read as follows : 

' ' We, the undersigned, officers commanding the 
various brigades, divisions, etc. , of the army of occupa- 
tion in Cuba, are of the unanimous opinion that this 
army should be at once taken out of the island of Cuba 
and sent to some point on the northern sea-coast of the 
United States ; that it can be done without danger to 
the people of the United States ; that yellow fever in the 
army at present is not epidemic ; that there are only a 
few sporadic cases ; but that the army is disabled by 



326 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

malarial fever to the extent that its efficiency is destroyed, 
and that it is in a condition to be practically entirely de- 
stroyed by an epidemic of yellow fever, which is sure to 
come in the near future. 

' ' We know from the reports of competent officers and 
from personal observations that the army is unable to 
move into the interior, and that there are no facilities 
for such a move if attempted, and that it could not be 
attempted until too late. Moreover, the best medical 
authorities of the island say that with our present equip- 
ment we could not live in the interior during the rainy 
season without losses from malarial fever, which is almost 
as deadly as yellow fever. 

' ' This army must be moved at once or perish. As 
the army can be safely moved now, the persons respon- 
sible for preventing such a move will be responsible for 
the unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives. 

"Our opinions are the result of careful personal obser- 
vation, and they are also based on the unanimous opinion 
of medical officers with the army, who understand the 
situation absolutely. 

"J. Ford Kent, Major-General Volunteers, Com- 
manding First Division, Fifth Corps. 

"J. C. Bates, Major- General Volunteers, Co)7imand- 
ing Provisional Division. 

" Adna R. Chaffee, Major- General, Commanding 
Third Brigade, Second Division. 

' ' Samuel S. Sumner, Brigadier- General Volun- 
teers, Commanding First Brigade Cavalry. 

"Will Ludlow, Brigadier- General Volunteers, 
Commanding First Brigade, Second Division. 

" Adelbert Ames, Brigadier- General Volunteers, 
Commanding Third Brigade, First Division. 



' 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 327 

"Leonard Wood, Brigadier- General Volunteers, 
Commanding the City of Santiago. 

"Theodore Roosevelt, Colonel Commanding Sec- 
ond Cavalry Brigade." 

Many of the critics of the War Department held that 
the slowness of action on the part of that branch of the 
government was due to a purpose of questionable char- 
acter. General Miles was at that time in the island of 
Porto Rico at the head of a large army, which seemed 
more than sufficient, in view of the feeble opposition, to 
make a rapid conquest of the island. The War Depart- 
ment, nevertheless, proposed to reinforce him with 
General Wade's division of troops, and held back a 
number of transports for that purpose. The critics of 
the Department declared that this expedition was wholly 
uncalled for, and that the movement was based upon 
political instead of military reasons. It was spoken of 
as a picnic at the expense of the government for the 
pleasure of the soldiers, who were expected to respond 
with ballots instead of bullets. 

The sarcastic comments of the press, in connection 
with a message from General Miles, saying "Do not 
send me any more troops," put an end to the proposed 
expedition, while the emphatic action of the generals at 
Santiago broke up the leisurely movement of depart- 
mental routine, and roused the officials to a realizing 
sense of the situation. The transports which had been 
intended for Wade's men were ordered to proceed with 
all haste to Santiago, and those which had been used 
for Miles' s army were sent to the same point, the whole 
being held sufficient to carry from twelve thousand to 
fifteen thousand men. All clothing and bedding likely 



328 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

to be infected were ordered to be destroyed, all men 
who were suffering from yellow fever or other infectious 
diseases to be left behind, and every precaution to be 
taken for the safe and healthy carriage of the men to 
their destination. 

The convalescent camp selected was at Montauk Point, 
Long Island, where a tract of land three miles square 
had been secured. It was said to possess many sanitary 
advantages, including excellent drinking water, a lake 
of considerable dimensions, and facilities for fresh-water 
bathing. 

Adverse criticism soon found new food for comment 
in the way the direction to take precautions for the safe 
and healthy carriage of the men was carried out. The 
transport Concho, which reached Hampton Roads on 
August i, with officers, non-commissioned officers, and 
nurses, was found to be in a most horrible condition, 
due to the lack of water, food, and medicine on the ship. 
There was no ice on the steamer and no water except 
the stale supply taken on in early June at Santiago. 
The only food consisted of coarse army rations utterly 
unfit for sick men to eat. Of medicine, there was only 
a scant supply of quinine, camphor, and sulphur. For 
thirty-eight hours the bodies of three dead men lay un- 
covered under the saloon, yielding a terrible stench. 
The health officer at Hampton Roads refused permission 
to bury these on shore, and the ship had to put to sea, 
two others dying in the meantime. "I believe if the 
men had had proper food and medicines all of them 
would have been alive to-day," said one of the staff on 
board. "I never saw such blundering in my life." 
' ' The food given the sick men would have sickened well 
men," said the doctor in charge. " Men who had just 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 329 

recovered from yellow fever should have had better food 
than hardtack and beans." 

The condition of the Concho should have served as a 
useful object-lesson in the conveyance of the sick sol- 
diers to Montauk Point, but those in charge do not 
seem to have availed themselves of the lesson. Follow- 
ing the Concho came the Seneca, marked by little less 
scandalous conditions. Other transports open to severe 
criticism were the Breakwater, the Santiago, the Comal, 
and the San Marco. It was evident not only that 
' ' some one had blundered, ' ' but also that some one 
kept blundering. And a new series of blunders cropped 
out at the Montauk Point camp, where the first soldiers 
who landed found no preparations for their reception, 
while the excellent water promised was conspicuously 
absent. Days passed before proper tentage was pro- 
vided and the camp was supplied with palatable water, 
while the food supply was composed of the ordinary 
army rations, no delicacies suitable for the sick being 
provided. 

The situation at Camp Alger called for as radical 
measures of relief as that at Santiago. Here were 
twenty thousand men exposed to unsanitary conditions 
and visited by a serious epidemic of typhoid fever. It 
was not until August 2 that an order for their removal 
to a healthier location was given, the old battle-site of 
Manassas being chosen for their new camp. The march 
was conducted in the bungling fashion which seemed to 
have become epidemic in the army, the officers in charge 
erring seriously through ignorance or carelessness. The 
troops were moved, but their food-supplies were not 
moved with them, the supply-wagons starting twelve 
hours after the march began, so that the men went to 



330 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

bed hungry and their rations failed to reach them until 
sunrise of the following day. The medicine-chests were 
similarly wanting, and in the whole movement the lack 
of a directing head was painfully apparent. 

The soldiers at Chickamauga soon proved to be no 
better off. Sickness appeared and increased there until 
the camp was a veritable pest-hole, the water-supply, 
never very abundant, growing daily more and more con- 
taminated, until it seemed, if something were not speedily 
done, that all the soldiers present would be prostrated 
with typhoid fever and other dangerous diseases. In 
truth, sickness had invaded and was increasing in all the 
camps, and immediate action for relief was imperatively 
necessary. 

The disposition in the public press to hold the War 
Department responsible for all these evidences of careless- 
ness and incompetency was perhaps unwarranted. In- 
experienced and negligent subordinates have a habit of 
blundering in spite of the wisest and most judicious 
orders, and for such delinquencies as that shown in the 
march to Manassas only the officers in charge could justly 
be held responsible. The lack of suitable supplies on the 
transports was perhaps due to a similar cause. Yet when 
we consider the many and varied evidences of incompe- 
tency and neglect, we cannot but consider the general 
directing head in some degree culpable, — in how large 
a degree only a full investigation can determine. 

After detailing the criticisms to which Secretary Alger 
was subjected, we must in justice let him speak for him- 
self, quoting from a letter written by him on August 13, 
and which described the great and multifarious labors of 
the Department during the war : 

" There is nothing young men in robust health are so 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 331 

prodigal of as their health until it is gone. Men go into 
camp feeling that they can stand anything and every- 
thing, and cannot be made to believe to the contrary, 
and are stricken with disease. Every effort has been 
made from the beginning to furnish every camp with all 
appliances asked for, but of course the commanding offi- 
cers in the field are the ones who have the direct charge 
of these men. 

' ' For instance, one army corps commander has given 
orders, and enforces them, respecting sanitary affairs, 
and he had to-day but a fraction over two per cent, on 
the sick-list. Others have been less successful, and the 
consequence is typhoid and other fevers have been bred 
and spread to a considerable extent. One regiment in 
the Chickamauga camp has a colonel who enforces sani- 
tary rules in his regiment, obliging the men to boil all 
the water they drink, keeping the camp cleanly, and the 
result,— less than twenty-five sick, and his camp, too, in 
as unfavorable a place as any in the command. Others 
more favorably situated have ten times that number on 
the sick-list. One of the regiments of the last call, not 
yet removed from its State, sends bitter complaints of 
typhoid fever. 

"Concerning the Santiago campaign, when the ships 
left Tampa they had on board three months' provisions 
and an abundance of hospital supplies. They had 
lighters to unload with at points of debarkation. These 
lighters were lost in severe storms on the way. As soon 
as we were notified of the fact two tows of lighters were 
sent from Mobile and New Orleans, which were also over- 
taken by storm and lost. The navy supplied us with 
lighters, and one of these was wrecked. The army dis- 
embarked, getting off a portion of its supplies and medi- 



332 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

cal stores, and immediately marched to the front to fight 
the Spaniards. 

"The great difficulty of landing supplies subsequently 
was that the wind sprang up every morning at ten and 
made a high surf, rendering almost impossible the use of 
small boats, with one lighter, which was all they had left 
for this purpose. Of the packers who were employed, 
sixty per cent, soon fell sick, and heavy rains falling every 
day, the roads (if they could be called such) became 
impassable for vehicles, and pack-animals had to be em- 
ployed to carry food to the army, which, being extended 
to the right around Santiago, increased the distance from 
the coast every day and made the task more difficult. . . . 

"Everything that human ingenuity could devise has 
been done to succor that army, — not the ingenuity of the 
Secretary of War, but the result of the combined counsel 
of those who have had a life-long experience in the field. 
That some men have been neglected on transports 
coming home there is no doubt, — all against positive 
orders, due, perhaps, to carelessness and negligence, 
but largely on account of not having the medical force 
to spare (many of whom were sick) from the camp at 
Santiago. Many medical officers sent with transports 
were taken ill on the way home." 

This chapter may be suitably closed with the recital 
of an incident that formed part of the series of events 
described. On July 23 Colonel Roosevelt wrote to 
Secretary Alger, with the approval of General Wheeler, 
asking him to send the cavalry division, "including the 
Rough Riders, who are as good as any regulars, and 
three times as good as any State troops, to Porto 
Rico." This division, with the other regiments of 
Rough Riders, would make nearly four thousand men, 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 333 

"who would be worth easily any ten thousand national 
guards armed with black powder Springfields or other 
archaic weapons." 

This communication brought a tart reply from the 
Secretary of War, sent in the form of a cable message, 
after the date of the " Round Robin." It said, 

"Your letter of 23d is received. The regular army, 
the volunteer army, and the Rough Riders have done 
well, but I suggest that, unless you want to spoil the 
effects and glory of your victory, you make no invidious 
comparisons. The Rough Riders are no better than 
any other volunteers. They had an advantage in their 
arms, for which they ought to be very grateful. 
" R. A. Alger, 

' ' Secretary of War. ' ' 

The sharpness of this rebuke was not uncalled for 
in the character of Colonel Roosevelt's letter, but the 
making public such a reply to a private letter exposed 
Secretary Alger to severe animadversion in the hostile 
press, which seemed disposed to attribute it to spite at 
Roosevelt's implied criticism of the War Department in 
his communication to General Shafter. However that 
may be, we cannot but look upon the outspoken colonel 
as the right man in the right place when we consider the 
quick and important effect of his action. 



CHAPTER XIX. 

THE INVASION OF PORTO RICO. 

The movements of the Spanish navy proved the dom- 
inating influences in the war with Spain. Had military 
considerations alone ruled, Havana would have been the 
main point of attack in Cuba, but the fact that Cervera's 
fleet took refuge in the bay of Santiago centred the 
movement of invasion about the city of that name. The 
city of Manila, through the presence of a Spanish fleet 
in its harbor, became a second central point in the war. 
And, thirdly, the movement of Camara's fleet from 
Cadiz to Port Said gave rise to a projected naval expe- 
dition against Spain. This was deferred on account of 
Camara's hasty return, but the purpose was not aban- 
doned, and almost at the last days of the war a powerful 
fleet under Admiral Sampson was held ready to proceed 
against the Spanish coast. The only event in the war 
not dominated by naval exigencies was the invasion of 
Porto Rico. At an early date in the war the conquest 
of this valuable island became a settled purpose of the 
administration. The invasion was deferred from time to 
time for reasons connected with the Santiago campaign, 
yet the occupation of this island before the conclusion of 
the war was held to be indispensable. 

As it was proposed to send an army to Porto Rico 
large enough to effect a rapid conquest of the island, its 
departure was delayed until after the surrender of Santi- 
ago, in order that a part of the experienced regiments 
334 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 335 

at that place might be employed. Those under Major- 
General Miles, commander-in-chief of the expedition, 
were ready to sail on July 18, but a detention for several 
days took place, due to delay on the part of Admiral 
Sampson in furnishing the requisite naval escort ; a re- 
missness which, whatever its cause, brought him severe 
blame. To complete the expedition, a large body of 
troops were to be sent from the United States under the 
command of Major-General John R. Brooke, sailing from 
Charleston, Tampa, and Newport News. 

For several days Miles' s troops sweltered in the 
crowded transports under a tropical sun while waiting 
the promised escort. It was not until the 21st that they 
finally set sail, some four thousand in number. The 
expedition from Charleston, numbering about three 
thousand men, was already under way, and fears were 
entertained that it might reach the point of rendezvous 
in advance of the naval support. A similar force set sail 
from Tampa, while General Brooke, with five thousand 
three hundred men, left Newport News a week later. 
It was proposed that these should be followed by others, 
making a total force of about thirty-five thousand men. 
Supplies in abundance were forwarded with the troops, 
and a strong corps of engineers accompanied the army, 
with a large store of engineering machinery and equip- 
ment for road- and bridge-building. The authorities did 
not intend to repeat the mistakes which had so seriously 
imperilled the success of the Santiago expedition. 

It was not publicly known to what port the expedition 
was directed, but general surprise was felt on learning 
that on Monday, the 25th, four days after sailing, Miles' s 
transports had entered the harbor of Guanica, in the 
southwestern section of the island, and at almost the 



336 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

farthest possible remove from the port of San Juan. 
This was not the point originally determined upon, but 
the commander-in-chief, for satisfactory reasons, decided 
during the voyage to change its destination. In the 
lead of the escort was the Gloucester, the little con- 
verted yacht which had made so noble a record in sink- 
ing the Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers at Santiago. 
After her came the Massachusetts, the Yale, and the 
Columbia, escorting the transports, whose tardiness had 
kept the expedition so long upon the sea. 

The harbor of Guanica is a picturesque place, a broad 
level of meadow land extending from the shore-line of 
its placid bay to a background of high mountains. The 
village consisted of about a score of prettily painted 
houses, with a sugar-mill on the right and a block-house 
some two miles distant on the left. The Spanish flag 
floated on a small log house upon the beach. 

Sounding constantly as she went, the Gloucester 
pushed boldly into the harbor, from which there soon 
came back to the fleet the sound of her 6-pounder guns. 
On reaching the village, she had sent her launch ashore, 
with about thirty sailors and a Colt rapid-fire gun. 
Rushing to the house that flew the flag of Spain, in a 
minute the active tars had it down and the stars and 
stripes floating in its place, while a hearty cheer greeted 
the first display of this emblem on Porto Rican soil. In 
a few minutes more there came a sharp patter of bullets 
from a squad of soldiers hid among the houses of the 
town. The rifles of the Americans answered, and the 
guns of the Gloucester quickly joined in, following the 
fugitives with 6-pounder shot as they broke and fled 
towards the hills. The result of the skirmish was four 
Spaniards killed and not one American wounded. 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 337 

The men of the Gloucester were warmly cheered for 
their useful service as the other ships came up the bay, 
and the landing of the troops was quickly under way, 
the men forming into companies and occupying points 
of vantage in the vicinity on reaching shore. A strong 
detachment was sent out to reconnoitre Yauco, a small 
place about five miles inland, which formed the terminus 
of the railroad from Ponce, fifteen miles due east. A 
high-road, whose condition was the reverse of promis- 
ing, led to the latter place, but from Ponce to San Juan 
extended a military road, eighty-five miles long, in admi- 
rable condition, and thoroughly adapted for the passage 
of artillery and army wagons. 

On the 27th, two days after Guanica was reached, Com- 
mander Davis set out with the Dixie, Gloucester, An- 
napolis, and Wasp to blockade the port of Ponce and 
capture lighters for the use of the army. Here no re- 
sistance was encountered, the Spanish having evacuated 
the place, which surrendered to Commander Davis on 
demand, the American flag being raised in the early 
morning of the 28th. Sixty lighters and twenty sailing- 
vessels were captured, and the people received the 
American troops with wild enthusiasm. Soon after 
General Miles reached the place, with transports convey- 
ing General Ernst's brigade, of Wilson's division, which 
was at once landed, and was received with an ovation by 
the citizens. 

The scene, indeed, was among the most remarkable 
of the war. As the ships entered the harbor, they were 
surrounded by boats filled with citizens shouting ' ' Viva 
Americanos. ' ' The flags of all nations but Spain floated 
from the houses, and the streets, balconies, and roofs 
were filled with joyous people, of every class of society, 



338 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

loudly cheering General Miles and the American flag - . 
There did not seem to be a Spanish sympathizer in the 
town, and the people fraternized with the soldiers as if 
they were overjoyed at the idea of becoming citizens of 
the United States. 

General Ernst's brigade at once started for the town 
of Ponce, three miles inland, which capitulated as readily 
as its port, the Spaniards retreating towards the moun- 
tains, and the people welcoming the troops with the 
warmest enthusiasm. Generals Miles and Wilson were 
cheered to the echo when they entered the town, in 
which they were received by the mayor and the British 
consul, who acted in behalf of the Spaniards in deliver- 
ing the city into their hands. Stepping on to the balcony 
after the ceremony, they were received with such a roar 
of cheers that the modest conquerors hastily withdrew. 
"The island," said Mayor Colon, "would now enjoy 
peace and prosperity, and the best citizens were glad the 
Americans had come." 

General Miles then issued the following proclamation : 
" In the prosecution of the war against the kingdom 
of Spain by the people of the United States, in the 
cause of liberty, justice, and humanity, its military forces 
have come to occupy the island of Porto Rico. They 
come bearing the banners of freedom, inspired by a 
noble purpose, to seek the enemies of our government 
and of yours, and to destroy or capture all in armed 
resistance. They bring you the fostering arms of a free 
people whose greatest power is justice and humanity to 
all living within their fold. Hence they release you 
from your former political relations, and it is hoped this 
will be followed by your cheerful acceptance of the gov- 
ernment of the United States. 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 339 

"The chief object of the American military forces 
will be to overthrow the armed authority of Spain and 
give the people of your beautiful island the largest 
measure of liberty consistent with this military occupa- 
tion. They have not come to make war on the people 
of the country, who for centuries have been oppressed, 
but, on the contrary, they bring protection, not only to 
yourselves, but to your property ; promote your pros- 
perity and bestow the immunities and blessings of our 
enlightenment and liberal institutions and government. 

" It is not their purpose to interfere with the existing 
laws and customs which are wholesome and beneficial to 
the people, so long as they conform to the rules of the 
military administration, order, and justice. This is not 
a war of devastation and desolation, but one to give all 
within the control of the military and naval forces the 
advantages and blessings of enlightened civilization. ' ' 

The capture of Ponce was an important step towards 
the subjugation of the island. It is the second city of 
the island, with a population of twenty-two thousand, 
and a jurisdiction numbering forty-seven thousand. Playa, 
the port, has about five thousand population, and has a 
spacious harbor, into which vessels of twenty-five feet 
draught can enter. Ponce was founded in 1600 by Ponce 
de Leon, whose name it bears. It possesses a number 
of handsome edifices, and occupies one of the healthiest 
and most agreeable situations on the island. 

The first opposition to our troops, beyond that of the 
skirmish at Guanica, occurred on the succeeding day at 
Yauco, near which the Spaniards ambushed eight com- 
panies of Massachusetts and Illinois regiments. The 
enemy was repulsed and driven to a ridge a mile away, 
from which a body of cavalry charged the advancing 



340 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

infantry. They in turn were driven back and retreated 
to Yauco, leaving four dead on the field. No Americans 
were killed and only three were slightly wounded. On 
the following day Yauco was occupied, and the troops 
from Guanica began an overland march upon Ponce. 
So far not a man had been killed on the American side. 

The business of Ponce, momentarily checked, was 
soon in full tide again, those citizens who had fled to the 
woods and hills with their valuables quickly returning, 
and banks and stores being opened for trade. The 
competition of the merchants for the American dollar 
was matched by the competition of the people for the 
American flag, the stock of flags on hand being soon so 
reduced that General Miles felt it necessary to cable 
home, " Please send any national colors that can be 
spared, to be given to the different municipalities." 
On the 31st he telegraphed as follows : 

"Volunteers are surrendering themselves with arms 
and ammunition. Four-fifths of the people are over- 
joyed at the arrival of the army. Two thousand from 
one place have volunteered to serve with it. They are 
bringing in transportation, beef, cattle, and other needed 
supplies. The custom-house has already yielded four- 
teen thousand dollars. As soon as all the troops are 
disembarked, they will be in readiness to move." 

On the same day the town of Juan Diaz, eight miles 
from Ponce on the road to San Juan, was occupied, the 
people greeting the American flag with the same enthu- 
siasm as at Ponce. A similar feeling was manifested at 
Yauco, whose mayor issued a grandiloquent proclama- 
tion, saying, — 

' ' This is a day of glorious remembrance for each son 
of this beloved isle, because for the first time there waves 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 341 

over it the flag of stars, planted in the name of the 
United States of America by the major-general of the 
American army, Senor Miles." 
He concluded with, — 

' ' Citizens, long live the government of the United 
States of America. Hail to its valiant troops ! Hail, 
Porto Rico, always American ! 

" El Alcalde, Francisco Magia. 

"Yauco, Porto Rico, United States of America." 

Thus far the Spaniards had shown no disposition to 
make a stand against the Americans, though they might 
have attacked with effect some of the small American 
garrisons. Colonel Hulings held Juan Diaz with but 
two companies, who might have been flanked and cut 
off by the Spaniards ; yet they were not molested, nor 
were any of the little detachments which he sent out for 
reconnoitring purposes, though the fields of tall sugar- 
cane bordering the roads offered abundant opportunities 
for ambushes. 

There was reason to believe, however, that the Span- 
iards were preparing to give the Americans a warm re- 
ception at Aibonito, where the military road to San Juan 
crosses the mountains, a point which presents excellent 
opportunities for defence. General Miles received in- 
formation that this road had been mined by the enemy, 
who had also hidden explosives in the wayside bushes. 
These defences lay between Juan Diaz and Aibonito, at 
which town was a considerable body of troops prepared 
to offer a stout resistance. Miles, therefore, determined 
to foil them by a change of plan, and to approach San 
Juan by a different route. 



342 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

In pursuance of this new plan, movements were made 
in various directions, troops being advanced on lines east 
and west of the imperilled situation. Their outposts 
in a few days were twenty miles to the north of Ponce, 
the several movements being so co-ordinated that the 
Spaniards at Aibonito were likely to find themselves 
beset on every side, and in danger of capture unless they 
should make a hasty retreat upon San Juan. 

General Brooke, with a force of twelve hundred men, 
proceeded on transports to Arroyo, whence his advance, 
on August 5, reached the town of Guayama, on the 
eastern side of the island, due south from San Juan. 
They found here a Spanish force of about five hundred 
men, but a mere skirmish sufficed to drive them out, the 
sole loss being one Spaniard killed and two or three on 
each side wounded. From there the line of march lay 
to Cayey, farther inland, a position from which the 
military road to San Juan could be seized beyond the 
points where mines had been placed. 

This movement to the east was paralleled by one to 
the west, General Roy Stone occupying Adjuntas, to 
the north of Ponce, and reaching, by the 4th, the town 
of Utado, fifteen miles farther inland and near the centre 
of the island. The road between these places was not 
adapted to the transportation of wagons and artillery ; 
but General Stone soon had a force of five hundred 
natives at work, making the way passable. His route 
lay towards Arecibo, on the northern coast, where trans- 
ports could meet him with the guns and wagons, and 
whence a railroad and a good dirt road extended to San 
Juan. 

The important town of Coama, midway between Ponce 
and Guayama, remained unoccupied, but the advance 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 343 

was rapidly approaching it, a reconnoitring party of 
about twenty men advancing to the suburbs on the 
evening of August 1. Here they opened fire on the 
volunteer pickets, who immediately fled. The town was 
not taken, however, until the 9th, when General Ernst's 
brigade advanced upon it, while the Sixteenth Pennsyl- 
vania, under Colonel Hulings, made a flank movement 
through the mountains and struck the Aibonito road 
half a mile beyond the town, thus cutting off the retreat 
of the garrison. The Spanish force, one hundred and 
fifty in number, was captured. 

Other events of passing interest took place elsewhere. 
An advance guard, reconnoitring northwest of Guanica, 
came upon a strong Spanish force in the hills near 
Hormigueros, north of Mayaguez. A sharp encounter 
took place, the enemy being dislodged with considerable 
loss. The American loss was two killed and fourteen 
wounded. From that point a march on Mayaguez, a 
place of some importance on the western border of the 
island, was contemplated. At Cape San Juan, the north- 
eastern point of land on the island, a landing had been 
effected, and the light-house was held by forty American 
sailors, who were attacked by a force of eight hundred 
Spaniards before daybreak on August 9. They were 
driven back by shells from the Amphitrite, the Cincin- 
nati, and the tug Leyden, suffering severely for their 
temerity. 

Thus on the south, the west, and the east the Amer- 
ican forces were pushing forward into the island, meeting 
with scarcely any resistance, and received by the natives 
with a flattering greeting at all points. 

The Spanish leaders seemed to have based their sole 
hopes of a successful resistance on the garrison of 



344 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

Aibonito, on which mountain stronghold General Miles 
was moving his troops from several directions. By the 
nth a cavalry advance reached a point within three 
miles of the town, where it was fired upon by the Span- 
ish outpost, strongly posted with artillery on a high hill 
that commanded the military road. A sharp skirmish 
took place, none of the Americans being injured. By the 
13th the invading army had gained favorable positions 
in all quarters. General Schwan had reached Mayaguez, 
General Henry was within fifteen miles of Arecibo, Gen- 
eral Brooke had advanced beyond Guayama, and was on 
the point of attacking a strong Spanish position on the 
road to Cayey. An artillery duel had just taken place 
with a strongly posted Spanish force near Coamo. At 
Aibonito the enemy's batteries on the heights had been 
shelled on the 12th. General Wilson was moving to 
turn the right flank of the Spanish, whose rear was 
threatened by General Brooke. All was ready for what 
might have proved a severe and sanguinary battle, when 
news reached the island and spread to the camps that 
put an end to all hostilities. "Cease action !" shouted 
Lieutenant McLaughlin, riding up to a battery that was 
about to fire on the Spanish works before Guayama. 

" Why?" came the wondering question. 

' ' The war is over, ' ' was the reply. ' ' A peace protocol 
was signed at Washington yesterday, and all is at an 
end." 

It came in time to save the Spaniards from inevitable 
defeat. In a week more the whole of Porto Rico would 
probably have been in American hands. 

The tidings of the treaty of peace put a stop to several 
active movements of hostility elsewhere. At Manza- 
nillo, in Cuba, a severe bombardment was in progress, 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 345 

which continued through the afternoon and evening of the 
12th, and was resumed on the morning of the 13th. The 
town was summoned to surrender, the authorities being 
given three hours in which to capitulate. When a flag 
of truce appeared on the Spanish side, the natural im- 
plication was that they were ready to treat. But when 
it reached the American ships, their commander was 
handed a cable message from General Shafter to the 
effect that peace had been declared and that hostilities 
must cease. The guns had fired their last shots. 

Another engagement was in progress at the port of 
Caibarien, on the north coast of Santa Clara, whither 
the Mangrove had gone to protect the landing of a 
Cuban expedition. She found here the Spanish gun- 
boat Hernan Cortes and a smaller gunboat, which were 
anchored near the shore in shoal water. The Mangrove 
had only two 6-pounders, while the gunboats were much 
better armed, and there were several pieces of artillery 
mounted on shore. Yet, in despite of this superiority 
of force, the little tug made an attack on the Spanish 
boats, reply being made from ship and shore with artil- 
lery and Mauser rifles. The Hernan Cortes carried 
two 4.7-inch guns, whose shells exploded all about the 
Mangrove. 

Suddenly there appeared flags of truce, one on the 
small gunboat and two on shore, and a boat put off with 
a Spanish officer on board. On reaching the Mangrove, 
he announced, ' ' Peace is proclaimed, and I have in- 
structions for your commanding officer from the military 
commander of this district." This commander had been 
telegraphed information of the fight, and had at once 
sent word that peace was restored and the fight must 
cease. 



346 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

The final and the most successful shots from Morro 
Castle, Havana, were fired on the morning of August 12 
at Commodore Howell's flag-ship, the San Francisco, the 
monitor Miantonomoh, and the yacht Sylvia, then on 
blockade duty. The ships had orders not to attack the 
batteries and turned to get out of range. As they did 
so, a 10- or 12-inch shell struck the stern of the San 
Francisco, tearing a hole about a foot in diameter, and 
making a complete wreck of the commodore's quarters. 
His bookcase was smashed to fragments. No one was 
injured. Before the day closed, the peace protocol was 
signed and the long blockade was at an end. 



CHAPTER XX. 

THE SIEGE OF MANILA. 

The war with Spain had two widely separated fields 
of action, — the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico in the 
Atlantic and the Philippine Islands in the Pacific, nearly- 
half the circumference of the earth intervening. In the 
former field warlike events were far more varied and 
continuous, and therefore we have given undivided at- 
tention to these after describing the great victory in 
Manila Bay. We must now return to the Philippines, 
where, though the American forces were quiescent, there 
had been no small degree of warlike activity on the part 
of the natives. 

In the preceding chapters concerning the Philippines 
mention has been made of the compact that ended the 
rebellion at the close of 1897, and the rise of the rebels 
again in 1898. This second outbreak did not become 
active until after May 24, on which day General Agui- 
naldo and twelve others of the insurgent leaders landed 
at Cavite, having come from Hong-Kong on the despatch- 
boat McCullough. The return of this able leader at once 
gave vitality to the insurgent movement, and a bold 
advance against Manila was made. At that time there 
were said to be thirty thousand natives in the field, 
though they were poorly supplied with arms. 

On the night of the 24th the insurgents made a recon- 
noissance in force against the Spanish outposts, and 
found them to be protected by guns which had been 

347 



348 THE WAR WITH SPAIN, 

turned landward from the shore batteries. During the 
succeeding days they were actively aggressive, the prin- 
cipal engagement being on the left branch of the Zapote, 
which they waded during a typhoon, stormed the banks 
for several miles, and drove the Spaniards from their 
trenches with knives. Other fights took place around 
Manila, the insurgents apparently having an ample 
supply of arms and ammunition, given them in part by 
Admiral Dewey. One result of their operations was a 
large number of prisoners, about eighteen hundred in 
all, whom they brought into Cavite. In addition, two 
batteries had been taken and the whole province of 
Cavite was in their hands. By May 31 they had taken 
several places in the vicinity of the city, whose suburbs 
they were attacking, and which they encircled for a dis- 
tance of seven miles. The Spanish authorities had 
offered a reward of twenty-five thousand dollars for 
Aguinaldo, dead or alive, an appeal to treachery which 
fortunately failed in its effect. 

Admiral Dewey, fearing a massacre if the city should 
be taken, set limits to the advance of the insurgents, 
forbidding them to cross the Malolele River, seven miles 
south of Manila. They were told that if they should 
seek to disobey this order, the gunboat Petrel would be 
stationed there to bombard them. He was not willing 
to permit ' ' hordes of passionate semi-savages to storm a 
civilized metropolis," and determined to hold them in 
check until the American troops should arrive. Mean- 
while, the Spaniards felt themselves to be in a serious 
strait. On June 3 Captain-General Augustin cabled to 
Madrid : 

"The situation is very grave. Aguinaldo has suc- 
ceeded in stirring up the country, and the telegraph- 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 349 

lines and railways are being cut. I am without commu- 
nication with the provinces. The province of Cavite 
has completely rebelled, and the towns and villages are 
occupied by numerous bands. 

" I am striving to raise the courage of the inhabitants, 
and will exhaust every means of resistance ; but I dis- 
trust the natives and the volunteers because there have 
already been many desertions. Bacoor and Imas have 
already been seized by the enemy. The insurrection 
has reached great proportions, and, if I cannot count 
upon the support of the country, the forces at my disposal 
will not suffice to hold the ground against two enemies." 

Aguinaldo, on landing, had issued three proclama- 
tions. One of these based his return on the failure of 
the Spaniards to carry out their promised reforms and 
the support offered by the United States. He proposed 
to act as dictator until the islands were completely free, 
when a constitutional republic, with president, cabinet, 
and congress, would be established. The second procla- 
mation forbade all peace negotiations with the Spaniards, 
and the third forbade robbery and acts of violence. The 
prisoners in his hands were well treated. 

On the 1 2th a despatch from Dewey said, "There is 
little change in the situation since my telegram of June 3. 
Insurgents continue hostilities and have practically sur- 
rounded Manila. They have taken two thousand five 
hundred Spanish prisoners, whom they treat most hu- 
manely. They do not intend to take the city at the 
present time. The health of the squadron continues 
excellent. The German commander-in-chief arrived 
to-day. Three German, one British, one French, one 
Japanese men-of-war in port. Another German man-of- 
war is expected." 



350 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

By the 20th of June the insurgents had taken four 
thousand Spanish and one thousand native prisoners, 
and had closed in on the city until it was very closely 
besieged. On the 12th they had proclaimed in Old 
Cavite the establishment of a provisional government, a 
declaration of independence of Spanish authority being 
read and General Aguinaldo elected president. The 
new president informed Mr. Williams, the United States 
consul, that this action was taken merely for purposes 
of cohesion, and that the insurgents desired to make an 
American colony of the Philippine Islands. He declared 
that no other country should possess the Philippines 
without fighting for them, and that if the United States 
declined the proffered gift, an independent republic would 
be founded. 

Day by day the situation of the Spaniards in Manila 
grew more desperate. On June 23 Augustin cabled as 
follows to Madrid : 

' ' The situation is still grave. I continue to maintain my 
position inside the line of block-houses, but the enemy is 
increasing in numbers as the rebels occupy the provinces, 
which are surrendering. Torrential rains are inundating 
the intrenchments, rendering the work of defence difficult. 
The numbers of sick among the troops are increasing, 
making the situation very distressing and causing in- 
creased desertions of the native soldiers. It is estimated 
that the insurgents number thirty thousand armed with 
rifles and one hundred thousand armed with swords, etc. 
Aguinaldo has summoned me to surrender, but I have 
treated his proposals with disdain, for I am resolved to 
maintain the sovereignty of Spain and the honor of the 
flag to the last extremity." 

Yet, despite the confessedly desperate situation of 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 351 

Augustin, he contrived to hold his own against the 
natives during the succeeding month, the Spaniards, 
though driven from their outpost works, holding on to 
their interior intrenchments with obstinate valor. It 
began to appear as if, despite the impetuosity of the 
natives, they could not succeed in their purpose without 
American aid. They were now, however, in possession 
of artillery, and had the city almost completely invested, 
while there was much sickness among the defenders and 
food had grown very scarce. On the other hand, 
anarchy appeared to have broken out among the natives, 
and Aguinaldo's position as dictator was by no means 
assured. The restraint exercised by the Americans over 
the insurgents was thought to have caused much irrita- 
tion among the latter, and decreased their desire to 
become citizens or subjects of the United States. 

Admiral Dewey, during these operations, maintained 
a position of masterly inactivity, keeping a controlling 
hand over Aguinaldo and his native forces, but desisting 
from any hostile movement towards the city other than 
that of the blockade. He was waiting, doubtless with 
impatience, the arrival of the troops, whose coming had 
been so annoyingly delayed, and his position was a very 
trying one, requiring the exercise of the highest judg- 
ment and discretion. 

The first expedition of troops, conveyed by the cruiser 
Charleston, entered Manila Bay on the 30th of June. 
On the 20th it had reached Guahan, or Guam, the largest 
of the Ladrone Islands, a group belonging to Spain. 
The chief town of this island, St. Ignacio de Agano, 
was defended by two forts, which were summoned to 
surrender by a shot from the Charleston. Never was 
there a more amusing capture of a town. The com- 



35 2 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

mandant, who knew nothing of the war, supposed the 
shot to be a friendly salute, and sent off a boat to the 
Charleston with regrets that, being out of powder, he 
was unable to return the salute. He was soon undeceived, 
and the governor and other officials of the island were 
taken on board and brought to Cavite, a force being left 
in charge of the captured town. On July 6 the troops 
were unloaded from the transports at Cavite, and the 
first step was taken towards an assault on Manila by land. 

Dewey, meanwhile, maintained the blockade, but not 
without a cause of irritation in the attitude of the Ger- 
mans, who had sent thither a far larger fleet than any 
other nation, and were thought to have intentions of 
interfering in the settlement of the Philippine question. 
What seemed an open indication of such a purpose was 
manifested on July 6, when the insurgents informed 
Dewey that the German gunboat Irene had refused to 
permit them to attack the Spaniards on Grande Island, 
in Subic Bay. 

Admiral Dewey had hitherto maintained an attitude 
of diplomatic friendliness towards the Germans, but this 
reported interference called for decisive action, and the 
cruisers Raleigh and Concord were at once sent to in- 
vestigate the affair. On entering the bay, the Raleigh 
fired upon the forts, on observing which the Irene slipped 
her cable and steamed out by the other channel. No 
resistance was made by the Spaniards, and the garrison, 
thirteen hundred in number, was quickly surrendered. 
The Spanish seemed endeavoring to defend the bay by 
submarine mines, in order to hold it as a place of ren- 
dezvous for Camara's fleet, supposed to be on its way 
from Spain. On returning to Manila, the commander 
of the Irene explained that he had interfered "in the 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 353 

cause of humanity," and offered to hand over to Admiral 
Dewey the refugees he had brought from the island. 
These Dewey declined to receive. The action of the 
Germans created much irritation in the United States, 
where many considered it little short of an act of war. 
But this feeling subsided when later despatches gave the 
details of the affair. Admiral Dewey's despatch con- 
tained no indication that he considered the action of the 
Irene as important. 

The second American expedition from San Francisco 
reached Manila Bay on July 19, and the disembarkation 
immediately began, the troops landing at Paranajo, two 
miles south of Manila, the cruiser Boston being detailed 
to cover the landing. The troops of the first expedi- 
tion, under General Anderson, were still at Cavite, 
though on the 19th the First California Regiment was 
pushed forward to Janbo, two miles from the Spanish 
lines. General Francis V. Greene, the leader of the 
second expedition, took command of the advance, Gen- 
eral Anderson remaining in Cavite. As regards the 
condition of affairs in Manila, reports came that the 
inhabitants were reduced almost to a state of starvation, 
new supplies of food, either by land or water, being cut 
off, and the old stock nearly exhausted. Abattoirs for 
the slaughter of horses and dogs were opened. Sick- 
ness, due to the wretched food and impure water, and 
aggravated by the rains, which fell daily in torrents, was 
said to be very prevalent, and Manila to have reached 
almost the extreme limit of its powers of resistance. 
The condition of affairs found on the surrender of the 
city, however, indicated that these reports greatly exag- 
gerated the situation, the people showing no evidence of 
the work of famine. 

23 



354 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

Dewey still waited. A third expedition, under Gen- 
eral Merritt, military commander of the Philippines, was 
nearly due, and the monitors Monterey and Monadnock 
were well on their way. He had no desire to capture the 
city till assured of his ability to hold it, and to control 
the natives if they should attempt to make trouble. On 
the 25th, Merritt arrived in the Newport, accompanied 
and followed by a number of transports, the strength of 
the expedition being about five thousand officers and 
men. He at once took command of the land forces, 
establishing his head-quarters in Cavite arsenal. 

It was a season of storm. Rains of unusual heavi- 
ness fell daily, and high winds made the waters of the 
harbor so rough that it was impossible to land the troops, 
who remained on the transports for a week or more after 
their arrival. The Spanish commander in the city took 
advantage of this opportunity to make an attack in force 
on the American troops, perhaps with the hope of 
driving them back before they were reinforced. 

The attack seems to have been precipitated by a 
movement of General Greene to extend his lines. On 
the 31st of July his trenches faced the Spanish works, 
extending some three hundred yards from the beach and 
joining the insurgent lines on their left flank. This, 
however, was a feast day of the natives, who, regardless 
of military considerations, withdrew into their camp, 
leaving the right flank of the Americans exposed. Two 
companies of the Tenth Pennsylvania and the Utah 
Battery were ordered to fill the gap, but before they 
could fairly do so the Spaniards were upon them, three 
thousand strong. 

It was an excellent opportunity for a surprise, a trop- 
ical typhoon raging and the rain descending in blinding 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 355 

torrents, yet the Pennsylvanians stoutly held their ground 
in the face of a fierce fire, which they briskly returned. 
The Utah Battery was dragged to the front through mud 
axle-deep, and poured in a destructive enfilading fire on 
the enemy. The alarm rapidly spreading, the First 
California was rushed to the point of danger, with two 
companies of the Third Artillery, armed with rifles. 
The charge of the enemy had carried them to the top 
of the trenches by the time these reinforcements arrived, 
but the fire proved too severe for them to face and they 
fell back in disorder. Several desperate charges were 
made with the same result, and in the end the Spanish 
soldiers retreated into the bush, from which they kept 
up an incessant fire on the road leading to Manila, along 
which they seemingly expected the Americans to ad- 
vance. But the latter had exhausted their ammunition 
and made no attempt to follow the enemy. 

The fight was renewed on the night of August 1, and 
again on the succeeding night, but no infantry charges 
were made, the enemy confining themselves to the use 
of artillery, to which the Utah Battery replied. The 
loss in the three days' fighting was fourteen killed and 
forty-four wounded, the Spanish loss being much heavier, 
though the numbers were unknown. 

This vigorous effort to check the American advance 
had proved an utter failure, and the fall of the city was 
evidently near at hand. On the 4th of August the Mon- 
terey entered Manila harbor. The Monadnock was ex- 
pected in a few days, and the time had arrived to bring 
the long period of suspense to an end. 

The final operations began on August 7, when Admiral 
Dewey and General Merritt sent a joint notice to the 
Spanish commander, giving him forty-eight hours to 



356 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

remove non-combatants preliminary to a bombardment of 
the city. They had a new man to deal with. Governor- 
General Augustin had withdrawn from military control 
on the plea that Spain was sending him no help. He 
was succeeded by General Jaudenes, from whom came 
a courteous reply to the American note, thanking the 
commanders for their humane sentiments, but stating 
that he had no place of refuge for the large number of 
sick and wounded, women and children, who were within 
the walls. During the interval, the German residents 
and many of those of other countries took the oppor- 
tunity to leave the city on the war-ships of their respec- 
tive nations. 

On the 9th, at the end of the period granted, a second 
joint note was sent to General Jaudenes, demanding a 
surrender on the ground of the hopeless condition of the 
Spanish forces and the suffering in store for the sick and 
the non-combatants in case of assault. In reply, time 
was asked to communicate with Madrid by way of Hong- 
Kong ; but this respite was refused, and the ships began 
to strip for action, a second respite being granted until 
noon of Wednesday, the 10th. All the boats and wood- 
work that could be spared from the ships were sent to 
Cavite Navy- Yard, splinter nets were spread, guns 
cleaned and oiled, and other preparations made. The 
foreign war-vessels in the harbor took positions to ob- 
serve the action, the British and Japanese ships anchor- 
ing near our fleet, the German and French taking posi- 
tions opposite. Thus they seemed to separate into two 
groups, the friendly and the lukewarm. 

On Wednesday morning the ships were cleared for 
action and the men at their quarters, when a signal came 
from the Olympia, " Action postponed." General Mer- 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 357 

ritt had found that the army was not ready. It was un- 
derstood by this time that the Spanish resistance would 
be in form only, sufficient to preserve the honor of their 
arms, but the American leaders took no chances and 
prepared to meet a stubborn resistance if it should come. 

The truce now continued until Saturday, the 13th. At 
8.45 a.m. on that day the fleet got under way, the Con- 
cord taking her position on the north end of the line and 
the Monterey standing in close to the Lunetta battery. 
The Charleston, Baltimore, and Boston faced the same 
battery farther out, and the Olympia, Raleigh, and Petrel 
took positions opposite the Malate forts. With them 
were the McCullough and the Callao, the latter a gun- 
boat captured from the Spaniards. 

At 9.30 the Olympia opened fire, followed quickly by 
the Petrel and the Raleigh, while the little Callao, which 
had steamed close in shore, opened briskly from her sin- 
gle rapid-fire gun. The first shots all fell short, as if 
with the purpose of satisfying Spanish honor without 
loss. But no signs of surrender came, and the ships 
began to fire with better aim. Clouds of smoke, dust, 
and flying fragments rose above Malate, on which the 
whole attack was directed, and it was evident that the 
position would soon be made untenable. No reply 
came, and no shots were fired at the Lunetta and Pasig 
batteries, which continued silent. At 10.50 the Olympia 
signalled, " Cease firing," and the Spaniards were asked 
by the international code signal if they had surrendered. 
The result was not known in the fleet until 2. 30 p. M. , 
when the Olympia set the signal, ' ' The enemy has sur- 
rendered," and wild cheers of exultation broke from the 
crews. 

While the ships were thus engaged, a more sanguinary 



358 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

contest was taking place on shore. The Utah Battery- 
kept time with the ships in playing on the Malate works, 
which answered, though rather feebly. In less than half 
an hour after the bombardment began General Greene 
decided on an advance, signalling to the ships to cease 
firing. They kept on, however, the heavy rain render- 
ing the signals invisible. All the morning rain had 
been pouring down in sudden gushes, but in spite of 
this the troops sprang forward at the word, moving 
swiftly along the beach, with colors flying and band 
playing. A creek lay in their way, but they plunged in 
it and waded across. At eleven o'clock the Malate fort 
was occupied, the Spanish flag hauled down, and the 
American flag waving above its walls. 

The hardest fighting was done by the right wing, led 
by General McArthur, with the Astor Battery, his attack 
having no support from the guns of the fleet. The Cali- 
fornia troops, galled by a hot fire from Spanish sharp- 
shooters in houses on the right, charged into the Ermita 
suburb, where a stubborn contest took place in Calle 
Real with the Spaniards, who had barricaded the streets. 
They were attacked and driven out with pistols, the 
clearing of Calle Real ending the assault. About noon 
a white flag was floating over the city walls, indicating 
that the struggle was at an end. The loss on the Amer- 
ican side had been eight killed and forty wounded. The 
Spanish loss was much greater, though the number was 
unknown. Before the surrender the gunboat Cebu, in 
the Pasig River, was set on fire, and several smaller 
boats were destroyed. 

Flag-Lieutenant Brumby went ashore about noon and 
had an interview with General Jaudenes concerning the 
terms of capitulation. General Merritt subsequently 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 359 

joined in the conference, the terms agreed upon being, 
in brief outline, the following : 

Surrender of Manila and its suburbs. 

Officers to retain their swords and personal effects, but 
not their horses. 

Men to surrender their arms, prisoners of war being 
supplied from the treasury fund until exhausted, then by 
the Americans. 

The safety of life and property of Spaniards to be 
guaranteed as far as possible. 

The question of transporting the troops to Spain to 
be decided by the American government, and that of 
returning their arms to the soldiers to be left to the 
decision of General Merritt. 

All public property to be surrendered and banks to 
continue in business under existing regulations. 

Under these terms about seven thousand soldiers were 
surrendered as prisoners. The insurgents were not per- 
mitted to take part in the attack on the city, being kept 
in the rear of the Americans. After the surrender they 
were forbidden to enter Manila unless unarmed, fear of 
violence being entertained. 

As soon as the terms of capitulation were signed, 
Lieutenant Brumby hastened to lower a Spanish flag, 
as an indication of the end of Spanish dominion over 
Manila. The flag lowered was a large one that waved 
over Fort Santiago in the northern portion of the walled 
city. As it descended, and the Stars and Stripes rose 
in its place, tears flowed from the eyes of many of the 
observers. It meant the end of a once vast colonial 
empire of the Spanish nation. The event was greeted 
by the guns of the fleet and loud cheers from all the 
Americans within view. 



360 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

An event succeeded that roused some severe criticism 
in the United States, the departure of General Augustin, 
with his family and suite, on the German war-steamer 
Kaiserin Augusta, which left the harbor immediately 
after the surrender. It was looked upon as in line with 
the general discourtesy with which the Germans had 
been charged throughout the blockade of Manila. But 
later advices showed it to have been done with the 
concurrence of Admiral Dewey, and the feeling sub- 
sided. 

With a proclamation by General Merritt, announcing 
a military occupation by the United States of the island 
of Luzon, the protection of all inhabitants in their per- 
sonal and religious rights, and the retention of existing 
laws until notice of change, the circle of military affairs 
in the Philippine Islands ceased. The taking of Manila, 
indeed, was the final military and naval event of the war. 
The peace protocol had been signed the day before, and 
the war with Spain was at an end. 



CHAPTER XXL 

FROM WAR TO PEACE. 

The war of 1898 was in some respects a singular one. 
It was fought entirely outside the two countries con- 
cerned, — that is, if we consider the colonies of Spain as 
no part of the country itself. It was fought almost en- 
tirely by the navy, there being but one battle on land in 
which large armies took part ; yet throughout the war 
less than a score of men lost their lives on the ships of 
the United States, and not a ship was seriously injured, 
while the navy of Spain was practically annihilated. It 
was a war in which all the successes were on one side, 
all the failures on the other, and in which the entire loss 
of life in battle on the part of the United States was but 
a few hundred men. That of Spain it is impossible to 
estimate. 

But while the war did not touch the mainland of the 
two countries concerned, its effects made themselves 
strongly felt there. To the United States it seemed to 
bring prosperity and glory. Industry advanced, com- 
merce increased, values grew, and money and food be- 
came superabundant ; while the eyes of Europe for the 
first time became fully opened to the greatness of the 
republic of the West, and came to look upon it as a 
new-world power, to be taken seriously into account in 
all future rearrangements of the status of the nations. 
Four months of war had surprisingly changed the rela- 
tions of the United States with the great powers abroad. 

361 



362 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

To Spain, on the other hand, it brought loss and 
degradation. That country came out of it shorn of her 
most valuable colonies, overloaded with debt, virtually 
bankrupt, and greatly lowered in rank among the na- 
tions. While the United States obtained all the money 
needed in the war from her own people at a low rate of 
interest, and took a large part of it directly from her 
treasury, Spain sought in vain to borrow from the capi- 
talists of the world, who refused to trust their money in 
such doubtful hands. Yet, if she could have borrowed 
millions, they would have been of little use to her ; for, 
beyond sending one fleet across the ocean to be annihi- 
lated, she was obliged to let the war be fought by the 
forces in her colonies, the soldiers sent over in previous 
years to subdue the insurrections. These once con- 
quered, Spain's power of defence in her colonies was at 
an end, for she was utterly unable to come to their 
aid. 

Such were the respective conditions of the two coun- 
tries. Some relation of the events that took place in 
each during the war comes here in place, as leading to 
the terms upon which peace was granted. In Spain a 
persistent system of falsification prevailed. The news- 
papers were not permitted to tell the truth, and it was 
only through indirect channels that a knowledge of the 
true state of affairs made its way among the people. 
The country was so deeply permeated with the elements 
of revolution, so many diverse factions — Carlists, repub- 
licans, anarchists — stood ready to rise against the gov- 
ernment, that the rulers dared not admit the losses of 
their arms, lest they should be driven in disgrace from 
the land. 

And yet the revolution that impended was not a result 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 363 

of Spain's misfortunes in war, but of her misgovernment 
and oppression in peace. The majority of the people 
were said to be absolutely without interest in the war, 
being so affected by the misery that prevailed at home 
as to take no concern in the affairs of the colonies. 
Hunger and destitution were the controlling forces ; the 
bread question was far more prominent than the war 
question, and the outbreaks that took place and the 
troubles that threatened were instigated by starvation 
rather than war. Spain was in a state of ferment which 
threatened every social and political institution of the 
land, and the government was in no condition to prose- 
cute a war abroad while at home she seemed trembling 
on the verge of a volcano. Her wisest statesmen felt 
that the contest was hopeless, but feared the effect of a 
confession of defeat. And the fatal Spanish spirit of 
procrastination was by no means absent, uselessly pro- 
tracting the struggle when every day added to the diffi- 
culties of the situation and the chances of a sterner 
penalty being imposed in the end. 

A few words will suffice to indicate the financial ability 
of the United States to prosecute the war. As a pre- 
liminary to the contest, $50,000,000 were taken in one 
sum from the treasury to aid in the work of preparation. 
At the end of the contest the treasury held more than 
$200,000,000 in gold. The total direct cost of the war 
was about $130,000,000, to provide the funds for which 
without disturbing the ordinary financial operations of 
the government a war-loan of $200,000,000 at three per 
cent, interest was offered to the people, care being taken 
that small subscriptions should be given the preference 
and that it should be in every respect a popular loan. 
The loan was taken with the greatest avidity, the offers 



364 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

made amounting to the vast sum of $1,325,000,000, or 
nearly seven times the amount of the issue. Nearly 
three hundred thousand subscriptions were received, the 
books closing on July 14, and the loan was distributed 
to the small bidders, the upper limit of allotments being 
$4500, while nearly half the total amount went to sub- 
scribers for $500 and under. 

To provide funds for the repayment of this loan and 
the meeting of the war expenses a new internal tax law 
was passed by Congress, embracing stamp taxes on a 
great variety of legal and business documents, license 
taxes on places of amusement, bankers, and brokers, and 
taxes on legacies, fermented liquors, tobacco, tea, and 
mixed flour. The law went into effect, except in the 
case of the last-mentioned items, on July 1, 1898. It 
promised to yield in no great time sufficient funds to pay 
all the expenses of the war. 

The ability of the United States to meet all demands 
likely to be made upon its resources, in war or peace, 
was shown in a statement issued in July from the Gov- 
ernment Bureau of Foreign Commerce, whose statistics 
indicated an extraordinary development of American 
commerce during the fiscal year ending July 1, 1898. 
This statement showed that the exports of the United 
States during that year had enormously exceeded the 
imports, and that these exports consisted of articles of 
manufacture to a degree greatly exceeding those of any 
preceding year. 

Mr. Frederick Emory, who prepared the report, 
referred to this trade development as "an American 
invasion of the markets of the world." In his view the 
United States was no longer merely the ' ' granary of the 
world," since, while its export of agricultural products 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 365 

was extraordinarily great, its sales abroad of manufactured 
goods had greatly extended, in spite of obstructions and 
discriminations in foreign countries. ' ' Notwithstand- 
ing," he said, "that organized effort to reach foreign 
markets for our manufactures is as yet in its infancy, the 
ability of the United States to compete successfully with 
the most advanced industrial nations in any part of the 
world, as well as with those nations in their home 
markets, can no longer be seriously questioned." We 
are being converted, he said, " slowly but surely from a 
people absorbed with the internal development of a virgin 
continent into one of the great commercial powers of the 
world, with the international interests and responsibilities 
which such a position naturally implies." 

The war with Spain promised to add greatly in its re- 
sults to our position and interests as a world power, by 
giving us valuable colonial possessions in near and dis- 
tant seas. One of these new possessions, the Hawaiian 
archipelago, while not directly, was indirectly a result 
of the war. This important group of Pacific islands had 
for several years been waiting to be accepted or rejected 
by the United States. A request from Hawaii for an- 
nexation several years before had been declined by Presi- 
dent Cleveland. The subject of annexation was brought 
up again in 1898, passed the House in the form of a 
resolution, and was passed by the Senate with a two- 
thirds vote on July 6. President McKinley immediately 
signed the resolution, and the long contest over Hawaii 
was at an end. 

On the 7th Secretary Long gave orders for the de- 
parture of the cruiser Philadelphia from Mare Island for 
Hawaii with the important news. The Philadelphia had 
taken no part in the war, being under repair since its be- 



366 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

ginning. She was now given the distinguished honor 
of carrying the flag of the United States to those islands, 
and by this act including them within the American 
Union. The duty of hoisting the flag was assigned to 
Admiral Miller, then in command of the Pacific Station, 
the President appointing a commission to frame laws 
suitable for the new acquisition of the United States. The 
Philadelphia sailed on the 27th, and the ceremony of final 
annexation took place on August 1 2, by an interesting co- 
incidence on the very day on which the protocol of peace 
with Spain was signed. The ceremony of raising the 
flag and formally proclaiming the Hawaiian Islands part 
of the United States was a simple one, Admiral Miller 
wisely not making it an occasion of ostentation, in view 
of the fact that the loss of their independence was bit- 
terly opposed by the natives of the islands. Few of 
them witnessed the ceremony of flag-raising, and the 
small number who appeared turned their eyes, filled with 
tears, away from their flag as it came slowly down, to be 
replaced by the standard of the United States. 

The ceremony took place at noon, in the presence of 
the authorities and all the people of Honolulu except the 
natives. As the Hawaiian standard fluttered downward 
to the earth, Admiral Miller gave a signal, the sound of 
a bugle was heard, and from the ground rose a magnifi- 
cent American flag, hailed with cheers as it unfurled and 
floated out on the air, and the inspiring notes of the 
' ' Star-Spangled Banner' ' rang out from the band of the 
Philadelphia. The President's proclamation was then 
read, the oath of allegiance to the United States was 
administered to President Dole and his Cabinet, who 
for the time being continued in power, the Hawaiian 
National Guard took the oath at their barracks, and 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 367 

the ceremonies ended. The republic of Hawaii had 
become part of the United States of America. 

Returning to affairs more immediately connected with 
the war, some reference to the attitude of the powers of 
Europe seems here demanded. Though these powers, 
in common with the other civilized nations of the earth, 
had declared neutrality between the warring nations, 
some degree of hostility to one or the other parties con- 
cerned seemed to underlie their sense of international 
obligations. The attitude of Germany appeared to indi- 
cate that a desire to share in the partition of the Philip- 
pine Islands was strongly entertained in that country, 
and many of the newspapers of Germany and France 
were strongly pro-Spanish in their comments on the war. 

Rumors of a purpose of intervention on the part of 
the European powers were from time to time set afloat, 
and the statement was made that several of these powers 
had it in view to try and make a European question of 
the hostile relations between Spain and the United 
States, dealing with these powers as they had dealt with 
Crete and Greece. If such a design was seriously enter- 
tained, dread of how the United States might receive a 
movement of this character stood seriously in the way 
of an attempt to put it into effect. And the attitude of 
Great Britain was an equally serious obstacle to any such 
project. That country not only was not to be drawn into 
any scheme of interference, but could not even be trusted 
to remain neutral. There was the strongest reason to 
believe that it would aid the United States in resist- 
ance to Continental coercion, and the powers of Europe 
did not dare to array against them, in a transatlantic 
matter, the British fleet. However all this be, and 
whether or not such a project was entertained as has 



368 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

been asserted, no open indication of any such purpose 
was made, and the war remained strictly confined to the 
two powers concerned. In truth, the real sentiments 
entertained by Germany and France towards the United 
States remained undivulged, the views afloat being 
mainly based on newspaper utterances, not on official 
acts. 

This being the case, and Spain being forced to depend 
on her own weak self, only one course stood between 
her and ruin, a request for peace. Such a request the 
United States had obviously no thought of making, and 
the continued series of reverses to the arms of Spain 
made it evident that the longer the war was permitted to 
continue the greater would be her final loss. It is the 
custom in modern wars for the conquering nation to 
make its defeated enemy pay the cost, and the ' ' bill of 
expenses" was running up at a rapid rate. Spain's only 
hope lay in an immediate peace, yet she seemed to be 
the last of the nations to perceive this, and permitted 
the war to drift on long after wisdom dictated a yielding 
of her pride and a request for the most favorable terms 
she could obtain. 

The first move of Spain in this direction was made on 
July 26, three months after the outbreak of the war, 
through the intermedium of M. Jules Cambon, the 
French ambassador to the United States. This gentle- 
man called on President McKinley at three o'clock in 
the afternoon of that day, with the statement that he 
had been instructed by the Foreign Office at Paris to 
make a tender of peace to the United States on the part 
of the Spanish ministry. M. Cambon had been simply 
authorized to open peace negotiations, but his powers 
were soon extended to enable him to act as the repre- 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 369 

sentative of Spain in obtaining conditions from the 
United States. 

After full consideration in cabinet meetings and in con- 
ferences with M. Cambon, a synopsis of the conditions 
upon which the United States would consent to • an 
armistice, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, 
was formulated and transmitted to Spain. It was in 
effect as follows : 

The President waived for the time being the question 
of demanding a pecuniary indemnity from Spain, but 
required the relinquishment of all claim of sovereignty 
over or title to the island of Cuba, and the immediate 
evacuation of that island ; the evacuation and cession to 
the United States of Porto Rico and other islands held 
by Spain in the West Indies ; and the cession of an 
island in the Ladrone group. The city, bay, and harbor 
of Manila were to be held by the United States until a 
commission, to be appointed by the two countries con- 
cerned, had decided on what should be done with the 
Philippines, and had concluded a final treaty of peace on 
the basis above indicated. 

Spain dealt with these terms with considerable delib- 
eration. On August 1 the Cabinet at Madrid held a 
long session, ending in a despatch to Washington for 
"further explanation of some difficult points." There 
was the best of reasons, however, for believing that the 
Spanish government had no intention of continuing the 
war, since that must result in the loss of all the Philip- 
pines, and possibly a demand for a large money indem- 
nity, while if the terms were quickly accepted the United 
States would perhaps limit its demand to a coaling and 
naval station in the Philippines. 

Later instructions to M. Cambon were to the effect 
24 



37 o THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

that Spain was anxious to retain possession of Luzon, 
the principal Philippine island, to have her troops depart 
from Cuba and Porto Rico with all the honors of war, 
and to have the right to remove all war material from 
those islands. She also asked to be relieved from paying 
the debt incurred on account of Cuba and Porto Rico. 
This last proposition, which would have saddled Cuba 
with a debt of $550,000,000, incurred in the effort to 
subdue its inhabitants, the United States was very little 
likely to accept, and the French ambassador was given 
to understand that this country would neither modify its 
propositions nor consent to enter upon peace negotia- 
tions until Spain had fully accepted the conditions pro- 
posed. 

Finding that no better terms were to be had, the 
Spanish Cabinet, at a meeting held August 7, accepted 
those offered. Though this information was at once 
made public in the United States, the answer itself was 
two days in reaching Washington, it coming via Paris, 
and requiring to be twice translated, put into cipher, and 
again deciphered. As the paper was a long one, enter- 
ing into considerable detail, all this took time, and it 
was not presented to the President by M. Cambon until 
5.30 p.m. of August 9. As the answer proved to be a 
practical acceptance of the American terms, the Presi- 
dent directed a protocol, or preliminary basis of a treaty 
of peace, embodying the propositions made, to be drawn 
up and submitted to M. Cambon as the representative 
of Spain. This decision was communicated by M. 
Cambon to the government at Madrid, from which came 
an immediate reply authorizing the French ambassador 
to sign the protocol on behalf of Spain. 

It was expected that the protocol would be signed and 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 371 

the war end on the 10th, but the French ambassador 
preferred first to transmit its full text to Madrid, that 
there might be left no room for misunderstanding, his 
request gaining force from the fact that a few verbal 
changes had been made in the text. Secretary Day as- 
sented to this request, and the protocol was converted 
into cipher and cabled to Madrid. Authority to sign 
came back by cable, and the final ceremony of signing 
took place about 4 p.m. on August 12, at which day and 
hour the war with Spain came to an end, — for no doubt 
was felt that the armistice would end in formal peace, 
Spain being helpless to resist any demands that the 
United States was likely to make. 

The text of the protocol, the signing of which was 
immediately followed by a proclamation from President 
McKinley suspending hostilities, was as follows : 

" His Excellency M. Cambon, Ambassador Extraordi- 
nary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the French republic 
at Washington, and Mr. William B. Day, Secretary of 
State of the United States, having received respectively to 
that effect plenary powers from the Spanish government 
and the government of the United States, have established 
and signed the following articles, which define the terms 
on which the two governments have agreed with regard 
to the questions enumerated below, and of which the 
object is the establishment of peace between the two 
countries, namely : 

"Article i. Spain will renounce all claim to all 
sovereignty over and all her rights over the island of 
Cuba. 

"Article 2. Spain will cede to the United States 
the island of Porto Rico and the other islands which 
are at present under the sovereignty of Spain in the 



372 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

Antilles, as well as an island in the Ladrone Archipelago, 
to be chosen by the United States. 

"Article 3. The United States will occupy and 
retain the city and bay of Manila and the port of Manila 
pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, which shall 
determine the control and form of government of the 
Philippines. 

" Article 4. Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, 
Porto Rico, and the other islands now under Spanish 
sovereignty in the Antilles. To this effect each of the 
two governments will appoint Commissioners within ten 
days after the signing of this protocol, and these Com- 
missioners shall meet at Havana within thirty days after 
the signing of this protocol with the object of coming 
to an agreement regarding the carrying out of the 
details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and other 
adjacent Spanish islands, and each of the two govern- 
ments shall likewise appoint, within ten days after the 
signature of this protocol, other Commissioners, who 
shall meet at San Juan de Porto Rico within thirty days 
after the signature of this protocol, to agree upon the 
details of the evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands 
now under Spanish sovereignty in the Antilles. 

" Article 5. Spain and the United States shall ap- 
point to treat for peace five Commissioners at the most 
for either country. The Commissioners shall meet in 
Paris on October 1 at the latest, to proceed to negotia- 
tions and to the conclusion of a treaty of peace. This 
treaty shall be ratified in conformity with the constitu- 
tional laws of each of the two countries. 

"Article 6. Once this protocol is concluded and 
signed, hostilities shall be suspended, and to that effect 
in the two countries orders shall be given by either gov- 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 373 

eminent to the commanders of its land and sea forces as 
speedily as possible. 

' ' Done in duplicate at Washington ; read in French 
and in English by the undersigned, who affix at the foot 
of the document their signatures and seals. August 12, 
1898." 

The ceremony of signing was one of some interest, 
and its chief incidents may be given in a few words. 
The President, whose deep interest in everything relating 
to the war made him desirous of seeing its concluding 
event, had expressed a wish to be present at the signing, 
and was informed by Secretary Day that he had arranged 
with M. Cambon for the performance of this ceremony 
at four o'clock. In consequence it took place at the 
White House, instead of at the State Department, as had 
been previously arranged. 

At five minutes to four o' clock the Secretary of State 
made his appearance, coming through a heavy downpour 
of rain. He was accompanied by the three Assistant Sec- 
retaries, Mr. Cridler bringing the two copies of the pro- 
tocol which had been prepared. Ten minutes later M. 
Cambon and his secretary, M. Thiebaut, appeared at 
the north entrance, and were ushered into the Cabinet- 
room, where Secretary Day formally presented them to 
President McKinley and the others present. 

There was no delay in the work to be done. The 
document, as stated, had been prepared in duplicate, the 
text being given in parallel columns, one English, the 
other French ; one having the first column in English, 
the other in French. The latter was first signed, ' ' M. 
Jules Cambon" on the upper line, "William R. Day" 
on the lower. In the other copy the signatures were 
reversed. The latter copy was to go into the archives 



374 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

of the State Department, the former to be transmitted to 
Madrid. When it came to attaching the seals, it was 
found that though wax had been provided, no means of 
heating it were on hand, and this was finally done by the 
aid of a candle found in a common candlestick in the 
President's bedroom. 

President McKinley strongly expressed his satisfaction 
at the conclusion of the ceremony, and earnestly thanked 
the two French gentlemen for their useful services in 
bringing about the result. Congratulations were ex- 
changed among all present, followed by the President 
affixing his signature to the proclamation announcing 
the armistice, and the passing around of a box of the 
White House cigars. As a souvenir of the event, 
Assistant Secretary Moore secured the pen with which 
the signing had been done. Within a brief period tele- 
grams were being sent to Cuba, Porto Rico, and Hong- 
Kong ordering the cessation of hostilities, and before 
the day ended the news of peace had spread around the 
earth. From Hong-Kong a swift British steamer sped 
away at full speed to carry the welcome news to Manila, 
before which far-off city, a few hours afterwards, the final 
battle of the war was fought. The Hispano-American 
war ended with the falling of that city of the Eastern 
seas into American hands. 



CHAPTER XXII. 

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS. 

Our history is practically ended. We set out to 
describe the war with Spain, and have carried that for- 
ward to its concluding event. The signing of the pro- 
tocol was equivalent to concluding a treaty of peace, for 
there was no question but that this would be its ultimate 
result. A dozen loose threads of consequences of the 
war remained floating in the air, but these we can merely 
name ; in what they will end is for the future to decide. 

The conclusion of the war did not put an end to the 
hostile relations between the native inhabitants of the 
Spanish colonies and the Spanish soldiers and residents. 
The people of Porto Rico manifested the same bitter 
hatred against the Spaniards as animated the Cubans, 
and the close of hostilities between the contending par- 
ties was followed by violence on the part of the natives, 
largely instigated by reports of outrages committed by 
the Spanish soldiers in their retreat. The town of Cota 
was burned and the Spanish residents were obliged to 
fly for their lives, while throughout the surrounding 
country the terror-stricken Spaniards appealed to the 
Americans for protection. This was given where pos- 
sible, and two newspapers which violently called for 
vengeance were suppressed, but it was not easy to pre- 
vent individual examples of persecution. The turmoil, 
however, could only continue until the evacuation by the 
Spaniards and the full American occupation of the island. 

375 



376 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

In Cuba the insurgents remained in arms, and it was 
evident that some degree of hostile relations would per- 
sist between them and the Spanish soldiers until the 
evacuation was completed and a temporary American 
protectorate established. Commissions were appointed 
by the President to proceed to these islands and arrange 
for them a form of government, to continue until their final 
status should be decided. The commissioners appointed 
for Cuba consisted of Rear- Admiral W. T. Sampson and 
Major-Generals M. C. Butler and James F. Wade ; those 
for Porto Rico were Rear- Admiral W. S. Schley, Major- 
General John R. Brooke, and Brigadier-General W. W. 
Gordon. Captain-General Blanco headed the Spanish 
commission for Cuba and Captain-General Macias that 
for Porto Rico. 

Congress had resolved that Cuba should be indepen- 
dent, but as the conditions there became better under- 
stood serious doubts were entertained of the ability of 
the insurgents to maintain a civilized form of govern- 
ment. Many of them were ignorant negroes. Knowl- 
edge of political affairs was sadly lacking among them, 
and a large number of the inhabitants, alike of Spanish 
and of Creole birth, fearing anarchy in place of settled 
government, were anxious for the United States to retain 
possession of the island. It seemed not improbable that, 
in view of the considerable depopulation of Cuba during 
the war, an influx of Americans might replace the van- 
ished inhabitants, and the island in this way eventually 
come under American control. In any event an Ameri- 
can protectorate would probably need to be long main- 
tained, for the people were evidently unfit to govern 
themselves. 

The disposal of the Philippine Islands was an equally 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 377 

pressing problem, this, by the terms of peace, being left 
to the decision of a commission of five members from 
each country, who were to meet for consideration of the 
subject not later than October 1. The American com- 
missioners, as appointed by President McKinley, were 
the Secretary of State, William R. Day, Senators C. K. 
Davis, of Minnesota, William P. Frye, of Maine, and 
George Gray, of Delaware, and Hon. Whitelaw Reid. 

As to what should be done with the Philippines, a 
wide difference of opinion prevailed in the United States. 
Many called for a retention of the whole group ; many 
others opposed retaining any, looking upon an extension 
of American dominion to those distant waters as a dan- 
gerous experiment. The probability seemed to be that 
the island of Luzon would be annexed, while the remain- 
ing islands might be left to Spain to be governed under 
strict regulations devised by the Commission. The 
old unjust and cruel rule would certainly not be per- 
mitted. 

As in the West Indies, so in the Philippines, there was 
a native element to be dealt with that was likely to give 
trouble unless its wishes were considered in the settle- 
ment. The reports of irritation of the natives against 
the Americans were exaggerated or unfounded, and at a 
conference with their leaders they expressed their full 
willingness to co-operate with the Americans and to sur- 
render their arms if assured that the islands would remain 
an American or a British colony or protectorate. But 
they positively refused to remain under Spanish rule, 
and declared that they dared not disarm until they knew 
who were to be their future masters. Aguinaldo, in an 
interview held with him, said that he was in command 
not of an army, but only of an unruly rabble, and was 



378 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

earnest in his desire that the Americans should give the 
Philippines a free and liberal government, to whose 
establishment he would lend his full support. 

On August 20 an imposing naval demonstration took 
place in the harbor of New York, the leading war- vessels 
of the West India fleet — the battle-ships Iowa, Indiana, 
Massachusetts, Oregon, and Texas, and the cruisers 
New York and Brooklyn — entering the harbor on that 
day, where they were received with an ovation that 
amply testified to the admiration of the people for the 
battle-scarred ships, their commanders and crews. 

Rewards were dealt out freely to the heroes of the 
navy. Dewey, as already stated, had been early made 
a rear-admiral. The same reward was given Sampson, 
Schley, and Howell, Sampson being advanced eight 
numbers on the navy list and Schley six, so that Samp- 
son outranked Schley, instead of being subordinate to 
him as previously. Rewards were dealt with a liberal 
hand to other officers of the navy and army, the three 
months of war giving to many worthy officers an advance 
in rank greater than they were likely to have attained in 
twice that many years of peace. 

The very valuable service rendered by the navy in the 
war, and the disposition of European powers to add 
steadily to their strength upon the sea, could not fail to 
give rise to a desire to add largely to the strength of the 
American navy, and fit it for possible contest with 
stronger powers than Spain. Though five new battle- 
ships were nearly completed, and three more, with four 
monitors, had been ordered in the recent session of Con- 
gress, this was thought to be insufficient to meet the new 
requirements arising from the recent war. The Board 
of Experts, which includes the chiefs of all the bureaus 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 379 

of the Navy Department, agreed upon a general pro- 
gramme of additions to the navy to be recommended for 
consideration by Congress at its next session. 

This programme embraced the construction of fifteen 
sea-going fighting ships. Three of these were to be 
battle-ships of greater tonnage and speed than any now 
in the navy, their displacement to be 13,000 tons and 
their average cruising speed 19 knots. Their main bat- 
teries were to be composed of four 12-inch rifles, and 
their secondary batteries to include fourteen to sixteen 
6-inch rapid-fire guns. There were also recommended 
three first-class armored cruisers of 12,000 tons dis- 
placement and 22 knots' speed, to be covered with heavy 
armor from stem to stern, and to mount four 8-inch rifles 
in turrets and ten or twelve 6-inch rapid-fire guns in 
broadside. Nine other cruisers were provided for, three 
to be second-class protected and armored ships and six 
third-class protected ships. The building of a number 
of troop-ships for colonial service was also recommended, 
to be capable of carrying twelve hundred soldiers, with 
their supplies and baggage. These were deemed neces- 
sary in view of the newly acquired colonial possessions 
of the United States. 

That the United States would need a larger standing 
army in the future was equally evident, though it was 
felt that great dependence would need to be placed on 
the National Guard, the latter to be much better trained 
and disciplined than heretofore. By this means a large 
and effective army could be made available at short 
notice and at small cost in case of exigency. As 
regarded the volunteer army raised for the war, steps 
were taken immediately after the signing of the protocol 
for disbanding a large number of the troops, though the 



380 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

requisites of garrison duty in the newly acquired terri- 
tory rendered it necessary to keep a considerable con- 
tingent of them for some time under arms. 

The suggestion was made that the United States 
should add to its official corps a General Staff, such as 
is employed by European governments, to take charge 
of military matters in times of peace and keep the army 
in a fixed state of readiness for war. In such a case the 
lack of material, awkwardness, and inefficiency displayed 
in the early days of the war with Spain would not be 
likely to recur in future conflicts, and even a hastily 
levied army could be put into the field more quickly 
and under far better conditions than in the instance here 
under consideration. 

As regards the formation of a large standing army, 
which some advocate, the recent action of the Czar of 
Russia gives voice to the feeling which is widely enter- 
tained concerning the military establishments of Europe. 
He advocates a reduction of these immense armies as 
crushing and dangerous elements of the body politic and 
as threatening obstacles in the way of the development 
of settled conditions of peace. It is sincerely to be 
hoped that the international conference to this end pro- 
posed by him may yield the desired result. Whether 
it does or not, the movement of the Czar is a decided 
step in the right direction, and the disarmament which 
he suggests cannot fail in the end to come. 

Complaints as to the treatment of the sick soldiers 
continued, severe blame being laid on the War Depart- 
ment, the chorus of detraction spreading until it affected 
the press of the country like an epidemic. To what ex- 
tent this blame was deserved could not be decided in 
the heat of the moment, and needed to be left for later 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 381 

and cooler consideration and a possible official investiga- 
tion. Much sickness prevailed, not only among the sol- 
diers brought home from Cuba and encamped at Mon- 
tauk Point, but also in the home camps at Manassas and 
Chickamauga, while the supply of food was said to be 
absolutely unadapted to the needs of the sick, the water 
to be contaminated with disease germs, and the other 
requisites lacking or inadequate to the situation. To 
overcome the difficulty new camps were established in 
healthier locations, to which the sick soldiers were re- 
moved, and steps were taken to provide them with suit- 
able food and shelter. The lack of proper care and 
attention may have been in a measure unavoidable, but 
there was certainly much neglect and inefficiency, for 
which some one was to blame, and official red tape in 
many instances seems to have set aside the dictates of 
common sense and humane sentiment. 

A few words on the probable effect of the war on the 
nations concerned and we have done. Spain has lost 
all, or nearly all, her remaining colonies, but whether 
this is likely to prove an injury or an advantage to 
her it remains for time to decide. The colonies of 
Spain for several centuries immensely exceeded in extent 
those of any other nation, yet history yields no evidence 
that any benefit was ever derived from this vast colonial 
dominion. Even in the early days, when gold flowed 
in rich streams into the coffers of Spain, this wealth 
served to enrich the commercial nations surrounding 
her, not herself. In fact, her colonies proved a deadly 
incubus, draining off her energy and yielding nothing 
of value in return. Absorbed in the government of 
these distant possessions, the home interests of Spain 
were sadly neglected, industry remained stagnant, com- 



382 THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 

merce undeveloped, and while the nations around were 
making immense strides forward in prosperity, Spain, 
once foremost among them all, sank steadily into 
decadence. 

It may be that the loss of her colonies will prove to 
her a blessing instead of a curse. Having no interests 
to care for abroad, she may devote new attention to her 
interests at home, and develop her natural resources 
until in time she regains something of her old rank 
among the nations. Whatever be the effect of the loss 
of her colonies upon Spain, it cannot but prove a bless- 
ing to the colonists themselves, who have escaped from 
the most severe and crushing of despotisms, and taken 
their place among the free and self-governed people of 
the earth. The colonial policy of Spain was from the 
first to the last a cruel and barbarous one, and the moral 
sentiment of mankind long ago demanded that it should 
be brought to an end. The United States has proved 
the evangel of liberty and prosperity to the manumitted 
peoples. 

As regards the effects of the war upon the United 
States, they are likely to be much less important. The 
war was but a passing incident in the history of this 
country, not a vital problem. It has given us an in- 
creased knowledge of our strength and resources, and 
won us a new and high respect in Europe, but has added 
little to these powers and resources. It has given us 
island colonies, but what benefit these are likely to bring 
us it is too soon to say. We have stepped into what 
some designate a dangerous imperial position, but this 
simply means that our growing interest in the concerns 
of the world has been unmasked by the events of the 
war, not that these three months of hostilities have 



THE WAR WITH SPAIN. 383 

brought us any new strength or higher importance. 
They have but swept away the mist of misconception 
and revealed our real importance to the powers of the 
world. It must soon have manifested itself in any event. 
Two results may be spoken of. The war has had a 
valuable effect in removing the shreds of ill feeling re- 
maining between the North and the South, and welding 
the two sections of our country into one strongly 
cemented Union ; and it has aroused a strong sentiment 
of affinity between the Anglo-Saxon peoples of the earth 
which may in the end prove a leading factor in the his- 
tories of the nations. The English-speaking peoples 
have grown mighty and all-pervading with the passage 
of the years, and with joined hands they would be all- 
powerful. But it is in peace, not in war, that the great 
republic of the West is destined to prevail. It is with 
the olive-branch, not the sword, that it should stand 
before the world. It may again be forced into war, as 
it has been forced by Spain, but peace is its mission, 
industry its interest, prosperity its goal ; and the inva- 
sion of the world which in the future it is destined to 
make will be that of commerce, not of arms ; of thought, 
not of force ; of the beneficent products of the soil and 
the mill, not the direful harvest of fire and sword. 



THE END. 



3477-2 



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